“Claims Involving” CBA-Covered Employees: Arbitration Exclusion Applies Even to Non-Union Supervisors When Union Employees Are Integral to the Claim

1. Introduction

Robert Barnes v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. is a Sixth Circuit decision addressing a recurring problem at the intersection of employment arbitration agreements and unionized workplaces: how to apply an exclusion clause that removes from arbitration “claims involving an employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.”

The plaintiff, Robert Barnes, worked for decades providing security at Detroit’s Renaissance Center and rose to a supervisory role. After his termination, he brought a class action alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and failure to promote against a set of defendants including his employer and related entities. Defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Barnes signed. The district court denied arbitration, holding that the agreement’s exclusion clause applied because Barnes’s claims “involve” lower-level, unionized security officers covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Defendants appealed under the Federal Arbitration Act’s interlocutory appeal provision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Key issue: Whether a non-union supervisor’s claims fall outside an arbitration agreement because they are “claims involving” unionized employees covered by a CBA at the time the dispute arose.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement’s exclusion clause unambiguously removes Barnes’s claims from arbitration. Although Barnes himself was not CBA-covered due to his supervisory status, the claims as pleaded necessarily depended on alleged discriminatory conduct by lower-level unionized security officers and on Barnes’s reporting of that conduct.

The court rejected defendants’ attempt to rewrite the exclusion clause to mean only claims brought by union employees. The agreement used “the Employee” (a defined term referring specifically to Barnes) elsewhere, but used the broader phrase “an employee” in the exclusion—signaling an intentionally broader scope. Finally, the court held that the federal presumption favoring arbitration does not override ordinary contract interpretation where an exclusion is express and unambiguous.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Ciccio v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 2 F.4th 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2021)
    Role in the opinion: Provided the standard of review—denial of a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed de novo. This positioned the Sixth Circuit to independently interpret the contract without deference to the district court’s construction.
  • Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)
    Role in the opinion: Supplied the oft-cited “federal policy favoring arbitration” and the instruction to resolve doubts in favor of arbitration. The Sixth Circuit treated this presumption as important but not dispositive when contract language is clear.
  • Samaan v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 835 F.3d 593, 601 (6th Cir. 2016)
    Role in the opinion: Anchored the principle that, notwithstanding the FAA, courts apply state-law contract principles to interpret arbitration agreements (unless displaced). This directed the court to Michigan contract law.
  • Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Mich. 1995)
    Role in the opinion: Used to confirm the application of Michigan law given Barnes’s Michigan employment and assent.
  • Innovation Ventures v. Liquid Mfg., 885 N.W.2d 861, 870 (Mich. 2016)
    Role in the opinion: Provided Michigan’s core interpretive rule: if a contract is unambiguous, interpretation “begins and ends” with the text’s “plain and ordinary meaning.” This supported the court’s refusal to adopt defendants’ narrower, policy-driven reading.
  • Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc., 848 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Mich. 2014)
    Role in the opinion: Cited via Innovation Ventures v. Liquid Mfg. for the proposition that plain meaning gives effect to the parties’ intent at formation.
  • Cavalier Mfg. Co. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 564 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
    Role in the opinion: Reinforced that defined contractual terms receive their specified meanings—important to the court’s contrast between “the Employee” (defined) and “an employee” (undefined, broader).
  • McGrath v. Allstate Ins. Co., 802 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) and Citizens Ins. Co. v. Pro-Seal Serv. Grp., Inc., 730 N.W.2d 682, 687 (Mich. 2007)
    Role in the opinion: Supported the use of dictionaries to ascertain the ordinary meaning of undefined terms—here, the pivotal word “involving.”
  • United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 516 (6th Cir. 2001)
    Role in the opinion: Offered an interpretive touchstone for “involved” meaning “included,” assisting the court’s range of plausible meanings.
  • Glob. Prods., Inc. v. Mayser Polymer USA, Inc., No. 339451, 2019 WL 637284, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019)
    Role in the opinion: Supported the court’s attention to capitalization/defined-term conventions. The decision helped justify treating “an employee” as intentionally broader than “the Employee.”
  • Teamsters Loc. Union No. 89 v. Kroger Co., 617 F.3d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 2010)
    Role in the opinion: Recognized that broad arbitration clauses are “particularly subject to” the presumption in favor of arbitrability—then used as a foil for the court’s conclusion that the presumption yields to a clear exclusion.
  • Russell v. Citigroup, Inc., 748 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 2014)
    Role in the opinion: Critical to limiting the arbitration presumption: it does not “short circuit” contract interpretation and has no work to do when an “express provision” excludes the dispute. The Sixth Circuit treated this as the governing framework.
  • Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010)
    Role in the opinion: Cited via Russell v. Citigroup, Inc. to reinforce that arbitration is a matter of consent, not policy preference, and courts cannot impose arbitration beyond the parties’ agreement.
  • Simon v. Pfizer Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 775 (6th Cir. 2005)
    Role in the opinion: Confirmed that even when an arbitration clause is broad, an express and unambiguous exclusion controls.
  • Barnes v. G4S Secure Sols. (USA) Inc., No. 23-cv-12897, 2025 WL 769970 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2025)
    Role in the opinion: Served as the decision under review and the source for the district court’s core conclusion: Duck (a union member) fell within the exclusion, and Barnes’s claims “involve” unionized employees, placing his claims outside arbitration as well.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. State contract law governs the meaning of “claims involving”

The court began by fixing the interpretive method: despite the FAA’s arbitration-friendly policy, Michigan contract law supplies the rules of construction. Under Michigan law, if the words are unambiguous, the inquiry “begins and ends” with the text.

