Consciousness of Guilt Is Not Deliberation: Limits on Proof of Deliberate-Intent First-Degree Murder and the Binding Force of UJI Use Notes (State v. Trujillo)

1. Introduction

State v. Trujillo (N.M. July 9, 2026) arises from the killing of sixty-year-old Samuel Cordero by fifteen-year-old Judah Elijah Trujillo after the two met at Ragle Park in Santa Fe following contact on Grindr. A jury convicted Judah of willful and deliberate first-degree murder (NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1)) and tampering with evidence (§ 30-22-5) for taking Samuel’s phone and discarding it.

On appeal, Judah primarily challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of “deliberate intention” required for first-degree murder, and (2) the district court’s decision to instruct the jury on motive using UJI 14-5029 despite its use note stating, “No instruction on this subject shall be given.” He also requested presentence confinement credit under § 31-18-15.3(B).

The Opinion’s doctrinal significance lies in its clarification that post-crime “consciousness-of-guilt” evidence is not, without more, evidence of pre-killing deliberation—and in its reiterated admonition that UJI use notes are binding on district courts.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court held the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove deliberate intent for first-degree murder; the jury would have had to speculate about Judah’s mental state before the single fatal shot.
  • Rather than ordering a new trial, the Court remanded for entry of judgment for second-degree murder because the jury was instructed on—and necessarily found—the elements of that lesser included offense.
  • The Court held the district court erred by giving the motive instruction contrary to the UJI use note, but the error was not fundamental (and any potential unfairness was “ameliorate[d]” by reversal of first-degree murder).
  • The Court affirmed the tampering conviction and directed the district court to apply presentence confinement credit.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Sufficiency review and the anti-speculation principle

  • State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011: Supplies the familiar test—whether any rational juror could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003 (text only): Reinforces appellate restraint: no reweighing credibility or substituting judgment.
  • State v. Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003 and State v. Slade, 2014-NMCA-088: Anchor the Opinion’s key constraint—courts must ensure verdicts rest on evidence, not “guess or conjecture,” and “an inference must be linked to a fact in evidence.” Trujillo operationalizes these cases by concluding the State supplied evidence of an intentional killing but not the missing link: what Judah actually deliberated about before firing.

2) What “deliberate intention” requires

  • State v. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059: The centerpiece for the Opinion’s deliberate-intent analysis. Adonis held that even if a defendant had time/opportunity to deliberate (e.g., retrieving a weapon), the State must still produce evidence tending to show the defendant actually deliberated. Trujillo mirrors Adonis: the State offered no evidence of Judah’s plan, motive, or mental process prior to the shot.
  • State v. Taylor, 2000-NMCA-072 (quoted in Adonis): Supports the distinction between intentional killing and deliberate-intent killing; intent to kill can exist without the “weigh and consider” component.
  • State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001 and State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035: Illustrate situations where prolonged violence plus surrounding evidence (motive, persistence, statements) supports deliberation. Trujillo uses them to reject the State’s attempt to analogize Judah’s “failure to flee” to a prolonged struggle that evidences persistence in killing.

3) Weapon-possession facts in context

  • State v. Lucero, 1975-NMSC-061 and State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002: Prior cases where bringing a weapon was among multiple facts supporting deliberation (e.g., accusatory statements, stalking, lying in wait, repeated stabbing). Trujillo’s method is to “put the evidence back into its context” and reject a stripped-down, factor-aggregation approach.
  • State v. Slade, 2014-NMCA-088: Especially important because it rejects the notion that arriving armed, without more, proves deliberation; it also cautions that ordinary gun-carrying practices can cut against inference of a plan to kill.

4) Consciousness-of-guilt evidence vs. deliberation

  • State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002: The Opinion treats Flores as a source of later “problematic conflation” because Flores included language suggesting flight/deception can “prove consciousness of guilt” in an intent analysis. Trujillo narrows Flores by tracing its citation chain and concluding it does not support a per se rule that consciousness of guilt equals deliberation.
  • State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, State v. Trujillo, 1981-NMSC-023, and State v. Ruiz, 1995-NMCA-007: Used to show Flores’s foundation was actually about admissibility of consciousness-of-guilt evidence under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA (1999), not about proving deliberate intent as an element.
  • State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007: Supplies the limiting principle: statements or post-crime conduct may be probative of deliberation only where accompanied by additional evidence (e.g., motive) making the inference legitimate. Trujillo applies Astorga to hold that discarding the phone and saying “I did something bad” show guilt, not deliberation.
  • State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027 and State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035: Demonstrate when “lack of remorse” evidence is probative—overt celebratory or incriminating statements and conduct close to the killing. Trujillo distinguishes those cases from mere “calm” appearance on security video.
  • State v. Arredondo-Soto, S-1-SC-35112 (nonprecedential): Mentioned as an example of the post-Flores conflation the Court seeks to correct.

5) Jury instructions, use notes, and fundamental error

  • State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019 and State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017 (text only): Supply the fundamental-error framework when no trial objection is made.
  • Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015: Establishes the key procedural rule reinforced here—UJI use notes are binding on district courts. Trujillo re-emphasizes that a court commits error by disregarding the use note barring motive instructions.

6) Remedy: direct remand for entry of a lesser included offense

  • State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021 and State v. Haynie, 1994-NMSC-001: Provide the interests-of-justice test and support the practice of entering judgment on a lesser included offense without retrial where the jury necessarily found its elements.
  • State v. Lobato-Rodriguez, 2024-NMSC-014: Used to explain that by convicting of the greater offense (and having been instructed on manslaughter as a lesser), the jury necessarily rejected sufficient provocation.

