Chilled Worship Attendance Establishes Standing and RFRA “Substantial Burden” Against DHS’s Sensitive-Locations Rollback

1. Introduction

In Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. United States Department of Homeland Security (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to follow its prior “sensitive locations” guidelines (the 2021 Policy) when conducting immigration enforcement actions in or near the plaintiffs’ houses of worship.

The case arose after DHS rescinded longstanding restrictions limiting enforcement at or near “places of worship,” replacing detailed approval and exigency rules with a directive that officers use discretion and “common sense” (the 2025 Policy). The plaintiffs—Quaker meetings, a Sikh gurdwara, and the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship—alleged that the rollback chilled immigrant attendance, undermining communal worship and religious ministries, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment expressive association right.

Key issues on appeal were (i) Article III standing at the preliminary-injunction stage, (ii) whether plaintiffs were likely to succeed on a RFRA claim (especially the “substantial burden” element), and (iii) whether the government preserved any strict-scrutiny justification under RFRA.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Standing: Plaintiffs made a “clear showing” they were likely to establish standing. The court held that reduced attendance and chilled participation were concrete injuries; those injuries were fairly traceable to the 2025 Policy because third-party reactions were a predictable effect of the rollback; and an injunction restoring prior limits likely would redress at least part of the harm.
  • RFRA merits (likelihood of success): Plaintiffs were likely to prove the 2025 Policy “substantially burdens” their religious exercise by increasing the risk of enforcement at worship sites, pressuring faith communities to modify practices (e.g., welcoming immigrants, leaving doors open) and impairing communal worship central to their faiths.
  • Strict scrutiny waiver: The government waived any argument that the 2025 Policy satisfies strict scrutiny because it failed to present legal argument or evidence on compelling interest/least restrictive means in the district court.
  • Winter factors: The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest favored a tailored injunction limited to plaintiffs’ worship sites.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standing: injury, traceability, redressability at the preliminary-injunction stage

  • Murthy v. Missouri: Supplies the preliminary-injunction-stage evidentiary posture—plaintiffs must make a “clear showing” that they are “likely” to establish standing. The Fourth Circuit repeatedly anchored its analysis in this heightened-but-provisional standing showing.
  • Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife: Provides the familiar three elements (injury-in-fact, traceability, redressability) and the requirement that injury be concrete and “actual or imminent.” The court treated reduced attendance and disrupted religious practice as sufficiently concrete at this stage.
  • Peterson v. Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin.: Cited for de novo review of standing as a question of law.
  • Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Cheatham, Bennett v. Spear, and Sheppheard v. Morrisey: These frame causation when third parties are involved. Bennett supplies the “determinative or coercive effect” formulation; Sheppheard reiterates that independent third-party actions usually break traceability unless the government’s action predictably shapes them.
  • Dep't of Com. v. New York and Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env't Prot. Agency: The doctrinal centerpiece for traceability. The court treated immigrant non-attendance as the “predictable effect” of DHS’s policy change—analogous to predictable census nonresponse in Dep't of Com. and predictable market effects in Diamond Alt. Energy. This is the opinion’s most important standing move: it validates standing for regulated-entity plaintiffs harmed through foreseeable third-party behavioral responses to government policy.
  • Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA: Invoked by the government to argue the policy did not “regulate, constrain or compel” plaintiffs. The court rejected the framing as inconsistent with the “predictable effect” approach of Dep't of Com..
  • Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine: Used by the government to characterize the causal chain as too attenuated. The Fourth Circuit distinguished it, emphasizing this case involved a direct mechanism: rollback of worship-site protections leading to fear of enforcement leading to non-attendance.
  • United States v. Texas: DHS argued plaintiffs improperly challenged “downstream effects” of immigration enforcement. The court distinguished Texas, emphasizing plaintiffs did not contest arrest/prosecution authority—only the location-based operational policy at worship sites.
  • Laird v. Tatum and United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan: DHS analogized plaintiffs’ harm to a nonjusticiable “subjective chill.” The court distinguished: plaintiffs produced objective evidence of reduced attendance and concrete disruption of communal worship.
  • Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd: Critical to traceability: the challenged policy need not be the sole cause; it is enough that it is “in part responsible.”
  • Deal v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ., Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., and Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env't Prot. Agency: Supply the low bar for redressability and the “commonsense inferences” principle, especially where third-party behavior is predictable.
  • Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis: Supports that “granular specificity” is not required at the preliminary-injunction stage if the record shows imminence.

