Completed Hobbs Act Robbery Remains a § 924(c) Crime of Violence; “Did So Knowingly” Indictments Satisfy Rehaif for § 922(g)(1)

Introduction

United States v. Nigel Richardson (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (not for publication) arose from two armed robberies of delivery drivers in Miramar, Florida. According to the government’s proof, Nigel Richardson placed delivery orders with two restaurants and then—along with another person—robbed the arriving drivers at gunpoint.

A federal grand jury charged Richardson with: (1) two counts of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)); (2) two counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)); and (3) one count of felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). After a jury convicted him on all counts, Richardson appealed on four principal issues:

  • whether Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause;
  • whether the § 922(g)(1) count violated the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause by failing to allege knowledge of felon status as required by Rehaif;
  • whether the evidence was sufficient to prove a “firearm” (no gun was recovered); and
  • whether exclusion of psychiatric evidence deprived him of a fair trial.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that (1) completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a § 924(c) “crime of violence” under binding circuit precedent and is not undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor; (2) the indictment’s language—alleging Richardson “possessed a firearm ... having previously been convicted ... and did so knowingly”—sufficiently alleged Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status element, defeating the Grand Jury Clause challenge; (3) the evidence was sufficient to prove Richardson possessed/brandished a real firearm, relying on eyewitness testimony and corroborating phone photos/videos identified by the manufacturer as a Hi-Point C9; and (4) excluding competency-related psychiatric evidence did not violate due process given its limited relevance to Richardson’s 2018 mens rea and the risk of jury confusion, and in any event would have been harmless.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) § 924(c) “crime of violence” and Hobbs Act robbery

  • In re Saint Fleur — The foundational Eleventh Circuit holding that “Hobbs Act robbery ... clearly qualifies” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s use-of-force clause. The panel treated this as directly controlling on completed Hobbs Act robbery.
  • In re Colon — Reaffirmed that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, reinforcing the circuit’s categorical approach to the completed offense.
  • United States v. St. Hubert — Reiterated that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the circuit’s binding precedent.
  • United States v. Taylor — The Supreme Court held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a § 924(c) crime of violence. Richardson argued Taylor implicitly destabilized circuit precedent as to the completed offense.
  • United States v. Wiley — Explained that Taylor addressed only attempt, leaving completed Hobbs Act robbery intact; used by the panel (via later precedent) to reject Richardson’s Taylor-based challenge.
  • United States v. Solomon — The panel’s key post-Taylor circuit authority explicitly rejecting the same argument Richardson made here and reaffirming that completed Hobbs Act robbery “cannot be accomplished without” qualifying force.
  • United States v. Davis and Brown v. United States — Anchored the legal framework: the residual clause is void (Davis), so analysis turns on the elements clause (Brown).
  • Alvarado-Linares v. United States — Provided the standard of review (de novo) for “crime of violence” determinations.

2) Indictment sufficiency, Rehaif, and the Grand Jury Clause

  • Rehaif v. United States — Requires the government to prove the defendant knew both the possession and his prohibited status (here, felon status).
  • Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States — Cited for the Grand Jury Clause principle that a defendant has a right not to be tried absent a valid grand jury indictment.
  • United States v. Outler — Stated the core rule: all elements must be included in the indictment for a conviction to stand.
  • United States v. Leonard — The panel’s primary in-circuit indictment precedent post-Rehaif, holding that similar “did so knowingly” language, read sensibly, reaches the status element; the district court relied on it and the panel followed it.
  • United States v. Jordan — Indictments get a “common sense construction,” and tracking statutory language is usually sufficient.
  • Flores-Figueroa v. United States — Linguistic/grammatical interpretive support: “knowingly” typically modifies the whole action, including the object/status component, absent contextual reasons to narrow it.
  • United States v. Martinez and Elonis v. United States — Richardson analogized to Martinez, where an indictment failed after Elonis clarified the mens rea requirement; the panel distinguished Martinez because Richardson’s indictment, reasonably read, did allege knowledge of status.
  • Stirone v. United States and Russell v. United States — Invoked by Richardson to argue structural error and automatic vacatur; the panel rejected the premise because it found no omission in the indictment.
  • Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc. — Not substantive to the indictment issue, but cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of former Fifth Circuit Unit B precedent.

