Cisco Closes the Sosa Door: Alien Tort Statute Claims Limited to the “Blackstone Three”

1. Introduction

In Suhail Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., No. 25-1043 (4th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (unpublished) (per curiam), Iraqi plaintiffs brought claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) against CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (CACI), asserting conspiracy to commit torture and conspiracy to commit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT).

The appeal arrived in an unusual posture: the Fourth Circuit had previously affirmed a plaintiffs’ verdict and addressed a third-party indemnification action, see Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 170 F.4th 162 (4th Cir. 2026). After the Supreme Court decided Cisco Systems Inc. v. Doe I, 600 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 1882 (2026), the Fourth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing, granted panel rehearing, vacated its prior opinion, and directed dismissal of the case.

The key issue on rehearing was straightforward but consequential: after Cisco, do federal courts have authority to recognize ATS causes of action for modern international human-rights norms such as torture and CIDT (including conspiracy theories)?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that Cisco “effectively overruled” the prior framework under which the panel had recognized the plaintiffs’ ATS claims. Because Cisco declared that the category of judicially created ATS causes of action is a “null set,” the Fourth Circuit concluded it must dismiss the plaintiffs’ ATS claims for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT. The court therefore:

  • Granted CACI’s petition for panel rehearing;
  • Vacated its prior decision (Al Shimari, 170 F.4th 162);
  • Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice;
  • Dismissed as moot CACI’s third-party indemnification complaint against the United States (because the judgment against CACI was reversed).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

Cisco Systems Inc. v. Doe I, 600 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 1882 (2026)

Cisco is the engine of the rehearing disposition. The Fourth Circuit quoted Cisco’s core holding: “we close the door that Sosa cracked to judicially created ATS liability,” concluding that the supposed narrow class of judge-made ATS causes of action “is a null set.” (146 S. Ct. at 1892).

That language did not merely tighten a standard; it eliminated the doctrinal space lower courts had relied upon to recognize ATS claims beyond a historically fixed set. The Fourth Circuit treated Cisco as dispositive: if aiding-and-abetting torture claims fell, then conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT necessarily fell as well.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)

The panel’s prior decision had held the claims “cognizable” under the ATS pursuant to the Sosa framework. On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that this framework could no longer support relief because Cisco repudiated Sosa’s “prediction” that courts could recognize a “narrow class” of additional claims without intruding on the political branches.

The opinion also reflects an important nuance drawn from Cisco’s caveat: Cisco did “not revisit” Sosa’s assumption about the historically recognized “Blackstone three” (safe conducts, ambassadors, piracy). That caveat becomes central in Judge Quattlebaum’s concurrence.

Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 170 F.4th 162 (4th Cir. 2026)

This is the Fourth Circuit’s now-vacated merits decision. Its main relevance here is procedural and doctrinal: it demonstrates how, pre-Cisco, lower courts continued to apply Sosa to recognize claims such as torture and CIDT-related theories. The rehearing opinion’s vacatur underscores that Cisco operates as an intervening, outcome-determinative change in law.

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628 (2021)

Judge Quattlebaum cited Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe for the proposition that, even before Cisco, the Supreme Court “never created a cause of action under the ATS” (593 U.S. at 635 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion)). This supports the concurrence’s view that Sosa’s “cracked door” produced confusion and prolonged litigation, now resolved by Cisco’s categorical closure.

United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

In addressing potential “workarounds,” the concurrence relied on United States v. Ali to show that conspiracy is a distinct offense that may not track the “law of nations” offense itself (Ali rejected a theory of conspiracy to commit piracy as a law-of-nations violation). This reinforces the concurrence’s position that, after Cisco, plaintiffs cannot repackage modern norms as historically recognized ATS claims.

United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820)

Judge Quattlebaum cited United States v. Smith for the classic definition that “piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea.” This precedent supports the concurrence’s narrower historical reading: if piracy’s core elements include robbery and the high seas, torture/CIDT conspiracies are not plausibly “piracy” and cannot be treated as equivalent.

RJR Nabisco v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013)

The concurrence separately emphasized the presumption against extraterritoriality, quoting RJR Nabisco and citing Kiobel. Even if an ATS cause of action existed, plaintiffs would still have to show that the case “touch[es] and concern[s]” the United States with sufficient force (Kiobel) and that the relevant conduct tied to the statute’s “focus” is domestic (RJR Nabisco).

