Commissary Purchases as Evidence of Sincerity: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Qualified Immunity for Removing Inmate from Religious Vegan Diet; Denial of Vegan Shoes/Commissary Not a RLUIPA “Substantial Burden”; Reenrollment Moors Injunctive Relief

Introduction

In Ammon Ra Sumrall v. Georgia Department of Corrections, No. 23-11783 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) (published), the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Grant joined by Chief Judge William Pryor and Judge Kidd, affirmed summary judgment and qualified immunity for prison officials who removed an inmate from a religious vegan meal program after discovering repeated commissary purchases of non‑vegan foods. The court also rejected related Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and it resolved several claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), holding that requests for vegan athletic shoes and vegan‑labeled commissary items were not “substantial burdens,” and that the request for vegan meals was moot because the inmate had been reenrolled in the program and remained on it for years.

The case sits at the intersection of prison administration, free exercise rights, and RLUIPA. It addresses:

  • Whether officials act within their discretionary authority when enforcing a religious diet program even if a specific removal ground was not yet codified in prison policy;
  • Whether removing an inmate from a religious diet program based on contradictory commissary purchases violates clearly established Free Exercise or Due Process rights;
  • What it takes to prove an Equal Protection violation in this setting;
  • How the Eighth Amendment’s adequacy‑of‑nutrition standard applies where the inmate declines available food for religious reasons; and
  • What constitutes a “substantial burden” under RLUIPA for non‑meal accommodations, and when reenrollment moots injunctive claims for religious meals.

