Date: Jul 27, 2026

Concealment-Based Interdependence Confirms a Single Wire-Fraud Conspiracy; No Appellate Jurisdiction Without a Separate Notice of Appeal for § 3582 Denials (First Circuit)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Irizarry-Irizarry (1st Cir. July 24, 2026), the First Circuit reviewed the jury convictions of attorney Arnaldo J. Irizarry-Irizarry for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering arising from a scheme that diverted approximately $9 million associated with Puerto Rico legislative awards intended for renovations to the Municipality of Mayagüez’s trauma center.

Irizarry served as a legal advisor to Mayagüez and its mayor. The scheme centered on moving the $9 million from a municipal account into an investment account under MEDI (Mayagüez Economic Development, Inc.) and then distributing large sums through intermediary entities, including TEGA Holdings, LLC, and onward to Irizarry’s entity, U.A. United Advisors Corporation.

The appeal presented two core issues:

Whether the trial evidence was sufficient to prove Irizarry’s knowing and intentional participation in the charged single, overarching conspiracy (and thus sustain the substantive wire-fraud and money-laundering counts).
Whether the First Circuit could review the denial of Irizarry’s pro se sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) even though he filed no notice of appeal from that later order.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed Irizarry’s convictions and dismissed (without prejudice) his sentencing challenge for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

On sufficiency: the court held a rational jury could find Irizarry knowingly joined a single wire-fraud conspiracy. It emphasized that concealment conduct—here, Irizarry’s efforts to deter and stall municipal auditors and to characterize the transfer as legal—supported both interdependence (his success depended on the scheme’s health) and the scheme’s overall cohesion. Because the conspiracy conviction stood, his derivative challenges to the substantive wire-fraud and money-laundering counts failed.
On § 3582: the court held it lacked jurisdiction because Irizarry filed no notice of appeal from the district court’s order denying his motion; a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review of that order.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sufficiency review framework

The court restated the familiar sufficiency standard from United States v. Díaz-Rosado (quoting United States v. Cruz-Díaz): reviewing evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” including reasonable inferences, and asking whether a rational factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This framing mattered because Irizarry’s arguments largely asked the appellate court to reweigh inferences—something the sufficiency standard disallows.

2. Elements and intent in conspiracy

To define what the government had to prove, the court relied on United States v. Falcón-Nieves for the requirement of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective and knowing participation, and for the “two intents” in conspiracy: (i) intent to agree and (ii) intent to commit the substantive offense (wire fraud).

3. Single vs. multiple conspiracies: the “common goal, interdependence, overlap” test

The court applied the three-factor test as stated in United States v. Vavic (quoting United States v. Abdelaziz): (1) common goal, (2) interdependence, and (3) overlap. Irizarry conceded the common-goal factor, so the case turned on interdependence and overlap.

4. Interdependence doctrine and concealment

For interdependence, the court cited United States v. Dellosantos (quoting United States v. Mangual-Santiago) for the proposition that interdependence exists when “the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect.” It further cited United States v. Niemi (and referenced United States v. Mubayyid) for the formulation that interdependence may be shown where a participant knows his success depends on the continued existence and health of the unlawful organization.

These precedents were pivotal because the court treated Irizarry’s alleged role not as initiating transfers, but as engaging in post-transfer concealment (assuring auditors the transaction was legal; discouraging corrective action; joining stonewalling) that protected the scheme’s viability and the conspirators’ ability to keep and continue distributing funds.

5. Overlap and hub-and-spoke conspiracies

The “overlap” factor was supported with Mangual-Santiago (quoting United States v. Portela) for the rule that overlap can be established through the “pervasive involvement” of a single core conspirator or “hub character.”

Irizarry invoked United States v. Monserrate-Valentín (quoting United States v. Franco-Santiago, later “abrogated on other grounds” by Musacchio v. United States) to argue that interaction with a hub does not automatically convert multiple “spoke” conspiracies into one “wheel.” The court responded by distinguishing the point: it did not abandon the “hub” overlap principle; rather, it found additional evidence supporting Irizarry’s knowledge of and agreement to join the broader scheme— including timing of incorporation, payment flows, fabricated invoices, admissions to the FBI agent, and coordinated concealment.

6. Variance (charged conspiracy vs. proven conspiracy)

Irizarry argued the jury must have convicted based on a variance between the charged single conspiracy and proof of some narrower agreement. By affirming the sufficiency of a single conspiracy under Vavic’s framework, the panel concluded there was “no variance, let alone a prejudicial variance.”

7. Appellate jurisdiction and notices of appeal

On the § 3582 issue, the court relied on Manrique v. United States for the rule that a party must file a notice of appeal from the judgment or order it seeks to challenge; courts may overlook defects in a notice but “may not overlook the failure to file a notice of appeal at all.” The court also cited Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why concealment supported interdependence

The court’s key move was to treat Irizarry’s conduct with the auditors as part of the conspiracy’s operational needs. Even if other actors arranged the transfers and account openings, a rational jury could find the scheme required:

Time to distribute and use diverted funds,
Reduced institutional resistance (avoiding a clawback or a formal “major finding”), and
Maintenance of legitimacy (the pretense that the funds were legally “invested” for Mayagüez’s benefit).