3) Sufficiency of the evidence that the weapon was a “firearm”

  • United States v. Charles, United States v. Friske, and United States v. Poole — Set the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standards: de novo review, draw inferences in the government’s favor, and the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
  • United States v. Hunt — Crucial Eleventh Circuit rule: lay opinion can establish that a device is a firearm even if the gun is not recovered or introduced at trial.
  • United States v. Woodruff and United States v. King — Reinforced Hunt: witness testimony describing and reacting to a real-looking gun can suffice.
  • United States v. Grapp, Russell v. United States (5th Cir. 1970), and Winslett v. United States — Addressed “on or about” pleading: proof of a reasonably near date satisfies an indictment’s date allegation.
  • United States v. Beverly, United States v. Taylor (1st Cir. 1995), United States v. Lankford, and United States v. Lawson — Persuasive authority from other circuits approving firearm findings based solely on eyewitness testimony in comparable contexts.
  • United States v. De Leon-Quinones and Parker v. United States — Supported the inference that victims’ compliance and reactions to being threatened indicate the gun was real.
  • United States v. Seastrunk and United States v. Buggs — Illustrate that testimony using qualifiers like “looked like” or “appeared” can still be sufficient to support weapon/firearm findings.
  • Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g — Used to situate “appeared real” testimony within ordinary lay-opinion evidence about the appearance of things.

4) Exclusion of psychiatric evidence and the right to present a defense

  • United States v. Hurn and United States v. Ramos — Framework for due process challenges to excluded defense evidence; “material” means crucial/critical.
  • Chapman v. California — Harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard if constitutional error occurred.
  • Clark v. Arizona — Approved categorical restrictions on mental-disease evidence offered to negate mens rea absent an insanity defense, citing risk of jury confusion and preserving the jurisdiction’s chosen insanity framework.
  • United States v. Litzky and United States v. Westcott — Applied similar principles under federal law: absent an insanity defense, psychiatric evidence generally cannot be used “to excuse conduct,” and may be excluded when it does not address the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the offense and risks confusion.
  • United States v. Vereen, United States v. Moore, and United States v. Bates — Treated § 922(g)(1) as a general-intent offense and emphasized that psychiatric evidence is typically inadmissible to negate mens rea in general-intent prosecutions.
  • United States v. Russell (11th Cir. 2020) — Richardson’s principal reliance; the panel distinguished it because the district court here did instruct the jury on the knowledge-of-status element and did not categorically exclude all mens rea evidence—only Dr. Du Bois’s competency-focused material.
  • United States v. Roosevelt Coats — Supported harmlessness: felon status and prior imprisonment are “not the kind of thing that one forgets.”
  • United States v. Litzky (n.2) and United States v. Sarras — Cited for de novo review of constitutional questions arising from evidentiary exclusions.

Legal Reasoning

1) Hobbs Act robbery remains a categorical “crime of violence”

The court’s reasoning tracks the elements-clause inquiry: whether the offense “always requires” proof of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” under § 924(c)(3)(A). Because Hobbs Act robbery’s statutory definition includes taking property “by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,” the Eleventh Circuit—via In re Saint Fleur and its progeny—treats the completed offense as categorically involving qualifying force.

Richardson’s main doctrinal move was to extend United States v. Taylor (attempted robbery not qualifying) to completed robbery. The panel, invoking United States v. Solomon and United States v. Wiley, rejected that extension: Taylor is limited to attempt liability and does not undermine circuit precedent holding that the completed crime necessarily involves the requisite use/threatened use of force.

2) The “did so knowingly” indictment language satisfies Rehaif

Richardson framed the indictment issue as constitutional: if the grand jury did not charge knowledge of prohibited status, trial and conviction would offend the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause. The panel resolved the issue through “common sense” textual reading under United States v. Jordan and circuit indictment precedent in United States v. Leonard.

The critical linguistic step was applying Flores-Figueroa v. United States: when an indictment alleges the defendant “possessed a firearm ... having previously been convicted ... and did so knowingly,” the adverb “knowingly” ordinarily modifies the entire described conduct—possession and status—rather than only the bare act of possession. Thus, the panel held the indictment alleged the Rehaif element and the grand jury necessarily found probable cause as to that element.

The attempted analogy to United States v. Martinez (post-Elonis v. United States) failed because, unlike the indictment in Martinez, Richardson’s indictment—reasonably read—did include the relevant mens rea as to the element at issue. His structural-error argument under Stirone v. United States and Russell v. United States likewise failed because it depended on the premise of an omission the panel did not find.

3) Sufficient evidence of a “firearm” without recovering the gun

The “firearm” definition came from 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), and Richardson emphasized that no gun was recovered. The panel applied established sufficiency principles (United States v. Charles; United States v. Friske) and the Eleventh Circuit’s long-standing rule that lay testimony can prove a firearm (United States v. Hunt).

For the § 922(g)(1) count, the court relied heavily on digital evidence: photos/videos on Richardson’s phone showing him holding a handgun. A Hi-Point corporate witness (the company president) identified distinctive features and opined the gun was a Hi-Point model C9, and the company had not approved replicas (including airsoft) resembling it. The court further rejected Richardson’s “date” argument by invoking the “on or about” rule: proof of possession reasonably near the date alleged suffices (United States v. Grapp; Winslett v. United States).

