CGIA Notice Strictly Runs from Discovery of Injury—Not Discovery of the Proper Public Entity

Precedents Cited

1) Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster

The Court relied on Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 923 (Colo. 1993) for the governing post-1986 rule: the CGIA notice period is triggered when a claimant discovers they have been wrongfully injured; the claimant “need not yet know the cause of the injury or the extent of the damage.” Mostellar treats Trinity as controlling authority that forecloses tying the notice clock to identifying the correct public entity.

2) State v. Young (and its legislative override)

The district court relied on State v. Young, 665 P.2d 108, 109-11 (Colo. 1983) for the idea that a claimant must have a reasonable opportunity to discover “basic and material facts” before notice is due. The Supreme Court rejected that reliance, emphasizing that the General Assembly amended section 24-10-109(1) in 1986 to override Young. The Court cited Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 1996) to confirm the amendment’s purpose and effect. This is the opinion’s doctrinal pivot: Young is not the operative framework for section 24-10-109(1) as now written.

3) Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey and City & Cnty. of Denver v. Crandall

The Court reinforced that section 24-10-109(1) is a “non-claim” statute and a jurisdictional prerequisite: failure to strictly comply requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It quoted Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Colo. 2000) for mandatory dismissal and for the proposition that the deadline is “not subject to equitable defenses such as waiver, tolling, or estoppel,” and cited City & Cnty. of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627, 633 (Colo. 2007) as accord. These cases supplied the opinion’s baseline: courts cannot use equity to soften section 24-10-109(1)’s deadline.

4) Finnie v. Jefferson County School District R-1 (narrowed to subsection (3))

Mostellar invoked Finnie v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003) to argue for a purpose-driven, equity-sensitive approach where governmental conduct thwarts the CGIA’s objectives. The Court distinguished Finnie as addressing section 24-10-109(3) (where to file notice), not section 24-10-109(1) (when notice is due). It reiterated Finnie’s internal division: (1) requires strict compliance as jurisdictional, whereas (3) permits “substantial compliance” on a case-by-case basis, considering agency/equity and protection against misrepresentations.

Crucially, the Court explained that even if Finnie-style considerations could be imported, they would not help Mostellar because Colorado Springs “did nothing to impede” timely notice. Any alleged delay or omission by Manitou Springs was deemed irrelevant to the statutory duty owed to Colorado Springs as the entity “entitled to notice.”

5) Other cited authorities supporting method and statutory purpose

• City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, ¶ 14, 420 P.3d 289, 293: de novo review of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) ruling when the dispute is legal characterization rather than contested jurisdictional facts.
• Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC, 2026 CO 6, ¶¶ 23-24, 583 P.3d 778, 783: plain-language statutory interpretation principles (apply unambiguous text as written).
• Jefferson Cnty. Health Servs. Ass'n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Colo. 1998): CGIA notice purposes (prompt investigation/remedy, settlement, fiscal planning, defense preparation), used to show that strict adherence is consistent with legislative objectives.
• The court of appeals decision, Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 23CA1908 (Oct. 24, 2024), is affirmed; the Supreme Court largely adopted its view that the 182-day deadline is jurisdictional and not subject to tolling/estoppel.

Legal Reasoning

1. Text controls. The Court treated section 24-10-109(1) as unambiguous: notice is due within 182 days of “discovery of the injury,” “regardless of whether the person then knew all of the elements of a claim.”
2. Discovery means injury discovery, not defendant-identity discovery. By invoking Trinity and the 1986 amendment (via Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez), the Court rejected the district court’s Young-based approach that would delay the clock until discovering who caused the injury.
3. Equity is categorically limited for subsection (1). The Court reaffirmed the “non-claim” and “jurisdictional” character of subsection (1) under Kelsey and Crandall, and thus the unavailability of waiver/tolling/estoppel.
4. No “impossibility” on this record. The Court noted Mostellar offered no evidence establishing she could not have discovered Colorado Springs’ involvement, suggesting alternatives such as an open records request or research into local transit organization. Without a factual showing, the “impossibility” framing could not overcome the statute’s strict terms.
5. Misleading conduct must be by the entity entitled to notice. The Court treated Finnie as, at most, a misrepresentation case (and a subsection (3) case). Here, Colorado Springs did not mislead or direct Mostellar; therefore, any alleged delay by Manitou Springs did not excuse Mostellar’s failure to notify Colorado Springs within the statutory period.
6. Harshness is for the legislature to fix. Echoing concerns raised in the special concurrence below, the Court acknowledged the outcome may feel inequitable, but held that courts must apply subsection (1)’s plain language; policy adjustments belong to the General Assembly.

Impact

• Protective-notice practice is incentivized. Claimants injured on public property may feel compelled to provide CGIA notices to multiple potentially connected public entities early—especially where responsibility may be allocated by contract or intergovernmental agreement.
• Responsibility-disclosure gaps remain largely unremedied in subsection (1). Even extended engagement by one public entity, without identifying other potentially responsible entities, will not delay the notice clock for those other entities—absent legislative change.
• Litigation will likely shift to factual “could have discovered” disputes. The Court’s discussion of open records requests and other investigative steps signals that future claimants may attempt to build records showing diligence and practical inability, even if equitable doctrines remain formally unavailable under subsection (1).
• Municipal risk allocation can be litigation-critical. Intergovernmental agreements may determine operational responsibility, but they do not, under this decision, alter the statutory trigger for notice; they instead heighten the need for early investigation.