Stipulated Post-Hearing Income Submissions Permit Supplemental Evidence, but Income Imputation Requires a Purpose Finding and Effective-Date Explanation

1. Introduction

Childers v. Childers, 2026 ND 150, is a child-support modification appeal arising from the parties’ 2022 divorce (one minor child, V.L.C.). The defendant-father, Austin Lloyd Childers, sought modification of parenting-related provisions and child support after changing employment in December 2024, which reduced his income. The State of North Dakota (Child Support Enforcement Agency) appeared in the district court as a statutory real party in interest (but declined to participate on appeal).

The central issues on appeal were:

  • Procedure/record: whether the district court could consider supplemental post-hearing income materials when the parties had stipulated to provide income information to the State after the hearing for guideline calculations.
  • Merits/imputation: whether the district court’s decision to impute income under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(7) was supported by adequate findings—specifically, whether Austin changed employment for the purpose of reducing child support.
  • Effective date: whether the court adequately explained its choice of an effective date (October 15, 2025) rather than the motion date or another reasoned date.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to consider supplemental post-hearing materials, holding that the parties’ stipulation contemplated out-of-court income submissions requested by the State and therefore distinguished cases limiting post-hearing supplementation. However, the Court reversed and remanded in part because:

  • The district court imputed income under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(7) without making a necessary factual finding that Austin’s employment change was made for the purpose of reducing his child support obligation.
  • The district court set a modification effective date (October 15, 2025) without explaining why, requiring remand for an explanation.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. “Motions to reconsider” and the procedural lens

  • Richardson v. Richardson, 2022 ND 185, ¶ 3, 981 N.W.2d 907: The Court reiterated that North Dakota does not formally recognize “motions to reconsider,” but will treat them as motions under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j) (alter/amend) or N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (relief from judgment) if properly framed. The abuse-of-discretion standard governs review of denial of such reconsideration requests. This framing mattered because the child-support issue was revived through competing “reconsideration” motions and related orders.

B. Post-hearing supplementation limits—distinguished by stipulation

  • Larson v. Larson, 1998 ND 156, 582 N.W.2d 657: In Larson, one party filed new evidence post-hearing without moving to reopen the record, and the district court considered it—prompting remand. In Childers, the Supreme Court distinguished Larson because the parties here stipulated on the record that income information would be provided after the hearing upon the State’s request to calculate child support.
  • Adams v. Adams, 2016 ND 169, 883 N.W.2d 864 (and Adams v. Adams, 2015 ND 112, 863 N.W.2d 232 (“Adams I”)): Adams II reversed a district court that effectively revisited/altered a provision previously affirmed on appeal and relied on new evidence without proper procedural mechanisms. Childers distinguished Adams II because the supplemental evidence here was part of the stipulated method for computing child support after the hearing—not an improper attempt to relitigate a final, already affirmed determination.

C. Standards of review and adequacy of findings

  • Updike v. Updike, 2022 ND 99, ¶ 5, 974 N.W.2d 360 (quoting Schrodt v. Schrodt, 2022 ND 64, ¶ 19, 971 N.W.2d 861): Child support determinations involve mixed review (questions of law de novo; findings of fact clearly erroneous; limited discretion reviewed for abuse).
  • Rothberg v. Rothberg, 2006 ND 65, ¶ 14, 711 N.W.2d 219: Requires findings sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review—central to the remand on imputation.
  • Datz v. Dosch, 2014 ND 102, ¶ 22, 846 N.W.2d 724: Reiterates abuse-of-discretion framework (arbitrary/unreasonable/unconscionable; not a rational mental process; misapplication of law).

D. Imputation doctrine and “purpose” requirement

  • Pomarleau v. Pomarleau, 2022 ND 16, ¶ 10, 969 N.W.2d 430: Confirms that if an obligor makes a voluntary change in employment for the purpose of reducing support, the court has discretion to impute income under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(7).
  • Olson v. Olson, 520 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1994): Adopted a “rule of reason” pre-guidelines provision, limiting imputation when employment decisions are reasonable. Childers held reliance on Olson was misplaced because subsequent administrative rulemaking governs.
  • Logan v. Bush, 2000 ND 203, ¶ 14, 621 N.W.2d 314: Explains Olson predates the promulgation of § 75-02-04.1-07(7), and the rule does not categorically bar imputation merely because an income reduction might be “reasonable.” Logan supports the proposition that the rule confers discretionary authority—while reasons for change remain relevant to the “purpose” inquiry.
  • Schwalk v. Schwalk, 2014 ND 13, ¶¶ 10, 18, 19, 25, 841 N.W.2d 767: Used for the narrower point that courts are not required to make explicit findings on every listed factor in § 75-02-04.1-07(7). Childers distinguished Schwalk on the evidentiary posture: in Childers, the evidence about motive/purpose was disputed and required resolution.
  • Toppenberg v. Toppenberg, 2025 ND 121, ¶ 15, 23 N.W.3d 751: A key comparator on “discernibility.” In Toppenberg, the district court’s findings allowed the Supreme Court to discern the purpose was not support reduction. In Childers, findings did not permit similar deduction.
  • Montgomery v. Montgomery, 481 N.W.2d 234, 235-36 (N.D. 1992): Supports affirmance when reasons are fairly discernible from findings; invoked in Toppenberg and applied by contrast in Childers to justify remand where reasons were not discernible.

