Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: No Presumption of Irreparable Harm and No “Public Harm” Substitution Under Winter

Case: West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date: June 3, 2026
Disposition: Preliminary injunction vacated

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) citizen suit challenging alleged ongoing violations of a state-issued National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)-type permit governing releases of HFPO-DA (a PFAS compound often associated with “GenX”) from Chemours’s Washington Works facility into the Ohio River near Parkersburg, West Virginia.

Parties. The plaintiff-appellee, West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. (“Rivers Coalition”), is a nonprofit with roughly 1,000 members dedicated to the health of West Virginia waters. The defendant-appellant, The Chemours Company FC, LLC (“Chemours”), operates the facility. Little Hocking Water Association, Inc. intervened as an additional plaintiff, but the preliminary injunction motion at issue was pursued by Rivers Coalition.

Key issues on appeal. Chemours challenged the preliminary injunction on two grounds:

• Standing: whether Rivers Coalition demonstrated Article III standing (via associational standing through member Charlise Robinson) to seek preliminary injunctive relief.
• Irreparable harm: whether the district court correctly found that Rivers Coalition had shown likely irreparable harm—an indispensable prerequisite under Winter.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court on standing at this stage, but found multiple legal and factual defects in the irreparable-harm analysis and therefore vacated the preliminary injunction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Standing

Applying the preliminary-injunction requirement that the plaintiff show “a substantial likelihood that [it has] standing” (as stated in Delmarva Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm'n), the court held Rivers Coalition satisfied Article III through associational standing. It focused on member Charlise Robinson’s stated avoidance of boating on the Ohio River due to Chemours’s HFPO-DA permit violations, and her testimony that she would boat more frequently and with greater enjoyment if Chemours complied.

Irreparable harm

The court vacated the injunction because Rivers Coalition did not make a legally sufficient and factually supported showing that Robinson was “likely to suffer irreparable harm” absent preliminary relief. The panel identified three legal errors by the district court:

• treating public harm as satisfying the irreparable-harm factor;
• applying a presumption of irreparable harm from continuing environmental violations;
• treating “excess discharge” alone as automatically constituting irreparable harm.

Independently, the panel found the district court’s Robinson-specific harm findings clearly erroneous because the expert testimony relied upon described only an increased risk (not harm more likely than not), and the expert conceded she could not conclude harm to Robinson given Robinson’s non-ingestion uses of tap water.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and how they drove the result)

1) Standing and environmental “avoidance” injuries

• Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife supplied the canonical tripartite test: injury in fact, traceability, redressability. The Fourth Circuit framed its inquiry within that structure.
• Delmarva Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm'n set the procedural posture rule: at the preliminary-injunction stage, the plaintiff must show a “substantial likelihood” of standing.
• Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n) provided the associational-standing framework. Only prong (a)—member standing in her own right—was contested.
• Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. was the centerpiece for injury-in-fact based on reasonable avoidance of recreation due to pollution. The panel treated Robinson’s avoidance of boating as the same type of cognizable injury recognized in Laidlaw.
• Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp. (en banc) reinforced two critical standing points the court leaned on:
  • reasonable fear-based curtailment of use can be injury in fact; and
  • no additional “scientific proof” (such as actual measured pollutant levels at the precise place/time) is required where there is a “direct nexus” between the plaintiff and the area of environmental impairment.
  This helped the court reject Chemours’s attempt to turn the standing inquiry into a numeric debate about whether river concentrations exceeded West Virginia’s 140 ppt goal or the EPA’s 10 ppt SDWA standard.
• Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Carroll Cnty. was cited for the standard of review applicable to standing findings (clear error for underlying facts; de novo for the legal conclusion).
• DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno supported the proposition that standing is assessed for each form of relief; thus, Little Hocking’s presence did not cure Rivers Coalition’s need to show standing for the preliminary injunction it sought.
• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't anchored redressability limits for injunctive relief (continuing or imminent future violation). The panel treated ongoing permit exceedances and testimony of resumed boating enjoyment as sufficient at this stage.
• United States v. Hays, Penegar v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., and United States v. Newby framed a procedural aside: standing objections cannot be waived, but a plaintiff can forfeit theories—yet Chemours forfeited any forfeiture argument by not pressing it.

