Date: Sep 15, 2026

Claim Preclusion Bars Repeat Federal Land-Use/Takings Suits Against Municipal Actors and Their Privies; Later-Arising Zoning Claims Must Still Be Plausibly Pleaded

Thomas Gage v. Borough of Hopatcong, No. 26-1099 (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2026) (nonprecedential).

1. Introduction

This Third Circuit disposition arises from a long-running land-use dispute involving Thomas I. Gage (a pro se property owner) and the Borough of Hopatcong, New Jersey, including municipal personnel and a municipal judge. Gage repeatedly sought approvals to construct a single-family dwelling. His applications were deemed “incomplete” at various points, and later treated as complete only subject to conditions including an NJDEP wetlands-related “letter of interpretation.” The NJDEP concluded protected waters/wetlands existed “on and adjacent to” the property, complicating development.

Separately, the Borough issued zoning-violation notices after inspections in 2021 and 2024, and Municipal Court Judge Peter A. Fico presided over some related proceedings in 2024–2025. The federal litigation at issue is Gage’s third federal action tied to the same development controversy. The key appellate issues were: (i) whether the new suit was barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), (ii) whether the later-arising zoning-violation allegations stated plausible constitutional or conspiracy claims, and (iii) whether the District Court properly denied default judgment/recusal and awarded attorneys’ fees and costs after labeling Gage a “vexatious litigant.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the District of New Jersey’s dismissal and post-judgment orders. It held:

Claims challenging the denial of Gage’s land development applications (including an asserted “taking” without just compensation) were barred by res judicata because a prior federal dismissal constituted a final judgment on the merits, involved the same parties or their privies, and arose from the same underlying course of events.
Res judicata did not bar claims tied to zoning violations that occurred after the earlier lawsuits were filed, but those allegations still failed on the merits because the complaint did not plausibly plead conspiracy or due process violations.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal and default judgment.
The attorneys’ fee and cost award to Ruschke was supported by the record (counsel appearance and detailed fee certification) and was not undermined by Gage’s assertions.
New theories raised for the first time on appeal were not considered; expansion of the appellate record was denied.

The panel noted the appeal was properly before it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and that review of the denial of the post-judgment motion brought up the underlying judgment. The opinion is expressly “NOT PRECEDENTIAL.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Appellate posture and scope of review

Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam): invoked for the principle that the Third Circuit “may affirm on any basis supported by the record,” underscoring that an appellee can win even if the appellate court relies on reasoning different from the district court’s rationale.
McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1992): used to confirm that an appeal from the denial of a timely post-judgment motion can “bring up” the underlying judgment for review—important here because it allowed review of both dismissal and the later fee award.

Res judicata framework and “final judgment on the merits”

Erie Indemnity Co. v. Stephenson, 157 F.4th 265 (3d Cir. 2025): cited for plenary review of res judicata dismissals, signaling the appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal determination on preclusion.
Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 726 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2013): supplied the canonical three elements of federal claim preclusion (final merits judgment; same parties or privies; same cause of action).
Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607 (3d Cir. 2020): cited to support treating the prior dismissal as a “final judgment on the merits” for claim-preclusion purposes, foreclosing re-litigation of the development-application dispute.

Privity and “close or significant relationship,” including alleged co-conspirators/employment relationships

Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1972): central to the court’s privity analysis; it recognizes privity where there is a “close or significant relationship” between successive defendants, including when alleged to be co-conspirators.
Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950): cited via Gambocz, reinforcing that claim preclusion can apply beyond identical parties where relationships justify binding a new defendant to the earlier judgment’s preclusive effect.
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1989): used as cross-circuit support that employer-employee relationships can underpin claim preclusion—useful here because the Borough and its personnel were treated as sufficiently aligned with the prior defendant engineer for preclusion purposes.

