Changed-Country-Conditions Motions to Reopen Must Compare to Conditions at the Original Merits Hearing (Not Later Benchmarks)

1. Introduction

Ala Rahim Yonan v. Todd Blanche (Sixth Circuit, Aug. 13, 2026) concerns a long-removed Iraqi national, a Chaldean Catholic Christian, who sought to reopen removal proceedings to pursue protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Yonan was ordered removed in 2008 after conceding removability based on multiple criminal convictions and waiving appeal. Fourteen years later, he filed his third motion to reopen, asserting that country conditions in Iraq had materially deteriorated for Chaldean Christians—particularly due to the rise and political entrenchment of the Popular Mobilization Forces (“PMF”) and other developments.

The central issue was not whether Yonan ultimately qualifies for CAT relief, but whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) applied the correct legal standard to decide if the “changed country conditions” exception permits an untimely, successive motion to reopen. The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA used the wrong comparator by treating post-2008 conditions as the baseline, rather than conditions at the 2008 merits hearing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s denial of Yonan’s third motion to reopen, and remanded. Although the BIA correctly recited the governing standard, it misapplied it by deeming Yonan’s evidence “incremental” after comparing 2022–2023 developments to conditions that post-dated Yonan’s 2008 hearing (including mid-2010s conditions surrounding the PMF’s emergence). The court reiterated that materiality must be assessed by comparing conditions at the time of the original merits hearing to conditions at the time of the motion to reopen.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Kilic v. Barr (citing Nasrallah v. Barr) — Used to establish jurisdiction: even where 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) limits review for certain criminal noncitizens, the bar does not foreclose review of CAT-related determinations. This allowed the court to reach Yonan’s legal-standard challenge.
  • Perez v. Bondi — Confirmed the court reviews the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination when the BIA issues its own opinion; here, the 2025 decision was reviewed together with the incorporated 2023 decision.
  • Marqus v. Barr — Provided the de novo standard for questions of law and reinforced CAT’s “public official”/“acquiescence” component (relevant to the court’s explanation that state-linked forces may matter to CAT risk).
  • Abdulahad v. Garland — The controlling Sixth Circuit framework for changed-country-conditions motions to reopen in the CAT context. The court relied on Abdulahad for: (a) the correct temporal comparison (merits hearing vs. motion date), (b) the “incremental or incidental” versus “material” distinction, and (c) the principle that courts review only the reasoning the BIA articulated.
  • Preçetaj v. Sessions — Quoted (through Abdulahad) for the rule that appellate courts may not assume the BIA considered factors it did not mention; also used (with other authority) to reject affirmance on alternative grounds not relied upon by the agency.
  • Bi Feng Liu v. Holder (citing Matter of S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247 (B.I.A. 2007)) — Supplied the canonical comparator rule: evidence submitted with the motion must be compared to conditions “at the time of the merits hearing.” Matter of S-Y-G also supplied the “incremental or incidental” language.
  • Dieng v. Barr (quoting Pablo Lorenzo v. Barr) — Clarified that “material” change can be shown when hostility or persecution has “escalated” since the original proceeding.
  • Tulung v. Garland (First Circuit) — Persuasive authority underscoring why using later baselines is improper: the time gap between multiple motions can “arbitrarily” distort the inquiry and make genuine deterioration since the merits hearing appear merely incremental.
  • Lindor v. Holder (quoting Daneshvar v. Ashcroft) — Used to reject the government’s attempt to affirm based on Yonan’s alleged evidentiary omission regarding 2008 conditions because the BIA did not rely on that rationale.
  • Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland (quoting Bi Xia Qu v. Holder) and Gonzales v. Thomas — Emphasized remand as the default remedy when agency reasoning is flawed, reflecting judicial restraint in immigration adjudication.
  • Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland — Framed the narrow “harmless error” exception: affirmance is possible only where the petitioner’s prospects are so weak that remand would not matter.
  • Diallo v. Gonzales — Cited in the majority’s response to the dissent for the proposition that if it is unclear whether the BIA applied the proper standard, remand is appropriate.
  • Orta Martinez v. Bondi — Cited by the dissent to argue against remanding to seek “a perfect opinion” absent reason to believe remand could change the outcome.
  • Shabo v. Barr — Noted (in the majority and dissent) for the general requirements of reopening to pursue CAT based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The governing rule. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), motions to reopen are generally limited (one motion, filed within 90 days). For CAT-based reopening, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception where the applicant offers previously unavailable, material evidence of changed country conditions. The Sixth Circuit framed the “materiality” inquiry as a two-time comparison: (1) conditions at the original merits hearing (here, 2008) versus (2) conditions at the time of the motion to reopen (here, 2022, supplemented later).