Viet. Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973)

These cases appear in the concurrence to reinforce the general limiting principle that not all wrongful conduct can be styled as a “tort in violation of the law of nations” under the ATS. They function as supporting authority for the concurrence’s insistence on historically bounded ATS coverage and resistance to expansive modern constructions.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The per curiam’s reasoning is direct: (1) the plaintiffs’ claims depend on a court-recognized ATS cause of action; (2) Cisco holds that the judicial creation of ATS causes of action is no longer permissible; therefore (3) the claims must be dismissed.

Judge Quattlebaum’s concurrence adds structure and consequences:

  1. Post-Cisco ATS causes of action are confined to the “Blackstone three” (because Cisco preserved only Sosa’s “assumption” about them).
  2. Conspiracy theories do not salvage ATS liability—even “conspiracy to commit piracy” would fail as an end-run (citing Ali).
  3. Historical mismatch: torture/CIDT conspiracies lack piracy’s essential elements (high seas + robbery), and accepting “analogy” arguments would re-open the very door Cisco closed.
  4. Extraterritoriality as a backstop: even if plaintiffs could clear the cause-of-action hurdle, they would still need to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application under Kiobel/Nestlé/RJR Nabisco—something the concurrence says the record cannot support.

One noteworthy tension is framing: the concurrence repeatedly describes dismissal as for “lack of jurisdiction,” while Cisco (and Sosa) distinguish the ATS’s jurisdictional grant from the availability of a cause of action. The Fourth Circuit’s instruction to dismiss “without prejudice” functions pragmatically: the federal ATS pathway is closed, but the order does not purport to adjudicate any non-ATS theory a plaintiff might attempt elsewhere (subject to other doctrines and defenses).

3.3. Impact

The opinion’s practical rule is sweeping: ATS litigation based on modern international human-rights norms—torture, CIDT, aiding and abetting, conspiracy— is no longer viable in the Fourth Circuit after Cisco.

More broadly, the decision illustrates how Cisco reshapes ATS practice nationwide:

  • Merits-based ATS innovations are foreclosed: lower courts should not engage in Sosa-style norm identification for new causes of action.
  • Litigation gravitation away from ATS: plaintiffs will be forced to seek alternative legal vehicles (if any exist) rather than ATS-based human-rights tort claims.
  • Procedural cleanup: long-running ATS cases may be reopened or re-evaluated where they relied on Sosa’s previously “cracked” door.
  • Residual ATS category remains narrow: if any ATS claims survive at all, they are confined to the historically recognized “Blackstone three,” with courts likely to resist attempts to expand those categories through “analogies” or derivative liability theories.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
A federal statute that gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain civil actions by non-U.S. plaintiffs for torts “in violation of the law of nations.” The key dispute is not just jurisdiction, but whether a cause of action exists.
Jurisdiction vs. cause of action
Jurisdiction is the court’s power to hear a kind of case. A cause of action is a recognized legal claim that entitles a plaintiff to relief if proven. Sosa treated the ATS as jurisdictional, while Cisco rejects judicial creation of new ATS causes of action.
The “Blackstone three”
Historically recognized law-of-nations offenses referenced in Sosa: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. After Cisco, these are effectively the only potential ATS claim-types left open.
CIDT
“Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,” a human-rights concept often invoked in international law. After Cisco, its status as an international norm does not, by itself, permit an ATS cause of action.
Presumption against extraterritoriality
A rule that U.S. statutes are presumed not to apply to conduct abroad unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. The concurrence explains that even if an ATS claim existed, plaintiffs would still need to show sufficient U.S.-based conduct tied to the statute’s focus.
Dismissal without prejudice
A dismissal that does not decide the claim on a final, preclusive basis. Here it reflects that the ATS route is closed, but the court is not purporting to resolve any different, non-ATS claim a plaintiff might attempt (subject to other limits).

5. Conclusion

This rehearing decision is a direct application of Cisco Systems Inc. v. Doe I to a prominent ATS human-rights suit. By vacating its earlier merits affirmance and ordering dismissal, the Fourth Circuit confirms a new baseline rule: federal courts may not recognize judge-made ATS causes of action beyond the historically assumed “Blackstone three,” and modern ATS claims for torture/CIDT (including conspiracy theories) must be dismissed.

In doctrinal terms, the decision marks the end of the Sosa-era project of incremental ATS common-law development; in practical terms, it sharply narrows the ATS as a tool for transnational human-rights tort litigation.