B. “Involving” is broad enough to cover Barnes’s pleaded theory—under either plausible definition

The exclusion removed from arbitration “claims involving an employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.” Because “involving” could mean (i) merely “relating to” or “including,” or (ii) “requiring as a necessary accompaniment,” the court considered both possibilities and concluded Barnes loses under either.

Barnes’s operative allegations repeatedly tied his causes of action to discriminatory acts by lower-level security officers, and to complaints by Black officers, all of whom were union members covered by a CBA. Those employees were not peripheral; their conduct and the reporting of that conduct were pleaded as the factual engine of:

  • the discrimination and hostile work environment claims (incidents “committed by…Caucasian security officers”);
  • the whistleblower/retaliation theories (Barnes’s reporting of those incidents); and
  • the failure to promote theory (promotions allegedly granted to union employees over Barnes on discriminatory grounds).

On that pleaded record, the claims “necessarily flow from—and thus ‘involv[e]’—employees” covered by a CBA at the time the dispute arose.

C. Drafting choices (“the Employee” vs. “an employee”) defeated defendants’ narrowing construction

Defendants’ principal move was to narrow the exclusion so that it would apply only to claims brought by union employees. The court rejected this because the contract’s internal logic cut the other way:

  • The agreement defined “the Employee” (capitalized) to mean Barnes specifically.
  • The exclusion, by contrast, used “an employee” (uncapitalized), signaling a broader category than Barnes.
  • The agreement elsewhere used “the Employee” in other exclusions, reinforcing that the choice of “an employee” was deliberate.

In short, if the parties intended the exclusion to turn only on whether Barnes himself was CBA-covered, the agreement would have said so by using the defined term.

D. The presumption favoring arbitration did not apply because the exclusion was clear

The court treated the arbitration presumption as a tie-breaker for genuine uncertainty, not a device to override unambiguous text. Relying on Russell v. Citigroup, Inc. and Simon v. Pfizer Inc., the court reasoned that when a dispute is excluded by an express provision, there are no “doubts” to resolve in favor of arbitration.

E. “Absurd results” arguments failed because they did not match the clause’s operative trigger

Defendants warned that a broad reading would make claims non-arbitrable if a union member were merely questioned as a witness, or if Barnes “confided” in a union member. The court rejected these hypotheticals because they misconstrued what makes a claim “involving” a union employee: the union employee must be part of the claim in a meaningful way (here, integral factual predicates), not a happenstance bystander. The agreement was not illusory because many categories of Barnes’s potential disputes (e.g., involving management or other supervisors) would still be arbitrable.

3.3. Impact

A. Broader practical reach of CBA-related exclusions

The decision materially strengthens CBA-related carve-outs in individual arbitration agreements. Even a non-union supervisor can be routed out of arbitration if the pleaded causes of action are substantially anchored in conduct by unionized employees covered by a CBA at the relevant time.

B. Pleading and proof dynamics in discrimination suits

Many discrimination and hostile environment claims necessarily describe coworkers’ conduct. Under this decision’s logic, where an arbitration agreement excludes claims “involving” CBA-covered employees, plaintiffs may defeat arbitration by pleading that unionized coworkers were core actors in the discrimination, retaliation predicate, or comparator/promotional decisions—so long as those allegations are not merely tangential.

C. Drafting lessons for employers and arbitration program designers

Employers seeking to preserve arbitration should expect courts to enforce exclusion clauses as written—particularly where the agreement uses defined terms carefully. If the intent is to exclude only claims by CBA-covered employees (and not claims that merely implicate them), clearer drafting is essential (e.g., “claims brought by the Employee while covered by a collective bargaining agreement”).

Conversely, employers who include such exclusions to avoid overlap/conflict with grievance-arbitration systems should recognize the potential breadth of “involving” language; it can sweep in disputes by managers if union employees are central to the narrative and elements of the claim.

D. Limiting the arbitration presumption

The opinion reinforces a doctrinal boundary: the FAA’s pro-arbitration presumption does not authorize courts to ignore plain contractual limitations. Future litigants in the Sixth Circuit should expect the presumption to matter most at the margins of ambiguity, not in the face of express carve-outs.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Motion to compel arbitration: A request asking the court to stop the lawsuit and require the parties to resolve the dispute in private arbitration, as provided by contract.
  • Exclusion clause (carve-out): A contractual provision stating certain disputes are not subject to arbitration, even if the agreement is broad overall.
  • Collective bargaining agreement (CBA): A contract between an employer and a labor union that governs terms of employment and often provides its own grievance/arbitration process for disputes involving union members.
  • Presumption in favor of arbitrability: A legal principle that, when it is genuinely unclear whether a dispute is covered by an arbitration clause, courts lean toward arbitration. This presumption does not override clear contractual exclusions.
  • Defined term vs. ordinary term (“the Employee” vs. “an employee”): Contracts often define a specific term (here, “the Employee” = Barnes). Using a different, non-defined phrase (“an employee”) usually signals the parties meant something broader than the defined term.
  • De novo review: The appellate court decides the issue anew, without deferring to the district court’s interpretation.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of arbitration by enforcing the arbitration agreement’s unambiguous exclusion for “claims involving” CBA-covered employees. The court’s central contribution is interpretive and practical: where a carve-out uses broad language (“involving”) and contrasts defined terms (“the Employee”) with broader phrasing (“an employee”), courts will read the exclusion to reach beyond the claimant’s own union status.

The opinion’s significance lies in its disciplined approach to arbitration contract interpretation: state-law plain-meaning rules control, and the federal pro-arbitration presumption cannot be used to erase express contractual limits. For workplaces mixing supervisory staff and unionized employees, the decision underscores that CBA-related exclusions may have wider consequences than employers anticipate—often turning on how claims are factually structured and pleaded.