Compelled Psychological Examinations at Michigan Miller Hearings: Permissible if Defense Offers Psychological Expert Evidence, but Admissible Only in Rebuttal

I. Introduction

People of Michigan v. Donyelle Michael Black (Supreme Court of Michigan, July 30, 2026) resolves a recurring procedural and constitutional question arising in juvenile-life-without-parole resentencings: when a defendant plans to present expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing, may the court require the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by an expert selected by the prosecution?

The case stems from Donyelle Michael Black’s 1988 bench-trial convictions for first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm for a homicide committed at age 15. He received life without parole (LWOP). After Miller v Alabama and Montgomery v Louisiana, Michigan’s statutory resentencing framework (MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a) permitted the prosecution to seek reimposition of LWOP through a “Miller hearing.”

Black’s first Miller hearing featured defense psychological testimony; the prosecution offered no witnesses, and the trial court erroneously stated the prosecution bore no burden. While Black’s appeal was pending, People v Taylor (2022) held the prosecution bears the burden at a Miller hearing. The Court of Appeals vacated the resentencing and ordered a second Miller hearing. On remand, the prosecution moved to compel Black to undergo a prosecution psychological exam (or else strike defense psychological testimony). The trial court granted the motion; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court granted review to address the Fifth Amendment/self-incrimination implications, timing, and admissibility limits.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Disposition: The Court of Appeals was affirmed, but trial court orders were vacated to the extent they incorporated the first hearing’s record and relied on the first hearing’s defense intent; the case was remanded.

Concurring (THOMAS, J.): Agreed with the result but emphasized that federal/state caselaw permits compelled exams only with careful scope tailoring and safeguards, and flagged future issues such as who selects/appoints the examiner and what procedures trial courts should adopt.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. The juvenile-LWOP line: individualized sentencing and Michigan’s Miller framework

• Miller v Alabama: The constitutional anchor. The opinion reiterates Miller’s rule that mandatory juvenile LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment and requires consideration of youth and attendant mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest penalty. This is why Michigan’s resentencing must account for individualized factors (the “Miller factors”).
• Montgomery v Louisiana: Supplies retroactivity, explaining why older mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences, like Black’s, must be revisited.
• People v Taylor (2022): Central Michigan procedural precedent. Taylor held the prosecution bears the burden to rebut the presumption against LWOP by clear and convincing evidence. Black’s first resentencing was vacated because the trial court applied an incorrect burden framework. In Black, Taylor also drives the Court’s insistence that the second Miller hearing is a “distinct proceeding” that must “begin anew.”
• People v Boykin: Cited for the Legislature’s response to Miller via MCL 769.25 (and the conditional retroactivity pathway in MCL 769.25a), situating Miller hearings as a statutory-constitutional hybrid procedure.
• People v Parks and People v Taylor (April 10, 2025): Cited to show Michigan’s expanding constitutional protections for “late adolescents” (18–20). This increases the practical importance of the Court’s rule: more defendants will litigate Miller-type hearings and may present psychological evidence.
• People v Bennett: Used to emphasize that mental health considerations can be embedded within the first two Miller factors even if not a standalone factor—supporting the majority’s premise that mental status evidence can be relevant at Miller hearings.

2. Self-incrimination doctrine: when compelled mental-health examinations are permitted

• Estelle v Smith: The cautionary baseline. Estelle held it violates the Fifth Amendment to use statements from a court-ordered psychiatric exam against a defendant at sentencing when the defendant “introduced no psychiatric evidence” and had not indicated an intent to do so. Black distinguishes Estelle on the ground that the defendant here is given a choice and, crucially, the compelled exam’s product is restricted to rebuttal use.
• Buchanan v Kentucky: Provides the rebuttal principle. Where the defendant presents psychological evidence (there, to support “extreme emotional disturbance”), the prosecution may introduce evidence from a court-ordered evaluation for the limited purpose of rebutting the defense’s mental-status proof.
• Kansas v Cheever: The Supreme Court’s modern reaffirmation: when defense introduces expert testimony based on examination of the defendant, the prosecution may rebut with testimony from an expert who also examined the defendant, because otherwise the adversarial process would be “one-sided and potentially inaccurate.” Black treats Cheever as the logical foundation for compelling an exam as a precondition to offering defense psychological testimony.
• In re Gault: Cited for the principle that Fifth Amendment applicability turns on the nature of the statement and exposure it invites, not the type of proceeding—supporting the extension of self-incrimination protections into sentencing-like contexts.
• Chavez v Martinez: Used to frame the Fifth Amendment as primarily a limit on the use of compelled statements in a “criminal case,” supporting the Court’s conclusion that the timing requirement (deciding whether to sit for an exam before the hearing) is not itself unconstitutional.

