Certification of Connecticut Wage-Law Questions: Compensability of Mandatory Security Screenings and the De Minimis Doctrine

1. Introduction

Del Rio v. Amazon.com.dec.llc (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) arises from a familiar wage-and-hour dispute in modern logistics: whether warehouse employees must be paid for time spent in employer-mandated security screenings after they have clocked out. Plaintiffs-Appellants Javier Del Rio, Colin Meunier, and Aaron Delaroche—former employees at Amazon fulfillment centers in Connecticut—brought Connecticut wage-law claims on behalf of a putative class, alleging unpaid straight-time and overtime for post-shift (and other exit) screening time.

The District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.) granted summary judgment to Amazon, relying on federal wage-and-hour principles associated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of security screening time in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014). On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the case turns on unresolved questions of Connecticut law—particularly the meaning of “hours worked” in Connecticut statutes and regulations—and therefore certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

Key issues: (1) Are mandatory on-premises security screenings “hours worked” requiring compensation under Connecticut wage law? (2) If compensable, does Connecticut recognize a de minimis exception for small amounts of time, and what are its parameters?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit did not decide whether the screening time is compensable. Instead, it:

  • Certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question whether Connecticut’s wage laws and regulations require compensation for time spent in mandatory security screenings at the workplace.
  • Certified a second, contingent question: if screening time is compensable, whether a de minimis exception applies and what amount of time counts as de minimis.
  • Held that certification is warranted nostra sponte, dismissed Appellants’ certification motion as moot, and retained jurisdiction pending the Connecticut Supreme Court’s response.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Federal screening-time precedent and its limits under state law

Amazon’s merits position in the district court relied on Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory anti-theft security screenings were not compensable under the FLSA as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act (PTPA), because such screenings were not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ principal activities.

The Second Circuit treated Busk as relevant background but emphasized a foundational point of wage-and-hour federalism: even if federal law does not require compensation for the time, Connecticut may decide to provide broader worker protection. To illustrate that other states have diverged from Busk under their own laws, the court cited:

  • In re Amazon.com, Inc., 255 A.3d 191 (Pa. 2021) (Pennsylvania law did not incorporate federal approach; screening time compensable).
  • Amaya v. DGS Constr., LLC, 278 A.3d 1216 (Md. 2022) (Maryland “work” not limited to compensable work under federal law).
  • In re Amazon.com, Inc., Fulfillment Ctr. FLSA & Wage & Hour Litig., 852 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2017) (example of jurisdictions aligning more closely with federal treatment).
  • Buero v. Amazon.com Servs., Inc., 521 P.3d 471 (Or. 2022) (another example of post-Busk state-law handling).
  • Vaccaro v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, Civ. Action No. 18-11852, 2020 WL 3496973 (D.N.J. June 29, 2020) (New Jersey law requiring compensation; state law in conflict with PTPA and not incorporating it).

These authorities were not used to decide Connecticut law; they were used to demonstrate that the question is policy-laden and genuinely open—making certification appropriate.

B. Connecticut appellate guidance pointing in different directions

The Second Circuit identified Connecticut’s most on-point discussion as Belgada v. Hy's Livery Service, Inc., 297 A.3d 199 (Conn. App. Ct. 2023). There, the Connecticut Appellate Court construed Connecticut’s mealtime exclusion and, to define “work,” looked to federal FLSA doctrine (applying the “predominant-benefit” test) and found limousine-guarding during meal breaks not compensable.

The Second Circuit found Belgada “instructive” but incomplete for this case because the relevant Connecticut definition of “hours worked” at issue here may not turn on defining “work” at all; it includes “all time during which an employee is required by the employer to be on the employer's premises,” including time “required to wait on the premises while no work is provided.”

C. Connecticut Supreme Court decisions on when federal wage law is persuasive

The opinion explained why Connecticut precedent does not yield a clear predictive answer:

  • Williams v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., 166 A.3d 625 (Conn. 2017) shows Connecticut sometimes aligns with federal wage law where a statute is “nearly identical” to its federal counterpart, but also shows the Connecticut Supreme Court begins with the plain meaning of the state provision and may reject federal methods where state regulatory text leaves “no room” for them.
  • Roto-Rooter Servs. Co. v. Dep't of Lab., 593 A.2d 1386 (Conn. 1991) reflects the willingness to interpret a Connecticut provision in line with federal law where the language “track[s]” federal language.
  • Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc., 89 A.3d 841 (Conn. 2014) underscores that the FLSA can function as a floor and state law may provide “the same or greater protection,” an important signal against automatic incorporation of federal limitations.
  • The court also noted Connecticut’s wage-remedy provisions are “remedial” and intended to “penalize” employers, citing Butler v. Hartford Tech. Inst., Inc., 704 A.2d 222 (Conn. 1997) (quoting Shortt v. New Milford Police Dep't, 562 A.2d 7 (Conn. 1989)).

D. Certification standards and federal appellate housekeeping precedents

The opinion’s operative “precedent” is procedural: when state law is uncertain, the Second Circuit may predict state law or certify. It cited RSD Leasing Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 81 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2005)) for that framework.

