Chiriboga-Herrera v. Litt: Summary Judgment Denied Where Homeowner’s Exemption and Labor Law § 200 Theories Are Not Eliminated as a Matter of Law

1. Introduction

In Chiriboga-Herrera v Litt (2026 NY Slip Op 00344 [2d Dept Jan. 28, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed a pre-discovery summary judgment order that had dismissed claims against property owner Marty Litt arising from a fatal construction accident. The decedent, William Orlando Barzallo-Diaz, allegedly was struck in the head by a falling beam weighing approximately 1,000 pounds and was pronounced dead at the scene.

The plaintiffs, as co-administrators of the estate, pleaded Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), 200, and common-law negligence. Litt sought dismissal principally on (i) the homeowner’s exemption under Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 and (ii) lack of supervision/control over the work.

The Second Department reversed as to plaintiff Joselyn Natalia Chiriboga-Herrara, holding that Litt did not meet his prima facie burden for summary judgment on the homeowner’s exemption or on Labor Law § 200/common-law negligence where the pleadings and proof implicated both “premises condition” and “means and methods” theories. The appeal by plaintiff Elva Castro was dismissed because no appeal lies from an order entered on the default of the appealing party (CPLR 5511).

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Homeowner’s exemption (Labor Law §§ 240[1], 241[6]): Litt failed to establish, prima facie, that the work’s purpose at the time of the accident was connected to his residential use of the property and failed to eliminate triable issues regarding his supervision/control of the work.
  • Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence: Litt failed to show the case fell solely within the “means and methods” category and failed to eliminate triable issues under both standards (premises condition notice/creation and supervisory control).
  • Procedure: Because Litt did not satisfy his prima facie burden, summary judgment was improper “regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers” under Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6): nondelegable duties and the homeowner’s exemption

  • Argueta v Hall & Wright, LLC and Thorpe v One Page Park, LLC: The court reiterated the central framing that Labor Law § 240(1) protects against elevation-related hazards and imposes a nondelegable duty on owners/contractors/agents. These cases supply the doctrinal baseline against which an owner must then prove entitlement to the homeowner’s exemption.
  • Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.: Cited for § 241(6)’s nondelegable duty to provide reasonable and adequate protection and to comply with specific Industrial Code rules. It reinforces that exemption—not delegation—must carry Litt’s dismissal motion.
  • Punina v Canaday, Lazo v Ricci, and Ortega v Puccia: These cases articulate the homeowner’s exemption text—owners of one- and two-family dwellings “who contract for but do not direct or control the work.” The Second Department applied that two-part requirement (qualifying dwelling + no direction/control).
  • Marquez v Masciosia and Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc.: Used for the rule that applicability of the exemption turns on whether the “site and purpose of the work” is connected to the owner’s residential use, assessed based on the owner’s intentions at the time of injury. This precedent drove the court’s holding that evidence of past primary residence and later return was not, by itself, enough to establish residential purpose “at all relevant times.”
  • Venter v Cherkasky and Rajkumar v Lal: Cited for the “direction or control” inquiry—whether the owner supervised the method and manner of the actual work being performed. The Second Department used this standard to conclude Litt’s proof did not eliminate factual disputes about supervision/control.
  • Pawelic v Siegel (contrast with Argueta v Hall & Wright, LLC): Invoked to support the conclusion that Litt’s showing was insufficient on residential purpose at the time of the accident.
  • Mitchell v 148th St. Jamaica Condominium: Cited alongside Venter v Cherkasky to underscore that an owner’s submissions can fail to eliminate triable issues where the injured worker is employed by a subcontractor and the record leaves supervision/control unresolved.

2) Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence: dual categories and summary judgment burdens

  • Valencia v Glinski and Wilson v Bergon Constr. Corp.: Cited for the foundational point that § 200 codifies the common-law duty to maintain a safe workplace. Wilson also supplies the critical two-category framework: (i) dangerous/defective premises conditions and (ii) manner of work (“means and methods”).
  • Ortega v Puccia and Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.: Cited for the premises-condition liability standard: creation of the condition or actual/constructive notice. This was pivotal because Litt could not win without addressing (and negating) this theory if the case plausibly involved a premises condition.
  • Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co.: Cited for the means-and-methods rule: no recovery against an owner/general contractor for subcontractor methods/materials absent “some supervisory control.”
  • Venter v Cherkasky and Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp.: These cases supply the key procedural burden rule applied here: when an accident is alleged to involve both premises conditions and means/methods, the movant must address proof applicable to both liability standards; otherwise, summary judgment fails.
  • Poulin v Ultimate Homes, Inc.: Cited for the proposition that unless the movant establishes the accident falls into only one § 200 category, it must exonerate itself as a matter of law under all potentially concurrent causes.
  • Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.: Applied for the rule that failure to make a prima facie showing requires denial of summary judgment regardless of the opposing papers.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Homeowner’s exemption requires proof tied to the moment of injury. Litt’s affidavit showed the property was previously his family’s primary residence and that the family returned after completion, but the court held this did not establish, prima facie, that “at all relevant times” the project’s purpose was connected to Litt’s residential use—an essential element under Marquez v Masciosia and Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc.
  2. Direction/control is a fact-intensive issue not eliminated by Litt’s submissions. Under Venter v Cherkasky (and Rajkumar v Lal), the question is supervision over “method and manner.” The court found Litt’s affidavit and contract-related proof did not eliminate triable issues as to whether he supervised/controlled the injury-producing work, particularly given the subcontractor employment context (Mitchell v 148th St. Jamaica Condominium).
  3. For Labor Law § 200, a movant must confront both categories unless it narrows the case to one. The court rejected Litt’s attempt to characterize the case solely as “means and methods.” Because the pleadings and allegations could implicate both (i) dangerous condition/notice/creation and (ii) supervision/control, Litt was required to negate both theories to win summary judgment (Venter v Cherkasky; Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp.).
  4. Procedural consequence: prima facie failure ends the motion. With unresolved factual issues and insufficient prima facie proof, the court denied summary judgment without reaching the adequacy of plaintiffs’ opposition (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.).

C. Impact

  • Stricter evidentiary discipline for homeowner’s exemption motions. Owners cannot rely on general residential history or eventual occupancy; they must substantiate that the work’s purpose at the time of injury was residential in nature and must also negate “direction or control” factually.
  • Reinforced “both-theories” burden for § 200 summary judgment. Where an incident plausibly involves both premises conditions and work methods, this decision underscores that owners must move against—and support record proof negating—both liability pathways, or else summary judgment is vulnerable.
  • Practical effect on litigation timing. The court’s emphasis that this occurred “prior to the completion of discovery, including party depositions” signals that early summary judgment is risky where intent, control, notice, and on-site practices remain undeveloped.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Nondelegable duty
A legal obligation that remains with the owner/contractor even if the work is assigned to others; liability can attach regardless of delegation.
Homeowner’s exemption (Labor Law §§ 240, 241)
Protection for owners of one- and two-family dwellings who hire work but do not direct or control it; it depends on residential purpose and lack of supervision over how the work is done.
Prima facie showing (summary judgment)
The movant’s initial burden to present enough admissible evidence to win as a matter of law; if it fails, the motion is denied even if the opponent’s papers are weak.
Triable issue of fact
A genuine factual dispute requiring a trial (or further fact-finding), which prevents summary judgment.
Labor Law § 200 categories
(1) Premises condition: liability can turn on whether the owner created the hazard or had notice. (2) Means and methods: liability can turn on whether the owner supervised/controlled how the contractor/subcontractor performed the work.

5. Conclusion

Chiriboga-Herrera v Litt crystallizes two practical rules for New York construction-accident litigation in the Second Department: (1) to obtain the homeowner’s exemption on summary judgment, an owner must prove the work’s residential purpose at the time of injury and negate direction/control with competent evidence; and (2) to dismiss Labor Law § 200 and negligence claims, an owner must address both premises-condition and means-and-methods standards unless the record conclusively places the case into only one category. The decision’s procedural backbone—Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.—reinforces that failing the prima facie burden ends the motion.