Close-Proximity Presumption for U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): Same-Floor Firearm-and-Drugs Placement Supports the Enhancement Absent Rebuttal

Introduction

Case: United States v. Samuel Barnes (3d Cir. June 29, 2026) (nonprecedential).
Parties: United States of America (Appellee) v. Samuel Barnes (Appellant).
Context: After a search warrant execution at Barnes’s Wilmington residence, officers found (i) a 9mm pistol with an obliterated serial number and a loaded extended magazine in one upstairs bedroom closet, and (ii) crack cocaine, a digital scale with residue, ammunition, and cash in Barnes’s upstairs bedroom. Barnes admitted the items were his and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number.

Key sentencing issue: Whether the District Court properly applied the four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), where the “other felony” was an uncharged drug offense.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed Barnes’s 90-month sentence. It held that the District Court did not clearly err in finding the firearm was in “close proximity” to drugs for purposes of the guideline commentary’s drug-case rule, triggering a rebuttable presumption that the enhancement applies. The court further held Barnes failed to rebut that presumption under the factors identified in prior Third Circuit precedent. Even if the guideline text required a more “logical nexus,” the panel concluded the factual findings established such a connection.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Perez, 5 F.4th 390 (3d Cir. 2021)

United States v. Perez is the opinion’s central authority. It supplies three key doctrinal moves that drive the result here:

  • Ambiguity of “in connection with”: Perez recognized the phrase could mean either a logical/causal relationship or a more coincidental physical relationship, which opened the door to relying on guideline commentary.
  • Drug-case proximity rule as a presumption: Interpreting Application Note 14(B), Perez held that “close proximity” creates a rebuttable presumption that the enhancement applies.
  • Rebuttal framework: Perez identified non-exhaustive factors (type of gun, loaded status, storage/possession near drugs, accessibility) to evaluate whether the defendant has shown the gun’s presence was “mere accident or coincidence,” i.e., had no relationship to drug activity.

Barnes’s appeal was largely an attempt to avoid Perez’s proximity presumption by disputing “close proximity” (separate bedrooms; no measured distance). The panel applied Perez to hold that same-floor placement in two upstairs bedrooms could satisfy “close proximity” and that Barnes did not rebut the presumption.

United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2014)

United States v. Napolitan is cited (via Perez) as the source of the four rebuttal factors. Its influence is methodological: it frames the “connection” inquiry as a practical, fact-bound assessment of whether the firearm plausibly facilitated (or had the potential to facilitate) drug trafficking.

United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341 (3d Cir. 2022)

United States v. Adair supplies the clear-error standard articulation and, importantly, supports the panel’s point that appellate courts may rely on district-court factual findings even when an appellant presses a different legal interpretation. Here, that mattered because Barnes argued Perez was wrong; the panel responded that, even under Barnes’s preferred “logical nexus” reading, the existing findings sufficed.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)

Cited (through Adair) for the canonical definition of clear error: reversal requires a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” This deferential standard was outcome-determinative because Barnes’s principal attack was factual (lack of precise distance evidence; separate rooms).

United States v. Clark, 115 F.4th 245 (3d Cir. 2024) and United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2000)

These cases reinforce an expansive construction of “in connection with.” United States v. Clark (quoting United States v. Loney) emphasizes that the phrase is construed broadly and can cover a “wide range of relationships” between firearm possession and another felony. The Barnes panel used this to underline how difficult it is to rebut the proximity presumption when the surrounding circumstances suggest protective/emboldening firearm possession.

United States v. McIntosh, 124 F.4th 199 (3d Cir. 2024)

United States v. McIntosh is cited for an unresolved interpretive question: whether the Sentencing Commission’s commentary definition of “another felony offense” is reasonable under Kisor-style limits on deference to agency interpretations. While Barnes did not dispute that drug dealing qualifies as “another felony offense,” the citation signals that guideline commentary remains a live battleground—and that Barnes is situated within broader post-Kisor litigation over the force of commentary.

United States v. Tajwar, 167 F.4th 867 (6th Cir. 2026) and United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2009)

These Sixth Circuit cases are used by analogy for the “emboldening” rationale: firearms can facilitate crime by providing protection or confidence, even if not brandished or actively used. The Third Circuit cited them to support the common-sense inference that a readily accessible pistol (especially with an obliterated serial number and a nearby loaded extended magazine) can be possessed to protect drugs/cash or to embolden trafficking activity.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Two independent paths to the enhancement (but only one needed on appeal)

The District Court found the enhancement satisfied under both Application Note 14(A) (general facilitation/potential facilitation) and Note 14(B) (drug-case close proximity). On appeal, the panel affirmed based on Note 14(B) and did not need to evaluate Note 14(A) because Barnes could not show clear error on the proximity finding or rebuttal analysis.

