Coaching Children to Make False Abuse Allegations Is Actionable Psychological Abuse—and Denial Makes an Improvement Period Futile (In re R.H.-M. and A.H.-M.)

I. Introduction

In In re R.H.-M. and A.H.-M., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed an order terminating a mother’s parental rights after the circuit court found that she psychologically and emotionally abused her children by coaching at least one child to fabricate allegations of physical abuse against the father. The case arose from a July 2023 abuse-and-neglect petition filed by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) based primarily on Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) interviews in which the children described abuse by their father.

Although the initial petition contained no allegations against the mother, the proceedings shifted after the circuit court ordered a psychological evaluation of one child (A.H.-M.) and the record developed evidence that the mother had influenced the child’s disclosures. Following the evaluation, DHS filed an amended petition alleging the mother psychologically abused the children by pressuring the child to make false allegations to please the mother (and maternal grandmother), producing severe anxiety, anger, depression, and disruptive behaviors.

The appeal presented two central issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred in adjudicating the mother as an abusing parent based on clear and convincing evidence; and (2) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminating parental rights where the mother claimed willingness to participate in services but refused to acknowledge her own abusive conduct.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s January 9, 2025, dispositional order terminating the mother’s parental rights. It held:

  • Adjudication was supported by clear and convincing evidence under W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i), including the child’s disclosures during the psychological evaluation that the mother told her to claim the father hit her and directed her what to say, as well as expert testimony that the child exhibited “extensive indications of coaching and influence” and suffered serious psychological effects.
  • Denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period was proper under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) because, despite the mother’s stated willingness to engage in services, she refused to acknowledge responsibility and instead blamed the maternal grandmother—rendering treatment and remediation impracticable under the Court’s established “acknowledgment” requirement.
  • Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare where the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood the mother could correct the conditions of abuse in the near future and that no services could remedy the parenting deficiencies given her ongoing denial.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. In re Cecil T. — Appellate standards of review in abuse and neglect

The Court began with the familiar review framework from Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. This allocation of deference matters in abuse-and-neglect appeals because adjudicatory and dispositional orders frequently turn on credibility, expert interpretation, and the circuit court’s on-the-ground assessment of parental insight and child harm.

Here, the Court’s reliance on In re Cecil T. signals that the mother’s challenge faced a steep uphill climb: she needed to show that the circuit court’s factual findings (coaching, psychological harm, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing) were not just debatable but “clearly erroneous.”

2. In re A.M. — Meaning of “clear and convincing evidence” in adjudication

The Court quoted In re A.M., 243 W. Va. 593, 598, 849 S.E.2d 371, 376 (2020), to explain that “clear and convincing evidence” requires more than a “mere scintilla” yet is less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This articulation is pivotal in emotionally driven cases involving competing narratives, where a parent may attempt to recast expert-driven harm findings as speculative.

Applying In re A.M., the Court treated the child’s disclosures to the evaluating psychologist, coupled with expert testimony attributing the child’s symptom severity to coaching pressure, as satisfying the required evidentiary threshold.

3. In re Tiffany Marie S. — Deference to circuit court findings unless clearly erroneous

The Court invoked Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996), emphasizing that findings of abuse “shall not be set aside” unless clearly erroneous. This principle undergirded the Court’s rejection of the mother’s attempt to shift blame to the maternal grandmother as a means of undermining adjudication.

Notably, the mother’s theory did not negate the circuit court’s core findings that the mother herself coached and influenced the child; it merely suggested an additional actor. Under In re Tiffany Marie S., such reframing does not justify appellate reversal when the record contains ample support for the circuit court’s determination.

4. In re Timber M. and In re Charity H. — The “acknowledgment” requirement and futility of improvement periods

The denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period rested heavily on the Court’s established doctrine that acknowledgment is a prerequisite to effective remediation. The Court quoted In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004)):

“In order to remedy the abuse . . . , the problem must first be acknowledged,” otherwise “the problem [is] untreatable and . . . an improvement period [is] an exercise in futility at the child's expense.”

In In re R.H.-M. and A.H.-M., this rule did decisive work. The mother argued she was willing to participate in services and had engaged in therapy. The Court held that willingness to “do services” without accepting responsibility for the abusive conduct is insufficient because services cannot meaningfully target a denied problem. The mother’s insistence that blaming the grandmother constituted an “appropriate admission” was rejected: the parent must acknowledge their own proven abusive conduct to demonstrate likelihood of full participation and benefit.

5. In re Tonjia M. — Circuit court discretion to deny improvement periods where no improvement is likely

The Court cited In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002), for the proposition that circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when no improvement is likely. This discretionary standard complements the “acknowledgment” doctrine: once the circuit court finds entrenched denial and lack of insight, it may reasonably conclude that a structured improvement period would not be effective or safe.

6. In re H.B. — Imputation of abuse to other children in the home

Although not central to the mother’s assignments of error, the Court highlighted In re H.B., -- W. Va. --, -- S.E.2d --, 2025 WL 3158237 at *6 (Nov. 12, 2025), explaining that “the statutory definition of an abused child allows the abuse of one child to be automatically imputed to other children in the home,” including emotional abuse.

This matters because much of the most developed evidence concerned A.H.-M.’s evaluation and symptom presentation. In re H.B. supports the circuit court’s authority to adjudicate and protect the sibling (R.H.-M.) based on proven abuse to A.H.-M., without requiring identically detailed proof of harm to each child.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Adjudication: coaching as “emotional injury” inflicted knowingly or intentionally

The Court grounded adjudication in the statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence (W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i)) and the definition of an “[a]bused child” in W. Va. Code § 49-1-201, which includes a child whose welfare is harmed or threatened by a parent who “knowingly or intentionally inflicts . . . emotional injury upon the child or another child in the home.”