For the § 924(c) brandishing counts, eyewitness testimony alone was adequate under United States v. Hunt and later cases. Both drivers described a black handgun pointed at their chest at close range and testified it appeared real. The panel treated “appeared”/“looked” real as competent lay perception rather than fatal equivocation, citing authorities such as United States v. Seastrunk and United States v. Buggs, and reinforcing the inference by noting the photo evidence of Richardson with a real C9 shortly before the first robbery.

4) Exclusion of competency/psychiatric evidence did not deny a fair trial

Richardson attempted to use a competency evaluator’s findings to argue his mental illness caused memory deficits such that he might not have known his felon status—an effort to negate Rehaif knowledge. The panel analyzed the claim under due process principles governing the right to present a defense (United States v. Hurn).

At the constitutional-violation step, the panel leaned on Clark v. Arizona and its own precedent United States v. Litzky: mental-disease evidence offered outside an insanity defense can be restricted, especially where it risks confusing the jury and is not meaningfully tied to the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense. Here, Dr. Du Bois evaluated Richardson’s competency in 2020, while the crimes occurred in 2018; the panel viewed the evidence as a “snapshot” of later mental state, insufficiently probative of Richardson’s 2018 knowledge of status and likely to mislead.

The panel also underscored doctrine specific to § 922(g)(1): it is a general-intent offense (United States v. Vereen; United States v. Moore), and psychiatric evidence is “in the vast majority of cases” inadmissible to negate mens rea in general-intent prosecutions (United States v. Bates). The case Richardson relied on—United States v. Russell (11th Cir. 2020)—was distinguished because the jury here was instructed on the knowledge-of-status element and the court did not impose an objective-only standard; it simply excluded this particular competency-related evidence.

Finally, even assuming error, the panel found harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California), stressing that the proffer was at least partly inculpatory (it referenced Richardson’s recollection of prior pleas/convictions) and that Richardson’s prior 33-month prison term supported the inference that he knew his felon status (United States v. Roosevelt Coats).

Impact

  • Post-Taylor stability for completed Hobbs Act robbery in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision reinforces that Taylor does not affect the circuit’s settled rule that completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A), and it signals continued reliance on United States v. Solomon and United States v. Wiley to dispose of similar challenges.
  • Drafting and litigating Rehaif-compliant indictments: By treating “did so knowingly” as reaching all material elements, the decision strengthens the government’s ability (at least in this circuit) to defend indictments that do not explicitly spell out “knew he was a felon,” so long as the knowledge allegation sensibly modifies the described status.
  • Proof of a “firearm” without recovery: The opinion is a roadmap for prosecutors: combine eyewitness “real gun” testimony (sufficient by itself under Hunt) with digital corroboration (photos/videos) and manufacturing-identification testimony to blunt “toy/replica” and “no gun recovered” defenses.
  • Limits on competency-related psychiatric evidence to negate Rehaif knowledge: The decision signals skepticism toward using later competency evaluations to create reasonable doubt about earlier knowledge-of-status, especially when offered outside an insanity defense and when the proffer is not tightly time-linked to the offense conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Elements clause vs. residual clause (§ 924(c)): A “crime of violence” can qualify if its statutory elements necessarily involve using, attempting, or threatening force (elements clause). The alternative “residual clause” route is unconstitutional after United States v. Davis.
  • “Categorical” analysis: Courts look at the legal definition (elements) of the offense, not the defendant’s specific conduct, to decide if it always requires force. That is why the Hobbs Act robbery debate turns on the statute’s required elements.
  • Rehaif knowledge-of-status: In § 922(g) cases, the government must prove the defendant knew he possessed a gun and knew he was in a prohibited class (here, knew he was a felon).
  • Grand Jury Clause and indictments: The grand jury must charge every essential element; if an element is missing, the defendant can argue he was tried on something the grand jury didn’t approve.
  • General intent vs. specific intent: General intent crimes typically require only that the defendant knowingly did the act; specific intent crimes require an additional purpose. Courts are more hesitant to admit psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea for general-intent crimes.
  • Rule 403 “confusion” concerns: Even relevant evidence may be excluded if it is likely to mislead the jury or cause unfair prejudice or confusion—especially “snapshot” mental-health evidence not tied to the offense date.
  • Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Even if a constitutional error occurred, the conviction stands if the appellate court concludes the error could not have affected the verdict under Chapman v. California.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nigel Richardson delivers four practical takeaways: (1) completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a § 924(c) crime of violence in this circuit notwithstanding Taylor; (2) a § 922(g)(1) indictment alleging the defendant “did so knowingly” can, under a common-sense reading, satisfy Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status requirement and avoid Grand Jury Clause invalidation; (3) the government can prove a “firearm” element through lay eyewitness testimony, bolstered by digital and manufacturer-identification evidence even when no gun is recovered; and (4) competency-oriented psychiatric evidence remote in time from the offense may be excluded without violating due process, particularly where it risks confusing jurors and does not directly address the defendant’s mental state at the time of possession.