B. “Close proximity” did not require a tape measure

Barnes argued the government presented no evidence of actual distance and that the court found only “proximity,” not “close proximity.” The Third Circuit rejected that as a basis for reversal: the record established both the gun and drugs were found in two upstairs bedrooms on the same floor, with the drugs located near 9mm ammunition matching the firearm’s caliber. Under clear-error review, those facts were sufficient to sustain a “close proximity” finding.

C. The presumption applied—and Barnes did not rebut it

Once “close proximity” was established under Note 14(B), United States v. Perez required treating the enhancement as presumptively applicable. The burden then shifted (as a practical matter) to Barnes to show the firearm had no relationship to drug-related activity—i.e., that its presence was “mere accident or coincidence” and did not have the potential to facilitate trafficking.

Applying the Perez/Napolitan factors, the panel upheld the District Court’s inference of connection:

  • Type of gun: a pistol (commonly associated with drug trafficking rather than sporting purposes).
  • Loaded status / readiness: while the pistol was unloaded, it was next to a loaded extended magazine, supporting rapid use.
  • Location relative to drugs/paraphernalia: different bedroom, same floor; drugs and scale in Barnes’s room; firearm in another room’s closet.
  • Accessibility: the weapon was “readily accessible” in the home.

The panel also approved the District Court’s skepticism of Barnes’s claim that he was “out of the game,” given the presence of distribution indicia (digital scale with residue), cash, and drugs.

D. Attempted challenge to circuit law failed procedurally and substantively

Barnes argued United States v. Perez was wrongly decided and that the guideline text demands a logical connection. The panel noted that a Third Circuit panel generally cannot overrule prior precedent absent an intervening change in law (and that Barnes had not raised this argument below). More importantly, the panel held that even under a “logical nexus” standard, the facts established a logical link between the pistol (with obliterated serial number) and the crack cocaine in the same upstairs area of a residence associated with drug trafficking.

3. Impact

  • Practical reach of “close proximity”: The decision signals that, at least on deferential review, “close proximity” can be satisfied by same-floor placement across rooms within a residence—without precise distance testimony—especially when other facts tie the firearm to drug activity (matching ammunition, cash, paraphernalia, accessibility).
  • Rebuttal is demanding: Defendants seeking to rebut Note 14(B)’s presumption should expect to need affirmative, credible evidence that the gun’s presence was unrelated to drugs (lawful purpose, storage circumstances inconsistent with protection/emboldening, inaccessibility, or other facts breaking the facilitation inference).
  • Nonprecedential but indicative: Although labeled nonprecedential, the opinion illustrates how district courts may frame findings to withstand appeal: identify close proximity facts and explicitly apply the Perez factors.
  • Post-Kisor commentary disputes remain: By citing United States v. McIntosh, the panel implicitly situates these cases in the ongoing debate about when commentary can expand or define guideline terms—an issue likely to affect future enhancements and definitional notes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement: A four-level increase if the defendant possessed a firearm “in connection with” another felony (including, per commentary, an uncharged felony).
  • Application Note 14(A) vs. 14(B):
    • 14(A): general rule—gun “facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating” another felony.
    • 14(B): drug-case shortcut—if a gun is found in “close proximity” to drugs or paraphernalia, the enhancement applies (in the Third Circuit, presumptively, per United States v. Perez).
  • Rebuttable presumption: A legal inference that applies once certain facts are shown (here, close proximity), but can be overcome with contrary evidence showing no real connection.
  • Clear-error review: A highly deferential appellate standard for factual findings; the appellant must show the finding is not just possibly wrong, but clearly mistaken.
  • Guideline renumbering: The opinion notes Amendment 834 redesignated the provision as § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) effective Nov. 1, 2025—important for practitioners matching older case law to current guideline text.
  • “Nonprecedential”: The decision is not binding precedent under the Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures, though it can still be informative and persuasive.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms a robust application of the drug-case “close proximity” presumption for U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). It underscores that, on clear-error review, same-floor storage of a readily accessible pistol near drug evidence can qualify as “close proximity,” and that rebutting the presumption requires more than denying ongoing dealing—especially when objective indicia (drugs, scale residue, cash, matching ammunition) support an inference that the firearm could protect or embolden drug trafficking. Within the Third Circuit’s existing framework (anchored by United States v. Perez), Barnes illustrates how proximity-plus-context commonly suffices to uphold the enhancement.