The panel’s holding provides practical, precedential guidance in the Eleventh Circuit for correctional officials vetting religious sincerity through objective conduct and for litigants navigating the evidentiary and doctrinal demands of constitutional and RLUIPA claims in carceral settings.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Qualified Immunity (Free Exercise and Due Process): Prison officials acted within their discretionary authority in managing the Alternative Entrée Program (AEP). It was not clearly established that removing an inmate from a religious vegan program based on repeated purchases of non‑vegan commissary items violated the Free Exercise Clause or created a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Officials may question sincerity where conduct contradicts professed beliefs, and no materially similar precedent barred the removal here.
  • Equal Protection: The inmate failed to identify a similarly situated comparator with specific, contemporaneous purchase evidence and failed to show purposeful discrimination. Conclusory affidavits lacking dates and names did not create a triable issue; testimony showed removals spanned multiple racial and religious groups for the same reason (non‑vegan purchases).
  • Eighth Amendment: The Constitution requires nutritionally adequate food, not adherence to an inmate’s religious dietary preferences. Because regular trays were adequate and the inmate could consume vegan components, refusing to eat did not create an Eighth Amendment violation, nor did medical evidence show “serious damage to future health or safety.”
  • RLUIPA:
    • Vegan athletic shoes: Denial did not substantially burden religious exercise; at most it inconvenienced the inmate’s preferred exercise footwear.
    • Vegan‑designated commissary items: No substantial burden where vegan meals were available through the AEP; RLUIPA does not compel the prison to stock a vegan commissary when meals already accommodate the diet.
    • Vegan meals: Moot because the inmate had been reenrolled in the AEP and remained on it; the “restricted vegan” plan still provided vegan meals. The voluntary‑cessation exception did not apply; government defendants are presumed not to resume challenged conduct, and any future removal would be based on conduct within the inmate’s control.
  • Procedural Note on Damages under RLUIPA: The court noted existing circuit precedent foreclosing money damages against officials for RLUIPA violations and declined to stay the case pending the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Landor, because the plaintiff had forfeited the damages issue below.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769 (11th Cir. 2020), and Nehme v. FIU, 121 F.4th 1379 (11th Cir. 2024): Standards of de novo review for summary judgment and qualified immunity.
  • Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975 (11th Cir. 2017): De novo review for mootness; RLUIPA framework in prisons (also later cited for the substantial burden standard elsewhere in the opinion).
  • Mobley v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2015), and Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019): Two‑step qualified immunity burden shifting; plaintiff must prevail on both prongs.
  • Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047 (11th Cir. 2019): Discretionary‑authority inquiry focuses on the official’s job function (“arsenal of powers”), not on strict compliance with internal policy; managing a food program falls within a warden’s legitimate functions.
  • Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912 (11th Cir. 2022): “Clearly established” law cannot rest on abstract generalities; the unlawfulness must be apparent to a reasonable officer without materially similar facts only where the principle is exceptionally clear.
  • Watts v. Florida Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007): Free Exercise requires a sincerely held religious belief.
  • Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), n.13: Prison officials may (and courts can) question the authenticity of religious claims; the sincerity inquiry is permissible though not probing.
  • Cambridge Christian School, Inc. v. FHSAA, 942 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2019): Courts may test sincerity but the inquiry should not be unduly probing.
  • United States v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 828 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2016), and Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1987): Relied upon by the inmate but found not materially similar; neither involved contradictory inmate conduct undermining claimed religious dietary adherence.
  • Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC, 34 F.4th 1028 (11th Cir. 2022), and Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999): Due process protected liberty interests arise where the State has consistently provided a benefit and its denial imposes atypical and significant hardship relative to ordinary prison life.
  • Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999), and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995): Invoked by the inmate, but the court found the general principles insufficient to clearly establish a right to remain on a religious diet amid contradictory conduct.
  • Sweet v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2006), and Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010): Equal Protection comparator requirements; “prima facie identical in all relevant respects.”
  • Evers v. General Motors, 770 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1985): Conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts do not create a genuine issue for trial.
  • Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2017), and Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995): Equal Protection requires purposeful, intentional discrimination; racist language evidence can preclude summary judgment.
  • Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 2020), and Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985): Eighth Amendment standards; prisons must provide reasonably adequate, nutritionally sufficient food; only “extreme deprivations” that pose unreasonable risk of serious harm violate the Constitution.
  • McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004), and LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991): Other circuits recognizing that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee compliance with religious dietary preferences per se.
  • Thai Meditation Ass’n of Alabama v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2020): RLUIPA “substantial burden” requires more than inconvenience; coercive pressure that tends to force adherents to violate precepts or mandates religious conduct can qualify.
  • Florida Ass’n of Rehabilitation Facilities v. Florida DHRS, 225 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2000), Sierra Club v. EPA, 315 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2002): Mootness principles; jurisdictional dismissal when no meaningful relief remains available.
  • United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953), Coral Springs Street Systems v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2004), and Keohane v. Florida DOC Secretary, 952 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2020): Voluntary cessation doctrine; government defendants receive a rebuttable presumption of non‑recurrence when ceasing challenged conduct.
  • Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004): Forfeiture of arguments not raised below; discretionary exceptions are narrow.
  • Landor v. Louisiana DOC & Public Safety, No. 23‑1197 (U.S. June 23, 2025): Cited by the panel to note pending Supreme Court review of RLUIPA damages, though the issue was forfeited here and Eleventh Circuit precedent currently forecloses damages against officials for RLUIPA violations.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Qualified Immunity on Free Exercise and Due Process

The court first confirmed that managing the religious meal program fell within the officials’ discretionary authority even though, at the time of the July 2020 removals, the Georgia DOC policy had not yet listed non‑vegan commissary purchases as a formal removal criterion. Under Carruth, the “discretionary authority” inquiry centers on whether the action is within the official’s job functions, not whether the official complied with every internal policy. Managing the AEP list was squarely within that authority.

Turning to “clearly established” law, the court framed the Free Exercise question narrowly: could officials reasonably rely on an inmate’s repeated purchase of non‑vegan items to question sincerity and remove him from a vegan religious diet without violating clearly established law? Relying on Cutter’s recognition that prisons may question authenticity and Cambridge Christian’s caution that the inquiry should not be probing, the panel held that general statements requiring accommodation of “truly held” beliefs did not give “fair warning” that removal in these circumstances was unlawful. The inmate’s cited precedents did not involve contradictory conduct.