B. Preliminary injunction framework and standards of review

  • Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.: The four-factor test (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest) drives the merits/relief structure.
  • Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land and Roe v. Dep't of Def.: Clarify standards of review: legal rulings de novo, fact findings clear error, ultimate injunction decision abuse of discretion.
  • Pashby v. Delia (abrogated on other grounds by Stinnie v. Holcomb): Supports that success on some claims can suffice for a preliminary injunction; the court therefore declined to reach the First Amendment claim once RFRA likelihood of success was established.

C. RFRA: substantial burden and strict scrutiny

  • Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Ramirez v. Collier: Frame RFRA’s “very broad protection” and that it can exceed First Amendment protection, setting a pro-plaintiff baseline for RFRA coverage.
  • Goodall ex rel. Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch. Bd., Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Lew, and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div.: Supply the “substantial burden” test: government action that creates “substantial pressure” to modify behavior and violate beliefs—even via indirect coercion.
  • Holt v. Hobbs and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.: Establish the “exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means requirement once substantial burden is shown.
  • Bowen v. Roy, Mahmoud v. Taylor, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: DHS relied on Bowen to argue plaintiffs cannot dictate “internal operating procedures.” The court distinguished: unlike recordkeeping in Bowen (and land-use in Lyng), the 2025 Policy concerns “direct, coercive interactions” affecting worship access and communal religious practice—closer to the kind of burdens RFRA targets.

D. Waiver, preservation, and equitable/public-interest considerations

  • Bell v. Brockett: Applied to hold the government waived strict-scrutiny arguments by failing to raise them below.
  • Jolly v. Coughlin and Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason: Support irreparable harm where substantial burdens on religious exercise (and analogous First Amendment harms) are shown.
  • Trump v. CASA, Inc.: DHS invoked separation-of-powers language about effectuating statutes; the court found the government offered no record facts showing material impairment from restoring the prior worship-location limits for these plaintiffs.

E. The concurrence’s additional standing authorities

  • Benham v. City of Charlotte, N.C.: Cited for the proposition that decreased attendance can be a cognizable injury in appropriate cases.
  • Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC, v. EPA, Penegar v. Liberty Mut. Ins., and Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski: The concurrence emphasized an additional “pocketbook injury” theory: reduced contributions resulting from decreased attendance and the principle that even small economic redress can satisfy Article III.
  • Richardson v. Clarke: Reinforces the general rule against raising new arguments on appeal absent exceptional circumstances.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Standing through predictable third-party behavior

The court’s standing analysis is built around a practical causal narrative: DHS reduced formal constraints on enforcement at worship sites; DHS publicly signaled churches would no longer function as de facto protected spaces; immigrants and mixed-status families predictably perceived greater risk; and attendance declined, disrupting communal worship and ministries. Relying on Dep't of Com. v. New York, the court treated third-party non-attendance not as speculation but as a predictable, evidenced response to a government policy change.

The opinion also clarifies that plaintiffs need not prove exclusivity of causation (Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd), and that redressability does not require total relief— restoring the 2021 Policy’s constraints would likely draw at least some worshipers back, satisfying the “not onerous” standard (Deal v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ.).

B. RFRA “substantial burden” extends to location-based enforcement risk that disrupts communal worship

The court rejected DHS’s narrow “no prohibition/no penalty” framing. Under Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div. and Fourth Circuit RFRA caselaw, substantial burdens include indirect coercion and substantial pressure to alter religious practice. Here, the burden was evidenced in two interlocking ways:

  1. Pressure to change religious conduct and identity: Faith leaders described pressure to stop actively welcoming immigrants, to discourage participation, and to consider locking doors—changes directly at odds with theological commitments (e.g., Quaker equality and peace testimonies; Baptist ministry obligations; Sikh communal practice).
  2. Impairment of communal worship and ministries: Reduced attendance—especially of immigrant congregants—was not incidental; it struck at worship forms that are inherently communal (Quaker meeting, Sikh gurdwara practice, congregational worship and service). The court treated this as a burden on “exercise of religion” as RFRA defines it broadly, “whether or not compelled by, or central to” a belief system.