2) Preliminary injunction law: irreparable harm is movant-specific, not presumed

• Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. supplied the controlling four-factor test and the “clear showing” requirement. The panel treated Winter’s text—“he is likely to suffer irreparable harm”—as categorical, not fact-bound.
• Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. W. Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P'ship provided the abuse-of-discretion framework for reviewing preliminary injunctions (clear error for factual findings; de novo for legal conclusions).
• Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n was cited for the proposition that each Winter factor must be satisfied “as articulated,” reinforcing the panel’s unwillingness to dilute or reallocate the irreparable-harm factor.
• Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo was the decisive authority against presuming injunctions (and thus presuming irreparable harm) in CWA cases. The panel read Weinberger as foreclosing any rule that a permit violation or continuing environmental illegality mechanically compels injunctive relief without traditional equitable analysis.
• Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell reinforced that environmental statutory violations do not automatically establish irreparable harm; courts still apply equitable principles.
• Beber v. NavSav Holdings, LLC and Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. supported the panel’s separation of:
  • irreparable harm to the movant; and
  • public interest/public harm (a separate Winter factor).
  They were deployed to show the district court’s “public harm counts as irreparable harm” approach would double-count.
• Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina and East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage were invoked by Rivers Coalition to justify looking at public harms, but the panel distinguished them: they involved downstream public effects of harm to the movant, not public harm substituting for the movant’s irreparable harm.
• Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump was cited for the key doctrinal point that Winter requires irreparable harm be “likely,” not merely possible—an important predicate to the panel’s critique of “increased risk” testimony.
• Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin was cited for the meaning of “likely” as “more likely than not,” further tightening the evidentiary burden.
• Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., Reading v. N. Hanover Twp., and In re Navy Chaplaincy were used to clarify the relationship between standing and irreparable harm: they overlap but “do distinct work,” and one does not automatically satisfy the other.
• Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc'ns, LLC and Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cohen framed clear-error review, which the panel ultimately applied to reject the district court’s factual conclusions about Robinson-specific harm.
• Custis v. United States and United States v. Roof were used by analogy to support a statutory interpretation principle: when Congress intends to alter traditional judicial analysis (here, equitable injunction standards), it knows how to do so; its silence implies no departure.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Standing: “direct nexus” plus reasonable avoidance

The court’s standing analysis is notable for refusing to demand pollutant-level proof at the standing stage where the plaintiff member has a concrete relationship to the affected resource and the defendant has violated permit limits.

• Injury in fact. Robinson testified she refrained from boating on the Ohio River due to knowledge of Chemours’s permit violations and would boat more often and with greater enjoyment if violations ceased. Under Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, such “curtailment” based on reasonable concerns constitutes injury in fact.
• Reasonableness without numeric proof. Chemours tried to characterize avoidance as unreasonable because treated tap water never exceeded West Virginia’s 140 ppt goal, and because the SDWA’s 10 ppt MCL/MCLG was not yet enforceable. The panel sidestepped a “which number governs” debate and instead relied on Gaston Copper’s “direct nexus” approach: permit violations + designated recreational use + close geographic proximity made avoidance reasonable.
• Traceability. Chemours argued Robinson’s prior boating was too infrequent. The panel rejected frequency as dispositive, noting Laidlaw tolerated plaintiffs with minimal prior use and focusing instead on Robinson’s testimony linking her avoidance to Chemours’s conduct.
• Redressability. The court emphasized that injunctions remedy injuries from continuing violations or imminent future violations (Steel Co.), and the record supported ongoing issues and Robinson’s stated intent to recreate if compliance occurred.

2) Irreparable harm: strict adherence to Winter, even in CWA citizen suits

The opinion’s central doctrinal move is to reassert that environmental seriousness does not relax the traditional preliminary-injunction test.

• No “public harm” substitution. The district court treated harms to the public (health/environment) as satisfying irreparable harm. The Fourth Circuit held that Winter requires likely irreparable harm to the plaintiff (or, in associational standing, the relevant member). Public harm belongs under “public interest,” and counting it in irreparable harm “double-counts.”
• No presumption of irreparable harm. The district court presumed irreparable harm from “continuing violation of federal environmental law.” The Fourth Circuit held this conflicts with Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, which specifically rejected mechanical injunctions for CWA violations and insisted on established equitable principles absent explicit congressional displacement.
• Exceedance ≠ irreparable harm, without more. Declaring that “excess discharge” “clearly causes irreparable harm” effectively creates an automatic rule; the panel rejected it as inconsistent with the movant-specific requirement and with the absence of a statutory presumption.

