Certification on Whether Hotel Beach-Area Contractors Owe Puerto Rico’s Heightened Innkeeper Duty

I. Introduction

This diversity case arises from the drowning deaths of hotel guests Ryan Fortune and Rawle Fortune in ocean waters fronting the Courtyard Marriott Isla Verde Beach Resort in Carolina, Puerto Rico. Their family members sued multiple entities, ultimately proceeding only against Iguana Sport Services, Corp. (“Iguana”), a contractor hired by the hotel to provide towel and beach attendants and holding certain permits to conduct beach-related commercial operations.

The appeal turns on whether Iguana owed the decedents a duty to warn or protect them from dangerous ocean conditions (rip currents) under Puerto Rico law—specifically: (i) contractual duties (express or implied) arising from Iguana’s relationship with Marriott; (ii) duties arising from Iguana’s DNER permit; and (iii) whether Iguana is subject to Puerto Rico’s “heightened duty of care” traditionally applied to entities like hotels/innkeepers.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirms key portions of the district court’s duty analysis but does not finally resolve the core “heightened duty” issue. It holds:

• No duty from contract: Iguana’s written agreement required only providing towel/beach attendants; the record did not support an implied agreement that Iguana assumed guest-safety or emergency-response duties.
• No duty from DNER permit (as construed): The permit’s “safety” and “prudence in adverse climatic conditions” terms apply to Iguana’s authorized 250 square feet occupancy area (the sandy operational footprint), not the ocean waters where the drownings occurred.
• Heightened duty unresolved: Puerto Rico law does not clearly answer whether a contractor operating a limited hotel-adjacent area can be treated as an “innkeeper,” or whether the nature of beach operations can trigger a heightened duty akin to hotels/hospitals/schools.

Because the unanswered Puerto Rico-law questions are outcome-determinative, the First Circuit certifies two questions to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court under Rule 52.2(d) and retains jurisdiction pending the answers.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Federal appellate framework: summary judgment and review

• Axis Ins. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc. – Used for the summary-judgment lens (facts and reasonable inferences viewed in favor of the nonmovant) and articulation of “genuine dispute of material fact.”
• John B. Cruz Constr. Co. v. Beacon Comtys. Corp.; Jette v. United of Omaha Life Ins.; United States v. Strong – Cited for de novo review of summary judgment and legal interpretations.
• Ithier v. Aponte-Cruz – Quoted (via Axis) for the materiality standard: whether a rational factfinder could resolve an outcome-changing fact.
• Hosp. San Antonio, Inc. v. Oquendo-Lorenzo – Governs Erie-style method in diversity: apply federal procedure (summary judgment) but Puerto Rico substantive law; when Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not ruled, the First Circuit must predict, and may certify if uncertainty is dispositive.

2) Puerto Rico duty sources and “special relationship” doctrine

• De-Jesus-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus. of P.R., Inc. – Supplies the tripartite taxonomy of duty sources: (1) statute/regulation/ordinance/bylaw/contract; (2) traditionally recognized duty for the situation; (3) special relationship through custom.
• Elba A.B.M. v. Univ. of P.R. – Identifies institutions (schools, hospitals, hotels) that, due to the essential nature of their activities, are held to a heightened standard of care—forming the doctrinal starting point for the disputed “heightened duty” issue.

3) Contract formation and implied obligations

• Mattei Nazario v. Vélez & Asociados – Recognizes that contractual duties can arise from express and implied agreements; the court uses this to frame, but ultimately reject, the asserted implied safety undertaking by Iguana.
• Marcial v. Tomé – Invoked for textual fidelity principles in contract interpretation: clear terms control.

4) Agency/apparent principal (raised but deemed inapposite)

• Grajales-Romero v. Am. Airlines, Inc. – Describes the “apparent principal” doctrine; the court explains it would potentially implicate Marriott (as apparent principal), not Iguana, so it does not establish Iguana’s duty.

5) Statutory interpretation method in Puerto Rico

• Banco Bilbao Vizcaya v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico – Stresses text-first statutory construction; legislative purpose is consulted after ambiguity.
• Cruz Parrilla v. Departamento de la Vivienda – Quoted (via Banco Bilbao) to reinforce the text-first approach.

6) Hotel/innkeeper heightened duty line

• Blomquist v. Horned Dorset Primavera, Inc. – Restates Puerto Rico negligence elements and confirms the heightened duty hotels owe guests to keep accessible areas safe (while not being absolute insurers).
• Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc. – A key First Circuit exposition of Puerto Rico’s innkeeper duty and its contours.
• Cotto v. C.M. Ins. – Puerto Rico authority (as cited) supporting the hotel duty framework.
• Baum-Holland v. Hilton El Con Mgmt., LLC – Further First Circuit discussion of hotels’ heightened duty to guests under Puerto Rico law.
• Pabón Escabí v. Axtmayer – Illustrative Puerto Rico Supreme Court case imposing liability where defendant was both owner and innkeeper; the First Circuit cites it to show Puerto Rico precedent has not addressed the narrower “partial operator/contractor” scenario.

7) Limits on heightened duty and the “scope of activity” concept

• Montalbán v. Centro Comercial Plaza Carolina – Distinguishes heightened-duty institutions from contractors/businesses whose activities do not require providing protective services; the First Circuit treats this as leaving conceptual room for heightened duties beyond the classic triad, depending on the activity.
• Estremera v. Inmobiliaria Rac, Inc. – Quoted (via Montalbán) for the proposition that not every contractor’s scope encompasses protective obligations.

8) Certification, comity, and restraint in unsettled local law

• Carrasquillo-Ortiz v. Am. Airlines, Inc. – Supports certification where Puerto Rico law is unsettled and dispositive; emphasizes comity concerns.
• Santiago-Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co. – Quoted (via Carrasquillo-Ortiz) for the principle that federal courts should avoid making unnecessary state-law pronouncements when certification is appropriate.
• Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc. – Cited for the practice of inviting additional guidance from the Puerto Rico Supreme Court beyond the certified questions.

9) Waiver for underdeveloped arguments (scope narrowing)

• Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R. – Cited for the “prudent and reasonable person under the circumstances” negligence standard; used to show appellants did not develop a distinct argument under this traditional duty rubric.
• United States v. Zannino – Applied to deem the underdeveloped “traditional duty” argument waived.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Contract-based duty: narrow reading plus record-based course-of-dealing analysis

The court treats “duty” as a threshold negligence element. Under Mattei Nazario v. Vélez & Asociados, a contract can imply duties through conduct, but the court found no evidence Iguana agreed to undertake guest protection, lifeguarding, emergency response, or warning protocols. The written contract required only attendants, and the extra tasks identified (chairs, umbrellas, cleaning, gear) were operational amenities rather than an assumption of security functions.

Importantly, the court relied on uncontradicted operational testimony: Marriott security—not Iguana—decided and executed weather alert measures and handled emergencies. Occasional informal guest advisories by Iguana employees did not transform into a contractual safety undertaking.

2) Permit-based duty: text-first interpretation and geographic/operational limits

Appellants relied on permit conditions requiring Iguana to ensure “safety” of the authorized “area” and to exercise “prudence” when weather becomes adverse. The First Circuit applied Puerto Rico’s text-first approach (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) and construed “area/space” as the specifically authorized 250-square-foot occupancy zone on sand. Conditions prohibiting expansions without authorization reinforced that the “area” is fixed and bounded.

On that reading, even if rip currents are “weather conditions,” the permit’s prudence obligation is limited to Iguana’s authorized operational footprint, not the ocean. Thus, the permit does not impose a duty to warn/protect against dangers in the water where the drownings occurred.

3) Heightened duty: identification of a dispositive gap and why prediction is inappropriate

The court explains Puerto Rico’s heightened duty doctrine (hotels/innkeepers, hospitals, schools) primarily through Elba A.B.M. v. Univ. of P.R., and the hotel cases Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., Blomquist v. Horned Dorset Primavera, Inc., Cotto v. C.M. Ins., and Baum-Holland v. Hilton El Con Mgmt., LLC.

But Puerto Rico’s statutory definition of “innkeeper” (P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 711(b)) turns on being “engaged for profit, in the operation of a hotel,” and the opinion finds the statute provides no clear guidance on whether partial-area operators (like beach-area contractors) can qualify “for that area.” Nor does existing Puerto Rico caselaw resolve whether the “scope of activity” concept discussed in Montalbán v. Centro Comercial Plaza Carolina could extend heightened duties to beach-operation contractors because of the inherent risks of ocean-adjacent services.

Because these questions are outcome-determinative and implicate Puerto Rico’s policy choices about expanding heightened duties, the court invokes comity principles and certifies rather than speculate (Carrasquillo-Ortiz v. Am. Airlines, Inc.; Santiago-Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co.).

C. Impact

1) Practical and doctrinal consequences if Puerto Rico recognizes “partial innkeepers”

If the Puerto Rico Supreme Court answers “yes” to Question 1, Puerto Rico tort law could recognize that an entity operating a discrete part of a hotel’s guest-accessible environment can inherit innkeeper-like obligations for that zone. That would:

• Encourage hotels and contractors to allocate safety roles explicitly in contracts (warnings, flag systems, lifeguards, training, emergency response coordination).
• Increase litigation focus on who “operates” a guest-accessible area and how operational control is evidenced (uniforms, staffing, decision-making authority, permit holdings, daily supervision).
• Potentially expand duty exposure for specialized vendors beyond hotels to other hospitality sub-operators (pool management companies, tour desk operators, beach concessionaires).

2) If heightened duty turns on “nature of services” rather than hotel status

If the Puerto Rico Supreme Court answers “yes” to Question 2, heightened duties could attach based on risk-laden service contexts (here, ocean-adjacent beach operations) even when the provider is not an “innkeeper.” That could reshape duty analysis from formal status (hotel/innkeeper) toward functional risk and reliance (guest dependence on operator warnings and safety practices).

3) If Puerto Rico answers “no” to both questions

A “no/no” outcome would likely confine heightened duties to the classic categories (hotels/innkeepers as operators of the hotel as a whole, schools, hospitals), leaving contractor liability primarily to:

• express contractual safety undertakings,
• clear regulatory/permit-based safety obligations, and
• ordinary negligence duties tethered to control and foreseeability (when adequately developed in pleadings and briefing).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Heightened duty of care: A stricter obligation imposed on certain institutions (e.g., hotels) because guests reasonably rely on them for safety in areas the guest can access. It is not “strict liability,” but it raises expectations of preventative measures.
• Innkeeper (P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 711(b)): A profit-seeking person or entity engaged in “the operation of a hotel.” The hard question here is what “operation” means when a contractor runs only one slice of guest services.
• Duty sources in Puerto Rico negligence: A duty can arise from (i) a statute/regulation/contract; (ii) traditional negligence principles; or (iii) “special relationships” (hotel-guest) that justify stronger protective obligations.
• Certification: A federal appellate court formally asks the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to decide unsettled Puerto Rico-law issues. The federal court pauses the case (retaining jurisdiction) and applies the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s answers to resolve the appeal.
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling for the moving party when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the law entitles that party to win; here, duty was treated as a legal question suitable for summary adjudication on the contract/permit theories.
• Maritime-terrestrial zone: A legally defined coastal strip governed by specific permitting; the permit’s geographic scope was central to limiting Iguana’s obligations.

V. Conclusion

Wilson v. Iguana Sport Services, Corp. is most significant not for announcing a final duty rule, but for crystallizing a major unresolved question in Puerto Rico premises and hospitality liability: whether entities that operate discrete hotel-adjacent guest areas—particularly higher-risk beach environments—can be treated as innkeepers or otherwise held to Puerto Rico’s heightened duty of care.

The First Circuit decisively narrows two duty theories (contract and DNER permit) through text-focused analysis and record-based operational proof, while appropriately reserving the broader, policy-laden “heightened duty” expansion question for Puerto Rico’s highest court. The forthcoming answers will likely shape how Puerto Rico allocates safety responsibility among hotels, specialized contractors, and permitting structures in coastal hospitality settings.