Co-Conspirator Witness-Tampering Evidence Admissible on Circumstantial Proof; § 922(g)(1) Remains Constitutional Under Eleventh Circuit Precedent

1. Introduction

In United States v. Deion Larry Jamar Mangum (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Mangum’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case arose from a November 7, 2022 domestic-dispute response at Shayalia Bradford’s home in Brundidge, Alabama, where officers ultimately found a rifle in brush near the treeline behind the house and arrested Mangum.

The appeal presented three issues: (1) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting witness-tampering/bribery communications as co-conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (and, relatedly, Rule 403/Rule 404(b) themes); and (3) whether the evidence of knowing possession was sufficient despite the absence of forensic/video proof.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Constitutionality: The panel held it was bound by United States v. Dubois and United States v. Rozier to reject Mangum’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1).
  • Evidentiary ruling: The panel found no abuse of discretion in admitting Scott’s messages to Bradford (offering “cash” for not showing up to court) as co-conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), concluding the government established by a preponderance that a conspiracy existed and the statements furthered it.
  • Sufficiency: The panel held the evidence supported knowing possession: two witnesses testified they saw Mangum with the gun; police found the gun near a phone identified as Mangum’s; and the jury was entitled to credit the witnesses despite impeachment attempts.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

1) Second Amendment / Binding precedent

  • United States v. Dubois and United States v. Rozier: The court treated these as controlling Eleventh Circuit authority holding § 922(g)(1) constitutional. Dubois specifically held that neither United States v. Rahimi nor New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen abrogated Rozier; therefore, a panel must follow Rozier unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc says otherwise.
  • United States v. White: Provided the “prior panel precedent” rule—central to the court’s refusal to revisit § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality.
  • United States v. Pugh and United States v. Leahy: Cited for the de novo standard on constitutional review, reinforcing that even under fresh review the panel remained bound by precedent.
  • United States v. Utsick: Addressed the government’s preservation/plain-error argument; the panel effectively deemed it immaterial because binding precedent foreclosed Mangum’s claim “under any standard of review.”

2) Co-conspirator statements, conspiracy proof, and admissibility standards

  • United States v. Miles (core Rule 801(d)(2)(E) framework): Supplied the three-part test—preponderance proof of (1) a conspiracy, (2) inclusion of declarant and defendant, and (3) statement during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  • Bourjaily v. United States, United States v. Dickerson, and United States v. Hough: Reinforced that the Miles test governs and that “in furtherance” is assessed under a permissive approach.
  • United States v. Wenxia Man and United States v. Byrom: Supported a key procedural point: when deciding whether a conspiracy exists for Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the court may consider the challenged statements and “independent outside evidence,” including hearsay at the admissibility stage. This underwrote the panel’s acceptance of the district court’s consideration of Scott’s later admission to Agent Porter as part of the preponderance analysis, even though the government conceded it would not introduce that admission to the jury.
  • United States v. Knowles: Anchored the panel’s reliance on circumstantial evidence to prove the conspiracy’s existence.
  • United States v. Bowe: Clarified that a defendant need not be charged with conspiracy for Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to apply—important here because the trial was for § 922(g)(1), not conspiracy.
  • United States v. Watkins: Provided a definitional gloss on “preponderance of the evidence,” which the panel used to justify the district court’s threshold finding.
  • United States v. Rivera, United States v. Beaufils, Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), and Stermer v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. (In re ATIF, Inc.): Established the deferential “abuse of discretion” posture, emphasizing that reversal requires a misapplication of law, clearly erroneous facts, or a clear error of judgment.
  • United States v. Church: Supported the panel’s Rule 403 holding by describing a “strong presumption in favor of admissibility” and deference to the trial court’s balancing.
  • United States v. Hammond: Provided substantive relevance: attempts to influence a witness may show “consciousness of guilt,” bolstering probative value against Rule 403 attack.
  • Santiago: The opinion cites “Santiago, 837 F.2d at 1549” for the “in furtherance”/conspiracy analysis; although the full case name is not provided in the text, the citation signals additional Eleventh Circuit authority supporting liberal treatment of statements made in execution of a conspiracy’s objective.

3) Sufficiency of evidence and possession principles

  • United States v. Robertson (quoting United States v. Tinoco): Framed appellate sufficiency review—view evidence in the light most favorable to the government and credit the verdict’s inferences.
  • United States v. Trujillo (quoting United States v. Suba): Supplied the controlling question: whether any rational juror could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt; also that the government need not disprove every hypothesis of innocence.
  • United States v. Martin: Confirmed circumstantial evidence can sustain conviction and distinguished reasonable inferences from speculation—used both in the 801(d)(2)(E) discussion and sufficiency analysis.
  • Rehaif v. United States: Set the knowledge requirement under § 922(g): knowledge of possession and knowledge of status. Mangum’s stipulation to felony status and knowledge narrowed the dispute to possession.
  • United States v. Ochoa, United States v. Flanders, United States v. Green, and United States v. Beckles: Provided the doctrinal map for actual vs. constructive possession and the limit that “mere presence” or awareness is insufficient. The panel implicitly treated the case as supported by evidence of actual possession (eyewitnesses) plus corroborating circumstances (phone and gun location).
  • United States v. Hano (quoting United States v. Feliciano), United States v. Lebowitz, United States v. Williams (390 F.3d 1319), United States v. Ramirez-Chilel (quoting United States v. Eddy): These authorities constrained appellate second-guessing of credibility determinations, requiring near-impossibility before overturning a jury’s choice to credit a witness.
  • United States v. Varazo (quoting United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 132, 1343 (11th Cir. 2017)): Supported the panel’s rejection of the “no forensics/no video” theme by emphasizing that evidence preservation gaps go to weight, not admissibility, and that evidence may be tied to a defendant through surrounding circumstances.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why the Second Amendment challenge failed

The court’s reasoning was institutional rather than historical-analytical: regardless of how Mangum framed Bruen/Rahimi, the panel treated United States v. Dubois as dispositive that those Supreme Court decisions did not abrogate United States v. Rozier. Under United States v. White, a panel cannot reconsider Rozier without “clearer instruction from the Supreme Court” (the quoted Dubois formulation). Thus, the constitutional claim was rejected as foreclosed.