On procedural due process, the court noted that an inmate must show a protected liberty interest and inadequate process. Although the inmate argued that the AEP created a liberty interest and that removal forced a choice between starvation and faith, he identified no authority clearly establishing a liberty interest in remaining on a religious diet program when the inmate’s own conduct undermined the claimed commitment. Broad statements from Bass and Sandin could not carry the burden. Qualified immunity therefore attached to both the Free Exercise and Due Process claims.

2) Equal Protection: Comparators and Discriminatory Purpose

The court required a showing that similarly situated inmates of other races or religions received better treatment and that decisionmakers acted with discriminatory intent. The inmate relied primarily on a white, Jewish comparator, but the only receipt in the record showed non‑vegan purchases dated August 19, 2020—after the July 2020 purchase review that precipitated removals. Because officials could not have removed that inmate in July for purchases made in August, the comparator was not similarly situated “in all relevant respects.” Additional assertions that unnamed white or Jewish inmates also bought non‑vegan items were conclusory and undated; under Evers, such assertions do not create a genuine issue of fact.

On discriminatory purpose, the record showed that removals were based on non‑vegan purchases and spanned multiple racial groups, with no evidence of racial animus (unlike Harris, where racist language supported a triable issue). Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

3) Eighth Amendment: Adequate Nutrition vs. Religious Preference

The Eighth Amendment requires reasonably adequate, nutritionally sufficient meals—not menu compliance with religious preferences. The inmate did not dispute that standard trays were nutritionally adequate; he argued that he could not eat them due to religious constraints. The panel warned against a rule allowing an inmate to manufacture a constitutional deprivation by refusing to eat adequate food. Medical records did not show serious risk to health (and COVID‑19 infection—contracted before the onset of symptoms—confounded causal claims). No triable Eighth Amendment claim existed.

4) RLUIPA: No Substantial Burden for Vegan Shoes/Commissary; Vegan Meals Moot

The court applied RLUIPA’s threshold: the plaintiff must show the government substantially burdened his religious exercise. Two of the inmate’s “Special Religious Requests” failed this test:

  • Vegan athletic shoes: Denial amounted to inconvenience, not coercion to violate religious tenets. The availability of rubber slides and alternatives sufficed; the statute does not assure preferred gym footwear.
  • Vegan‑designated commissary items: Because vegan meals were available through the AEP, the lack of vegan labeling or vegan stock at the commissary did not substantially burden religious exercise. RLUIPA does not require duplicative food avenues once the core diet is otherwise accommodated.

The third request—for vegan meals—was dismissed as moot. The inmate had been reenrolled on October 19, 2020, and remained on the AEP. He argued that the “restricted vegan” plan was “largely inedible,” but he had sued over removal, not meal quality, and the restricted plan still provided vegan meals—the relief he sought. Invoking the voluntary cessation doctrine failed: government defendants benefit from a rebuttable presumption of non‑recurrence, and any future removal would be based on the inmate’s own non‑vegan purchases (now expressly codified as a basis for removal). The record showed years of uninterrupted participation since reenrollment.

Finally, the court noted (in addressing the inmate’s request to stay the mandate) that Eleventh Circuit precedent presently forecloses money damages against officials for RLUIPA violations; because the plaintiff had not raised a damages theory below, the issue was forfeited notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Landor. Practitioners should therefore preserve such claims if they wish to benefit from any future change in the law.