“Same cause of action” and transactional similarity

Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1999): applied for a practical approach—res judicata applies if new allegations seek recovery for “essentially the same wrongful conduct” or a “single course of wrongful conduct.”
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2010): reinforced that courts look to the “essential similarity of the underlying events,” not the specific legal labels—important because Gage’s “takings” framing did not avoid preclusion.

Pleading standards for conspiracy and zoning-based constitutional claims

D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc): relied on to reject conclusory conspiracy allegations lacking facts permitting an inference of a conspiratorial agreement.
DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Twp. of W. Amwell, 53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 1995): cited for the proposition that procedural due process is satisfied where the state provides “reasonable remedies” to correct local administrative errors—limiting federal constitutionalization of routine zoning disputes.
Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2004): invoked to hold that the alleged zoning misconduct did not rise above “a normal zoning dispute” so as to satisfy the substantive due process “shocks the conscience” threshold.

Recusal standards

Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2000): supported the conclusion that adverse rulings alone do not establish disqualifying bias.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): the Supreme Court anchor for the same point—judicial rulings typically do not show partiality without additional evidence of personal bias.

Defaults, forfeiture, raising new issues, and record limits

United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1984): cited for the Third Circuit’s disfavor of defaults/default judgments, supporting denial where an answer was timely under an extension.
In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2016): used to treat undeveloped opening-brief arguments as forfeited (the court declined to consider certain issues Gage did not properly brief).
Orie v. Dist. Att'y Allegheny Cnty., 946 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019): applied to refuse consideration of claims raised for the first time on appeal.
Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2009): cited for the rule that appellate review is generally limited to the district court record and supplementation is reserved for exceptional circumstances (not present).

Prior related decisions in the same dispute

Gage v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 2022 WL 254599 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2022): described as dismissing claims against Ruschke on qualified immunity and dismissing claims against NJDEP for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; treated as the foundational “final merits” disposition for later preclusion.
Gage v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 2022 WL 4540834 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2022): denial of reconsideration that warned of possible sanctions for future frivolous filings.
Gage v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 2024 WL 1076675 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2024): dismissed a second suit on res judicata (as to Ruschke) and sovereign immunity (as to NJDEP), and warned of sanctions upon a “third strike.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Claim preclusion as the decisive filter for the “development application” claims. The court methodically applied the Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs three-part test. It treated the 2022 dismissal as final on the merits (Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co.), found identity/privity because Ruschke was the same defendant and the Borough/Donegan were sufficiently aligned (employment relationship and alleged joint conduct) under Gambocz v. Yelencsics (with Bruszewski v. United States and Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp. as reinforcement), and concluded the “cause of action” matched because all theories sprang from the same nucleus of facts regarding the property’s development dispute (Churchill v. Star Enters.; Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp.). Notably, re-labeling the dispute as a constitutional “taking” did not escape preclusion because the operative events remained the same.
Later-arising zoning-violation claims: not precluded, but inadequately pleaded. The panel recognized a temporal limit on claim preclusion: the zoning-violation claims arose after the prior lawsuits were filed, so they were not barred. Even so, the court required plausible factual content, rejecting “vague” and conclusory fraud/conspiracy assertions under D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch.. It also treated the matter as a prototypical local zoning dispute for which state processes generally provide adequate procedural remedies (DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Twp. of W. Amwell), and found the alleged misconduct did not meet the stringent substantive due process “shocks the conscience” threshold (Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana).
Recusal: adverse rulings are not bias. Gage’s claim of partiality rested on unfavorable decisions. Applying Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc. and Liteky v. United States, the court held that adverse rulings—without more—do not show personal bias or create a reasonable question as to impartiality.
Default judgment: disfavored and unwarranted where the answer was timely as extended. The court emphasized the Third Circuit’s general disfavor of default judgments (United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency) and upheld denial because the Borough’s counsel answered within the time the District Court extended.
Attorneys’ fees/costs for vexatious litigation: record support and lack of meaningful challenge. While the opinion does not dwell on the fee-shifting doctrinal source, it affirms on a practical evidentiary basis: counsel appeared, the District Court ordered an itemized fee petition, counsel submitted a detailed certification, and Gage did not contest it below. The Third Circuit rejected Gage’s claim that no fees were shown to exist because the record contained the certification and appearance.
Appellate discipline: forfeiture, new claims, and record boundaries. The panel declined to consider issues not developed in the opening brief (In re Wettach), refused to entertain new claims first raised on appeal (Orie v. Dist. Att'y Allegheny Cnty.), and denied record expansion absent exceptional circumstances (Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc.).

