CAT Protection Requires Particularized Evidence of Future Torture When Past Harm Was Tied to Abandoned Property

Introduction

In Ramirez Gastiaburo v. Bondi (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a petition for review filed by Gregorio Ramirez Gastiaburo, Susana Maria Vasquez Franco, and their minor children—natives and citizens of Ecuador—seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petition challenged a June 25, 2024 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) January 8, 2024 denial of CAT relief.

The core issue was evidentiary: whether Petitioners proved it was “more likely than not” they would be tortured if returned to Ecuador, where they alleged past threats and harm by the Los Choneros gang. Although Petitioners had also applied for asylum and withholding of removal, those claims were abandoned on appeal, leaving only CAT protection for review.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioners failed to carry their burden to show a likelihood of future torture. The court emphasized that the gang’s interest, as found by the IJ, was tied to using Petitioners’ family farm for criminal purposes. Because Petitioners had left and effectively abandoned the land, and because the record lacked evidence of ongoing gang interest or ability to locate Petitioners upon return, the court found the asserted future-torture risk too speculative.

The court also rejected Petitioners’ contention that the agency improperly required them to prove internal relocation was impossible, explaining that relocation is a permissible factor the agency may consider, but the ultimate burden remains on the applicant to prove likely future torture.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2006): Cited for the practice of reviewing both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Here, it justified the panel’s reliance on reasoning from both levels of the agency adjudication.
  • Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018): Cited for the standard of review—factual findings for substantial evidence; legal questions de novo—framing the court’s deferential posture toward the agency’s predictive factfinding about future risk.
  • Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019): Quoted for the proposition that the “substantial evidence” threshold “is not high,” reinforcing that the court would uphold the agency if the record reasonably supported its conclusions, even if contrary inferences were possible.
  • Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021): Used twice: (1) to reaffirm that the applicant bears the burden of proving likelihood of future torture under CAT; and (2) to support the principle that when the petitioner bears the burden of proof, failure to adduce evidence can itself supply substantial evidence for denial.
  • Beltran-De Roque v. Barr, 781 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2019): Applied to support denial where the record lacked evidence that the gang remained interested in the applicant or that future torture was likely—an analogy the court found apt given the absence of proof of continuing Los Choneros interest.
  • McCarthy v. Sessions, 730 F. App'x 75 (2d Cir. 2018): Cited similarly for the evidentiary gap problem—past involvement (there, with a business) had ended and the record did not show present gang interest—mirroring the court’s view that Petitioners’ departure from the farm severed the asserted motive for harm.
  • Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008): Cited for the “more likely than not” standard and to underscore that speculative claims about future harm, unsupported by concrete evidence, cannot satisfy CAT’s predictive burden.
  • Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 2020): Central to the relocation dispute. The court relied on Manning to clarify that CAT regulations do not require an applicant to prove relocation is impossible, but the agency may consider evidence that the applicant can relocate to avoid torture. The decision uses Manning to frame relocation as a factor, not a separate dispositive burden-shifting element.
  • Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 432 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005): Cited for the requirement of “particularized evidence” supporting a CAT claim; generalized fear is insufficient. The court used this to highlight the absence of evidence explaining how Los Choneros would know Petitioners returned or why they would pursue them.
  • Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008): Quoted (via Quintanilla-Mejia) for the proposition that lack of evidence, where the petitioner bears the burden, can be enough to uphold the agency’s denial under substantial-evidence review.

Legal Reasoning

  1. CAT requires a forward-looking probability showing. Applying 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), the court focused on whether torture is “more likely than not,” not merely possible. The agency could reasonably conclude Petitioners did not prove that probability.
  2. The agency permissibly tied “future risk” to “past motive.” The IJ found Los Choneros targeted Petitioners “solely” to use their farm. The court treated that finding as central: if the motive was access to land, Petitioners’ abandonment of the land undermined the inference of future targeting.
  3. Absence of evidence of continuing interest or ability to find Petitioners was dispositive. The court emphasized record gaps: no proof Petitioners would return to the farm, no proof the gang would target them elsewhere, and no explanation for how the gang would even learn of their return or locate them. Under the burden-of-proof framework, these omissions supported denial.
  4. Internal relocation was treated as a factor, not an applicant-imposed impossibility test. Responding to Petitioners’ “impossible relocation” argument, the court reiterated (via Manning v. Barr) that relocation need not be disproved by the applicant, but can be weighed by the agency under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The court also characterized Petitioners’ prior “fruitless” relocation claim as conclusory and insufficient to overcome the broader evidentiary deficiencies.
  5. Deferential review did the rest. Invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), the court held that a “reasonable adjudicator” would not be compelled to conclude the opposite, making the agency’s findings conclusive under substantial evidence review.

Impact

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision illustrates how the Second Circuit evaluates CAT claims in practice:

  • Property-tethered threats: Where the asserted persecutor’s motive is tied to a specific asset (here, land), applicants may need evidence that the motive persists despite separation from that asset (e.g., ongoing threats, attempts to locate the applicant, harm to relatives, or evidence of a broader targeting rationale).
  • “Particularized evidence” of future risk: The decision reinforces that CAT relief is unlikely where the applicant cannot articulate—beyond general country conditions—why the torturer would still care, and how the applicant would be found.
  • Relocation as a practical consideration: The court’s treatment of relocation signals that even without an “impossibility” requirement, weak evidence on relocation can combine with weak evidence of continuing interest to defeat the “more likely than not” showing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CAT protection: A form of relief preventing removal if a person shows it is more likely than not they will be tortured in the destination country.
  • “More likely than not”: A probability greater than 50%. It requires a reasoned, evidence-based prediction, not mere possibility.
  • Substantial evidence review: A deferential standard; the court upholds the agency if the record reasonably supports its view, and reverses only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to disagree.
  • Particularized evidence: Case-specific proof connecting the applicant personally to a likely future harm (e.g., recent threats, tracking efforts, targeted violence), as opposed to general evidence that a country has crime or human-rights problems.
  • Internal relocation factor: Under CAT regulations, the agency may consider whether the applicant could avoid likely torture by living elsewhere in the country; it is one factor among several, not necessarily a standalone requirement.

Conclusion

Ramirez Gastiaburo v. Bondi underscores that CAT relief hinges on a well-supported showing of future torture risk. Where the record supports that a gang’s past harm was motivated by access to abandoned property—and the applicant offers no particularized evidence of continued interest, ability to locate, or a reason for renewed targeting—the agency may reasonably find that torture is not “more likely than not.” The decision also reiterates that internal relocation is a permissible consideration but does not displace the applicant’s overarching burden to prove likely future torture.