CAT “Acquiescence” Requires More Than Unsolved Crime: Police Response and Anti-Corruption Efforts Defeat Willful-Blindness Claims

1. Introduction

In Carlos Borjas Tobias v. Pamela Bondi (4th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of Carlos Alberto Borjas-Tobias’s appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Borjas, a Honduran national, alleged he feared torture by the 18 Street gang if returned to Honduras and claimed Honduran police would not protect him due to corruption and collusion. The central issue was whether substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Borjas failed to prove it was “more likely than not” he would be tortured by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, Honduran officials.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the record supported the agency’s finding of no government “acquiescence.” Although the IJ credited Borjas’s account of two robberies (2010 and 2012) and later extortion calls, the police responded to the reported crimes, took reports, and attempted investigative steps (including a photo lineup). Borjas could not identify perpetrators and did not report the subsequent extortion calls. The court agreed with the IJ and BIA that an inability to solve a crime, without more, does not establish willful blindness or acquiescence.

The court also upheld the agency’s evaluation of country-conditions evidence, noting it showed ongoing gang violence and corruption but also meaningful governmental steps to combat these problems. On that record, the court concluded substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT relief and found no legal error or abuse of discretion.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Herrera-Martinez v. Garland, 22 F.4th 173 (4th Cir. 2022)

    Provided the governing CAT framework: the applicant must prove it is “more likely than not” he would be tortured in the country of removal, and that torture involves severe pain or suffering intentionally inflicted “by or with the consent or acquiescence” of a public official. The court used this definition to focus the dispute on whether police conduct amounted to acquiescence.

  • Cabrera Vasquez v. Barr, 919 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2019)

    Anchored two key points: (1) past torture is relevant but creates no presumption of future torture; and (2) “acquiescence” requires prior awareness and a breach of the legal duty to intervene, and can be satisfied by “turn[ing] a blind eye.” The opinion applied this standard to conclude that police responsiveness to reported incidents and the lack of evidence of willful blindness defeated the acquiescence element.

  • Nolasco v. Garland, 7 F.4th 180 (4th Cir. 2021)

    Supplied the scope of review when the BIA adopts and affirms the IJ while adding its own reasoning: the court reviews both decisions. That mattered here because the Fourth Circuit assessed the IJ’s factfinding (police response, reporting gaps) as well as the BIA’s agreement with those findings.

  • Ponce-Flores v. Garland, 80 F.4th 480 (4th Cir. 2023)

    Clarified standards of review: factual findings (including predictions about future torture and acquiescence) are reviewed for substantial evidence and are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise; abuse of discretion review applies to claims that the agency ignored or distorted key evidence or failed to give a reasoned explanation. The court relied on these standards to reject Borjas’s arguments that the agency improperly discounted his testimony and corroborating country evidence.

  • Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2016)

    Cited for the proposition that inability to bring criminals to justice is not itself evidence of acquiescence. The Fourth Circuit used it to reinforce that an unsolved crime—without evidence of consent, willful blindness, or refusal to act—does not meet the CAT acquiescence requirement.

  • Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2014)

    Further supported the “more than non-prosecution” rule: even where police are aware of a crime, failure to solve it is insufficient absent evidence police are unable or unwilling to oppose it. The opinion used this reasoning to distinguish between imperfect law enforcement and acquiescence to torture.

  • Moreno-Osorio v. Garland, 2 F.4th 245 (4th Cir. 2021)

    Supported the agency’s reliance on country reports indicating Honduran government efforts to combat police corruption. The Fourth Circuit drew on this case to conclude it was reasonable to infer that state efforts undermined a claim of systemic official willful blindness.

  • Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2011)

    Reinforced that the presence of gang violence does not alone show government approval or acquiescence, particularly where the record shows government initiatives to improve security. The court analogized to hold that evidence of anti-gang measures cut against Borjas’s acquiescence theory.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is best understood as a step-by-step application of CAT elements to the factual record, under deferential review:

  1. Police response vs. “turning a blind eye.”

    The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Borjas’s own testimony showed police action: officers responded to reports, took statements, and prepared a photo lineup. These facts supported the IJ’s finding that police did not “turn a blind eye” to the reported incidents.

  2. Non-reporting of key threats weakened the acquiescence claim.

    Borjas did not report the extortion calls demanding weekly payments. Without evidence that authorities were made aware of (or would likely be aware of) those later threats and would then breach a legal duty to intervene, it was harder to prove acquiescence as defined in the regulations and Cabrera Vasquez.

  3. “Unsolved” is not “acquiesced.”

    The opinion treated Borjas’s theory—police did not “properly investigate,” therefore they acquiesced—as speculative. The court agreed with the IJ that many legitimate reasons can explain why investigations fail, especially where the victim cannot identify perpetrators. The court then bolstered that point with Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch and Garcia-Milian v. Holder.

  4. Country conditions: mixed evidence, reasonable agency inference.

    The court accepted that Honduras faces gang violence and corruption, but held the agency reasonably found the government was taking “meaningful steps” to combat them. Under substantial-evidence review, the court would not reweigh the record where it did not compel the opposite conclusion.

  5. Outcome determinative standard of proof.

    Even assuming arguendo that past harm approached “torture,” Borjas still had to prove future torture was “more likely than not” and linked to official consent or acquiescence. The court concluded the evidentiary gaps on acquiescence and future likelihood prevented meeting that burden.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished and nonbinding within the Fourth Circuit, the decision illustrates several practical and doctrinal effects for CAT litigation:

  • High evidentiary demands for “acquiescence”: Applicants alleging police corruption must connect generalized country evidence to their personal risk and show a concrete likelihood that officials would be aware of impending torture and would breach their duty to intervene.
  • Reporting matters: Failure to report key threats (such as extortion demands) can significantly undercut an argument that officials would be willfully blind, particularly where the record otherwise shows police responded when contacted.
  • Country-condition evidence cuts both ways: Evidence of violence and corruption is not enough if the same record also supports findings of state efforts to combat gangs and corruption; under substantial-evidence review, agencies may prevail where their inferences are reasonable.
  • Reinforcement of “no acquiescence from ineffectiveness alone”: By citing Ninth Circuit authority, the opinion signals a cross-circuit consensus that investigative failure or lack of prosecution, standing alone, does not establish acquiescence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CAT protection: A form of relief preventing removal where a person proves they would more likely than not be tortured in the destination country.
  • “More likely than not”: A probability greater than 50%.
  • Torture (for CAT): Severe physical or mental pain intentionally inflicted, and crucially, connected to official involvement—either direct action or official consent/acquiescence.
  • Acquiescence / willful blindness: Not mere ineffectiveness. It means officials are (actually or effectively) aware of the torture beforehand and then fail their legal duty to intervene—often described as “turning a blind eye.”
  • Substantial evidence review: The court does not decide the facts anew; it upholds the agency unless the evidence forces (compels) a contrary conclusion.

5. Conclusion

Carlos Borjas Tobias v. Pamela Bondi underscores a recurring CAT principle: evidence of gang violence and imperfect policing does not, without a stronger showing of official consent or willful blindness, establish government “acquiescence.” Where police respond to reported incidents, the applicant cannot identify perpetrators, key threats are not reported, and country conditions also reflect government countermeasures, the agency may reasonably deny CAT relief—and the Fourth Circuit will typically affirm under substantial-evidence review.