Compassionate Release Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) Requires 10 Years Served; Dropped State Charges Do Not Qualify as “Other Reasons” Under § 1B1.13(b)(5)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Phillip Smith (11th Cir. 2026-06-30) (unpublished, non-argument calendar), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The appeal centered on whether Smith identified an “extraordinary and compelling reason” as defined by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13—specifically:

• whether he could proceed under § 1B1.13(b)(6) (“unusually long sentence,” at least 10 years served, and a “change in the law” producing a “gross disparity”); and
• whether the post-sentencing “dead docketing” (non-pursuit) of related state sex-offense charges could qualify under the catchall § 1B1.13(b)(5) (“other” reasons similar in gravity to enumerated categories).

Smith’s theory was practical: he did not receive acceptance-of-responsibility credit at sentencing due to pending state charges, and he argued that the later state decision not to pursue those charges meant he would likely receive a lower federal sentence “if sentenced today.” The government opposed relief, disputing eligibility and, alternatively, arguing dangerousness and the § 3553(a) factors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on eligibility grounds:

1. No eligibility under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) because Smith had not “served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.” That threshold requirement was dispositive.
2. No eligibility under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) because the state’s later non-pursuit of charges (and the speculative possibility of a different acceptance-of-responsibility outcome) was not “similar in gravity” to the enumerated circumstances in § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4) (medical, age, family circumstances, or victimization in custody).

The court therefore did not need to reach the alternative considerations (dangerousness and § 3553(a)), though the district court had also found Smith remained a danger. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Smith’s procedural complaint that he was denied a chance to file a reply, noting the local rule barred replies in criminal motions.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021)

Giron supplied two key guardrails:

• The standard of review: the panel reiterated it reviews de novo “whether a defendant is eligible” for a reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). That framing matters because the appeal turned on interpreting eligibility criteria in § 1B1.13.
• The “one-strike” structure: if a defendant fails any required element, the court “cannot grant relief and need not analyze the remaining requirements.” This principle supported the panel’s decision to affirm once it concluded Smith had no qualifying “extraordinary and compelling reason.”

2. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021)

Tinker was the doctrinal blueprint for compassionate release analysis in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 1B1.13; (2) consistency with § 3553(a); and (3) no danger to the community. The court invoked Tinker to emphasize that compassionate release is a three-part test and that failure on any single part is fatal.

3. United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015)

Puentes anchored the court’s threshold premise: federal courts have no inherent authority to modify a sentence, and may do so only when a statute or rule authorizes it. This reinforced the opinion’s strict approach to the policy statement’s textual prerequisites (notably the “10 years served” requirement).

4. Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014)

Although not a sentencing case, Campbell supported the court’s acknowledgement that pro se filings are liberally construed. Even with that liberal construction, the panel found Smith’s asserted grounds did not fit § 1B1.13(b)(5) and were foreclosed under § 1B1.13(b)(6) by the time-served prerequisite.

5. Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320 (2026)

The panel’s footnote discussion of Rutherford is important—even though the court expressly declined to decide whether Rutherford independently foreclosed Smith’s request. As described in the opinion, Rutherford held that when Congress makes a sentencing change non-retroactive, the mere fact that an older sentence is longer than a post-amendment sentence is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason,” and that to the extent § 1B1.13 “counsels otherwise,” it “is invalid.”

The Eleventh Circuit avoided resolving the full scope of Rutherford’s effect on § 1B1.13(b)(6) in this case because Smith failed a separate, clear eligibility condition: he had not served 10 years. Practically, however, the footnote signals that future litigants invoking (b)(6) based on non-retroactive changes in law should expect Rutherford-based challenges.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is notably textual and categorical:

1. Strict application of § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s time-served gate: Smith’s motion relied on § 1B1.13(b)(6), which explicitly requires that the defendant “has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.” Because Smith sought relief about a year after sentencing, the panel treated the requirement as unambiguous and dispositive. This reflects a broader Eleventh Circuit pattern (consistent with Puentes, Tinker, and Giron) of treating compassionate release as tightly cabined by statute/policy statement.
2. Constrained meaning of the (b)(5) catchall (“similar in gravity”): Smith attempted to recharacterize his ground as an “other” reason under § 1B1.13(b)(5). The court rejected that reframing by comparing his asserted circumstance to the enumerated (b)(1)-(4) categories. The panel held that a state prosecutor’s later decision not to pursue charges—however consequential it might have been to the federal sentencing calculus—does not resemble, in kind or gravity, the guideline’s specified humanitarian/extraordinary categories (serious medical issues, advanced age, family caretaker crises, or abuse victimization in custody).
3. Procedural point—no reply permitted: Smith argued the district court ruled too quickly, before he could file a reply. The panel relied on S.D. Ga. L.R. Crim. 12: replies in criminal motion practice are not permitted, so there was no procedural error.

