Colorado Auto-Insurance Disclosure: “Copy” Means the Full Policy, Relevance Is Broad, and the § 10-3-1117 Penalty Accrues Once Per Claim

Case: Fogel v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (10th Cir. May 21, 2026) (Order and Judgment; persuasive authority)
Statute at Issue: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1117(2)(a), (3)

1. Introduction

Fogel arises from a bicycle–truck collision in Pueblo, Colorado. The tort claimant, Carl Fogel, sought the at-fault driver John Catalano’s insurance information from Shelter Mutual Insurance Company under Colorado’s auto-insurance disclosure statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1117.

Section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requires an insurer, within 30 days of a proper written request, to provide specified information for “each known policy of insurance of the named insured … that is or may be relevant to the claim,” including “(iv) A copy of the policy.” If the insurer violates the section, § 10-3-1117(3) imposes “one hundred dollars per day” from the 31st day “until the insurer provides the information required,” plus “attorney fees and costs incurred … in enforcing the penalty.”

The dispute centered on four Shelter policies associated with Catalano: one covering the Ford Ranger involved in the accident, plus three other policies for other vehicles (and/or where Catalano was an insured). Shelter promptly produced only the Ranger policy, then later sent a letter quoting and analyzing policy language to explain why the other policies did not apply—without producing those policies. Shelter produced the remaining policies more than a year later in federal Rule 26 disclosures.

The key issues on appeal were:

• Relevance: whether policies for vehicles not involved in the collision were policies that “are or may be relevant to the claim” under § 10-3-1117(2)(a).
• Form of disclosure: whether excerpts/analysis could substitute for “a copy of the policy.”
• Penalty structure: whether the $100/day penalty is multiplied per policy/request or applies once per claim.
• Fee shifting: whether appellate fees are available to the claimant who successfully defends the penalty award.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Fogel on liability and affirmed the district court’s penalty calculation of $35,600 (356 days × $100/day), holding:

• Under Colorado interpretive rules, and guided principally by Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance, the disclosure duty in § 10-3-1117(2)(a) unambiguously required Shelter to provide copies of the non-Ranger policies because coverage was at least a legitimate question during the statutory response period.
• The statutory phrase “A copy of the policy” requires the policy itself, not excerpts, not summaries, and not quotations lifted from another policy form—even if the insurer asserts the forms are identical.
• Section 10-3-1117(3) authorizes a single running penalty per claim/violation period, not multiple penalties per separate request or per unproduced policy.
• Fogel is entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees and costs for defending Shelter’s appeal under § 10-3-1117(3), with the amount to be determined on remand; however, fees attributable to Fogel’s unsuccessful cross-appeal seeking multiplied penalties are excluded.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is explicitly “Erie-predictive”: it sought the result Colorado courts would reach, emphasizing Colorado statutory-construction decisions and a newly issued intermediate appellate interpretation of § 10-3-1117.

• Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance (Colo. App. Feb. 5, 2026).
  This is the opinion’s pivotal state-law anchor and the first Colorado appellate decision interpreting § 10-3-1117’s “is or may be relevant” language. Bohanan held the statute “unambiguously” required disclosure even where the insurer later concluded no coverage existed; an insurer cannot defeat the statute by a unilateral coverage denial. The Tenth Circuit treated Bohanan as “highly persuasive” and applied its logic: the need for multi-page analysis in Shelter’s July letter demonstrated a real coverage question, making the non-Ranger policies “or may be” relevant during the response period.
• McWilliams v. Dinapoli (10th Cir. 2022); Etherton v. Owners Ins. (10th Cir. 2016); N.H. Ins. v. TSG Ski & Golf (10th Cir. 2025).
  These decisions supply the Tenth Circuit’s deference framework: absent “convincing evidence” the Colorado Supreme Court would disagree, the federal court follows the Colorado Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Colorado law. This is the doctrinal basis for treating Bohanan as effectively controlling guidance.
• Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez (Colo. 2025) and People ex rel. B.C.B. (Colo. 2025).
  These Colorado Supreme Court cases provide the interpretive toolkit: start with text, enforce plain meaning, read harmoniously, avoid surplusage and absurdity, and only use extratextual aids if ambiguity persists. The panel used these principles to (i) treat “copy” as plain-language “duplicate,” and (ii) reject multiplied penalties as both textually unsupported and absurdly incentivizing.
• Thao v. Grady Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth. (10th Cir. 2025) and Pirkheim v. First Unum Life Ins. (10th Cir. 2000).
  These are procedural precedents for de novo review of summary judgment and for drawing inferences against the party targeted by the motion under review in cross-motions.
• Wade v. EMCASCO Ins. (10th Cir. 2007).
  Cited for the broader “predictive” approach—considering other jurisdictions and trends—though the panel ultimately deemed that unnecessary because Bohanan clarified Colorado law.
• Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50 (Colo. 2006) and People v. Jones (Colo. 2020).
  These stand for the proposition that when statutory language is unambiguous, courts apply it as written and do not resort to other interpretive aids (e.g., statutory purpose or lenity). The panel used these to avoid deciding the rule-of-lenity dispute.
• Weatherill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. (Colo. App. Mar. 12, 2026).
  Cited to note an adjacent question—whether § 10-3-1117 is “penal” for statute-of-limitations purposes—without resolving whether lenity applies here.
• Stumpf v. Colo. Dep't of Rev., Motor Vehicle Div. (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns (U.S. 2001)).
  Used to reject “mousehole” readings: if the legislature intended multiple penalties, it would have said so, rather than implying an “elephant” in an otherwise singular penalty clause.
• Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes (Colo. 2010) and Frazier v. People (Colo. 2004).
  These support the “avoid absurd results / honor legislative intent” approach in rejecting claimant-controlled penalty multiplication that could distort the insurance market and the statute’s settlement/transparency objectives.
• Colorow Health Care v. Fischer (Colo. 2018).
  This is the panel’s “substantial compliance” framework. Even assuming substantial (not strict) compliance could suffice, Shelter failed: noncompliance was “stark,” undermined transparency purposes, and did not support an inference of good-faith effort.
• Banner Bank v. Smith (10th Cir. 2022); Town of Erie v. Town of Frederick (Colo. App. 2010); Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. (Colo. App. 2012); Stuart v. N. Shore Water & Sanitation Dist. (Colo. App. 2009).
  These authorities support awarding appellate fees under a fee-shifting statute (state law governs in diversity; appellate fees are included; fees are limited to successful issues and excluded for unsuccessful cross-appeal components).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. “Is or may be relevant to the claim” — relevance is evaluated ex ante, not by the insurer’s final coverage conclusion

The panel treated § 10-3-1117(2)(a) as a disclosure regime designed to ensure claimants can assess potential coverage, not as a privilege reserved for policies the insurer ultimately concedes are applicable. The decisive insight borrowed from Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance is that “may be relevant” captures uncertainty during the statutory response period: if it takes investigation or detailed policy interpretation to decide coverage, the policy “may be relevant” and must be disclosed.

The panel highlighted that Shelter’s own conduct demonstrated uncertainty: the July letter offered multi-page quotations and interpretive analysis to justify non-coverage. That level of analysis supported the inference that the policies were not obviously irrelevant and that the coverage question was “fundamental,” thereby triggering disclosure.

Critically, the court rejected the insurer-veto model: allowing an insurer to deny disclosure whenever it decides no coverage exists would hollow out “may be relevant,” permit strategic nondisclosure, and invert the statute’s transparency function.

B. “A copy of the policy” — plain meaning forecloses excerpts and “trust us” equivalency

The court’s “copy means duplicate” holding is a straightforward application of Colorado’s plain-meaning rule (Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez; People ex rel. B.C.B.). A “copy” is a duplicate reproduction of the policy; an excerpt is not a duplicate, and excerpts from another policy form are even further afield.

The panel reinforced its textual reading with a contemporaneous regulation: Colo. Code Regs. § 702-5-5-2-03, § 5(C) (2020), which required providing a copy of the policy (excluding declarations and application). That regulatory structure only makes sense if “copy” refers to the policy document itself, not a claimant’s ability to reconstruct coverage from partial materials. (The court noted the regulation’s later repeal in December 2025, but used it as confirmatory context for how “copy” was operationalized at the time.)

C. Penalty mechanics — one penalty per claim/violation period, not per request

The court’s penalty analysis turned on the interaction between subsection (2)(a) and subsection (3). While § 10-3-1117(3) speaks in singular terms (“the penalty”), the more structural point is that § 10-3-1117(2)(a) imposes an obligation to produce information for “each known policy … that is or may be relevant” upon a single written request—without requiring multiple separate requests per policy.

If the insurer’s legal duty is not keyed to the number of requests, the penalty should not be either. The panel also invoked Colorado’s “absurd results” canon (People ex rel. B.C.B.) to reject a claimant-controlled multiplication scheme, which would encourage redundant requests to inflate penalties rather than advance disclosure.

