Date: Mar 13, 2025

Cash-to-Drug Conversion May Track Seized-Drug Ratios and Tested Purity; Bare PSR Denials Do Not Create a Rule 32 “Dispute”

1. Introduction

In United States v. Moore, et al. (Sixth Circuit, Mar. 12, 2025) (unpublished), the court resolved consolidated sentencing appeals arising from a 2023 Kalamazoo-area drug-trafficking conspiracy involving Terrance Jamal Moore, Darnell Daishan Moore, and Ellis Lekieth Hull. All three pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, hydrocodone, and methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) (with Terrance also admitting a threshold quantity implicating § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) for “50 grams or more” of actual methamphetamine).

The key appellate issues concerned: (i) how the district court approximated drug quantity by converting seized cash into “converted drug weight,” including whether it could treat the proceeds as tied to actual (pure) methamphetamine; (ii) whether Terrance properly received a leadership enhancement; (iii) whether Darnell properly received a firearm enhancement and whether the district court complied with Rule 32 and burden-allocation rules; and (iv) whether Hull’s mental-health mitigation justified a departure or variance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Cash-to-drug conversion affirmed: The court held it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to convert seized currency into drug weight using the ratio of drugs seized at the stash house and the tested purity (actual methamphetamine), and it approved use of a conservative (higher) price-per-ounce.
Leadership enhancement affirmed: The §3B1.1(c) enhancement was supported by Terrance’s control of the stash-house “hub” and communications reflecting decision-making over pricing, transactions, and co-conspirators’ customer interactions.
Firearm enhancement affirmed: The court found no Rule 32 error and no improper burden-shifting; once the government established weapon possession, the presumption of connection applied, and Darnell did not show it was “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected to the offense. Foreseeability of a co-conspirator’s firearms was also supported.
Mental-health variance/Departure denial affirmed: The denial of a departure was unreviewable absent a misunderstanding of authority, and the variance denial was procedurally and substantively reasonable because the district court considered schizophrenia evidence yet found Hull “fully engaged” and not unusually impaired.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Sentencing review framework

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Established abuse-of-discretion review for sentencing and separated procedural from substantive reasonableness. The opinion uses Gall to structure review and to identify “significant procedural error.”
United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2012): Reiterated dual review (procedural/substantive).
United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2011): Clarified standards: guideline legal interpretations reviewed de novo; factual findings reviewed for clear error.

B. Drug quantity approximation and converting cash

United States v. McReynolds, 69 F.4th 326 (6th Cir. 2023): Clear-error review for drug-quantity determinations.
United States v. Crowe, Case No. 22-6046, 2023 WL 4586154 (6th Cir. July 18, 2023): Reinforced the Guidelines’ quantity-driven structure (“greater the quantity, greater the sentence”).
United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2013): Require “minimal reliability” and caution when approximating drug quantity.
United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2009): Confirm seized funds may be converted into drug equivalents and that attribution and conversion ratio must be shown by a preponderance.
United States v. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d 128 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1993)): An approximation stands if supported by “competent evidence in the record.”
United States v. Gilliam-French, 692 F. App’x 270 (6th Cir. 2017): Supported rejecting controlled-buys as “not necessarily representative” of overall conduct; used here to justify reliance on seizure-based evidence rather than requiring direct evidence of prior sales in the same proportions.
United States v. Murillo-Almarez, 602 F. App’x 307 (6th Cir. 2015): Approved a straightforward cash ÷ street-price methodology for estimating drug quantities.
The opinion distinguishes or discounts out-of-circuit authorities raised by defendants: United States v. Frazier, 89 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir. 1996) (not a cash-conversion case), and United States v. Lucio, 985 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (factually different and misquoted in briefing).

C. Leadership enhancement

United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975 (6th Cir. 2013): Emphasized the district court’s superior position to evaluate “factual nuances” of leadership.
United States v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2016): Described the deferential review of the leadership determination and clear-error review of underlying facts.

D. Substantive reasonableness

United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019): Framed substantive reasonableness as a claim the sentence is “too long” due to unreasonable weighing of §3553(a) factors.
United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591 (6th Cir. 2023): Applied the presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences.
United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008): Rejected attempts to relitigate the district court’s balancing of §3553(a) factors as beyond abuse-of-discretion review.