2) Why the witness-tampering/bribery communications were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)

The appellate court held the district court stayed within its discretion by finding the Rule 801(d)(2)(E) foundation satisfied by a preponderance. The key inferential chain was:

  1. Mangum called his brother Scott and directed him to look up/contact Bradford, spelling her name.
  2. Scott contacted Bradford the next day.
  3. Scott then proposed “cash” for not showing up to Mangum’s court date—an act that, by its nature, advanced a goal of keeping Bradford from testifying.

The panel also endorsed the district court’s ability to consider additional “outside evidence” (even hearsay at the foundational stage) under United States v. Wenxia Man/United States v. Byrom, including Scott’s later statement to Agent Porter describing Mangum’s direction to contact Bradford and offer money. With that, the conspiracy finding became “more likely than not” under United States v. Watkins, and the “in furtherance” element was satisfied under the “liberal standard” of United States v. Dickerson.

3) Why Rule 403 did not bar the evidence

The panel applied the “strong presumption in favor of admissibility” from United States v. Church and found the evidence’s probative value substantial because witness-influence evidence supports an inference of “consciousness of guilt” under United States v. Hammond. It also noted Mangum did not articulate a concrete “unfair prejudice” theory on appeal beyond the general prejudicial nature of the evidence.

4) Why the evidence of possession was sufficient

The panel’s sufficiency reasoning combined deference to the jury with corroborative circumstances: two witnesses (Bradford and neighbor Adams) identified Mangum holding a gun matching the recovered firearm, and officers found the firearm near a ringing phone identified as Mangum’s. Under United States v. Trujillo and United States v. Suba, the government did not need to eliminate every alternative explanation (including Mangum’s theory that Bradford could have owned the gun). Under United States v. Hano, United States v. Williams (390 F.3d 1319), and United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, the jury’s choice to credit Bradford despite inconsistencies was essentially unassailable. The lack of forensic/video proof did not defeat the verdict because circumstantial and testimonial evidence can suffice under United States v. Martin, and “gaps” in preservation go to weight under United States v. Varazo.

C. Impact

  • Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision underscores that, post-Bruen and post-Rahimi, Eleventh Circuit panels will continue to uphold § 922(g)(1) as constitutional so long as United States v. Rozier remains binding and United States v. Dubois remains the circuit’s interpretation of Supreme Court developments. Practically, defendants will face a steep hurdle absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention.
  • Rule 801(d)(2)(E) foundations may be met through timing-based inferences: The opinion signals that close temporal proximity between a defendant’s instruction to contact a witness and the intermediary’s subsequent bribery/witness-influence message can be enough—especially when supplemented (at the foundational stage) by investigative testimony about admissions. This may encourage broader government use of co-conspirator statements in “consciousness of guilt” contexts even when the conspiracy is collateral to the charged offense.
  • Rule 403 challenges require specificity: The panel’s treatment of prejudice suggests appellants must articulate concrete unfair-prejudice mechanisms (e.g., propensity misuse, emotional impact, confusion of issues) rather than rely on the obvious fact that damning evidence is prejudicial.
  • Proof of possession: The decision reiterates that juries may convict on eyewitness testimony plus corroborating circumstances (like location of a defendant’s phone near the firearm), and the absence of DNA/fingerprints/video is not inherently exculpatory.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • § 922(g)(1): A federal law making it a crime for a convicted felon to possess a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.
  • Rehaif knowledge requirement: The government must prove the defendant knew (a) he possessed a firearm and (b) he belonged to the prohibited status group (here, knew he was a felon).
  • Actual vs. constructive possession: Actual possession is physically holding/controlling the gun. Constructive possession can be shown by control over the gun or the place it’s found, but “mere presence” near a gun is not enough (United States v. Green quoting United States v. Beckles).
  • Hearsay and the co-conspirator rule (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)): Normally, out-of-court statements offered for their truth are excluded. But a co-conspirator’s statement made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy is treated as “not hearsay,” if the judge finds the conspiracy exists by a preponderance.
  • Preponderance vs. beyond a reasonable doubt: “Preponderance” (used for admissibility foundations) means “more likely than not.” “Beyond a reasonable doubt” (used for guilt) is much higher.
  • Rule 403: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Courts generally lean toward admitting relevant evidence.
  • Rule 404(b): Evidence of other acts is often restricted to avoid propensity reasoning, but it may be admitted for permitted purposes (such as motive, intent, or consciousness of guilt). Here, the panel emphasized consciousness-of-guilt relevance via United States v. Hammond.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Deion Larry Jamar Mangum is a consolidation of three recurring appellate themes. First, it reinforces that, in the Eleventh Circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under controlling precedent despite Bruen and Rahimi. Second, it illustrates how courts may admit witness-tampering/bribery communications as co-conspirator statements where timing and context permit a reasonable inference of a joint plan—while also allowing the judge (at the admissibility stage) to consider broader investigative evidence under the circuit’s 801(d)(2)(E) framework. Third, it reiterates that a § 922(g)(1) conviction can rest on credited eyewitness testimony and corroborating circumstantial facts, without forensic or video evidence.