Child-Abuse “Testimony” Exception Does Not Reach Medical Records; Body-Cam Hospital Footage Requires Privilege-and-Policy Findings

1. Introduction

In People v. Soron, the Colorado Supreme Court confronted a high-stakes intersection of criminal investigation, medical privacy, and statutory procedure. After police found Amanda Ann Soron outdoors behind a store with her newborn (who later was pronounced dead at the hospital), officers sought and obtained broad hospital records by a court-issued production-of-records order (“POR”). Separately, an officer accompanied Soron in the ambulance and observed (and recorded via body-worn camera) portions of her hospital treatment, including a sedated procedure to deliver the placenta.

Soron moved to prevent the prosecution from reviewing her medical records and to vacate the POR, invoking physician-patient privilege and asserting lack of consent. The trial court suppressed/sealed (1) Soron’s medical records produced under the POR and (2) the body-worn camera video and the officer’s notes reflecting statements and events during medical care.

The key issues were:

• Scope of the child-abuse exception in section 18-6-401(3): does it pierce physician-patient privilege for documents (medical records) or only for testimony?
• Whether body-worn camera footage/notes capturing hospital treatment constitute privileged “medical information,” and if so, whether other statutes (notably the body-worn camera statute, section 24-31-902) reflect countervailing policy that narrows the privilege.
• Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under section 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1(a), given the trial court’s reliance on Crim. P. 41(e) and Fourth Amendment principles.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed suppression/sealing of Soron’s medical records because they are protected by the physician-patient privilege (section 13-90-107(1)(d)) and the child-abuse exception in section 18-6-401(3) applies only to “testimony,” not documents.

The Court reversed and remanded as to the body-worn camera video and the officer’s notes, holding the trial court made the privilege determination without taking evidence or making findings and without considering whether section 24-31-902 (body-worn camera requirements) reflects policy interests that may narrow the privilege. The trial court must conduct that analysis in the first instance.

Justice Samour concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing on remand for the body-cam materials but arguing the majority’s narrow reading of “testimony” frustrates legislative intent and produces absurd results in child-abuse prosecutions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15
  Used for the interlocutory appeal framework and certification requirements (substantial part of proof; not for delay). It supports the Court’s threshold conclusion that the appeal can proceed when the trial court’s ruling is framed under suppression doctrines.
• People v. Glick, 250 P.3d 578 (Colo. 2011) and People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480 (Colo. 2001)
  These cases provide the mixed-question suppression standard: deference to supported factual findings, de novo review of legal significance, and correction of erroneous legal standards.
• People in Int. of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28
  The Court relied heavily on B.C.B.’s statutory-interpretation method: apply plain language; read statutes harmoniously; avoid adding/subtracting words; do not reach extrinsic aids if unambiguous. This anchored the majority’s conclusion that “testimony” in section 18-6-401(3) means testimony.
• Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2005)
  Cited for the policy rationale behind physician-patient privilege—protecting confidences and privacy in the treatment relationship. This frames the medical records as presumptively protected.
• Trenshaw v. Jennings, 2025 CO 23
  Central to the Court’s description of the privilege’s breadth: it covers not only treatment communications but also physician observations; and it extends to pretrial discovery, including information in medical records. The majority used Trenshaw to reinforce that medical records can be privileged—even if relevant.
• Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
  Not cited for Confrontation Clause doctrine, but for a definitional reference to “testimony” as a “solemn declaration or affirmation.” Together with Black’s Law Dictionary, this supported the majority’s literal reading of section 18-6-401(3).
• People v. Christian, 632 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981)
  The prosecution invoked Christian to argue the child-abuse exception should not be artificially narrowed. The Court distinguished it: Christian involved witness testimony and marital privilege, not documentary medical records. It thus did not undermine the majority’s text-based line between testimony and documents.
• State ex rel. Udall v. Superior Ct., 904 P.2d 1286 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1995); State ex rel. Juv. Dep’t v. Spencer, 108 P.3d 1189 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.C., 391 N.W.2d 674 (S.D. 1986)
  The Court declined to follow these out-of-state authorities because their statutory exceptions used broader terms (e.g., “evidence”) or otherwise differed from Colorado’s “testimony” language. The majority treated statutory wording as dispositive.
• People v. Covington, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo. 2001)
  This case supplied the analytical “door” for remand on body-cam materials: because privilege is statutory and in derogation of common law, the legislature may narrow it when overriding public policy requires. The Court cited Covington to justify considering section 24-31-902 (body-worn camera policy) as potentially affecting privilege.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction: why the Court heard the case

Although Soron argued the order rested on privilege and the POR statute (not the Fourth Amendment), the Supreme Court emphasized the trial court explicitly analyzed the matter under Crim. P. 41(e) and Fourth Amendment principles. That was sufficient for interlocutory review under section 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1(a), given the prosecution’s certifications.

B. Medical records: privileged, and the child-abuse exception does not apply

The Court’s analysis proceeded in two steps:

• Step 1 — Are the records privileged?
  Yes. The records were generated in the course of treatment and contained information necessary for providers to “prescribe or act” for Soron (section 13-90-107(1)(d)). The presence of an officer did not convert the treatment into a law-enforcement-directed examination on this record: Soron was not under arrest, and there was no indication the officer directed care for investigative purposes.
• Step 2 — Does the child-abuse exception remove the privilege?
  No, because section 18-6-401(3) states the privilege “shall not be available for excluding or refusing testimony” in a child abuse prosecution. Applying the plain language, the Court held the exception is limited to testimony and does not reach documentary medical records. The Court treated the term as unambiguous and declined to expand it judicially.