7) Provocation/heat of passion and burden-of-proof context

  • Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975): Cited for the proposition that disproving heat of passion/sudden provocation is akin to proving intent and can be done via surrounding circumstances.
  • State v. Munoz, 1992-NMCA-004: Reaffirms provocation is generally a jury question.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Opinion’s central move: separating “intentional killing” from “deliberate intent”

Relying on UJI 14-201 NMRA (2023) and State v. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059, the Court insists that first-degree deliberate-intent murder requires evidence that the defendant weighed and considered reasons for and against killing—not merely that the killing was intentional or that time existed in which deliberation could have occurred.

2) Rejecting factor-stripping and speculative narrative-building

The Court criticizes the State’s approach as an attempt to take facts that supported deliberation in other cases (bringing a weapon, post-crime behavior) and add them together outside their original contexts. Under State v. Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003 and State v. Slade, 2014-NMCA-088, the jury cannot be left to “conjure an alternative story” without evidentiary grounding.

3) Key evidentiary clarifications

  • Failure to flee: At most shows opportunity/time, not actual deliberation. The Court also rejects using “failure to flee” as a proxy for “prolonged struggle” reasoning found in State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001 and State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035.
  • Consciousness of guilt: Discarding the phone, saying he “did something bad,” and appearing calm are guilt indicators, but they do not illuminate pre-shooting deliberation absent additional facts that tether them to planning or reflection.
  • Bringing/using a gun: The Court refuses to adopt any rule that bringing a firearm to an encounter “alone” proves deliberate intent. It distinguishes cases like State v. Lucero, 1975-NMSC-061 and State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002 because those cases had substantial additional deliberation evidence. It aligns with State v. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059 and State v. Slade, 2014-NMCA-088.
  • Forensics and “disbelief”: Even if Judah’s account were improbable, disproving his story does not fill the State’s affirmative burden to supply evidence of what happened that establishes deliberation.

4) Instructional error without fundamental error

The Court holds it was error to instruct on motive contrary to UJI 14-5029’s use note, reaffirming via Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015 that use notes bind district courts. But because Judah did not object, State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019 and State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017 (text only) govern; the Court finds Judah did not show a “shock the conscience” level unfairness, and the remedy on the murder count reduces any arguable prejudice.

5) Remedy: entry of second-degree murder

Using State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021 and State v. Haynie, 1994-NMSC-001, the Court chooses direct remand rather than retrial because the jury had been instructed on second-degree murder (UJI 14-220 NMRA (2023)) and voluntary manslaughter (UJI 14-210 NMRA (2023), UJI 14-222), and its verdict necessarily encompassed the elements of second-degree murder—including rejection of sufficient provocation as explained by State v. Lobato-Rodriguez, 2024-NMSC-014.

C. Impact

  • Higher discipline in deliberate-intent prosecutions: Prosecutors cannot lean on weapon possession plus post-crime concealment/flight to “bridge the gap” to deliberation. Trujillo reinforces that the State must present evidence enabling a non-speculative narrative of when and why deliberation formed.
  • Doctrinal clarification after Flores: The Opinion limits the misuse of State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002 by emphasizing that consciousness-of-guilt evidence is generally about guilt and admissibility—only occasionally, and with specific supporting facts, probative of deliberation.
  • Instruction practice: Trial courts are again warned that UJI use notes are binding (Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015). Even when non-fundamental, routine disregard risks reversal in closer cases.
  • Remedial pathway: The case strengthens the “direct remand for entry of lesser included offense” approach under State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, reducing retrials where the jury necessarily found the lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Deliberate intention: More than “intent to kill.” It means the defendant reflected—even briefly—by weighing reasons for and against killing (UJI 14-201).
  • Consciousness of guilt: Actions after a crime (hiding evidence, lying, flight) suggesting the person believes they committed wrongdoing. Trujillo clarifies this does not automatically prove the earlier mental process of deliberation.
  • Fundamental error: A very high bar for unpreserved issues—error must make the conviction fundamentally unfair (see State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019).
  • UJI use notes: Authoritative directions attached to uniform instructions. Under Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015, they are mandatory for district courts even though not “instruction text.”
  • Lesser included offense and direct remand: If a jury convicts on a greater offense, it often necessarily found all elements of a lesser offense. In that situation, appellate courts may order entry of conviction on the lesser offense without a new trial (State v. Haynie, 1994-NMSC-001; State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021).
  • Provocation / heat of passion: A partial mitigation concept distinguishing murder from voluntary manslaughter; whether provocation is “sufficient” is usually for the jury (State v. Munoz, 1992-NMCA-004), and the State can disprove it by surrounding circumstances (Mullaney v. Wilbur).

5. Conclusion

State v. Trujillo draws a firm evidentiary line: proof that a defendant intentionally killed—and later acted guilty—does not, without concrete supporting facts, prove the distinct element of deliberate intention required for first-degree murder. The Court’s insistence on non-speculative inference, its correction of post-Flores conflation between consciousness of guilt and deliberation, and its reminder that UJI use notes bind district courts collectively reshape how deliberate-intent cases must be tried and reviewed. The remedy—entry of second-degree murder—also underscores New Mexico’s growing preference, where appropriate, for interest-of-justice remands that avoid needless retrials when the jury has already found the lesser offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt.