Certification of Rhode Island UM/UIM Coverage for Employees Driving Personal Vehicles in the Scope of Employment

Introduction

Roberge v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, No. 24-1040) arises from a serious automobile accident involving an underinsured motorist. The plaintiff, Cynthia A. Roberge, was injured while driving her own personal vehicle in the course of her employment for the State of Rhode Island. The defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, issued a business auto policy to the State.

The central dispute is whether Rhode Island law nonetheless requires uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage for Roberge, even though the policy’s UM/UIM terms—read literally—do not cover her accident because she was not occupying a “covered ‘auto’.” The district court granted summary judgment for Travelers. On appeal, the First Circuit concluded that deciding the case would require answering unsettled, outcome-determinative questions of Rhode Island insurance law and therefore certified two questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit did not decide whether Roberge is entitled to UM/UIM benefits. Instead, it:

  • Agreed with the parties that, under the policy text, Roberge is not an “insured” for UM/UIM purposes because she was driving her own vehicle, not a vehicle owned by the State (nor a qualifying “temporary substitute”).
  • Held that two pivotal issues—(i) the meaning and reach of language in Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies and (ii) the interaction between liability coverage and UM/UIM coverage under R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1—lack controlling Rhode Island precedent.
  • Certified two questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and stayed the federal appeal pending answers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Certification doctrine and federal-state judicial roles

  • Johnson v. Johnson, 952 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2020): Cited for the foundational premise that the Rhode Island Supreme Court “has the final word on matters of Rhode Island law,” supporting certification where state law is unsettled.
  • R.I. Truck Ctr., LLC v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, 92 F.4th 330 (1st Cir. 2024): Provides the First Circuit’s restraint principle: certification is unnecessary if state law is sufficiently clear to predict the state high court’s answer; here, it was not.
  • Hosp. San Antonio, Inc. v. Oquendo-Lorenzo, 47 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022): Supplies the “predict the course” framing the court used to explain why it could not responsibly forecast Rhode Island Supreme Court outcomes on the two dispositive issues.
  • Smith v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 88 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993)): Emphasizes heightened federalism/prudence when difficult state-law questions implicate important state policy—an apt description of UM/UIM public policy.
  • Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 81 F.4th 73 (1st Cir. 2023): Used for the idea that where policy considerations do not “squarely favor” a single outcome, certification allows the state supreme court to make the relevant policy judgment.

2) Contract interpretation baseline (policy text excludes UM/UIM)

  • Koziol v. Peerless Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 647 (R.I. 2012): Cited for Rhode Island rules of insurance-policy interpretation (plain, ordinary meanings; contract-construction principles). This anchored the court’s agreement that the policy, as written, excludes Roberge’s UM/UIM claim.
  • Finch v. Centennial Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 495 (R.I. 1994): Referenced for “class-I insureds” (named insureds) vs. “class-II insureds” (occupants), a taxonomy relevant to how UM/UIM coverage often expands or contracts depending on status.
  • Ladouceur v. Hanover Ins. Co., 682 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1996): Used to define “underinsured motorist,” providing doctrinal background.

3) The “Martinelli” line: an unresolved scope-of-employment pathway

  • Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies, 687 A.2d 443 (R.I. 1996): The core precedent. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held the corporate policy unambiguously named the corporation—not the shareholder/manager—and denied UM/UIM where Martinelli was injured in a non-insured vehicle for personal reasons. Crucially, it added it did “not foreclose the possibility” that an employee injured within the scope of employment “might be considered the named insured” for UM/UIM purposes—language that fuels the present dispute.
  • Medeiros v. Anthem Casualty Insurance Group ("Medeiros I"), 796 A.2d 1078 (R.I. 2002): The Rhode Island Supreme Court invoked Martinelli and stated it “suggested” shareholders/employees acting within the scope of employment “might” be treated as named insureds, but found no evidence of business-related activity. The First Circuit read this as lending support to (but not defining) the potential “exception.”
  • Medeiros v. Anthem Cas. Ins. Grp. ("Medeiros II"), 822 A.2d 175 (R.I. 2003): Addressed newly discovered evidence and due diligence, but reiterated that summary judgment was proper because there was no evidence the decedents were acting in the course of employment—again hinting that the employment nexus could change the result.
  • Medeiros v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company of America ("Medeiros III"), No. C.A. 01-4842, 2003 WL 23195558 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2003): A Superior Court decision (by then-Justice Indeglia) denying summary judgment where evidence suggested the trip was business-related; it treated the “Martinelli exception” as usable after Medeiros I/II. The First Circuit used Medeiros III to illustrate uncertainty: even sympathetic readings acknowledge Rhode Island’s high court has not “fully resolved” the contours.

4) Rhode Island UM/UIM public policy framework (statutory symmetry question)

  • Am. States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831 (R.I. 2013): Quoted for a synthesized set of principles distinguishing UM/UIM provisions that violate public policy from those that do not. The First Circuit used this framework to show the analysis is “case-specific” and not mechanically resolved by existing categories.
  • Pin Pin H. Su. v. Kemper Ins. Cos./Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 416 (R.I. 1981): Cited for the statute’s “broad statutory purpose.”
  • Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 A.3d 902 (R.I. 2012): Cited for the statute’s protective purpose and as an example upholding an exclusion (vehicle used “to carry persons or property for a fee”), showing Rhode Island tolerates some contractual limitations.
  • DiTata v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 542 A.2d 245 (R.I. 1988): Cited for the principle that UM/UIM contracts must be construed with legislative public policy in mind, emphasizing indemnification rather than defeat of claims.
  • Malo v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 459 A.2d 954 (R.I. 1983): Used by Travelers (and recognized by the panel) for the proposition that the statute does not mandate which class of persons must be covered; the class is generally “left to the terms of the particular insurance policy.” The First Circuit noted this cuts against a broad symmetry theory, yet did not resolve the tension.
  • Am. States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 672 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2012): Cited for recognition of Rhode Island’s strong public policy against limiting UM/UIM recovery, supporting the notion that total denial of UM/UIM to someone insured for liability may raise distinct concerns.
  • Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Viti, 850 A.2d 104 (R.I. 2004): Cited for Rhode Island’s acknowledgement that its UM/UIM jurisprudence may differ from other jurisdictions, reducing the usefulness of out-of-state analogs.

5) Out-of-state cases (consulted but not predictive)

  • Skarbrevik v. Pers. Representative of Est. of Brown, No. W2014-00809-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 7184664 (Tenn. Ct. of App. Nov. 16, 2015), and LaRoche v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. CV 02-271, 2003 WL 23185889 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003): Identified as examples where some states interpret their UM statutes to afford employee protection in scope-of-employment settings, but the panel declined to treat them as predictive.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three structured steps:

  1. Contract clarity: Applying Koziol v. Peerless Ins. Co., the panel agreed the policy’s UM/UIM “covered ‘auto’” selection (symbol “2”: owned autos only) excludes coverage for an employee driving her own car, and Roberge’s vehicle was not a “temporary substitute” under the policy definition.
  2. Potential override by Rhode Island common law (Martinelli): Roberge’s claim depends on whether Martinelli’s “conceivable” scope-of-employment language requires treating an employee as the named insured despite contrary policy language. The panel found the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not set the “precise contours” of this concept, particularly for a “regular employee” injured within the scope of employment.
  3. Potential override by statute/public policy (§ 27-7-2.1): The policy provides broad liability coverage (symbol “1”: any auto) and covers employees using non-owned vehicles in the business; but UM/UIM coverage is limited to owned autos. Roberge argues this violates the statute’s requirement of UM/UIM coverage “for the protection of persons insured under the policy” and “in an amount equal to the insured’s bodily injury liability limits” absent a written lower selection. The panel saw plausible force in a “symmetry” reading—yet also recognized Malo v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. and Rhode Island’s acceptance of certain exclusions, making the policy question genuinely uncertain.

Because both unresolved issues are outcome-determinative and lack controlling precedent—and because state policy choices are embedded in the answers—the panel applied Rhode Island’s certification rule (R.I. Sup. Ct. R., Art. I, R. 6(a)) and its own certification prudence principles (R.I. Truck Ctr., LLC v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC) to certify two questions and stay the case.

Impact

Although the opinion does not decide the merits, it is consequential in at least four ways:

  • It squarely frames two dispositive state-law questions for Rhode Island’s high court, effectively inviting clarification of whether a “scope-of-employment” route to UM/UIM exists when the employer is the named insured and the employee is not in a covered auto.
  • It highlights a common coverage mismatch in fleet/business auto policies: liability coverage may be broad enough to protect employees using personal vehicles (especially in public-sector work), while UM/UIM is restricted to owned autos—creating a real-world gap in employee protection.
  • It may affect underwriting and procurement: If Rhode Island recognizes a statutory or common-law requirement of UM/UIM protection for employees in these circumstances, employers and insurers may need to reprice coverage, revise symbol selections, or adopt endorsements to align UM/UIM with liability coverage.
  • It underscores certification as a tool in insurance-policy disputes where public policy is contested and state precedent is suggestive but incomplete—particularly in UM/UIM law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • UM/UIM coverage: Insurance that pays the insured when the at-fault driver has no insurance (uninsured) or not enough insurance (underinsured) to cover the damages.
  • Named insured vs. “insured”: The named insured is the person/entity listed on the declarations page (here, the State). Policies then define who else counts as an “insured” for particular coverages (UM/UIM, liability, etc.).
  • “Covered auto” symbols: Business auto policies often use numerical “symbols” to define which vehicles are covered for a specific coverage part: symbol “1” can mean “any auto,” while symbol “2” can mean “owned autos only.” Different coverages can use different symbols in the same policy.
  • Temporary substitute auto: Usually a non-owned vehicle temporarily used because a covered auto is out of service due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. Here, the State vehicles were merely “in use,” so Roberge’s car was not a temporary substitute under the policy definition.
  • Public policy challenge: Even clear contract language can be unenforceable if it conflicts with a statute’s requirements or the public policy the statute embodies. The hard question is whether the specific limitation is a “reasonable limitation” or an impermissible restriction of statutory protection.
  • Certification: A federal court can pause its case and ask the state’s highest court to answer unsettled questions of state law that control the outcome, rather than guessing.

Conclusion

The First Circuit’s opinion is best understood as a disciplined federalism decision in a difficult UM/UIM dispute: the policy text excludes coverage, but Rhode Island law might override that result. Because Rhode Island precedent—especially Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies and the Medeiros decisions—suggests possibilities without defining rules, and because R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1 raises a novel “liability/UM-UIM symmetry” question, the court certified two questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

The key takeaway is that Rhode Island’s high court is now positioned to clarify whether (and when) employees driving personal vehicles within the scope of employment must receive UM/UIM protection under employer policies, and whether a policy may lawfully insure employees for liability in those circumstances while withholding UM/UIM based on the vehicle involved.