Colorado “Major Purpose” for Issue-Committee Status: Holistic, Factor-Guided Inquiry with Aggregation Across Ballot Measures

Introduction

Unite for Colorado v. Department of State, 2026 CO 56 (Colo. June 29, 2026), is a campaign-finance case about when an organization becomes an “issue committee” under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(I) of the Colorado Constitution—triggering registration and ongoing disclosure obligations under Colorado’s campaign-finance regime.

The dispute arose from Unite for Colorado’s activities during the 2020 election cycle, when it spent about $4.03 million on ballot-measure advocacy involving Propositions 113, 116, and 117, out of total spending of about $17.17 million (roughly 23.4%). After an administrative process and competing rulings in district court and the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on a single question: whether the court of appeals erred in interpreting the Constitution’s “major purpose” standard for issue-committee status.

The key legal issues were: (1) what “a major purpose” means under article XXVIII; and (2) whether “any ballot issue or ballot question” permits considering activity in the aggregate across multiple ballot measures, or requires a measure-by-measure inquiry. (The Court expressly did not reach Unite’s First Amendment claims because it denied certiorari on those issues.)

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the court of appeals and held:

  • “A major purpose” requires a holistic, fact-specific analysis of an organization’s creation, spending, and ballot-campaign-related activities, guided by a nonexhaustive set of factors recognized in Colorado case law and statute at the time.
  • The phrase “any ballot issue or ballot question” permits considering an organization’s ballot advocacy in the aggregate across multiple ballot measures.
  • Applying this framework, Unite’s early engagement in ballot advocacy and its in-kind signature-gathering support weighed in favor of a “major purpose,” but its relatively low percentage of spending on ballot advocacy (23.4%) weighed strongly against. Under the totality of circumstances, Unite did not have a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy in 2020 and therefore was not an issue committee.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Federal origins of the “major purpose” concept

The Court treated the “major purpose” phrase as a term of art with constitutional pedigree, anchoring its interpretation in U.S. Supreme Court decisions:

  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976): The origin of the “major purpose” limitation in campaign-finance doctrine. Buckley narrowed “political committee” coverage to groups controlled by candidates or whose major purpose is candidate nomination/election, helping address vagueness concerns. The Colorado Supreme Court used Buckley both as historical context and as evidence that “major purpose” calls for an inquiry into the organization, not a mechanical spending threshold.
  • Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) ("MCFL"): Central to Colorado’s reasoning. MCFL assessed the organization’s formation, funding, communications, and spending—an explicitly fact-intensive approach—before concluding the group was not a political committee. Colorado relied on MCFL to justify a flexible, “totality of circumstances” method and to support the specific types of facts considered in the seven-factor guidelines it adopts.
  • Supporting circuit authority that reflects Buckley’s approach: Fed. Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Fla. for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982).
  • The footnote discussion of administrative practice and “case-by-case” flexibility: The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012).

2) Colorado’s pre-Amendment 27 landscape and voter adoption

  • Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748 (Colo. 2000): A key “before” case. The Court had refused to read a “major purpose” limitation into the then-existing statutory definition of issue committee. In Unite, the Court used Common Sense Alliance to show that Amendment 27’s later addition of “major purpose” was deliberate—closing the earlier interpretive gap by importing a known doctrine.
  • Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007): Noted for two points: (i) the Tenth Circuit treated article XXVIII’s definition as adopting a Buckley-style major purpose test; and (ii) the court held that a $200 threshold “standing alone” is unconstitutional (a reminder that Colorado’s regulatory scheme must be tethered to constitutionally meaningful limiting principles).

3) Colorado appellate elaboration of “major purpose” (the Court largely embraces, but corrects the application)

  • Independence Institute v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008): Upheld the major purpose standard against vagueness/overbreadth challenges and articulated early factors (charter/bylaws, activities/expenditures, publications). Unite adopts the general approach of fact-specific analysis, treating Independence Institute as foundational Colorado guidance.
  • Cerbo v. Protect Colorado Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2010): Interpreted “major” as “considerable, principal” and evaluated multiple factors. Unite relies on Cerbo for definitional clarity and for the “considerable or principal portion” framing.
  • Colorado Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, 363 P.3d 727: Struck down a Secretary of State rule using a 30% expenditure threshold as arbitrary/capricious and untethered to the statutory “pattern of conduct” analysis. Unite uses this as a caution against bright-line percentages and in favor of holistic assessment.