The opinion treats parental coaching to fabricate abuse allegations as a form of intentional psychological manipulation with foreseeable harm. Several features strengthened the Court’s conclusion:

  • Direct child disclosure of parental direction: A.H.-M. told the psychologist that they went to court to say “Daddy hit me,” and when asked why, answered “Mommy said that,” and reported the mother told her what to tell the psychologist.
  • Expert interpretation of harm and causation: The psychologist attributed “extreme levels of anger, anxiety, and disruptive behaviors” and “significant depression and low self-esteem” to the child’s pressured false-allegation role and enmeshment.
  • Evidence of persistence and context: The circuit court emphasized the “relentless and pervasive” nature of the mother’s behavior, even during the evaluation process itself.

The mother’s principal appellate response—that the grandmother was responsible—did not negate this evidence. The Court characterized that argument as ignoring “evidence directly indicating that the petitioner coached A.H.-M.”

2. Improvement period: “willingness” is not “likelihood to fully participate” without accountability

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a parent seeking a post-adjudicatory improvement period must demonstrate they are “likely to fully participate.” The Court treated “full participation” as more than attendance and compliance; it includes the psychological capacity and honesty necessary to engage in services aimed at correcting the adjudicated conditions.

The circuit court found the mother had “numerous opportunities” to accept responsibility but “failed and refused,” continuing to blame the grandmother. The Supreme Court of Appeals endorsed the circuit court’s view that this rendered the abusive dynamics not meaningfully treatable through services—tracking the In re Timber M./In re Charity H. acknowledgment doctrine.

Importantly, the Court did not hold that therapy participation is irrelevant; rather, it held that therapy without insight and accountability does not satisfy the statutory requirement to show likely full participation in an improvement period aimed at remedying the proven abuse.

3. Procedural posture and record-bound appellate review

The Court also rejected the mother’s attempt to use dispositional-hearing testimony to undermine adjudication, noting (in footnote 5) that the circuit court did not have that testimony at adjudication and appellate relief cannot be predicated on evidence not before the adjudicating court. This reinforces a record discipline: adjudication is evaluated on the adjudicatory record, and a parent’s later testimony cannot retroactively erase earlier proof.

C. Impact

1. Recognition of “coaching” as serious psychological abuse with independently adjudicable harm

While framed as an application of existing statutes and standards rather than an explicit doctrinal innovation, the opinion powerfully confirms that coaching a child to fabricate abuse allegations can constitute “emotional and psychological abuse” sufficient to adjudicate and terminate parental rights—especially where an expert links the coaching pressure to measurable clinical symptoms (anxiety, depression, disruptive behaviors, enmeshment indicators).

Practically, this decision supports DHS and guardians ad litem in treating certain forms of coercive parental alienation and false-allegation pressure not merely as “custody conflict,” but as actionable abuse when it harms the child’s mental health and development.

2. Strengthening the “acknowledgment” requirement as a gatekeeping function for improvement periods

The Court’s reasoning underscores that improvement periods are not automatic and that formal compliance and professed willingness do not substitute for acknowledgment of the adjudicated problem. In future cases, parents who deny responsibility may find it difficult to meet W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), even if they participate in some services, because the key question becomes whether services can realistically address the adjudicated condition.

3. Imputation of emotional abuse across siblings

By referencing In re H.B., the Court signals that emotional abuse established as to one child can support findings as to other children in the household. This may influence litigation strategy and evidentiary presentation: a particularly developed record about one child’s harm (through evaluation and expert testimony) can lawfully extend protective findings to siblings, narrowing any argument that DHS must separately prove identical harms for each child.

4. Increased importance of evaluation integrity and interference evidence

The opinion highlights that interference with court-ordered evaluations—failing to take the child to the evaluation, and later influencing the child during evaluation—can become pivotal. Future courts may treat such conduct as indicative of a parent’s inability to follow court directives and as evidence relevant to both adjudication (showing coaching) and disposition (showing poor prognosis and lack of insight).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication (in abuse and neglect cases): The stage where the court decides whether the parent committed abuse or neglect, based on evidence. It is not yet the stage where the court decides the final permanent outcome.
  • Disposition: The stage where the court decides what to do going forward—services, custody arrangements, termination of parental rights, or other permanency outcomes.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than “more likely than not,” requiring strong, persuasive evidence, but not as high as “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Clear error review: On appeal, factual findings stand unless the appellate court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made. This is highly deferential to the circuit court.
  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A structured opportunity—after adjudication—for a parent to participate in services to correct the problems that led to the finding of abuse or neglect. The parent must show they are likely to fully participate.
  • Acknowledgment requirement: A practical rule: if a parent will not admit the problem the court found (e.g., coaching or psychological abuse), therapy and services cannot reliably fix it, so an improvement period may be denied as futile.
  • Imputation of abuse to siblings: Under West Virginia law (as discussed in In re H.B.), proven abuse of one child can support a finding that other children in the home are also “abused children,” because their welfare is threatened by the same parental conduct.

V. Conclusion

In re R.H.-M. and A.H.-M. affirms that coercing a child to make false abuse allegations—particularly where expert evidence shows resulting anxiety, depression, and disruptive behaviors—can constitute emotional and psychological abuse sufficient for adjudication and termination of parental rights. The decision also reiterates a central West Virginia abuse-and-neglect principle: improvement periods are not granted merely because a parent says they will comply; meaningful remediation requires acknowledgment of the abusive conduct. Where denial is entrenched and responsibility is displaced onto others, the circuit court may conclude there is no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination is necessary for the children’s welfare.