City of Dickinson v. Helgeson (2026 ND 34): Sanctions for Fictitious Citations and Rule 58 Vexatious-Litigant Authority in Noncriminal Traffic-Infraction Litigation

1. Introduction

In City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed two recurring pressures on modern trial and appellate courts: (1) how far docket-control tools (specifically, vexatious-litigant designations under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58) extend into ordinance-based traffic enforcement; and (2) what consequences follow when a litigant submits briefs containing fictitious or nonexistent case citations—an issue the Court expressly linked to potential AI “hallucinations,” while emphasizing that responsibility remains with the filer.

The City of Dickinson prosecuted Seth Neil Helgeson for failing to display license plates under Dickinson Municipal Code § 58-705. The case was transferred to district court for a jury trial. Although the underlying charge was a noncriminal traffic infraction, Helgeson engaged in extensive pretrial motions practice (yielding 277 docket entries in what the Court characterized as a “relatively simple traffic offense”). After the jury found him in violation, the district court designated Helgeson a vexatious litigant under Admin. R. 58. On appeal, Helgeson challenged (a) the district court’s jurisdiction/authority to enter that designation (arguing the matter was “criminal” and therefore excluded from Rule 58’s scope), and (b) the designation as violating multiple constitutional rights. The City, in turn, sought sanctions for Helgeson’s use of fictitious case citations in his appellate brief.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the vexatious-litigant order and imposed $500 in sanctions against Helgeson for briefing misconduct.

• Noncriminal infraction: Failure to display license plates is not among the exceptions listed in N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-05; therefore, under N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-02(1), the offense is noncriminal. Because Admin. R. 58 excludes only “criminal actions,” the district court had authority to apply Rule 58.
• Vexatious-litigant finding upheld: The district court did not abuse its discretion given Helgeson’s extensive, largely meritless motions practice and the burden imposed on judicial resources.
• Constitutional challenges rejected: Relying on prior North Dakota authority upholding vexatious-litigant regimes and courts’ inherent docket-control powers, the Court held Rule 58 contains sufficient safeguards and does not violate Helgeson’s asserted constitutional rights.
• Sanctions for fictitious cases: The Court found Helgeson cited multiple nonexistent cases, creating needless work for both the City and the Court. While acknowledging AI tools can improve access to justice, the Court stressed verification duties and sanctioned Helgeson $500 under the appellate rules.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review and framing the appeal

• Muhlbradt v. Pederson, 2020 ND 187, ¶ 8, 947 N.W.2d 922
  Cited for the proposition that questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. The Court used this to independently assess whether the underlying proceeding was “criminal” or “civil/noncriminal” for Rule 58 purposes.
• Glaum v. State, 2024 ND 86, ¶ 15, 6 N.W.3d 603
  Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework for reviewing a vexatious-litigant designation. The Court’s analysis tracks Glaum: it looked for arbitrariness, misapplication of law, or an irrational mental process—and found none.
• State v. Kirkpatrick, 2012 ND 229, ¶ 22, 822 N.W.2d 851 (citing State v. Sorenson, 2009 ND 147, ¶ 16, 770 N.W.2d 701)
  Used for the standard that alleged constitutional violations are reviewed de novo. This set the stage for the Court’s fresh review of Helgeson’s due process, equal protection, First Amendment, and open-courts arguments.

B. Clarifying the nature of traffic “violations”

• Andre v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 295 N.W.2d 128, 131 (N.D. 1980)
  Cited in a notable aside: the verdict/judgment used the word “guilty,” but the Court called it a “misnomer” because traffic violations are noncriminal infractions. Andre supported the Court’s preference for describing the outcome as an “adjudication” of a traffic violation rather than criminal guilt—an important conceptual distinction feeding directly into Rule 58’s “civil” scope.