3. Michigan sentencing/self-incrimination decisions supporting compelled evaluations with limits

• People v Wright: Establishes Michigan courts’ authority to order postconviction psychological/psychiatric evaluations for sentencing, and states the Fifth Amendment right “attaches” at such exams used for sentencing—supporting the Court’s careful, conditional permission model.
• People v Watkins: Cited to reinforce that the right against self-incrimination extends into sentencing.
• People v Bassage: Cited for the proposition that Michigan’s self-incrimination provision is interpreted no differently than the federal Fifth Amendment, simplifying the Court’s analysis into one integrated doctrine.

4. Persuasive authorities and procedural guardrails

• Bilal v United States, State v Madison, and Hernandez v Davis: Cited as supportive out-of-state/federal applications of Cheever to reject claims that refusing defense expert testimony unless the defendant submits to a government exam violates the Fifth Amendment.
• United States v Byers: Quoted for the practical point that the effective rebuttal to psychiatric opinion is typically contradictory psychiatric opinion—bolstering the “adversarial process” rationale.
• Maldonado v Superior Court of San Mateo Co: Used to underscore the Fifth Amendment’s focus on use of compelled statements and to highlight judicial power to issue protective orders preventing improper direct or derivative use.
• State v Reid: Cited (by analogy) for mechanisms restricting prosecution access to compelled-exam materials to reduce risk of contamination of the prosecution’s case-in-chief.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s doctrinal synthesis: “rebuttal permission” implies “exam access”

The opinion’s core move is inferential: because Buchanan v Kentucky and Kansas v Cheever permit the prosecution to use evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination to rebut defense psychological evidence, it “naturally follows” that a court may order such an examination when the defense indicates it intends to offer psychological expert evidence based on examining the defendant. Otherwise, the rebuttal right recognized in Buchanan/Cheever would be functionally hollow.

2. Why Miller hearings make mental-status evidence relevant (and contested)

The Court emphasizes that Miller hearings require an individualized assessment, including “possibility of rehabilitation,” and that multiple Miller factors (immaturity/impetuosity; family environment; competence-related limitations of youth) can have psychological dimensions. As a result, defendants may reasonably deploy expert psychological testimony to argue they are not “irreparably corrupt,” and the prosecution must be allowed to test that claim with comparable tools—subject to constitutional limits.

3. The constitutional safeguard: strict use limitation to rebuttal only

The Court draws a bright line: even if the exam is compelled, its fruits cannot be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. This implements Estelle’s concern (statements used against a defendant who did not put mental state at issue) by ensuring the exam only becomes relevant if and when the defendant opens the door with psychological expert proof. The Court also stresses the rebuttal must be limited in scope to the defense’s presentation.

4. Timing and “choice”: why requiring an early decision is not a Fifth Amendment violation

Black argued it is coercive to make him decide on an exam before the prosecution rests. The Court answers that the Fifth Amendment problem is not the decision point but the later evidentiary use. Citing Chavez v Martinez, the Court treats compulsion alone as insufficient; constitutional injury arises when compelled statements are used against the defendant in a criminal case. Because the prosecution cannot use exam evidence unless the defense introduces psychological evidence, Black is not “locked in.” He may sit for the exam and still elect not to present psychological expert testimony, in which case the prosecution is “precluded” from using the exam.

