Civil Appeals in Georgia: A Pro Se Notice of Appeal Filed While Counsel Remains of Record Is a Nullity and Cannot Confer Appellate Jurisdiction

1. Introduction

Muhammad et al. v. Clayton County et al. (A25A2167, decided January 15, 2026) arises from a 2016 motor vehicle collision in which a Clayton County fire truck, driven by Christopher Stripling, struck a 2006 Mercedes Benz C230 sedan driven by Safiyyah Muhammad. The crash severely injured Safiyyah’s then seven-year-old sister, A. M., who was seated in the front passenger seat with a seat belt but without a child restraint or booster; the front passenger airbag did not deploy. The Muhammads sued Clayton County, Stripling, and Mercedes Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) asserting negligence and strict product liability theories (including failure to warn). MBUSA brought Safiyyah in as a third-party defendant.

Although the underlying litigation involved substantive product-liability and negligence issues (including Georgia’s statute of repose), the Court of Appeals’ decision turns on a threshold procedural question: whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction when the appellants filed a pro se notice of appeal while still formally represented by counsel, followed by an amended notice after the 30-day deadline.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as untimely. The Court held that the Muhammads’ initial pro se notice of appeal (filed May 1, 2025) was a “legal nullity” because, at that time, their attorneys (Hall and Sampson) had not yet been formally relieved by court order. The attorneys’ withdrawal motions were not granted until at the earliest a June 2, 2025 post-judgment hearing (and memorialized by written order on June 4). The Muhammads’ subsequent amended notice of appeal filed June 5—63 days after the April 3 final summary-judgment order—was therefore untimely under OCGA § 5-6-38(a), and no extension under OCGA § 5-6-39(a)(1) appeared in the record.

The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s criminal-case decision in Johnson v. State (recognizing discretion to accept certain timely pro se filings by represented criminal defendants), but concluded that Romich v. All Secure, Inc. remains binding precedent in the civil context and required dismissal on these facts.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • E. P. Properties, Inc. v. Wright, 375 Ga. App. 83 (2025)
    Role in opinion: Cited for the general standard of review for summary judgment (de novo review; evidence viewed in favor of the nonmovant). While not dispositive to the jurisdictional holding, it frames the case’s procedural posture—an appeal from summary judgment—before the Court pivots to jurisdiction.
  • Duffy v. Sanders, 354 Ga. App. 684 (2020)
    Role in opinion: Supports the Court’s threshold duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte. This citation anchors the Court’s decision to address timeliness and the validity of notices of appeal before any merits.
  • Clay v. State, 370 Ga. App. 482 (2024)
    Role in opinion: Emphasizes that the right to appeal is statutory and that compliance with appellate procedure is jurisdictional. Although a criminal case, it supplies broadly stated jurisdictional principles the Court applies to this civil appeal.
  • Parker v. Robinson, 337 Ga. App. 362 (2016)
    Role in opinion: Provides the direct timeliness consequence: without a timely notice of appeal, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss.
  • Romich v. All Secure, Inc., 361 Ga. App. 505 (2021)
    Role in opinion: The central civil precedent. Romich held that where counsel has not been formally permitted to withdraw by court order, a party’s pro se notice of appeal is a “legal nullity.” The Court treats Romich as controlling: because no formal withdrawal occurred before May 1, the May 1 pro se notice could not invoke appellate jurisdiction.
  • Walker v. State, 308 Ga. 749 (2020), disapproved of on other grounds by Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876 (2023)
    Role in opinion: Used by analogy to illustrate that, at least in some contexts, an on-the-record ruling can suffice to make later pro se filings effective. The Court contrasts Walker with the record here, concluding that the earliest possible “formal” change in representation occurred at the June 2 hearing—still too late to salvage the May 1 filing and too late to make the June 5 amended notice timely.
  • Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876 (2023)
    Role in opinion: The Court acknowledges Johnson’s shift in the criminal context: a pro se filing by a counseled defendant is not always per se a nullity, and courts have discretion to recognize a timely, procedurally proper pro se filing. The Court, however, underscores two limiting points:
    1. Johnson is expressly about the criminal context.
    2. Johnson did not disapprove or overrule Romich, so Romich remains binding on the Court of Appeals in civil cases.
  • In the Interest of N. C., 358 Ga. App. 379 (2021)
    Role in opinion: Reinforces Romich’s civil rule: a pro se notice of appeal filed before an order permitting counsel to withdraw is ineffective, requiring dismissal.
  • Quarterman v. Quarterman, 170 Ga. App. 376 (1983)
    Role in opinion: A long-standing timeliness example—an appeal filed roughly two and a half months after summary-judgment orders was untimely and dismissed. Quarterman supports the strictness of OCGA § 5-6-38(a)’s deadline.
  • White v. State, 305 Ga. 111 (2019)
    Role in opinion: Cited for the binding-force doctrine: panels of the Court of Appeals must follow prior Court of Appeals decisions until properly overruled by that court or reversed/overruled by the Supreme Court. This supports the Court’s conclusion that it must adhere to Romich absent direct conflict.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a jurisdiction-first sequence:

  1. Timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional.
    Under OCGA § 5-6-38(a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the judgment or order appealed. If the notice is untimely, OCGA § 5-6-48(b)(1) authorizes dismissal, and the appellate court lacks power to decide the merits.
  2. Validity of the filing depends on representation status at the time of filing.
    Applying Romich v. All Secure, Inc., the Court treats a pro se notice of appeal filed while counsel remains of record as ineffective in civil cases—because a litigant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and through counsel, and because counsel’s withdrawal is not “formal” until the trial court enters an order permitting it.
  3. “Representation ended when the case was dismissed” is not the operative rule.
    The trial court’s view that counsel’s obligations ended when the case was dismissed with prejudice did not control. The Court of Appeals emphasized the procedural requirement: until counsel is formally relieved (by written order or, at the earliest, a sufficiently clear on-the-record ruling), counsel remains counsel of record.
  4. The first effective notice came too late.
    Because the May 1 pro se notice was a nullity, the June 5 amended notice was the operative notice. But it was filed 63 days after the April 3 final judgment—outside the 30-day window—and no extension under OCGA § 5-6-39(a)(1) appeared.
  5. Johnson does not displace Romich in this civil appeal.
    While the Court acknowledged that Johnson v. State created discretionary flexibility regarding pro se filings by represented defendants in criminal cases, it found that Johnson neither overruled nor disapproved Romich. Bound by precedent, the Court applied Romich and dismissed.

3.3. Impact

This decision’s practical significance is procedural but substantial:

  • For civil litigants: It reinforces that timely appellate jurisdiction cannot be “bootstrapped” by a pro se notice of appeal filed while counsel is still of record. Parties who believe representation has effectively ended must ensure a formal withdrawal occurs promptly—otherwise, a time-sensitive pro se filing may be treated as void.
  • For civil counsel: It highlights the risk created by delayed withdrawal. Even if attorney-client communications indicate termination, the appellate timetable may be running. Counsel and clients must coordinate to avoid gaps where the client files pro se while counsel remains officially responsible.
  • For trial courts and clerks: The case underscores the importance of clear, prompt rulings on withdrawal motions—particularly after final judgment—because appellate deadlines are unforgiving.
  • For future doctrine: The opinion suggests an unresolved boundary between Johnson’s criminal-case discretion and the civil nullity rule. Unless and until the Supreme Court extends Johnson’s discretionary approach to civil cases (or addresses Romich directly), the Court of Appeals signals that Romich will continue to govern civil appeals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Jurisdiction” (appellate jurisdiction): The appellate court’s legal authority to decide the appeal. If the notice of appeal is late (or legally ineffective), the appellate court must dismiss even if the underlying case seems important or merits review.
  • “Notice of appeal”: The document that starts the appeal. In Georgia, it generally must be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order or judgment.
  • “Legal nullity”: A filing treated as if it never existed for legal purposes. Here, the pro se notice was deemed void because the party was still represented by counsel of record.
  • “Counsel of record”: The lawyer officially listed as representing a party in the case. A lawyer remains counsel of record until the court grants withdrawal (typically by written order; sometimes an on-the-record ruling may suffice depending on context and clarity).
  • “Dismissed with prejudice”: The case is ended and cannot be refiled. Importantly, this does not automatically terminate counsel’s status as counsel of record for purposes of post-judgment proceedings and appellate steps.
  • “Statute of repose” (background issue in the litigation): A hard time limit that can bar claims after a set period (here, OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) and (c) are discussed in the opinion as part of the procedural history), regardless of when an injury is discovered. The Court of Appeals did not reach these merits because jurisdiction failed.

5. Conclusion

Muhammad et al. v. Clayton County et al. is a jurisdictional dismissal that reinforces a strict civil appellate rule in Georgia: a pro se notice of appeal filed while counsel remains of record is ineffective, and appellate jurisdiction will not attach unless a valid notice is filed within OCGA § 5-6-38(a)’s deadline. The Court’s reliance on Romich v. All Secure, Inc.—and its refusal to treat Johnson v. State as altering the civil rule—signals that, for now, Georgia civil litigants must treat formal withdrawal as a critical prerequisite to any pro se appellate filing. The decision’s broader significance lies less in the underlying tort and product-liability dispute and more in its clear warning: procedural missteps at the notice-of-appeal stage are fatal, and neither the case’s seriousness nor post-judgment confusion about representation will cure an untimely or legally void notice.