E. Effective date of modification

  • Bickel v. Bickel, 2020 ND 212, ¶ 23, 949 N.W.2d 832: Effective-date decisions are discretionary; appellate reversal requires abuse of discretion.
  • Geinert v. Geinert, 2002 ND 135, ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d 237: General rule: modification should take effect from the motion date unless good reason exists; if later, reasons should be apparent or explained.
  • Anderson v. Foss, 2024 ND 154, ¶ 4, 10 N.W.3d 570: Supports remand where a later effective date is chosen without adequate explanation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Why supplemental post-hearing income materials were permissible

The district court initially declined to consider certain post-hearing allegations/evidence (citing Larson and Adams II), but later clarified that the parties’ on-the-record stipulation anticipated precisely what occurred: the State would request additional income documentation and complete guideline calculations based on those out-of-court submissions. The Supreme Court treated this stipulation as the controlling procedural feature distinguishing this case from improper post-hearing supplementation.

The Court also rejected the argument that the issue was “untimely” because it was not developed during cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing, emphasizing that counsel agreed to the State-driven document-submission method “in lieu of testimony and cross-examination” on detailed financial matters.

B. Why remand was required on imputation under § 75-02-04.1-07(7)

The district court imputed income after finding Austin “voluntarily left” higher-paying employment and began working at a business “owned by his wife,” leading to a “significant reduction in income.” But § 75-02-04.1-07(7) defines the relevant “voluntary change in employment” as a change made for the purpose of reducing the child support obligation. The Supreme Court held that, on this record, the district court’s findings did not reveal whether it found the requisite purpose.

Importantly, the Supreme Court did not hold that explicit findings on each enumerated factor are always required. Instead, it held the findings were too thin to permit meaningful review because (1) the evidence on motive was disputed (Austin’s asserted health/family reasons versus Annika’s sworn allegations about intent to lower support), and (2) the order did not resolve that dispute. In short: the district court may have had a basis to impute, but it did not explain the legally essential “purpose” determination.

C. Effective-date reasoning required

The Supreme Court declined to direct adoption of the non-imputed calculation or the August 20, 2024 effective date (noting the requested retroactivity was “questionable” given the income reduction occurred no earlier than December 2024). But it held the district court must explain why it chose October 15, 2025, as the effective date, consistent with Geinert and Anderson.

3.3 Impact

  • Stipulations can authorize post-hearing financial supplementation without reopening the record. Childers signals that where parties stipulate to a document-driven, agency-assisted child support calculation process after a hearing, courts may consider the resulting supplemental submissions without running afoul of Larson-style concerns—so long as the supplementation stays within the stipulation’s scope.
  • Imputation orders must confront the “purpose” element when the evidence is contested. Childers strengthens the practical requirement that district courts explicitly resolve whether an employment change was made for the purpose of reducing support (or at least make findings from which that conclusion is fairly discernible). This is likely to increase remands where orders merely note a voluntary job change and reduced income.
  • Effective-date selections need articulated reasons. Reinforces that selecting a date substantially later than the motion date requires explanation—particularly in contested modification proceedings where retroactivity can materially affect arrears and reimbursement.
  • Narrowing reliance on older “reasonableness” framing. By reiterating Logan’s treatment of Olson, the decision keeps the analytic center on § 75-02-04.1-07(7)’s text and discretion rather than a standalone “rule of reason.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Imputing income: When a court calculates child support using an income amount the parent is treated as having (based on prior earnings/earning capacity) rather than the parent’s current reported income—typically when current income is reduced for disqualifying reasons.
  • “Voluntary change in employment” under § 75-02-04.1-07(7): Not every voluntary job change qualifies. The rule targets changes made for the purpose of reducing child support. The obligor bears the burden of proving the change was not for that purpose.
  • Stipulation: An on-the-record agreement between parties about procedure or facts. Here, it functioned like a procedural roadmap: income information would be provided later to the State for guideline computations.
  • Real party in interest (State): In some child-support matters, the State participates because it administers support enforcement and guideline calculations, and may have statutory interests (e.g., reimbursement of public assistance or ensuring guideline compliance).
  • “Motion to reconsider”: North Dakota doesn’t formally recognize it, but courts treat such requests as Rule 59(j) or Rule 60(b) motions depending on substance—changing the standard of review and what evidence may be considered.
  • Effective date of modification: The date from which the new support amount applies. Often the motion filing date is used, but courts can pick another date if they explain why.

5. Conclusion

Childers v. Childers establishes two practical mandates in North Dakota child-support modification practice: (1) where parties stipulate to post-hearing submission of income documentation to the State for guideline calculations, a district court may consider those supplemental submissions; but (2) when imputing income under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(7), the court must make findings—expressly or in a clearly discernible way—addressing whether the obligor’s employment change was made for the purpose of reducing child support, and must explain any materially delayed effective date. The decision reinforces appellate insistence on findings adequate for meaningful review, especially where motive and credibility are contested.