(b) The BIA’s error was methodological, not merely argumentative. The court accepted that the BIA cited the correct standard (including Matter of S-Y-G and Abdulahad) but held the BIA did not apply it. Two examples were decisive:

  • Rescission of the decree recognizing the Chaldean Patriarch (2023). The BIA deemed this incremental by comparing it to other post-2008 developments (including a March 2023 alcohol-sales ban and post-2008 incidents of harm). The Sixth Circuit found this revealed a post-dated baseline rather than an explicit comparison to 2008 conditions.
  • PMF political ascendancy (2021) and conduct (mid-2010s onward). The BIA reasoned Yonan did not show “greater impunity” or increased torture of Christians “as a result of” PMF political gains. The Sixth Circuit highlighted that the PMF did not exist in 2008 (it arose in 2014), so judging “incremental change” by comparing the PMF after 2021 to the PMF in the mid-2010s effectively used the PMF’s own history—rather than 2008 conditions—as the baseline. The proper inquiry was whether conditions in 2022 (including state-linked militia power and conduct) were materially different from the conditions in 2008.

(c) Limits on appellate “fixes.” The government argued Yonan’s presentation focused on changes since 2020 and that he may have failed to provide 2008 baseline evidence. The court declined to affirm on those grounds because the BIA did not rely on them, citing Lindor v. Holder and Daneshvar v. Ashcroft. The court also refused to treat the error as harmless, emphasizing the Sixth Circuit’s restrained use of harmless error in immigration cases and concluding this record could support a different outcome on remand.

3.3. Impact

(1) Reinforced “original merits hearing” baseline—especially in serial motions. The decision underscores that the relevant baseline does not drift forward after earlier motions to reopen. This matters in cases involving multiple reopening attempts, where agencies may be tempted to assess “incremental change” from the last motion rather than from the merits hearing.

(2) Practical consequence for CAT reopening records. The opinion signals that when the BIA discusses intervening benchmarks (mid-2010s reports, post-2008 incidents) without tying them back to the merits hearing conditions, it risks vacatur for legal error.

(3) Institutional consequence: constrained harmless-error review. By declining to find harmless error where the record could support a materially different risk profile (e.g., state-backed militia capacity and funding), the Sixth Circuit continues to channel these disputes back to the agency for first-instance application of the correct framework.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Motion to reopen: A request to re-start an already-final immigration case to present new evidence. It is normally time- and number-limited.
  • Changed country conditions exception: A narrow gateway allowing late or multiple reopening motions when the situation in the country of removal materially changes and the evidence was previously unavailable.
  • “Material” vs. “incremental” change: “Material” means conditions have meaningfully worsened (e.g., escalated persecution). “Incremental” means small, cumulative, or essentially more of the same.
  • CAT protection: Relief that prevents removal if the person is likely to be tortured by, or with the consent/acquiescence of, public officials. It is distinct from asylum and has different standards.
  • Harmless error: An error that does not justify reversal if it could not affect the outcome. The Sixth Circuit treats harmlessness as uncommon in this setting and generally prefers remand.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s core contribution in Ala Rahim Yonan v. Todd Blanche is procedural but significant: when assessing whether “changed country conditions” permit an untimely or successive CAT-based motion to reopen, the BIA must compare conditions at the time of the motion to conditions at the original merits hearing—without substituting later post-hearing benchmarks that can dilute genuine deterioration. Because the BIA’s analysis treated post-2008 conditions as the reference point, the court vacated and remanded for application of the correct temporal comparator and a legally sound materiality assessment.