C. Constitutional limits and the legitimacy of vexatious-litigant regimes

• Rath v. Rath, 2022 ND 105, ¶¶ 36-38, 974 N.W.2d 652
  The Court relied heavily on Rath to reject Helgeson’s constitutional challenges. Rath recognized that courts may restrict access to filing when necessary, and it upheld the constitutionality of the vexatious-litigant framework due to procedural safeguards (findings, notice, and structured filing requirements).
• Smith v. Erickson, 2019 ND 48, ¶ 12, 923 N.W.2d 503
  Quoted within Rath for the principle that a court may restrict access to the legal system given public rights and necessity. It also supported the specific conclusion that pre-filing orders do not inherently violate the constitutional right of court access.
• Holkesvig v. Grove, 2014 ND 57, ¶ 17, 844 N.W.2d 557; Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Ziebarth, 520 N.W.2d 51, 58 (N.D. 1994); Holkesvig v. VandeWalle, 2016 ND 107, ¶ 11, 879 N.W.2d 728
  These cases were marshaled (through Rath) to reaffirm courts’ inherent authority to manage dockets, stem abuse, and preserve institutional integrity. This line of authority functions as the constitutional “counterweight” to open-courts arguments: access is fundamental, but not absolute when used to disrupt judicial function.

D. Appellate sanctions and briefing accuracy

• Ihli v. Lazzaretto, 2015 ND 151, ¶ 21, 864 N.W.2d 483
  Cited for the Court’s broad discretion to impose sanctions for rules violations and to police compliance with appellate procedure. This anchored the Court’s willingness to sanction Helgeson for fictitious citations.

E. AI “hallucinations,” verification duties, and pro se accountability

• Mezu v. Mezu, 346 A.3d 181, 189 (Md. App. Ct. 2025) (citing Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 336 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025))
  These out-of-state decisions were cited for the emerging judicial observation that fake citations often stem from AI hallucinations. Importantly, the North Dakota Supreme Court used these authorities not to condemn AI, but to explain the phenomenon and reinforce that courts will treat fabricated authorities as serious misconduct regardless of the tool used.
• Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr., Igloo Series Trust, 783 F. Supp. 3d 959, 960 (N.D. Tex. 2025)
  Cited as a modern example of judicial openness to AI when used prudently, including its potential to help pro se litigants bring meritorious claims. The North Dakota Court aligned itself with that balanced view: openness to AI, paired with insistence on verification.
• Evenstad v. Buchholz, 1997 ND 141, ¶ 8, 567 N.W.2d 194
  Reinforced the principle that procedural rules are not relaxed for pro se litigants. This is the doctrinal bridge between “access-enhancing technology” and “nonnegotiable responsibility”: self-representation (even with AI assistance) does not excuse inaccurate citations or rule violations.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction/authority under Rule 58 turns on “criminal” vs. “noncriminal”

Helgeson’s primary jurisdictional argument hinged on Admin. R. 58(2)(a): “Litigation” includes civil proceedings but “does not include criminal actions.” The Court therefore asked a narrow legal question: what is the nature of an ordinance-based traffic prosecution for failure to display license plates?

The Court resolved this by applying the statutory classification in N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-02(1): a person cited for a traffic violation under state law or municipal ordinance is “deemed” charged with a noncriminal offense unless the offense is among those listed in N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-05. Because failure to display plates is not listed in § 39-06.1-05, the offense is noncriminal. That classification defeated the “criminal action” carve-out and preserved the district court’s authority to apply Rule 58.

The Court also underscored the conceptual point with its “guilty” misnomer discussion (citing Andre v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r): labels used on verdict forms do not transform a noncriminal infraction into a criminal prosecution.

B. The vexatious-litigant designation was supported by the record

Rule 58 requires a finding by a preponderance of evidence and defines “vexatious conduct” broadly (harassing, unwarranted by law, delay tactics, hindering administration of justice, burdening resources, etc.). It further defines “vexatious litigant” to include a person who repeatedly files unmeritorious motions and engages in frivolous tactics intended to cause burden, expense, or delay.

Applying Glaum v. State’s abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court emphasized concrete record indicators: Helgeson’s many pretrial motions (including multiple disqualification attempts and three dismissal motions) and the extraordinary docket volume (277 entries) in a simple traffic matter. On that record, the Court concluded the district court’s determination was reasoned and within its discretion.

C. Constitutional challenges fail when procedural safeguards and inherent authority are present

Helgeson invoked equal protection, First Amendment, open courts, and due process. The Court’s answer was largely doctrinal and institutional:

• Courts may impose reasonable filing restrictions to protect the judicial process, drawing on Rath v. Rath and Smith v. Erickson.
• Inherent authority to control dockets supports intervention where abuse threatens integrity and function, supported by Holkesvig v. Grove, Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Ziebarth, and Holkesvig v. VandeWalle.
• Safeguards matter: the Court pointed to findings, filing requirements, and notice as adequate procedural protections (as recognized in Rath).

