Charging Document as an Absolute Boundary: Conviction for an Uncharged Protective-Order Subsection Requires Reversal

1. Introduction

In State v. Boese (Kan. May 22, 2026), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a fundamental constraint on criminal adjudication: a defendant may be convicted only of the crime actually charged in the charging document. John C.T. Boese was charged under K.S.A. 21-5924(a)(1) for violating a protection from abuse order (a “PFA”), but the district court’s bench-trial finding of guilt expressly rested on a different form of protective order—a protection from stalking order (a “PFS”).

The State urged the court to treat the mismatch as harmless and to reframe it as an “alternative means” problem under the broader statute governing “violation of a protective order.” Boese argued in terms of insufficient evidence for the charged crime. The Supreme Court rejected both frames as incomplete and resolved the case under charging-document limits: Boese was convicted of a crime he was not charged with, requiring reversal and vacatur of sentence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the district court, holding:

  • The charging document sets the “outer limits” of permissible conviction(s).
  • A conviction for an uncharged crime must be reversed—the discrepancy is not treated as harmless error.

Because the amended complaint charged only a violation of a PFA order under K.S.A. 21-5924(a)(1) and no PFA order existed in the record, while the trial judge found Boese guilty of violating a PFS order, the conviction could not stand. The court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

State v. Fitzgerald, 308 Kan. 659, 666, 423 P.3d 497 (2018)

Fitzgerald supplied the central rule and the lens through which the court viewed the case: “[T]he charging document in any specific case . . . sets the outer limits of the conviction . . . that can result.” Boese applied this directly: the State’s decision to charge only K.S.A. 21-5924(a)(1) (PFA) fixed the boundary. The court also relied on Fitzgerald’s distinction between (1) a defective charging document and (2) a defect in proof as to the crime charged. Here, as in Fitzgerald, the charging document was not “defective” in the State v. Dunn sense; the problem was that the conviction rested on a different crime than the one charged.

State v. Ward, 307 Kan. 245, 259-60, 408 P.3d 954 (2018)

Ward reinforced the consequence of charging/proof mismatch: when the State fails to prove the crimes charged, a conviction cannot be sustained “regardless of whether it may have proved another crime.” Boese extends that principle to a setting where the factfinder affirmatively found guilt on the “other crime” (PFS) rather than the charged one (PFA).

State v. Reynolds, 319 Kan. 1, 2, 552 P.3d 1 (2024)

The State attempted to import Reynolds by characterizing the discrepancy as an “alternative means” problem under K.S.A. 21-5924. The Supreme Court refused the move on a key factual and procedural ground: whatever K.S.A. 21-5924 may allow in the abstract, the State did not charge alternative means. Boese was “clearly, precisely, and exclusively charged” under one subsection: (a)(1). Thus, Reynolds’ harmless-error framework for alternative means (and its concerns about jury instructions) did not control.

State v. Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 206, 224 P.3d 1159 (2010)

Wright mattered only as historical context: Reynolds overruled Wright’s “super-sufficiency” test for alternative means jury instructions. Because Boese involved a bench trial and a single-means charge, the Reynolds/Wright alternative-means line was “irrelevant” to the dispositive issue.

State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 375 P.3d 332 (2016)

The State argued waiver under K.S.A. 22-3208(4), styling the problem as a charging “defect.” The court rejected that reframing by applying Dunn (as understood through Fitzgerald): Dunn concerns particular categories of defects (jurisdiction/territory; failure to allege facts constituting a crime; inadequate notice). The complaint here did not suffer from those infirmities; it accurately charged one statutory offense (PFA-based violation). The failure lay in the subsequent conviction for a different offense (PFS-based violation), so waiver under K.S.A. 22-3208(4) did not apply.