4) Interpretive methodology cases (state constitutional construction)

  • Markwell v. Cooke, 2021 CO 17: The twin aims of constitutional interpretation—effectuate intent and prevent evasion.
  • People v. Smith, 2023 CO 40: Plain meaning as the starting point.
  • Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356: Technical meaning through judicial construction.
  • Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Maj. Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12: Use of technical legal meanings in construing article XXVIII (here, “express advocacy”).
  • In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549: Reliance on ballot titles/submission clauses and the Blue Book to discern voter intent.
  • In re Interrogatory on House Joint Resol. 20-1006, 2020 CO 23; Dwyer v. State, 2015 CO 58: Harmonization, deference to coordinate branches where appropriate, and presuming voter knowledge of existing law.
  • Weld Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550: Using constitutional declarations as interpretive guides.
  • In re Great Outdoors Colo. Tr. Fund, 913 P.2d 533: Courts should adopt constructions consistent with coordinate branches where possible.
  • Anti-evasion canon: Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, and Inst. for the Edu. of the Mute & Blind v. Henderson, 31 P. 714.

5) The informational interest and disclosure rationale

The Court supported Colorado’s disclosure regime by tying it to the electorate’s informational interest:

  • First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765: Even while protecting ballot-issue speech, the Court recognized disclosure as a means for voters to evaluate arguments.
  • Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182: Upheld certain ballot-measure disclosure requirements; recognized voter interest in knowing sources/amounts spent to place measures on the ballot.
  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310: Reaffirmed transparency and “who is speaking” rationales.
  • Lobbying-disclosure analogies: United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612; Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1.
  • Circumvention concerns: McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93.

6) “Any” means “all” for aggregation

In holding that “any ballot issue or ballot question” allows aggregation, the Court relied on interpretive precedents giving “any” an expansive meaning: Winslow v. Morgan Cnty. Comm'rs (relying on Filmore v. Wells); BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue; Stamp v. Vail Corp.; and the U.S. Supreme Court’s note in Babb v. Wilkie.

Legal Reasoning

1) “Major purpose” is a standard, not a formula

The Court began with ordinary meaning (“major” as “considerable, principal”; “purpose” as an objective), but concluded that those definitions do not themselves supply an administrable test. Because voters adopted a phrase already loaded with judicial meaning, the Court treated “major purpose” as importing a Buckley/MCFL-style approach: a holistic, case-by-case inquiry focused on whether ballot advocacy is a “considerable or principal” part of the organization’s activities.

The Court reinforced this by:

  • Citing Amendment 27’s declaration favoring “full and timely disclosure” and “strong enforcement” (art. XXVIII, § 1), showing a policy goal of meaningful transparency.
  • Using the Blue Book’s emphasis on informing voters “who is spending money to influence elections,” aligning the test with the informational interest underpinning disclosure.
  • Invoking anti-evasion principles: a rigid rule invites sophisticated actors to structure around disclosure.

2) The Court adopts (as nonexclusive) seven guiding factors

The Court approved the court of appeals’ list of seven factors as “guidelines” (not a checklist; none dispositive):

  1. Objectives in organizational documents or public statements;
  2. Activities and annual expenditures relative to ballot-measure activities/expenditures;
  3. Scope of issues in publications relative to ballot-measure communications;
  4. Length of existence relative to ballot advocacy;
  5. Organizational structure;
  6. Interrelatedness with the ballot measure’s proponents/opponents; and
  7. Other issues with which the organization has been involved.

The Court emphasized the factors’ pedigree: they reflect Colorado appellate law (notably Independence Institute and Cerbo), legislative codification efforts (2010 statutory definition), and the types of facts evaluated in MCFL.

3) “Any ballot issue or ballot question” allows aggregation

The Court held that “any” is expansive and is read in Colorado law to mean “all,” so a court may consider an organization’s ballot advocacy across multiple ballot measures. It also relied on purpose: voters’ informational interest is not reduced when spending is distributed across several measures. Finally, it rejected Unite’s measure-by-measure approach as producing absurd results (e.g., 100% ballot spending split across many measures could evade regulation).

