Certification of Kentucky “Reason to Believe” Mens Rea Question for Categorical Aggravated-Felony Analysis (K.R.S. § 514.110)

1. Introduction

In Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan v. Pamela J. Bondi (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 2026), the Seventh Circuit confronted a recurring immigration-removal problem: whether a state theft-related statute matches the federal “aggravated felony” definition for “receipt of stolen property.” The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, a lawful permanent resident, alleging he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his Kentucky conviction for attempting to receive stolen property (K.R.S. §§ 514.110, 506.010) qualified as an aggravated felony.

The key issue was mens rea. Federal law (as applied through the categorical approach) requires that receipt of stolen property involve the defendant’s subjective “knowledge or belief” that the property was stolen. Kentucky’s statute includes liability for receiving property “knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to believe that it has been stolen.” The court could not determine from controlling Kentucky precedent whether “reason to believe” demands subjective awareness (akin to willful blindness/deliberate ignorance) or permits conviction on an objective “reasonable person would have known” basis (constructive knowledge). Because that question of Kentucky law could determine removability, the Seventh Circuit certified it to the Kentucky Supreme Court.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit did not decide whether K.R.S. § 514.110 categorically matches the federal aggravated-felony definition. Instead, it held that the answer turns on an unresolved question of Kentucky law: whether the statute’s “having reason to believe” language requires subjective knowledge/belief (including deliberate ignorance) or can be satisfied by an objective standard.

Finding Kentucky precedent ambiguous—principally due to tension between Commonwealth v. Griffin and Martin v. Commonwealth— and noting the question’s determinative nature and likely recurrence, the court invoked Kentucky’s certification procedure (Ky. R. App. P. 50(A)) and certified a framed question focused on whether a jury may convict based solely on what a reasonable person would have known absent evidence of deliberate avoidance.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Oluwajana v. Garland: Cited for jurisdiction to review “questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). This anchors the panel’s authority to address the categorical-match issue despite immigration jurisdictional limits.
  • Aguirre-Zuniga v. Garland: Used to situate the statutory framework—removability for an aggravated felony after admission—and to reaffirm how such issues commonly arise in removal proceedings.
  • Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions: Supplies the controlling methodology: the categorical approach, which looks to the statute of conviction rather than case-specific facts. This precedent drives the opinion’s focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by K.R.S. § 514.110.
  • Mwendapeke v. Garland: Reinforces that the court must identify the minimum conduct necessary for conviction and treat a statute as overbroad if that conduct falls outside the generic federal definition.
  • Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS: Provides the Seventh Circuit’s articulation of generic “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), including the “criminal intent to deprive” component, which is essential to deciding whether receipt-of-stolen-property liability is sufficiently mens rea-based.
  • Khan v. Garland and In re Deang: These authorities supply the premise (accepted by the parties) that generic receipt of stolen property requires subjective “knowledge or belief” the property was stolen. In re Deang is particularly important because it rejects inferring the required intent from a mere “reason to believe” formulation, signaling potential overbreadth where “reason to believe” is objective.
  • United States v. Flores: Cited to illustrate a federal appellate view that “reason to believe” mens rea can be insufficient for generic receipt of stolen property, underscoring why Kentucky’s mens rea meaning is pivotal.
  • Commonwealth v. Griffin: Central Kentucky precedent. Its statement that a defendant is “held to know that which any reasonable person so situated would have known” suggests an objective standard (constructive knowledge). The Seventh Circuit reads this as pointing toward a “reasonable person” test rather than subjective awareness.
  • Pressley v. Haeger and Allen v. City of Chicago: Used to define “constructive knowledge” (what one should have known through reasonable diligence) and distinguish it from actual knowledge. This distinction matters because the federal generic offense requires subjective knowledge/belief.
  • Martin v. Commonwealth: Potentially reframes Griffin as a willful-blindness case: “wilful blindness” as equivalent to knowledge. The panel highlights ambiguity: Martin also describes covered statutes as requiring “something similar to constructive knowledge,” leaving uncertain whether Kentucky’s “wilful blindness” concept is defendant-focused (subjective) or reasonable-person-focused (objective).
  • United States v. Tantchev, United States v. Carrillo, and the William J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 4.10 (2023): These establish the federal “ostrich instruction” standard: deliberate avoidance must be tied to the particular defendant, and mere evidence that a reasonable person would suspect wrongdoing is not enough. The court uses these to show how an objective “reason to believe” standard would diverge from federal deliberate-ignorance doctrine.
  • Conyers v. Commonwealth and Lawson v. Commonwealth: Discuss Kentucky’s treatment of receiving stolen property and the legislature’s amendment adding “having reason to believe.” The Seventh Circuit reads these as not resolving whether the required mental state is subjective or objective.
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc. and In re Hernandez: Provide the Seventh Circuit’s standards and rationale for certification—seeking guidance where the federal court is “genuinely uncertain” and where state law lacks controlling precedent.
  • Martin v. Goodrich Corp.: Supports certification because the issue is of public importance and likely to recur.
  • Chmukh v. Garland: Along with other cited cases, illustrates that “receipt of stolen property” categorical-match disputes arise frequently in immigration contexts, supporting the recurrence rationale.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The categorical approach makes mens rea dispositive. Because the court must compare statutory elements—not Hassan’s actual conduct—the meaning of K.R.S. § 514.110’s “reason to believe” is outcome-determinative. If that phrase allows conviction without subjective knowledge/belief, the Kentucky statute reaches conduct outside the generic federal aggravated felony definition.
  2. Federal generic receipt of stolen property requires subjective “knowledge or belief.” The panel treated this requirement as settled for purposes of the case, supported by Khan v. Garland (quoting In re Deang) and consistent with how generic theft/receipt offenses embed a culpable intent requirement.
  3. Kentucky precedent creates an interpretive fork.
    • Commonwealth v. Griffin reads like an objective “reasonable person” standard (“held to know” what a reasonable person would know), which resembles constructive knowledge. If that is the rule, K.R.S. § 514.110 would likely be broader than the federal generic offense.
    • Martin v. Commonwealth reads Griffin through the lens of willful blindness—potentially aligning Kentucky law with subjective deliberate ignorance, which federal law treats as a form of actual knowledge. But Martin also uses language (“something similar to constructive knowledge”) that muddies whether Kentucky’s willful-blindness concept is truly defendant-centered or instead collapses into an objective negligence-like standard.
  4. Federal deliberate ignorance is not a “reasonable person” test. Relying on United States v. Carrillo, the court emphasized that federal willful blindness asks what the defendant did to avoid learning the fact, not what a reasonable person would have realized. This comparison underscores why the Kentucky interpretation matters: even if Kentucky labels its standard “knowledge” or “willful blindness,” it could still be functionally objective and therefore overbroad for federal purposes.
  5. Certification is the proper procedural tool. Applying Ky. R. App. P. 50(A), the panel found (i) the question may be determinative of removability and (ii) Kentucky lacks controlling precedent. The court also invoked federal certification principles (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc.; In re Hernandez)—seeking an authoritative state-law answer rather than predicting Kentucky law in a high-stakes immigration context.