Impact and Practical Consequences

  • Use of commissary data to assess sincerity: This published decision validates reliance on objective conduct—like repeated purchases of foods inconsistent with claimed religious restrictions—to question sincerity and administer program eligibility. While sincerity inquiries must not be “probing,” this case reinforces that they need not be blind to contradictions.
  • Qualified immunity contours: Plaintiffs must marshal materially similar precedent to defeat qualified immunity; generalities about accommodating religious diets will not suffice where the inmate’s conduct undercuts his claim. This will make early resolution (Rule 56) more attainable for prison officials in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Equal Protection evidentiary rigor: Comparator claims require specifics: names, dates, and contemporaneity of conduct relative to enforcement windows. Conclusory, undated affidavits will not avert summary judgment, and proof of discriminatory purpose remains essential.
  • Eighth Amendment boundaries: The decision underscores that adequacy is measured objectively by nutritional content, not by an inmate’s willingness to eat for religious reasons. Plaintiffs seeking Eighth Amendment relief should focus on demonstrable deficiencies and health risk, not personal abstention.
  • RLUIPA limits for non‑meal items: Denials of adjunct accommodations (e.g., vegan shoes or vegan‑labeled commissary products) are unlikely to qualify as “substantial burdens” when core dietary needs are otherwise met through a meal program. Plaintiffs should be prepared to show coercive pressure to violate religious precepts, not merely inconvenience.
  • Mootness of injunctive claims after reinstatement: Reenrollment typically moots claims seeking access to religious diets. The government’s voluntary cessation presumption is robust, particularly where recurrence hinges on inmate‑controlled conduct (e.g., commissary choices).
  • Policy changes do not defeat discretionary authority: The court’s application of Carruth clarifies that acting outside a then‑existing written policy does not strip officials of discretionary authority for qualified immunity purposes if the function is part of their job duties; this has implications for other prison program decisions pending policy updates.
  • Strategic litigation considerations:
    • Plead both removal and meal‑quality theories if both are at issue; the latter may survive mootness where the former does not.
    • Preserve RLUIPA damages theories and monitor Landor; although foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit at present, Supreme Court developments could alter remedies.
    • Document sincerity with consistent conduct; if purchases are for resale, corroborate with admissible evidence (e.g., contemporaneous proof of sales) to counter adverse inferences.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A shield for officials unless (1) they acted outside their job duties or (2) they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established by prior, materially similar cases or an obvious, specific principle. It protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.
  • Discretionary authority: Not whether the official followed every policy, but whether the action fell within the scope of the official’s job. Running a prison diet program does.
  • “Clearly established” law: Requires more than broad statements. The plaintiff must point to precedent that made it apparent to reasonable officials that the specific conduct was unlawful.
  • Sincerity inquiry: Government and courts may test whether a claimed religious belief is genuine. The inquiry should be respectful and not intrusive, but it may consider actions inconsistent with professed beliefs.
  • Equal Protection comparators: To show differential treatment, a plaintiff must identify others who are the same in all relevant respects (same program, same conduct, same time window) who were treated better.
  • Eighth Amendment nutrition standard: The Constitution requires “reasonably adequate” food with enough nutritional value to maintain health. Personal refusal to eat adequate food does not convert adequacy into a constitutional violation.
  • RLUIPA “substantial burden”: More than inconvenience. The policy must exert significant pressure that coerces a person to violate religious precepts or mandates religious conduct contrary to belief.
  • Mootness and voluntary cessation: A case is moot when a court cannot grant meaningful relief. If the government stops the challenged behavior, courts presume it will not resume it unless the plaintiff shows a reasonable likelihood of recurrence.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in Sumrall provides a clear, administrable framework for prison officials and litigants alike. It confirms that officials may look to objective conduct—such as commissary purchases contradicting claimed dietary restrictions—to assess sincerity and enforce religious diet programs without running afoul of clearly established Free Exercise or Due Process rights. Equal Protection claims must be grounded in specific, contemporaneous comparators and evidence of discriminatory purpose. Eighth Amendment claims hinge on nutritional adequacy, not subjective willingness to eat. And under RLUIPA, adjunct requests like vegan athletic shoes or vegan‑labeled commissary items generally will not constitute “substantial burdens” when a religious meal program meets the inmate’s dietary needs; meanwhile, reinstatement to such a program moots injunctive meal‑access claims absent a realistic prospect of recurrence.

Collectively, the opinion reinforces deference to prison administrators’ management of religious accommodation programs while preserving pathways for well‑documented claims showing concrete coercion or discriminatory treatment. It will likely be cited throughout the Eleventh Circuit for its pragmatic application of qualified immunity, its evidentiary rigor on Equal Protection, its boundary‑setting on Eighth Amendment diet claims, and its measured view of RLUIPA’s substantial‑burden threshold in the prison context.