5. Resetting the proceeding: vacatur and the “begin anew” requirement

The Court vacates the trial court’s attempt to incorporate the first Miller hearing record into the second. This is not merely housekeeping: Taylor changed the governing burden and standard. Incorporating a record created under an incorrect burden allocation risks contaminating the second hearing’s factfinding and legal framing. The Court insists the second hearing be treated as distinct to ensure Taylor’s clear-and-convincing rebuttal structure is correctly applied.

C. Impact

1. Operational rule for Miller litigation in Michigan

After Black, Michigan trial courts have explicit authority to condition admission of defense psychological expert testimony (based on examining the defendant) on the defendant’s submission to a prosecution-selected expert examination—so long as the prosecution’s use is limited to rebuttal and other safeguards are observed.

2. Strengthening adversarial testing while preserving constitutional limits

The decision recalibrates Miller hearings away from potentially one-sided expert narratives. It gives prosecutors a viable method to challenge defense expert claims about rehabilitation, maturity, empathy, or traits linked to youth—without allowing compelled statements to become affirmative proof in the prosecution’s initial presentation.

3. Likely downstream disputes

• Scope fights: What questions are “genuine psychological assessment” versus impermissible interrogation? The majority and the THOMAS concurrence both anticipate litigation over tailoring the referral question and limiting the resulting testimony.
• Derivative-use/contamination claims: Even with a formal “rebuttal only” rule, defendants may argue the prosecution’s case-in-chief was indirectly shaped by compelled exam information. Courts may respond with protective orders, restricted access, or sequencing procedures (as flagged by the citations to State v Reid and Maldonado v Superior Court of San Mateo Co).
• Expert selection and appointment: The concurrence highlights the absence of a statutory appointment mechanism in MCL 769.25 akin to those in MCL 768.20a(2) or MCL 330.2026(1). Future cases may test whether courts should default to neutral appointment methods or permit party-selected experts.
• Expansion beyond juvenile lifers: Because Michigan has extended Miller-like protections to ages 18–20 (People v Parks; People v Taylor (April 10, 2025)), the procedural rule in Black will likely apply across a broader resentencing docket.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is a “Miller hearing” in Michigan?

It is a resentencing proceeding under MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a where the court decides whether a person who committed an offense as a juvenile (and, in Michigan, certain 18–20-year-olds by case law) should receive LWOP. The court must consider the “Miller factors,” including youth-related characteristics and “possibility of rehabilitation.”

B. “Presumption against LWOP” and “clear and convincing evidence”

Under People v Taylor (2022), the court begins from the premise that most juveniles offend due to “transient immaturity, not irreparable corruption.” LWOP is exceptional, and the prosecution must rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence (a demanding standard higher than “preponderance,” lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt”).

C. Fifth Amendment self-incrimination in this setting

The right protects against being forced to provide statements that are then used against you in a criminal case. In mental-health exam cases, the key question is often not whether an exam occurred, but how the prosecution uses what was said. Black permits compulsion only to allow rebuttal if the defense presents psychological expert evidence based on examining the defendant.

D. “Case-in-chief” vs “rebuttal”

• Case-in-chief: The prosecution’s main presentation attempting to satisfy its burden (in a Miller hearing, rebutting the presumption against LWOP).
• Rebuttal: Evidence offered only after the defense presents evidence, limited to responding to (and not expanding beyond) what the defense put at issue.

Black’s safeguard is that compelled-exam evidence is limited to rebuttal, preventing the prosecution from using compelled statements as affirmative proof before the defense opens the door.

V. Conclusion

People v Black establishes a clear procedural-constitutional rule for Michigan Miller hearings: when a defendant seeks to introduce psychological expert evidence based on examining the defendant, the court may compel a comparable examination by a prosecution expert, but the resulting evidence is strictly limited to rebuttal use. The Court simultaneously corrects procedure by requiring the second Miller hearing to begin anew under People v Taylor’s burden and standard, rejecting record incorporation from a vacated hearing.

The decision’s significance lies in its attempt to balance two imperatives central to modern juvenile sentencing law: (1) individualized consideration of youth and rehabilitation potential, and (2) reliable adversarial testing of psychological claims—without allowing compelled statements to become a prosecutorial shortcut around the privilege against self-incrimination.