C. Impact

  • Immediate case impact (procedural): The removal consequence for Hassan hinges on the Kentucky Supreme Court’s answer. If Kentucky requires subjective knowledge/belief (including true deliberate ignorance), DHS’s aggravated-felony theory becomes stronger. If Kentucky permits conviction on an objective “reasonable person” basis absent deliberate avoidance, K.R.S. § 514.110 likely becomes overbroad under the categorical approach, undermining removability under the charged aggravated-felony provision.
  • Doctrinal impact (categorical litigation): The opinion reinforces a practical rule for federal courts: when the categorical-match inquiry depends on an unsettled state-law mens rea question—especially where state cases can be read as endorsing objective constructive knowledge—certification may be preferable to speculation.
  • State-law impact (clarification of Kentucky mens rea): The certified question invites Kentucky to clarify whether “reason to believe” is (a) an objective reasonable-person standard, (b) a subjective willful-blindness standard, or (c) some hybrid. That clarification would affect not only immigration consequences but also Kentucky charging, jury instructions, and appellate review in theft-related cases.
  • Practical impact (immigration consequences of theft statutes): Because receipt-of-stolen-property aggravated-felony disputes recur nationwide, a clear Kentucky answer will shape how noncitizens with K.R.S. § 514.110 convictions are charged, defended, and adjudicated in removal proceedings within and beyond the Seventh Circuit (as persuasive authority on the Kentucky element).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Categorical approach: A method that compares the elements of the statute of conviction to the elements of the generic federal offense—ignoring the defendant’s real-world conduct. If the state statute covers more conduct than the federal definition, it is “overbroad” and cannot categorically trigger the federal consequence at issue.
  • Aggravated felony (immigration): A federal term of art in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) that triggers severe immigration consequences, including deportability. It includes certain theft offenses (including receipt of stolen property) with a term of imprisonment of at least one year.
  • Subjective knowledge/belief: What the defendant actually knew or believed in their own mind. A factfinder can infer it from circumstances, but the ultimate question is the defendant’s awareness.
  • Constructive knowledge (objective): Not actual awareness; it means the defendant “should have known” based on what a reasonable person would have discovered with reasonable diligence. This is the Seventh Circuit’s concern if Kentucky’s “reason to believe” is purely objective.
  • Deliberate ignorance / willful blindness (“ostrich”): A doctrine treating a defendant as knowing a fact if they suspected it was highly probable and deliberately avoided confirming it. In federal law (as explained via United States v. Carrillo), it is defendant-focused and requires evidence of deliberate avoidance—more than mere negligence.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s central contribution in Hassan is procedural and clarifying: when an aggravated-felony categorical match turns on an unsettled, potentially outcome-determinative question of state mens rea—here, whether Kentucky’s “having reason to believe” in K.R.S. § 514.110 is subjective or objective—federal courts should consider certification rather than guesswork. The opinion identifies a genuine ambiguity in Kentucky’s treatment of “reason to believe,” spotlighting tension between the reasonable-person language of Commonwealth v. Griffin and the willful-blindness framing in Martin v. Commonwealth. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s answer will not only decide Hassan’s removability but also shape future immigration and criminal cases involving Kentucky’s receiving-stolen-property statute.