In short, the Court treated Rule 58 not as a categorical bar to courthouse access, but as a measured gatekeeping device triggered by demonstrated abuse and bounded by procedural protections.

D. Sanctions for fictitious citations: the duty is accuracy, not tool-choice

The Court found Helgeson cited multiple nonexistent cases; his citations either mapped onto different real cases or yielded nothing at all. The Court distinguished two types of problems:

• Ordinary miscitation (the City itself had some incorrect citations), which is burdensome but typically remediable.
• Fictitious/nonexistent authorities (Helgeson’s problem), which forces the opposing party and the Court to spend time investigating phantom sources and undermines the integrity of adjudication.

The Court framed the latter as sanctionable under N.D.R.App.P. 28(l) (accuracy and freedom from irrelevant/immaterial matters) and N.D.R.App.P. 13 (authorizing “appropriate action” for rules violations), relying on Ihli v. Lazzaretto for sanction discretion. It awarded $500 because the City did not substantiate attorney’s fees with an affidavit or quantified request.

Notably, the Court’s AI discussion is carefully balanced: it explicitly “encourage[s] and embrace[s]” technology (citing, among other sources, Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr., Igloo Series Trust), but warns that “scrupulous verification” is mandatory and that consequences attach regardless of whether errors arise from AI or carelessness. Citing Evenstad v. Buchholz, the Court reinforced that self-represented litigants are held to the same procedural standards.

3.3. Impact

A. Rule 58’s reach: noncriminal traffic matters are not “criminal actions”

A practical doctrinal takeaway is that Rule 58 can apply in proceedings that feel quasi-criminal—traffic enforcement in district court with a jury—but are statutorily noncriminal. Future litigants may be less able to avoid vexatious-litigant consequences by characterizing ordinance violations as “criminal” when state law deems them noncriminal infractions.

B. Litigation conduct in “small” cases can justify strong docket-control remedies

The Court’s emphasis on 277 docket entries signals that proportionality matters: when a party multiplies proceedings in a straightforward case, courts may treat that as a paradigmatic basis for vexatious findings. This is likely to embolden district courts to use Rule 58 in lower-stakes matters where the administrative burden is high relative to the merits.

C. Appellate briefing integrity and the emerging “AI verification” norm

The sanctions portion is likely the decision’s widest practical influence. The Court effectively announces a clear norm:

• Fictitious citations are sanctionable as a serious breach of appellate practice.
• AI is not banned and not stigmatized—but it does not dilute the duty of verification.
• Courts will not accept “citation errors by the other side” as a defense to fabricated authorities.

This aligns North Dakota with a developing national judicial posture: openness to AI as an access-to-justice tool, paired with strict accountability for accuracy. Practically, it should drive lawyers and pro se litigants toward verification workflows (checking reporters, docket numbers, database retrieval) before filing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Noncriminal traffic infraction vs. criminal case: Even when a case proceeds in court and results in a formal adjudication, the legislature can classify traffic matters as “noncriminal.” That classification affects which procedural regimes apply—here, whether Admin. R. 58 can be used.
• Vexatious litigant (Rule 58): A person whose repeated filings or tactics are frivolous, burdensome, harassing, or meant to delay. The remedy often includes a pre-filing requirement (court permission before filing more papers), designed to protect court resources and other parties.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. The Supreme Court does not ask whether it would have made the same decision, but whether the district court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on a legal error.
• De novo review: A non-deferential standard. For constitutional claims, the Supreme Court makes its own independent determination.
• AI “hallucinations” (in legal citations): A known risk where an AI tool can generate plausible-sounding but false case names/citations. The Court’s key point: regardless of cause, the filer bears responsibility for ensuring citations are real and accurate.

5. Conclusion

City of Dickinson v. Helgeson reinforces three principles with immediate operational significance. First, a statutorily noncriminal traffic infraction is not a “criminal action” for purposes of N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, preserving district court authority to impose vexatious-litigant controls in such proceedings. Second, North Dakota courts will sustain Rule 58 designations where the record shows repeated, unmeritorious filings that burden the system, and they will reject broad constitutional attacks when procedural safeguards and inherent docket-control authority are present. Third, and most pointedly for modern practice, the Court signals that fictitious or nonexistent citations—whether generated by AI or by careless drafting—undermine the appellate process and warrant sanctions, while simultaneously affirming that responsible use of technology is welcomed rather than condemned.