4) Application to Unite: spending share is central, though not dispositive

Applying the fact-specific inquiry, the Court found:

  • Objectives: Mixed. Unite’s website described it as an “issue advocacy organization,” but its formal correspondence disclaimed issue-committee status; the factor was not strongly weighted.
  • Timing: Supports major purpose. Unite engaged in ballot advocacy within about three months of formation.
  • Interrelatedness: Supports major purpose. Unite’s in-kind signature-gathering services and coordination signals (including contact with Independence Institute and subsequent creation of an issue committee supporting Proposition 116) suggested coordination more consistent with ballot-campaign purpose than incidental issue speech.
  • Overall spending ratio: Strongly ضد major purpose. Although $4+ million is substantial in absolute terms, the constitutional inquiry is comparative; 23.4% was held insufficient to show ballot advocacy was “considerable or principal” relative to all activities.

The Court declined to apply certain factors due to an insufficient record (publications scope, structure, and breadth of issue involvement), underscoring that the analysis is evidence-dependent and case-specific.

Impact

1) Clarified statewide rule for “major purpose” (and what it is not)

Unite establishes statewide Colorado Supreme Court authority that: (i) “major purpose” is a holistic, fact-specific standard, not a rigid percentage test; (ii) courts should use the seven-factor framework as guiding, nonexclusive considerations; and (iii) “any ballot issue or ballot question” allows aggregation across ballot measures.

2) Practical consequences for enforcement and compliance

  • Aggregation forecloses a common avoidance theory: Organizations cannot avoid “major purpose” scrutiny merely by spreading ballot spending across multiple measures.
  • Spending share becomes a heavyweight factor: While the Court avoided a bright-line threshold, its statement that spending “less than a quarter” does not reflect a major purpose will predictably influence future disputes—especially where other factors are mixed.
  • Record-building matters: The Court’s refusal to weigh certain factors due to insufficient evidence signals that agencies/complainants and respondents alike must develop detailed records on non-ballot activities, communications, and structure.
  • Reduced reliance on agency-made percentage rules: The decision aligns with Colorado Ethics Watch v. Gessler’s skepticism of arbitrary thresholds and pushes decision-makers toward narrative, evidence-based determinations.

3) Likely doctrinal ripple effects

Future cases may turn on: how to characterize “overall spending” (e.g., what counts as ballot advocacy versus general policy advocacy), how to assess “interrelatedness” (especially when services are provided), and how to weigh mixed-purpose entities with substantial non-ballot programs. Unite also strengthens the interpretive link between Colorado’s constitutional campaign-finance framework and federal major-purpose doctrine (Buckley/MCFL), which may shape future constitutional challenges even though this Court did not reach the First Amendment issues here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Issue committee: An organization regulated under Colorado campaign-finance law because it has a “major purpose” of supporting or opposing ballot measures (and, under the Secretary’s interpretation applied here, also crosses certain spending thresholds).
  • Major purpose: Not “any purpose” or “some spending.” It asks whether ballot advocacy is a principal or considerable part of what the organization does—judged from multiple kinds of evidence (purpose statements, spending, activities, timing, coordination, etc.).
  • Aggregation: Combining an organization’s ballot-measure advocacy across multiple ballot propositions when evaluating whether ballot advocacy is a major purpose.
  • In-kind contribution: Non-cash support (here, services like petition printing and signature gathering) that can signal closer operational coordination than a simple monetary donation.
  • Informational interest: The government’s (and voters’) interest in disclosure so the public can evaluate who is spending to influence electoral outcomes—especially salient for ballot measures where voters act like legislators.
  • Fact-specific / totality of circumstances: A flexible approach that considers the full picture instead of applying a single numerical rule.

Conclusion

Unite for Colorado v. Department of State (2026 CO 56) cements two core rules for Colorado ballot-measure regulation: (1) the “major purpose” inquiry is a holistic, factor-guided assessment of an organization’s creation, spending, and ballot-campaign conduct; and (2) the Constitution’s reference to “any ballot issue or ballot question” allows aggregation across measures.

On the merits, the Court’s application underscores that absolute dollars are not enough; what matters is whether ballot advocacy is “considerable or principal” relative to the organization’s overall operations. Despite meaningful ballot involvement and coordination indicators, Unite’s 23.4% ballot-advocacy share led the Court to hold it was not an issue committee for 2020—reversing the court of appeals and providing durable guidance for future enforcement, compliance planning, and litigation.