3.3 Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” and thus not binding under the Third Circuit’s internal rules, the opinion is still instructive on several recurring land-use litigation dynamics:

Broad transactional preclusion in land-use disputes. The court’s application of Churchill v. Star Enters. and Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp. reinforces that plaintiffs cannot avoid preclusion by changing legal theories (e.g., reframing as a federal takings claim) when the alleged wrong is part of the same development-approval controversy previously litigated.
Privity can capture municipalities and their personnel/contractors. By relying on Gambocz v. Yelencsics and the employment/relationship logic discussed with Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., the panel signals that when a prior suit targets an individual municipal actor, later suits against the municipality or closely related officials may be precluded if the plaintiff alleges coordinated conduct arising from the same operative facts.
Temporal boundary: later events are not precluded, but must meet federal pleading/constitutional thresholds. The decision distinguishes between preclusion (which did not reach later zoning citations) and plausibility/constitutional merit (which still defeated the later-arising claims). This limits serial litigation by ensuring that “new” episodes must be pleaded with particularized facts showing an actual constitutional violation, not merely disagreement with enforcement.
Sanctions/fee exposure for repetitive filings. The affirmance of attorneys’ fees and costs—after prior warnings in the earlier Gage v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. decisions—highlights escalating consequences for litigants who repeatedly refile overlapping disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Res judicata (claim preclusion): A rule that prevents a party from suing again over the same underlying dispute after a final judgment. It promotes finality and judicial efficiency. Here, it barred relitigation of claims tied to denial of development applications, even when repackaged as constitutional claims.
Privity: A sufficiently close legal relationship between parties such that a judgment involving one can bind another for preclusion purposes. The court treated the Borough and a zoning officer as in privity with a Borough engineer, especially given allegations of coordinated conduct and their work relationship with the municipality.
“Same cause of action” (transactional test): Courts look to whether claims arise from the same core events, not whether the plaintiff uses a new legal label. If it’s the same essential course of conduct, it is usually the same “cause of action.”
Procedural due process in zoning: Even if a zoning decision is wrong, federal due process is generally satisfied if state law provides reasonable procedures to challenge or correct the error (appeals, hearings, judicial review).
Substantive due process “shocks the conscience”: A very high bar in land-use cases: ordinary unfairness, mistakes, or aggressive enforcement usually do not qualify. The court viewed Gage’s allegations as typical of a zoning dispute, not the extraordinary misconduct needed for a federal substantive due process claim.
Default judgment: A procedural win granted when a defendant fails to respond in time. Courts disfavor defaults, especially when the defendant answers within an extension ordered by the court.
Recusal: A judge steps aside only when there is a legitimate basis to question impartiality. Losing motions is not, by itself, evidence of bias.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s affirmance in Thomas Gage v. Borough of Hopatcong underscores a practical, transaction-focused use of res judicata to halt repetitive federal litigation over a single land-development controversy—extending preclusion to municipal affiliates in privity with prior defendants. At the same time, it clarifies that post-judgment, later-arising zoning enforcement episodes are not automatically precluded, but they must be pleaded with concrete facts and must meet demanding federal constitutional standards. Procedurally, the decision also reflects appellate reluctance to disturb denials of default and recusal absent clear error, and it illustrates how repeated filings can culminate in fee awards when a court finds vexatious litigation.