Clarification of Two-Step Framework for EPA and CFEPA Sex Discrimination Claims

Introduction

In Sha’ola Terrell v. Alabama State University, No. 23-13714 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed multiple statutory claims arising from the non-reappointment of Ms. Terrell, a senior associate athletic director and designated Senior Woman Administrator at Alabama State University (ASU). Terrell sued ASU under Title IX, the Equal Pay Act (EPA), the Alabama Clarke-Figures Equal Pay Act (CFEPA), and for retaliation under the EPA and CFEPA. The district court granted summary judgment to ASU on all counts. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Title IX and retaliation claims but vacated and remanded Terrell’s EPA and CFEPA sex-discrimination claims in light of its recent decision in Baker v. Upson Regional Medical Center, 94 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2024), which clarified the proper analytical framework under the EPA.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam opinion resolved the following key points:

  • Title IX Claim: In light of Joseph v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, --- F.4th ---, No. 23-11037 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024), the court held that Title IX does not provide a private right of action for employees, and affirmed summary judgment for ASU.
  • Retaliation Claim: Terrell failed to show but-for causation between her complaint over unpaid Senior Woman Administrator funds and ASU’s decision not to reappoint her, especially since a male counterpart was non-reappointed for the same restructuring reason. The court affirmed summary judgment.
  • EPA and CFEPA Sex-Discrimination Claims: The court vacated and remanded these claims because the district court applied a three-step burden-shifting test akin to McDonnell Douglas, whereas the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Baker mandates a two-step framework: (1) prima facie showing of pay disparity for equal work, and (2) employer’s affirmative defense under one of the EPA’s four exceptions. The case was remanded for application of this clarified test.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Joseph v. Board of Regents, --- F.4th --- (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024): Clarified that Title IX contains an implied private remedy only for students, not employees.
  • Baker v. Upson Regional Medical Center, 94 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2024): Established the two-step framework for analyzing EPA sex-discrimination claims.
  • Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974): Defined the prima facie requirement and employer’s affirmative defenses under the EPA.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Established the three-step burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate-treatment claims (cited by the district court but corrected by Baker for EPA claims).
  • Steger v. General Electric Co., 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003): Previously applied a three-step burden-shifting test to EPA claims in this circuit.
  • Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992): Reiterated that EPA claims impose strict liability once a pay disparity is shown, without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.

Legal Reasoning

1. Title IX: The court applied the “prior-panel precedent” rule (United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)) to bind itself to Joseph’s holding that employees lack a private cause of action under Title IX.

2. Retaliation: Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Battle v. Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755 (11th Cir. 2006), Terrell bore the burden to show that but for her complaints she would have been reappointed. Because ASU non-reappointed both Terrell and a male colleague for restructuring reasons simultaneously, no genuine dispute of material fact as to causation existed.

3. EPA/CFEPA: The district court erred by importing a three-step McDonnell Douglas framework. Baker clarified that EPA claims entail:

  1. Plaintiff’s prima facie case: Show different wages paid to opposite sexes for “equal work” requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions.
  2. Employer’s affirmative defense: Prove one of four statutory exceptions—seniority system, merit system, quantity/quality of production system, or “factor other than sex.”

There is no third “pretext” step; if the employer fails to prove its defense, the plaintiff prevails. The court accordingly vacated and remanded for application of this two-step analysis.

Impact

• This decision cements Joseph’s limitation of Title IX employment claims, steering aggrieved employees toward Title VII or other statutes.
• It ensures consistent application of the EPA’s two-step framework in the Eleventh Circuit, aligning with Supreme Court precedent (Corning Glass Works) and emphasizing the strict-liability nature of EPA claims.
• Employers and practitioners must now tailor summary judgment and trial strategies to meet or rebut the two-step test, rather than employing McDonnell Douglas analogies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Summary Judgment (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56): A procedural device to resolve cases without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • Prima Facie Case: The initial burden on the plaintiff to make basic factual showings that, if uncontroverted, would entitle her to relief.
  • Burden-Shifting: A framework where the plaintiff first carries a burden, then the defendant must meet an affirmative defense, and there is no further “pretext” inquiry under the EPA.
  • Affirmative Defense: A factual or legal justification that, if proved by the employer, defeats the plaintiff’s claim even if the prima facie case is established.

Conclusion

Sha’ola Terrell v. Alabama State University is significant for two main rulings: (1) reaffirming that Title IX provides no private remedy for employment discrimination, and (2) clarifying that EPA and CFEPA sex-discrimination claims in this circuit must follow a two-step framework per Baker. The decision will guide both plaintiffs and defendants in how EPA claims are pleaded, litigated, and decided, ensuring that disparate-pay disputes are resolved under a standardized, strict-liability regime.