3) The evidentiary failure: “increased risk” and mismatch between testimony and Robinson’s exposure

Even if the district court had stated the correct legal rules, the panel held the record could not support a finding of likely irreparable harm to Robinson.

• Risk must be “likely,” not merely higher. The panel read Winter (via Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump) to require likelihood, not possibility. The expert’s “it increases the risk” framing did not establish that harm was more likely than not (as reinforced by Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin).
• Robinson-specific exposure was not supported. Robinson’s declaration stated she did not drink or cook with tap water, using it only for brushing teeth, bathing, laundry, cleaning, and watering plants. The expert conceded she could not “come to a conclusion” about harm given that usage pattern (because she lacked the needed exposure quantification). The district court nevertheless found harm “certain” and tied to “each incremental exposure,” which the panel deemed clearly erroneous on this record.

C. Impact

1) Environmental preliminary injunctions in the Fourth Circuit: Winter with teeth

The decision is a clear signal that district courts in the Fourth Circuit must apply Winter rigorously in CWA citizen suits:

• plaintiffs cannot shortcut irreparable harm by invoking the public’s interest in clean water;
• plaintiffs cannot rely on a “continuing violation” presumption; and
• plaintiffs must connect the scientific evidence to the particular member’s actual exposure pathway and show harm is likely (not merely that risk rises).

2) Litigation strategy: standing may be easier than irreparable harm

The opinion illustrates a widening practical gap:

• Standing may be satisfied by reasonable recreational avoidance where permit violations and proximity are shown, even without detailed sampling data.
• Irreparable harm requires materially more: a member-specific, likelihood-based showing that cannot rest on generalized toxicity or uncertain risk increments.

3) Role of SDWA standards in CWA disputes

The panel acknowledged that not-yet-enforceable SDWA limits are not irrelevant in principle to injury or harm, but the decision cautions that referencing regulatory numbers (like the 10 ppt MCL/MCLG) does not itself establish irreparable harm—particularly where the evidentiary bridge from concentration to likely harm for a specific person is missing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Clean Water Act permit limits (NPDES). The CWA generally prohibits discharging pollutants from a “point source” into navigable waters unless authorized by a permit. Permit “effluent limits” cap what may be discharged.
• Citizen suit. The CWA allows “any citizen” to sue a permit violator after notice, unless the government is already diligently prosecuting certain actions in court.
• PFAS / HFPO-DA. PFAS are persistent chemicals; HFPO-DA is a PFAS used as a polymer processing aid and can appear in facility wastewater.
• ppt (parts per trillion). An extremely small concentration measure—useful for chemicals regulated at trace levels.
• Outfall. The discharge outlet where wastewater leaves a facility into a river.
• SDWA MCL vs. MCLG. An MCL is an enforceable maximum permissible level in drinking water delivered by a public system (though a new MCL may have a delayed compliance date). An MCLG is a nonenforceable health goal—typically a risk-based target.
• Associational standing. An organization can sue on behalf of members if at least one member has standing, the suit is germane to the organization’s purpose, and the claims/relief do not require individual participation.
• Preliminary injunction and Winter. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary, early order. Under Winter, the movant must clearly show: likelihood of success, likely irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and public interest.
• Irreparable harm. Harm that is imminent and cannot be adequately repaired later (often because it is difficult to quantify or cannot be undone). Here, the critical point is that it must be likely to occur to the movant—not merely a heightened risk to the public.

5. Conclusion

West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC draws a firm doctrinal line for Clean Water Act citizen-suit injunctions in the Fourth Circuit: courts must not presume irreparable harm from permit violations, must not collapse the irreparable-harm inquiry into generalized public harm, and must demand record-supported proof that the particular member on whose standing the organization relies is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief. At the same time, the decision confirms that standing may be established through reasonable avoidance of recreational use where there is a direct nexus to the impaired waterway and documented permit exceedances—even without granular scientific measurements at the plaintiff’s precise point of use.