State v. Unruh, 320 Kan. 260, 261, 565 P.3d 825 (2025)

The court cited Unruh for the “right for the wrong reason” principle: it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ bottom-line reversal even though its own reasoning differed (the Supreme Court focused on the fact of conviction for an uncharged crime, making sufficiency analysis unnecessary).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. The charge fixed the permissible conviction. The amended complaint repeatedly identified a PFA-based violation: it cited K.S.A. 21-5924(a)(1), (b)(1) and referenced the Protection from Abuse Act (K.S.A. 60-3101 et seq.).
  2. The conviction rested on a different statutory basis. The trial judge stated: “I find that he knowingly violated the PFS, and I find him guilty of this.” While other record entries (including the journal entry and sentencing references) labeled the offense as PFA, the Supreme Court treated the court’s express finding as controlling: the only actual conviction supported by the court’s determination was for a PFS violation.
  3. This was not an alternative means problem. Alternative means doctrine presupposes the State charged a crime that may be committed in more than one way and that the factfinder was permitted to choose among those ways. Here, the State charged only one subsection—(a)(1). The court emphasized that it did not need to decide whether K.S.A. 21-5924 is an alternative-means statute because, as charged, the case was not.
  4. PFA and PFS are legally distinct, not interchangeable labels. The court acknowledged some overlap in practical protections (e.g., restraints on contact), but emphasized that PFA and PFS arise from different acts, procedures, scopes, and statutory structures, reflected in separate subsections of K.S.A. 21-5924(a). The State could not expand the charge by arguing the wording was “broad enough” to encompass (a)(6).
  5. Remedy: automatic reversal for conviction of an uncharged crime. Because Boese was never charged with the PFS-based offense, he was “not properly tried for that crime.” Under Fitzgerald and Ward, the conviction had to be reversed and the sentence vacated, without resort to harmless-error salvage.

3.3. Impact

  • Charging precision becomes outcome-determinative in protective-order prosecutions. Prosecutors must match the charged subsection of K.S.A. 21-5924(a) to the actual type of protective order in evidence (PFA vs PFS), rather than relying on the umbrella concept “protective order.”
  • Limits on post hoc reframing as “alternative means.” Boese signals that the State cannot use alternative-means harmless-error doctrine to cure a mismatch between the charged crime and the conviction where the charging document did not plead alternative means.
  • Bench trials are not exempt from charging-document boundaries. Even where the factfinder is a judge (and even where the parties loosely use terminology at trial), the conviction must correspond to the charge.
  • Recordkeeping matters, but does not override the actual finding of guilt. The court treated the trial judge’s express oral finding (PFS) as the operative conviction, notwithstanding contrary labels in the journal entry and sentencing remarks—highlighting the importance of aligning findings, entries, and statutory references.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Charging document (complaint/information/indictment)
The formal document that tells the defendant what crime the State is accusing them of committing. It defines what the defendant can be convicted of.
“Outer limits” rule
A defendant may not be convicted of an offense that lies outside what the charging document alleges—even if the evidence suggests a different offense occurred.
Alternative means
A single crime that can be committed in different ways. Alternative-means analysis typically matters when the State charges the broader offense and the factfinder may select among legally distinct “ways” of committing it.
PFA vs PFS
Different kinds of protective orders created by different statutes: PFA orders are issued under the Protection from Abuse Act (K.S.A. 60-3101 et seq.), while PFS orders are issued under the protection from stalking, sexual assault or human trafficking act (K.S.A. 60-31a01 et seq.). They are not interchangeable for charging and conviction purposes.
Harmless error
A doctrine allowing appellate courts to affirm despite some mistakes if the mistake did not affect the outcome. Boese holds this is not the tool to fix a conviction for a crime that was never charged.
Charging “defect” and waiver (K.S.A. 22-3208(4))
Some defects can be waived by proceeding to trial, but Boese reiterates that accurately charging one crime and then convicting of another is not a mere “defect” subject to waiver under Dunn/Fitzgerald’s framework.

5. Conclusion

State v. Boese reasserts a bright-line criminal procedure principle in Kansas: the charging document strictly cabins the lawful conviction. Where the State charges a violation of a PFA order under K.S.A. 21-5924(a)(1), a conviction for violating a PFS order cannot stand, even if the trial record might support the uncharged offense. The decision narrows the State’s ability to invoke alternative-means or harmless-error theories to rescue a conviction that exceeds the charge, and it underscores that PFA and PFS orders are materially distinct for both pleading and adjudication.