Under Niemi and Dellosantos, that made his conduct “advantageous” to other aspects of the scheme and allowed the jury to infer he understood his continued receipt/retention of benefits depended on the scheme’s health.

The court also rejected Irizarry’s factual premise that concealment could not matter because funds had already been disbursed by October 2016: the record showed continued payments via checks to U.A. and IManagement from October to December 2016 traceable to the siphoned funds.

2. Why overlap existed despite hub-and-spoke concerns

The court agreed García was the hub, but it did not stop there. It identified evidence a jury could view as tying Irizarry to the overall scheme rather than to an isolated spoke:

U.A.’s incorporation timing (March 2016) aligned with the scheme’s execution phase.
Payment timing and magnitude: U.A. received large TEGA payments shortly after TEGA received $900,000 from the UBIS account.
Agent testimony attributed admissions to Irizarry: no work performed; invoices fabricated at García’s direction; payments related to the $9 million “investment”; Mayagüez should have been sole benefactor; personal use of funds.
Coordinated concealment: Irizarry joined the collective effort to provide auditors minimal information while insisting the transaction was legal and no corrective action was needed.
Private meetings and frequent contact with García during the distribution period.

This combination allowed the jury to infer knowledge of the broader agreement (satisfying the concern articulated in Monserrate-Valentín/Franco-Santiago), while still applying the overlap concept from Mangual-Santiago/Portela.

3. Collapsing the remaining counts via the conspiracy finding

Irizarry framed the substantive wire-fraud and money-laundering insufficiency arguments as derivative: if he was not a knowing member of the conspiracy, the substantive convictions could not stand. The court accepted that framing and disposed of the substantive challenges once it found the conspiracy evidence sufficient.

4. Jurisdictional dismissal of the § 3582 appeal

Even though Irizarry attempted to raise the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion on appeal, the First Circuit treated the notice-of-appeal requirement as dispositive. Because the § 3582 order came after the conviction appeal was noticed and Irizarry filed no separate notice encompassing that order, Manrique v. United States required dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

C. Impact

1. Conspiracy proof in complex financial fraud: concealment counts

The opinion underscores that in white-collar schemes, a defendant’s role need not be in the initial diversion to be conspiratorial. Providing a legal “shield,” discouraging corrective action, or strategically stonewalling auditors can be “advantageous” conduct supporting interdependence and therefore a single conspiracy finding—particularly when coupled with evidence of fabricated documentation and personal benefit.

2. Hub-and-spoke defense strategies face a practical evidentiary hurdle

While the First Circuit reaffirmed the caution in hub-and-spoke cases (a hub’s multiple relationships do not automatically make one conspiracy), it also signaled that timing, payment trails, fabricated invoices, and coordinated concealment can supply the “knowledge and agreement” inference needed to bridge spokes into a single charged conspiracy.

3. Appellate practice: separate notice of appeal for later post-judgment orders

The jurisdiction ruling is a clear practice reminder: when a defendant seeks review of a later order (including a § 3582 denial) during a pending appeal, appellate jurisdiction generally requires a notice of appeal that encompasses that later order. Absent such a notice, the appellate court will dismiss, even if the merits might have been arguable.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Wire fraud: A scheme to defraud using interstate wire communications (e.g., wire transfers).
Conspiracy: An agreement to commit a crime plus knowing participation; it focuses on the agreement and intent, not just the end result.
Single vs. multiple conspiracies: A “single” conspiracy exists when participants share a common goal and their activities are interconnected. Multiple conspiracies exist when separate agreements operate independently, even if a central person is involved in each.
Interdependence: Whether one participant’s actions are necessary or helpful to other parts of the scheme, and whether participants’ success depends on the scheme’s continuing operation.
Overlap: Whether participants or operations overlap—often shown by a “hub” figure who is pervasively involved across the conspiracy’s stages.
Variance: A mismatch between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the conspiracy proven at trial. A defendant typically must also show the mismatch was prejudicial to warrant reversal.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): A statute allowing sentence reductions when the Sentencing Commission later lowers the guideline range that the defendant’s sentence was based on.
Notice of appeal / appellate jurisdiction: The formal filing that triggers an appellate court’s authority to review a specific judgment or order. Without it, the appellate court generally cannot act, regardless of the issue’s merits.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Irizarry-Irizarry reinforces two practical rules in federal criminal law and appellate practice. First, in conspiracy prosecutions, a defendant’s participation can be proved through conduct that protects the scheme—especially concealment aimed at auditors or oversight—because such conduct can establish interdependence and support a finding of a single overarching conspiracy even when the defendant did not execute every operational step. Second, defendants seeking appellate review of post-judgment rulings, including § 3582 denials, must file a notice of appeal that covers the later order; without that filing, Manrique v. United States compels dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.