Compassionate Release May Be Denied Solely on § 3553(a) and Dangerousness, Using Unobjected-to PSI Facts, Without Reaching “Extraordinary and Compelling” Reasons

Case: United States v. Jorge Gomez-Carbajal (11th Cir. May 15, 2026) (per curiam) (Not for Publication)
Lower Court: M.D. Fla., D.C. No. 8:18-cr-00163-JDW-AAS-1

1. Introduction

Jorge Gomez-Carbajal, serving a 130-month sentence imposed in 2018 for methamphetamine trafficking and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, moved in 2024 for a sentence reduction. Although styled as a request tied to “Retroactive Application of Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to Amendment 821,” the district court treated much of the filing as a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The motion asserted multiple grounds: an asserted sentencing disparity after Amendment 821; COVID-19 health risks; rehabilitation; a proposed reentry plan involving living with his brother; and an assertion that he no longer posed a danger. The district court denied relief, concluding (i) the § 3553(a) factors did not support reduction, (ii) he failed to show “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and (iii) he remained a danger to the community.

On appeal, Gomez-Carbajal challenged only the compassionate-release denial, arguing chiefly that the district court (a) improperly considered his reasons individually rather than cumulatively, (b) failed to “rebalance” § 3553(a) in light of new circumstances, and (c) wrongly found dangerousness by relying on police reports or arrest records.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, it held that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and permissibly found that Gomez-Carbajal remained dangerous based on undisputed PSI facts describing his possession of a significant quantity of pure methamphetamine and two loaded firearms and his conduct when officers approached. Because the § 3553(a) analysis independently supported denial, the court did not reach the argument about whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” must be considered cumulatively.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017)
  Used to anchor the standard of review: sentence-modification decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This framing is outcome-determinative in many compassionate-release appeals because it affords district courts “a range of choices.”
• In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989)
  These cases are invoked to emphasize what abuse-of-discretion means in practice: even if the appellate panel might have ruled differently, it will affirm absent a clear error of judgment.
• United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Together they supply the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part framework for § 3582(c)(1)(A): (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons; (2) § 3553(a) factors favor release; (3) release is consistent with the dangerousness inquiry tied to U.S.S.G. 1B1.13. Critically, they also provide the sequencing rule applied here: a district court may address the requirements “in any order,” and failure on any one is “fatal.” This allowed the panel to affirm solely on the § 3553(a) ground without deciding the cumulative-evidence argument.
• United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2017)
  These cases define how explicit a district court must be when discussing § 3553(a). The panel relied on them to reject the claim that the court had to address each factor or every piece of mitigation (including new reentry plans). The district court’s statement that it considered the factors—paired with discussion of offense seriousness, record, deterrence, respect for law, and protection of the public—was enough for meaningful appellate review.
• United States v. Valentin, 21 F.3d 395 (11th Cir. 1994); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. (2005); United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Gomez-Carbajal cited these to argue the district court improperly relied on police reports/arrest records. The panel distinguished the premise: it found “no indication” the district court relied on police reports; rather, it relied on PSI facts.
• United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1989))
  This line is central to the dangerousness holding: sentencing findings may be based on undisputed statements in the PSI. Because Gomez-Carbajal did not object to PSI facts at sentencing, those facts could properly support a later dangerousness finding in the compassionate-release context.
• United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1985)
  Cited in a footnote to note that dangerousness findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) are reviewed for clear error—underscoring that the district court’s dangerousness determination was sturdy under either clear-error or abuse-of-discretion review.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion operationalizes the Eleventh Circuit’s “any-order, any-one-failure-is-fatal” compassionate-release doctrine (from United States v. Giron and United States v. Tinker) by affirming on the § 3553(a) factor analysis alone.

On the merits of § 3553(a), the court found the district court’s explanation sufficient: it referenced the nature and circumstances of the offense (methamphetamine plus two loaded firearms, and conduct suggesting a reach for the weapons), the defendant’s history (including immigration violations and prior record), and the need for the sentence to reflect seriousness, promote respect for law, deter, and protect the public. Under United States v. Taylor, United States v. Dorman, and United States v. Johnson, the district court need not catalog each factor or every new circumstance so long as the record permits meaningful appellate review.

Regarding dangerousness, the panel rejected the claim that the district court impermissibly relied on police reports. It identified the PSI as the factual basis and then invoked United States v. Bennett/United States v. Wilson to hold that undisputed PSI facts are fair game. The procedural posture mattered: because Gomez-Carbajal did not object to PSI facts at sentencing, he effectively conceded them for sentencing purposes, allowing the district court to rely on them later in evaluating public-safety risk.

Finally, having affirmed based on § 3553(a), the panel expressly declined to reach the argument about cumulative consideration of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, citing United States v. Giron for the proposition that courts need not analyze all three prerequisites.

C. Impact

Although “Not for Publication” and therefore not binding precedent, the decision is a clear illustration of several consequential, recurring principles in Eleventh Circuit compassionate-release practice:

• Single-prong affirmance is routine: Appellants who focus on “extraordinary and compelling reasons” may still lose if the district court’s § 3553(a) explanation is adequate. This opinion reinforces that appellate courts will affirm without reaching the other prongs.
• PSI objections have long tail consequences: Failure to object to PSI facts at the original sentencing can later foreclose challenges to factual predicates (e.g., dangerousness) in post-judgment proceedings.
• “New circumstances” do not force a reweighing narrative: A district court may consider changed circumstances (rehabilitation, release plan), but it is not required to discuss them exhaustively; public-safety and offense-seriousness considerations can remain dominant.
• Limits of police-report arguments: Defendants frequently invoke Shepard v. United States-type constraints; this opinion signals that such arguments will fail if the district court relies on PSI facts rather than contested police reports.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)): A mechanism allowing a court to reduce an already-imposed prison sentence if statutory requirements are met, including consistency with sentencing purposes and public safety.
• “Extraordinary and compelling reasons”: A threshold justification (medical, family, or other serious circumstances, depending on governing law and policy statements) that can support a reduction—but it is not enough by itself in the Eleventh Circuit if § 3553(a) cuts against release.
• § 3553(a) factors: The sentencing considerations Congress requires courts to weigh, such as seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history and characteristics.
• Dangerousness inquiry (U.S.S.G. 1B1.13; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)): A public-safety assessment considering the offense, evidence, personal history, and the risk posed by release.
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSI): A probation-prepared report used at sentencing. In the Eleventh Circuit, facts in the PSI that the defendant does not dispute may be treated as admitted and used to support sentencing-related findings later.
• Abuse of discretion vs. clear error: “Abuse of discretion” is a deferential review of the district court’s ultimate decision; “clear error” is a deferential review of factual findings. Either way, deference makes reversal difficult absent a significant mistake.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jorge Gomez-Carbajal underscores a decisive feature of Eleventh Circuit compassionate-release jurisprudence: courts may deny relief based on the § 3553(a) factors (and related dangerousness considerations) without reaching whether a defendant’s asserted reasons—individually or cumulatively—are “extraordinary and compelling.” The opinion also highlights the enduring importance of PSI fact disputes at the original sentencing, because undisputed PSI facts can later supply the foundation for denying compassionate release on public-safety grounds.