It also cited Second Circuit certification authorities—53rd Street, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 8 F.4th 74 (2d Cir. 2021), Kuhne v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 579 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2009), and McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 356 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004)—to emphasize certification is discretionary and “exceptional,” but appropriate where statutory text does not yield a clear answer.

For the three-factor test supporting certification, it relied on Glover v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 6 F.4th 229 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri, 863 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2017)).

E. De minimis doctrine sources

On the second certified question, the court cited Nettleton v. C&L Diners, LLC, 296 A.3d 173 (Conn. App. Ct. 2023), which in turn quotes Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1984), for the flexible, fact-intensive nature of de minimis analysis.

F. Other cases indicating the issue’s systemic importance

The court pointed to ongoing litigation in Connecticut federal court to show the question’s recurrence, including Alfonso v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 21-cv-1644 (D. Conn. filed Dec. 10, 2021) and Johnson v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., No. 23-cv-743 (D. Conn. filed June 7, 2023). This supported the policy prong of the certification analysis.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s reasoning is a structured application of certification doctrine to a statutory-interpretation problem:

  1. No controlling Connecticut answer. The court found no “controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute” resolving whether mandatory post-clock-out security screening time must be paid under Connecticut’s definition of “hours worked.” Belgada signals that federal law may inform meaning when the legislature is silent, but does not resolve the specific text and structure at issue here.
  2. Textual ambiguity with plausible competing readings. The court highlighted that the definition of “hours worked” in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-76b(2)(A) and Conn. Agencies Regs. § 31-60-11 includes:
    “all time during which an employee is required by the employer to be on the employer's premises ... [including] time when an employee is required to wait on the premises while no work is provided by the employer.”
    From that text, one can plausibly conclude screening time is compensable because employees are required to remain on premises and wait through a mandatory process. Yet another plausible view is that Connecticut, through legislative history and interpretive practice, intended overtime concepts to track the FLSA/PTPA line between principal activities and postliminary tasks.
  3. Policy-laden consequences better decided by the state’s highest court. A holding that not all “hours worked” are compensable could reshape Connecticut wage law beyond the security-screening context. Conversely, a holding that such time must be paid could affect large sectors of the state economy that use screening, bag-check, or controlled-exit procedures. The court deemed that allocation of costs and protections a Connecticut policy decision.
  4. Determinative nature of the answer. The certified questions control the appeal’s outcome. If Connecticut incorporates the FLSA/PTPA approach, Amazon likely prevails; if Connecticut reads its “hours worked” text more broadly, the employees’ claims revive. Because the record includes time estimates from seconds to up to ten minutes, any compensability ruling naturally raises whether some time can be disregarded as de minimis.

3.3. Impact

The immediate “precedent” is procedural and institutional: the Second Circuit signals that Connecticut’s “hours worked” definition is sufficiently uncertain—and sufficiently consequential—that federal courts should hesitate to decide it by prediction where it will effectively set statewide wage policy.

Substantively, the certification tees up a potentially significant shift in Connecticut wage-and-hour law:

  • If Connecticut adopts a broader reading, employers may face increased exposure for a range of controlled-exit time (screenings, checkpoints, on-premises walking to exits where constrained, similar “required to wait on the premises” scenarios), not limited to Amazon-style facilities.
  • If Connecticut aligns with the federal postliminary framework, employers gain predictability and Connecticut wage law may more closely harmonize with federal PTPA doctrine for this category of time.
  • The de minimis ruling—if reached—could be just as consequential as the compensability ruling, because it sets a practical threshold that can decide classwide viability, damages, and timekeeping compliance expectations.

The court’s attention to other pending Connecticut cases indicates likely spillover: whatever rule the Connecticut Supreme Court announces may promptly govern multiple categories of “edge time” litigation (screenings, ingress/egress walking time, waiting time) under state law.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Hours worked” (Connecticut): A legal definition that can include more than active labor. Connecticut’s text expressly reaches time an employee is required to be on premises or required to wait, even when “no work is provided.”
  • Portal-to-Portal Act (PTPA): A federal amendment limiting compensable time under the FLSA for certain preliminary and postliminary activities. Busk applied that federal limitation to security screenings.
  • Certification: A procedure allowing a federal court to ask a state’s highest court to decide an unsettled state-law question that will determine the federal case’s outcome, avoiding federal guesswork on state policy.
  • De minimis time: A doctrine allowing courts (in some settings) to disregard trivial amounts of otherwise compensable time when recording it is impractical and the amounts are truly small; Connecticut’s contours for this doctrine in the screening context are unclear, hence the certified question.

5. Conclusion

Del Rio v. Amazon.com.dec.llc establishes a clear procedural waypoint for Connecticut wage litigation in federal court: where the compensability of mandatory on-premises exit procedures turns on Connecticut’s definition of “hours worked,” and Connecticut authorities do not supply a definitive answer, the Second Circuit will treat the issue as suitable for certification—particularly given the policy implications and the recurrence of “edge time” disputes.

The Connecticut Supreme Court’s forthcoming answers—whether screening time must be paid, and whether a de minimis exception applies—are poised to shape not only this class action but the broader architecture of compensable time under Connecticut wage law.