Date: Jun 25, 2026

Conditional Suspension Until Full Restitution for Probate Neglect and Mishandled Advanced Fees

1. Introduction

In the Matter of Paul B. McCarthy (R.I. June 24, 2026) is an attorney-discipline order issued by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island under Article III, Rule 6(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. The Disciplinary Board recommended suspension after finding that attorney Paul B. McCarthy violated the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with a probate representation for client Ms. Maureen G. Roy, involving the intestate estate of her brother, Gary L. Ketchen.

The central issues were (i) whether respondent failed to prosecute the probate matter with reasonable diligence, (ii) whether he failed to communicate adequately with his client, and (iii) whether he mishandled client funds by cashing an advance retainer and not treating unearned fees as trust property. The Court also addressed sanctioning, including how mitigation (remorse, acknowledgment) and aggravation (prior discipline) affect the outcome.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court accepted the Disciplinary Board’s findings and conclusions, held that respondent violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), and 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), and ordered that respondent’s license be suspended until he proves he has made full restitution to Ms. Roy in the amount of $2,034.00 (reflecting the remaining balance after a partial reimbursement of $500.00 from an original $2,534.00 advance payment).

The Court further provided that, upon making full restitution, respondent may seek reinstatement pursuant to Article III, Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Glucksman, 333 A.3d 504 (R.I. 2025) (mem.)

The Court quoted In re Glucksman for the foundational disciplinary principle that the purpose of professional discipline is to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the profession, not to punish the lawyer. It also relied on In re Glucksman for the structured approach to sanctions: mitigating and aggravating factors must be weighed to determine the appropriate level of discipline. In this case, remorse and acceptance of responsibility were treated as mitigation, but did not eliminate the need for a protective sanction.

In re Scott, 694 A.2d 732 (R.I. 1997)

The Court paired In re Scott with In re Glucksman to reinforce that disciplinary outcomes are driven by public-protection and institutional-integrity considerations. The citation signals continuity: even where misconduct arises in the context of personal difficulties (here, respondent referenced personal issues and the COVID-19 pandemic), the Court’s sanction analysis remains anchored to systemic objectives rather than individualized leniency.

In the Matter of McCarthy, 973 A.2d 617 (R.I. 2009)

The Court invoked In the Matter of McCarthy to establish respondent’s disciplinary history as a key aggravating factor. The prior suspension—stemming from out-of-state notarial misconduct and falsified attestation conduct—showed that respondent had previously been sanctioned for serious professional violations. In the 2026 matter, that history supported the Court’s decision to impose a meaningful restriction (an ongoing suspension) rather than a lesser outcome, even though respondent was remorseful and partially repaid the client.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a straightforward disciplinary sequence: procedural posture under Rule 6(d), fact-finding adopted from the Board, identification of rule violations, and selection of sanction based on governing purposes and factor-weighing.

Procedural path: Rule 6(d) review and show-cause conference

Under Article III, Rule 6(d), once the Board recommends a public sanction such as suspension, the full record and the Board’s recommendations are transmitted to the Court for review and entry of an “appropriate order.” The Court then required respondent to appear and “show cause” why the recommendation should not be adopted. Respondent appeared pro se, accepted responsibility, and did not contest the essential findings.

Rule 1.3 (Diligence): three-year stagnation of a probate administration

The misconduct supporting Rule 1.3 was the prolonged inaction: after filing a petition in October 2020 and submitting an affidavit that the probate court rejected, respondent ceased meaningful work. The estate “languished for over three (3) years” until successor counsel was retained. The Court treated this timeline and abandonment-like inactivity as inconsistent with “reasonable diligence and promptness.”

Rule 1.4 (Communication): client kept without adequate status and progress information

Although the order does not detail every communication failure, the Board’s finding of a Rule 1.4 violation necessarily reflects that the client was not kept “reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and that reasonable requests for information were not promptly answered, particularly given the multi-year dormancy culminating in the client’s need to hire replacement counsel.

Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property): advanced fees must be treated as client property until earned

The Court endorsed the Board’s Rule 1.15 conclusion in a context where respondent cashed an advance retainer check totaling $2,534.00 but did not timely complete the work for which the advance payment was made. Rule 1.15(c) requires advanced legal fees and expenses to be deposited into a client trust account and withdrawn only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. The restitution order implicitly reflects the principle that unearned portions of advanced payments remain the client’s funds and must be returned.

Sanction selection: suspension conditioned on restitution

Applying the discipline purposes emphasized in In re Glucksman and In re Scott, and weighing mitigation (remorse, partial repayment, acknowledgment) against aggravation (prior suspension in In the Matter of McCarthy), the Court adopted the Board’s remedial structure: an ongoing suspension that terminates only upon proof of full restitution. This device links reinstatement eligibility to a concrete public-protection measure—making the harmed client financially whole for unearned fees—while preserving formal reinstatement procedures under Rule 16.

3.3. Impact

Practically, the order underscores three discipline-significant points likely to shape future Rhode Island attorney-discipline outcomes:

Restitution as a gatekeeper to practice: the Court reaffirmed that suspension can be structured as continuing until the lawyer proves repayment, making restitution not merely an ancillary condition but the central trigger for ending the suspension.
Probate neglect is treated as serious misconduct: extended stagnation of an estate administration—especially where it forces a client to hire successor counsel—supports meaningful sanctions even when the lawyer cites personal hardship.
Prior discipline materially escalates consequences: the explicit reliance on respondent’s 2009 suspension signals that repeat disciplinary history can outweigh mitigation and support stronger protective measures.

For practitioners, the order also functions as a compliance reminder: advanced fee handling is not merely an accounting preference but a professional-conduct requirement tied directly to discipline exposure when representation stalls or ends without earned fees.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Suspended until restitution”: The lawyer cannot practice law unless and until he repays the specified amount and proves repayment to Disciplinary Counsel. The suspension is not for a fixed number of days; it lasts as long as repayment remains incomplete.
Advance retainer vs. earned fee (Rule 1.15(c)): Money paid up front generally remains the client’s money until the lawyer actually performs billable work or incurs expenses. Until then, it must be kept in a client trust account, not treated as the lawyer’s funds.
Mitigating vs. aggravating factors: Mitigating factors (e.g., remorse, partial repayment) can lessen discipline; aggravating factors (e.g., prior discipline) can increase it. The Court balances both to choose an appropriate sanction.
Rule 6(d) (Board recommendation to Court): When the Disciplinary Board recommends a public sanction (like suspension), the Supreme Court reviews the record and issues the final order.
Reinstatement under Rule 16: Even after satisfying restitution, the lawyer must follow the formal reinstatement process; repayment alone does not automatically restore the license.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, adopting the Disciplinary Board’s findings, imposed a restitution-conditioned suspension on Paul B. McCarthy for violating Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.15 in a probate matter marked by prolonged inaction, insufficient client communication, and improper handling of advanced fees. Guided by In re Glucksman and In re Scott, and influenced by respondent’s prior discipline in In the Matter of McCarthy, the Court emphasized that discipline is protective and integrity-preserving, and it used restitution as a concrete mechanism to safeguard the public and vindicate client interests before any return to practice.