D. “Substantial compliance” did not save Shelter

Even assuming (without deciding) that § 10-3-1117 tolerates substantial compliance, the court held Shelter failed under Colorow Health Care v. Fischer:

• Extent of noncompliance: Shelter did not provide what the statute explicitly demanded—copies of the policies—so the deviation was categorical, not technical.
• Purpose achieved?: the statute seeks transparency and reliable information; “dribs and drabs” coupled with “take our word for it” undermines that purpose.
• Good faith: where the statutory command is clear, refusing to do the easy thing (send copies) made it unreasonable to infer good-faith compliance efforts.

E. Fee shifting includes appellate fees, but only for successful work

Applying Banner Bank v. Smith, the court treated fees as part of the state-law cause of action and thus governed by Colorado law. Under § 10-3-1117(3) and Colorado appellate-fee principles (Town of Erie v. Town of Frederick), Fogel could recover reasonable appellate fees for “successfully defending the appeal” (as recognized in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins.). But consistent with Stuart v. N. Shore Water & Sanitation Dist., he could not recover fees attributable to his unsuccessful cross-appeal seeking multiplied penalties.

3.3 Impact

A. Practical compliance rule for insurers: “Send the policies, not the argument”

The decision strongly discourages a common litigation posture: responding to disclosure demands with coverage positions, excerpts, or summaries rather than document production. For Colorado claims governed by § 10-3-1117, insurers should expect that:

• Where coverage requires investigation or interpretation, the policy is at least “may be relevant,” triggering production.
• Producing a declarations page, liability limits, or a template form is not a substitute for producing a “copy of the policy.”
• Attempted “substantial compliance” will be scrutinized for whether it actually achieves statutory transparency—particularly when producing a full policy is easy.

B. Litigation incentives: penalty exposure is real, but not claimant-multipliable

The per-claim (not per-request) construction stabilizes exposure: insurers face a daily running penalty until they comply, but claimants cannot increase the daily rate by sending multiple requests. This balances two policy concerns evident in the opinion: (i) robust enforcement of prompt disclosure, and (ii) avoidance of arbitrary windfalls untethered to statutory purpose.

C. Likely influence on Colorado courts and federal diversity cases

Although labeled nonprecedential, Fogel is positioned to be persuasive in federal diversity cases applying Colorado law because it hews closely to Colorado interpretive methodology and relies on Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance. If the Colorado Supreme Court grants certiorari in Bohanan (noted as “cert. filed” in the opinion), its eventual resolution could either cement or recalibrate this framework; until then, Fogel provides a structured, text-and-purpose-consistent road map for applying § 10-3-1117.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Erie prediction”: In a federal diversity case, the federal court applies state substantive law. If the state supreme court has not spoken, the federal court predicts what it would do, often relying heavily on intermediate appellate decisions.
• “Is or may be relevant”: This is not “actually covers.” It asks whether, at the time disclosure is due, the policy could matter to the claim—especially when coverage is uncertain or contested.
• “Copy of the policy”: The actual policy document (a duplicate), not a summary, not selective excerpts, and not an insurer’s assurance that another form contains the same terms.
• Per-claim vs. per-request penalties: Per-claim means one $100/day stream for the insurer’s failure to provide required information for the claim; per-request would allow multiple $100/day streams based solely on how many letters the claimant sends.
• “Substantial compliance”: Sometimes the law tolerates near-miss compliance. Colorado evaluates (among other factors) how serious the deviation is, whether the rule’s purpose was still achieved, and whether the actor tried in good faith. Here, failing to provide policy copies was too fundamental to qualify.
• Rule of lenity: A tie-breaking rule that construes grievously ambiguous penal statutes in favor of the accused. The court did not reach it because it found the statute unambiguous as applied.

5. Conclusion

Fogel v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company crystallizes a pragmatic but text-driven enforcement regime for Colorado’s auto-insurance disclosure statute: (1) when coverage is genuinely in question, policies “may be relevant” and must be disclosed; (2) “a copy of the policy” means the policy itself, not excerpts or advocacy; (3) the $100/day remedy runs once per claim until compliance, preventing claimant-manufactured multiplication; and (4) fee shifting includes appellate fees for successful enforcement of the penalty.

The broader significance is institutional: the opinion treats § 10-3-1117 as a transparency mandate that reallocates informational leverage early in claims, aiming to reduce coverage guessing-games that can delay settlement and foster litigation.