This holding also dovetailed with the POR statute’s explicit exclusion: “Records” do not include privileged items unless the privilege-holder consents (section 16-3-301.1(11)(e)). Because Soron did not consent, the POR could not properly compel disclosure of privileged medical records to the prosecution, and the trial court’s sealing/preservation remedy was affirmed.

C. Body-worn camera video and officer notes: remand for evidence, findings, and statutory-policy analysis

The Court did not decide whether the body-cam footage and notes are privileged. Instead, it identified what was missing:

• No evidentiary basis and findings supporting the conclusion that the footage/notes reflect privileged medical information within section 13-90-107(1)(d).
• No analysis of countervailing legislative policy, particularly the body-worn camera statute, section 24-31-902, which may represent an “overriding public policy need” (per People v. Covington) that narrows privilege in some contexts.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the sealing order as to the body-cam video and remanded for the trial court to take evidence, make findings, and assess whether privilege applies and whether any statutory policy limits it.

D. The dissent’s competing interpretive frame (why “testimony” should include records)

Justice Samour argued that the majority’s literalism is inconsistent with Colorado’s long-standing approach to the physician-patient privilege: section 13-90-107 is framed in terms of who may “testify” and who may be “examined,” yet Colorado case law (including Trenshaw v. Jennings) recognizes the privilege covers medical records and discovery. On that view, using the same “testimony” vocabulary in section 18-6-401(3) should likewise be read to reach records, because the legislature would not have intended a “partial” exception that disables exclusion of in-court testimony while leaving prosecutors unable to access the underlying records pretrial. He further invoked the canon against absurd results, warning the majority’s rule could impede charging decisions, discovery compliance, and effective prosecution—particularly in cases involving a single parent and a deceased child victim.

3.3 Impact

1) A new, text-bound limitation on the child-abuse exception

The core precedential rule is that Colorado’s child-abuse exception in section 18-6-401(3) is confined to “testimony” and does not, by its terms, authorize compelled disclosure of privileged medical records absent patient consent. This is likely to become a central defense argument in child abuse cases where the state seeks medical records of a parent/defendant (and potentially other privilege holders), particularly through POR practice.

2) Increased importance (and contestability) of alternative mechanisms for medical evidence

After Soron, prosecutors may attempt to obtain the same substantive medical facts through:

• non-privileged sources (scene evidence, third-party observations not “necessary to prescribe or act”);
• witness testimony that falls within the “testimony” exception (subject to relevance and admissibility);
• arguments that specific information is outside the privilege’s scope because it was not necessary for treatment (a Trenshaw-type boundary question);
• potential legislative change expanding section 18-6-401(3) to cover “records” or “evidence.”

3) Hospital body-cam recordings become a structured, fact-intensive inquiry

The remand creates a roadmap for future disputes over police recordings in clinical settings: courts must develop a factual record and then reconcile physician-patient privilege with other legislative mandates (including transparency/accountability objectives in section 24-31-902). This will likely produce litigation over (i) patient consent, (ii) the officer’s purpose and role (security vs. investigation), (iii) whether the recorded content is “information acquired” by medical providers or instead independent police observation, and (iv) whether statutory policy narrows privilege for such recordings.

4) Practical consequences for POR practice

Because the POR statute excludes privileged records absent consent (section 16-3-301.1(11)(e)), Soron underscores that courts and affiants must explicitly grapple with privilege at the POR stage—particularly when the target is “all medical-related information” from a hospital encounter.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Physician-patient privilege (section 13-90-107(1)(d)): A rule that generally prevents doctors/nurses from disclosing treatment-necessary information about a patient without the patient’s consent, and it can extend to medical records and discovery.
• Child-abuse exception (section 18-6-401(3)): A carve-out stating the privilege cannot be used to exclude or refuse “testimony” in a child-abuse prosecution. The majority reads this literally as “testimony only,” not records.
• POR (production of records) order (section 16-3-301.1): A court order requiring a business entity to produce records material to a criminal prosecution. But the statute excludes privileged items unless the privilege-holder consents.
• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before trial concludes. Here, the prosecution could appeal the suppression order immediately because it was treated as a Crim. P. 41(e)/Fourth Amendment suppression ruling and the People certified the evidence was substantial.
• Remand for findings: The Supreme Court did not decide whether body-cam footage is privileged; it sent the issue back because the trial court must take evidence, make factual findings, and consider competing statutory policies.

5. Conclusion

People v. Soron establishes a consequential, text-focused precedent: in Colorado, the child-abuse exception in section 18-6-401(3) does not, as written, pierce physician-patient privilege for medical records—only for “testimony.” At the same time, the Court declined to make a categorical ruling on police body-worn camera recordings made in medical settings, requiring trial courts to build an evidentiary record and to evaluate whether the physician-patient privilege applies and whether the legislature has narrowed it through competing policy directives such as section 24-31-902.

The decision will shape (1) how prosecutors seek medical evidence in child-abuse cases, (2) how trial courts scrutinize POR requests implicating privilege, and (3) how Colorado balances medical privacy against transparency and accountability when law enforcement records clinical encounters.