The court also cabined Bowen v. Roy: the 2025 Policy was not mere internal administration like recordkeeping; it increased the likelihood of armed enforcement actions at worship sites, which the court characterized as “direct, coercive interactions” (citing Mahmoud v. Taylor to distinguish the “internal affairs” line of cases).

C. Strict scrutiny was not reached on the merits because the government waived it

Under RFRA, once plaintiffs show a substantial burden, the government bears the burden to prove compelling interest and least restrictive means. The Fourth Circuit held DHS waived that defense by failing to present argument or evidence in the district court (Bell v. Brockett). The concurrence underscores the practical litigation lesson: refusing to litigate strict scrutiny in the alternative can be dispositive at the preliminary-injunction stage, especially where the record contains strong plaintiff evidence of burden.

D. Winter factors: irreparable harm, equities, public interest

The irreparable-harm holding flowed from the RFRA burden: a substantial burden on religious exercise constitutes irreparable injury (Jolly v. Coughlin), reinforced by First Amendment analogies (Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason). On equities and public interest, the court emphasized the injunction’s limited scope (plaintiff locations only), the continued ability to enforce in exigent circumstances, and the public interest in preventing likely illegal government action.

3.3. Impact

  • Standing doctrine in policy-chill cases: The decision strengthens litigants’ ability—at least at the preliminary stage—to establish traceability where harms arise from predictable third-party behavior, provided there is concrete record evidence (declines in attendance, statements of fear, policy statements signaling enforcement at the location).
  • RFRA coverage for “risk-of-enforcement” burdens: The court treats the increased likelihood of enforcement at worship sites, and the resulting deterrence of participation in communal worship, as capable of constituting a “substantial burden.” This frames RFRA not merely as protection against direct prohibitions, but also against government operational choices that foreseeably disrupt religious community practice.
  • Preservation of strict-scrutiny defenses: The waiver holding is a significant procedural precedent: in RFRA cases, failure to develop compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means arguments and evidence below can forfeit the government’s principal merits defense on appeal.
  • Narrow injunction design as a durability strategy: The court’s comfort with the injunction was enhanced by its tailoring to the plaintiffs’ locations and its compatibility with enforcement in exigent circumstances and warrants, reflecting the concurrence’s emphasis on limited scope and fact-dependence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing (injury, traceability, redressability)
A plaintiff must show (1) a real-world harm (injury), (2) that the defendant’s action helped cause it (traceability), and (3) that a court order is likely to help (redressability). Here, reduced attendance and disrupted worship were the harm; the rollback made enforcement at worship sites more likely, predictably deterring attendance; and restoring the older policy would likely bring at least some worshipers back.
“Predictable effect” traceability
Even if third parties (immigrants) make the immediate decision not to attend, causation can still be satisfied if the government’s action predictably changes third-party behavior, as recognized in Dep't of Com. v. New York.
RFRA “substantial burden”
RFRA is triggered not only by outright bans but also by substantial pressure to change religious behavior or by serious interference with religious practice. The court held that fear-driven declines in worship participation and pressure to change welcoming/open-door practices could qualify.
Strict scrutiny (compelling interest + least restrictive means)
If RFRA applies, the government must show an exceptionally strong reason for its policy and that it chose the option that burdens religion the least while still achieving its goal. The Fourth Circuit did not evaluate this showing because DHS did not properly raise and support it in the district court.
Waiver vs. forfeiture
“Waiver” is an intentional or clear failure to raise an argument when required; appellate courts typically will not consider waived arguments. The court treated DHS’s failure to argue strict scrutiny below as waiver.
Preliminary injunction
A temporary, early court order meant to prevent serious harm while the case proceeds. Courts use the Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. factors to decide whether to grant it.

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision establishes a consequential combination of substantive and procedural holdings at the preliminary-injunction stage: (1) houses of worship can show standing when a policy rollback predictably deters attendance and the record documents that deterrence; (2) RFRA’s “substantial burden” can be met where increased enforcement risk at worship sites pressures religious communities to change practices and impairs communal worship; and (3) the government’s strict-scrutiny defense under RFRA can be lost on appeal if not developed in the district court. While expressly fact-dependent and limited to the plaintiffs’ worship sites, the opinion provides a roadmap for future challenges to location-based enforcement policies that foreseeably chill religious participation.