C. Impact

Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion reflects (and may reinforce in district-court practice) several operational rules in the Eleventh Circuit:

• § 1B1.13(b)(6) is gated by the 10-year requirement: Defendants cannot use (b)(6) early in their sentences, regardless of how compelling their disparity narrative may appear. District courts are likely to treat the “10 years served” language as a bright-line eligibility bar.
• § 1B1.13(b)(5) will be read narrowly: The decision illustrates a “category gravity” approach: the catchall is not a general fairness provision for sentencing reconsideration, but is limited to circumstances akin to severe health, age-related decline, acute family hardship, or custodial victimization. Collateral post-sentencing developments—like state case dispositions affecting perceived acceptance—are unlikely to qualify.
• Rutherford looms over (b)(6) litigation: The panel’s footnote tees up future disputes about whether (b)(6) can survive where it relies on non-retroactive changes in law. Litigants should anticipate arguments that Rutherford invalidates portions of § 1B1.13 that would treat non-retroactivity-driven disparities as “extraordinary and compelling.”
• Local-rule compliance matters in compassionate release procedure: Pro se litigants commonly expect to reply; this decision underscores that local criminal rules may foreclose replies and that courts may rule on the papers accordingly.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A))

A statutory mechanism allowing a federal court to reduce a prison sentence after sentencing, but only if specified conditions are met. It is not a resentencing from scratch.

“Extraordinary and compelling reasons”

A term of art. Courts look to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to decide which circumstances qualify. Ordinary sentencing complaints typically do not qualify.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (“unusually long sentence” + “10 years served” + “change in the law”)

A guideline provision that can allow certain “change in law” arguments—but only after the defendant has already served at least 10 years, and only where the change produces a “gross disparity.” In this case, the 10-year requirement alone ended the analysis.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) (“other reasons”)

A catchall that still has a limit: the “other” circumstance must be similar in seriousness (“gravity”) to listed categories like severe illness, old age, family caretaker emergencies, or abuse in prison.

Acceptance of responsibility

A guideline adjustment that can reduce a defendant’s offense level when the defendant clearly accepts responsibility (often by timely pleading guilty and demonstrating contrition). Smith argued he was denied this reduction due to pending state allegations.

“Dead docket” (state practice)

A procedural status indicating a case is not being actively prosecuted at present; it does not necessarily equal an acquittal or a definitive dismissal on the merits. The Eleventh Circuit treated this development as insufficiently extraordinary under § 1B1.13.

Non-retroactive change in law

When Congress changes sentencing law but does not apply that change to people already sentenced. Rutherford v. United States, as summarized by the panel, says non-retroactivity generally prevents using the resulting disparity as the basis for compassionate release, and may invalidate guideline language suggesting otherwise.

§ 3553(a) factors and “danger to the community”

Even if a prisoner shows an extraordinary and compelling reason, the court must still consider sentencing purposes (deterrence, protection of the public, seriousness, etc.) and must deny relief if the person would endanger others. Here, the panel affirmed without reaching those steps because eligibility failed first.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Phillip Smith reinforces a strict, eligibility-first approach to compassionate release in the Eleventh Circuit. The decision underscores two practical rules: (1) § 1B1.13(b)(6) cannot be invoked unless the defendant has already served at least 10 years; and (2) post-sentencing developments like a state case being placed on a “dead docket,” even if they might have affected acceptance-of-responsibility findings, do not qualify as “other reasons” under § 1B1.13(b)(5) because they are not comparable in gravity to the guideline’s enumerated humanitarian categories. The opinion also flags the continuing significance of Rutherford v. United States for future “change in law” compassionate-release litigation.