Chimpanzees Are Not “Persons” Eligible for Michigan Habeas Corpus Under MCR 3.303 (Supreme Court Review Denied)

Case: Nonhuman Rights Project Inc v. Deyoung Family Zoo LLC (SC: 169351; COA: 369247; Menominee CC: 23-017621-AH)
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan (Order denying leave), July 17, 2026
Key writing: Welch, J., dissenting from denial of leave

I. Introduction

This case arises from an effort by the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) to obtain a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of seven chimpanzees kept at the DeYoung Family Zoo (the “DeYoung Chimpanzees”). Plaintiff did not claim chimpanzees are human beings; instead, it alleged chimpanzees possess a common-law right to bodily liberty and that their confinement at the zoo unlawfully infringes that right. The requested remedy was release and transfer to a sanctuary accredited by the Global Federation of Animal Sanctuaries.

The circuit court denied relief on the ground that the chimpanzees “are not persons as required by MCR 3.303.” The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, reasoning that chimpanzees are not legal “persons” and therefore are ineligible for habeas corpus relief. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Justice Welch dissented, criticizing the Court of Appeals’ reliance on social contract theory and “despotic dominion” and urging the Court to consider whether habeas doctrine should evolve with advances in scientific understanding of animal cognition and autonomy.

II. Summary of the Opinion (Michigan Supreme Court Order and Welch, J., Dissent)

Disposition: The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application for leave to appeal “because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.”

Welch, J., dissenting: Justice Welch would have granted leave for two core reasons:

• Doctrinal concern: The Court of Appeals’ use of social contract theory and the concept of “despotic dominion” to define personhood, and its reliance on Michigan caselaw, was questionable.
• Evolution of common law: The Court should explore whether habeas relief—historically capable of common-law evolution—should develop in light of modern scientific understanding of chimpanzees’ cognitive and emotional capacities.

Justice Welch emphasized record-supported scientific claims that chimpanzees exhibit autonomy, self-awareness, future planning, empathy, compassion, and grief, and argued that these traits make the legal and moral questions surrounding “bodily liberty” and confinement especially acute.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v DeYoung Family Zoo, LLC (Court of Appeals decision under review)

The dissent addresses, and sharply criticizes, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v DeYoung Family Zoo, LLC, ___ Mich App ___ (October 17, 2025) (Docket No. 369247). The panel:

• Treated habeas eligibility as turning on whether the petitioner is a “person,” concluding chimpanzees are not.
• Leaned on William Blackstone’s division of “natural” and “artificial” persons and his framing of “absolute rights” as belonging to “particular men.”
• Invoked Blackstone’s property definition featuring “sole and despotic dominion,” and Blackstone’s Genesis-based narrative to situate animals as property rather than rights-bearers.
• Used social contract theory (including Hobbes) to assert personhood centrally involves capacity to exchange natural liberty for legal obligations—something the panel concluded chimpanzees cannot do.
• Declined to “update” Michigan common law, stressing that major departures should come from the Supreme Court.

Justice Welch’s dissent takes aim at each of these moves—especially the conceptual leap from historical property rhetoric and contractarian philosophy to a categorical bar on habeas relief.

2. Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63 (2005)

The Court of Appeals quoted Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 83 (2005), for the proposition that the Michigan Supreme Court is the “principal steward of Michigan’s common law.” Justice Welch agrees with that general allocation of authority, but uses it to argue the Supreme Court should have granted leave precisely because the Court of Appeals positioned the issue as a common-law evolution question requiring the Supreme Court’s stewardship.

3. Teel v Meredith, 284 Mich App 660 (2009)

The Court of Appeals relied on Teel v Meredith, 284 Mich App 660, 666 (2009), to suggest any “significant departure from Michigan law” should come from the Supreme Court. Justice Welch does not dispute the institutional caution expressed in Teel, but views it as a reason to grant leave (to decide whether a departure is warranted), not a reason to let the Court of Appeals’ categorical rule stand without Supreme Court engagement.

4. Sterling v Jackson, 69 Mich 488 (1888) and Ten Hopen v Walker, 96 Mich 236 (1893)

The Court of Appeals cited two nineteenth-century cases to support the view that animals are property under Michigan law:

• Sterling v Jackson, 69 Mich 488, 496 (1888), quoted for the proposition that “every man” may take wild creatures fit for food (subject to not injuring another’s rights).
• Ten Hopen v Walker, 96 Mich 236, 239 (1893), quoted for the statement that dogs “are the property of the owner.”

Justice Welch argues these cases are not dispositive because they address human ownership and control of animals, not whether a being held as property is categorically ineligible for habeas corpus. In other words, they may describe prevailing property doctrine, but they do not answer the habeas-specific question the plaintiff posed.

5. Johnson v M'Intosh, 21 US 543 (1823)

Justice Welch cites Johnson v M'Intosh, 21 US 543, 574 (1823), not as a controlling Michigan habeas precedent, but to illustrate the dangers of “dominion” reasoning. The dissent’s point is cautionary: concepts of “dominion” have historically been used to rationalize subjugation (there, conquest of Native American nations), and courts should be wary of importing similar justificatory logic into modern jurisprudence concerning living beings.

6. In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Stanley, 49 Misc 3d 746 (NY, 2015)

Justice Welch quotes In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Stanley, 49 Misc 3d 746, 772 (NY, 2015), for the observation that efforts to extend rights to chimpanzees are “understandable,” while acknowledging they had not succeeded there. The citation functions as comparative authority: it situates Michigan’s dispute within broader, recurring litigation over nonhuman habeas petitions.

7. Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003)

Justice Welch cites Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 579 (2003), for the proposition that “times can blind us to certain truths” and that later generations may recognize laws once thought necessary actually “serve only to oppress.” The dissent uses Lawrence as a general interpretive principle supporting openness to doctrinal change where evolving knowledge and values reveal unjustified constraints on liberty.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The operative legal dispute: “personhood” as a gatekeeper to habeas

The litigation is framed around whether habeas corpus relief under Michigan procedure is limited to “persons” and whether chimpanzees can qualify. The circuit court relied on MCR 3.303 (and plaintiff invoked MCL 600.4316 and MCR 3.303(D) for an order to show cause). The Court of Appeals treated “personhood” as dispositive and answered it categorically in the negative for chimpanzees.

2. Justice Welch’s critique of “despotic dominion” and Genesis-based jurisprudence

A central feature of the dissent is methodological: Justice Welch questions whether an eighteenth-century British jurist’s theological interpretation of Genesis is a “sound foundation for Michigan common law in the twenty-first century.” The dissent underscores that:

• Blackstone’s phrasing “despotic” is an addition rather than biblical text, and amici contended “dominion” is better read as stewardship and care.
• Even if Blackstone reflected historical common law categories, modern Michigan courts are not obliged to preserve outdated justifications, particularly where they rest on contestable theology rather than legal principle.

3. The dissent’s attack on the Court of Appeals’ social contract logic

The Court of Appeals reasoned that personhood involves the capacity to trade away “natural liberty” and assume legal obligations—something it concluded chimpanzees cannot do. Justice Welch challenges that foundation by stressing that tying basic rights to duty-bearing capacity yields unacceptable implications: it would threaten the status and protections of human beings who cannot meaningfully “consciously” enter such an exchange due to age or infirmity. The dissent characterizes that as a reductio: a theory that collapses when applied to universally protected humans is an unstable basis for denying habeas access categorically.

4. Common-law evolution and institutional roles

Justice Welch accepts that the Supreme Court is the “principal steward of Michigan’s common law” (Henry v Dow Chem Co) and that lower courts may hesitate to make “significant departure[s]” (Teel v Meredith). But she converts those propositions into an argument for review: if the Court of Appeals is declining to adapt habeas doctrine because it sees the Supreme Court as the proper decision-maker, then the Supreme Court’s denial of leave leaves a major question frozen at the intermediate level—despite acknowledged scientific developments and a doctrine (habeas) historically associated with safeguarding liberty.

C. Impact

1. Immediate doctrinal effect in Michigan

The Supreme Court’s denial of leave leaves in place the published Court of Appeals holding that chimpanzees are not “persons” entitled to habeas relief. As a practical matter, this makes Michigan an inhospitable forum—under current doctrine—for nonhuman habeas petitions seeking transfer from private captivity to sanctuaries, at least absent a change in law or a differently framed cause of action.

2. Litigation strategy: pressure shifts to legislation and alternative claims

Justice Welch explicitly notes that the Legislature can reconsider animal welfare laws, including those concerning confinement of chimpanzees. The likely downstream effect is to redirect advocacy toward:

• statutory reform (minimum standards, limits on solitary housing, enrichment mandates, restrictions on public interactions, or captivity bans);
• administrative enforcement of existing animal welfare regimes;
• common-law or statutory claims not requiring “personhood” as a threshold (e.g., consumer protection, licensing compliance, cruelty provisions, or nuisance where available).

3. Signals for future Supreme Court engagement

Although nonbinding, the dissent signals that at least one Justice viewed the Court of Appeals’ philosophical foundations as antiquated and potentially incompatible with modern legal commitments to liberty and coherent rights theory. This can influence future cases by:

• encouraging litigants to build records emphasizing autonomy, social needs, and harm from confinement;
• framing personhood not as contractarian capacity but as a legal construct that has historically extended beyond adult, competent humans (e.g., via guardianship and corporate personhood analogies—without asserting equivalence);
• pressing the court to articulate a more modern, secular justification for any categorical exclusion.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Habeas corpus: A legal procedure used to challenge unlawful detention. Traditionally associated with protecting liberty by requiring the custodian to justify confinement.
• “Person” in law: A category that determines who can hold rights or bring certain claims. It does not always mean “human being” (e.g., corporations can be “artificial persons”), but courts often limit some remedies to “persons.”
• Common law: Judge-made law developed through decisions over time. It can evolve as courts reassess older rules in light of changed facts, values, or understanding.
• Social contract theory: A political philosophy suggesting legitimate government arises from an agreement (explicit or implicit) among individuals to accept laws in exchange for benefits like security. The Court of Appeals used a duty-and-exchange framing to define personhood; the dissent warns that approach can wrongly exclude humans who cannot meaningfully “contract.”
• “Despotic dominion”: Blackstone’s rhetoric describing absolute human control over property. The dissent criticizes using that concept—especially when reinforced by theological narrative—as a modern legal foundation for treating living beings as outside the scope of liberty-protecting remedies.

V. Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s denial of leave leaves standing a published Court of Appeals rule that chimpanzees are not “persons” eligible for habeas corpus relief under Michigan procedure. Justice Welch’s dissent, however, mounts a sustained critique of the philosophical and historical premises used to reach that rule—particularly Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” framing and a contractarian definition of personhood—and argues that habeas doctrine, as a living common-law instrument for protecting liberty, warrants reconsideration in light of modern scientific understanding of chimpanzee cognition and autonomy.

In the broader legal context, the decision underscores a familiar institutional tension: courts’ reluctance to expand foundational categories like “personhood” versus the capacity (and, in the dissent’s view, the responsibility) of common law to evolve. For now, meaningful change in Michigan is most plausibly channeled through legislative action or alternative legal theories that do not depend on nonhuman “personhood” as a threshold requirement.