E. Firearm enhancement, Rule 32, and burden allocation

United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2003)): Clear-error review for firearm-possession findings in drug cases.
United States v. Wilson, 75 F.4th 633 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183 (6th Cir. 2020)): Defined the clear-error standard (“definite and firm conviction” of mistake).
United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001)): Provided the four-part plain-error test applied to the unpreserved Rule 32 claim.
United States v. Lang, 333 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2003): Central to the Rule 32 analysis; a defendant must produce evidence beyond a bare denial to create a genuine dispute over PSR facts.
United States v. Mack, 817 F. App’x 176 (6th Cir. 2020): Cited as an example rejecting claimed Rule 32 error where district court’s fact-finding was adequate.
United States v. Catalan, 499 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477 (6th Cir. 1996)): Set out the government’s initial burden (possession during offense/relevant conduct), and the defendant’s burden to show it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected.
United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Penaloza, 648 F. App’x 508 (6th Cir. 2016)): Reinforced constructive possession/relevant conduct framework for the firearm enhancement.
United States v. Woods, 604 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2010): Required reasonable foreseeability when attributing a co-conspirator’s firearm possession through relevant conduct.
United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 2002): Quoted via Darwich for the presumption that once possession is shown, the weapon is presumed connected to the offense.
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Used for the proposition that defendants must come forward with “evidence, not mere argument” to rebut the connection presumption.
United States v. Cochran, 14 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 1994): Distinguished; firearm hidden under a car seat was not foreseeable there, unlike the openly displayed firearms and stash-house context here.

F. Relevant conduct and particularized findings (plain error posture)

United States v. Donohue, 726 F. App’x 333 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2011)): Supported rejecting plain-error claims about missing “particularized findings” when the defendant did not request them at sentencing.
United States v. Louchart, 680 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2012): Clarified that limiting plea admissions does not prevent the government from supporting sentencing with related conduct.

G. Mental-health mitigation and appellate review limits

United States v. Johns, 65 F.4th 891 (6th Cir. 2023): A sentence can be procedurally unreasonable if the district court wholly fails to address legitimate mitigation arguments.
United States v. Coleman, 188 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc): Denials of downward departures are generally unreviewable unless the court erroneously believed it lacked authority.
United States v. Elliott, 521 F. App’x 513 (6th Cir. 2013): Approved weighing schizophrenia/mental illness against criminal history when selecting a within-guidelines sentence.
United States v. Judge, 649 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)): The record must show the judge listened, considered evidence, and took circumstances into account; it need not accept the mitigation argument.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Approximating drug quantity by converting seized cash

The court affirmed a methodology with three key features:

Using seizure-based evidence to anchor the approximation: Because the Guidelines permit approximation when seizures understate the scale (U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 cmt. n.5), the district court tied the cash conversion to the drug types, quantities, and purities found at the “Hazard” stash house. The Sixth Circuit deemed that approach “plausible” and supported by “competent evidence” (Mahaffey).
Relying on tested purity to treat methamphetamine as “actual”: The defendants argued the proceeds should have been converted to fentanyl/heroin or meth “mixture.” The district court credited lab testing showing the methamphetamine seized was “pure” (actual methamphetamine), and the Sixth Circuit held it was not speculative to use that purity where there was no counter-evidence of mixture sales.
“Err on the side of caution” implemented through pricing: The PSR used a price range for pure methamphetamine ($175–$250/oz) and converted using $250/oz, which yields fewer ounces for the same dollars, thereby lowering attributed drug weight (a conservative conversion). The Sixth Circuit treated this as consistent with Sandridge and Johnson.

Importantly, the panel rejected an implicit rule that the government must show prior completed sales in the same proportions as the seizure. It also noted that Terrance’s plea agreement admitted the $4,825 was proceeds, undercutting arguments that the money lacked a drug nexus.

B. Leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c)

Applying the non-exhaustive factors in U.S.S.G. §3B1.1 cmt. n.4, the district court found leadership based on: (i) Terrance renting and controlling the stash-house “hub”; and (ii) communications showing authority over customer management, pricing, and directing co-conspirators. The Sixth Circuit deferred under Washington and Robinson, emphasizing that even in a “shared phone/shared house” arrangement, a defendant can qualify as an organizer/leader if the record shows decision-making and direction of others.

C. Firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1): Rule 32 and burdens

The opinion separates three related points that often get conflated at sentencing:

Rule 32(i)(3)(B) “dispute” requires more than a bare denial: Relying on United States v. Lang, the court held Darnell did not truly “put in dispute” the PSR facts because he offered no evidence (affidavit/testimony/documents) beyond counsel’s denials. Thus, the district court could rely on PSR facts and the hearing record.
Government’s initial burden vs. defendant’s rebuttal burden: The panel reaffirmed the two-step allocation: (a) the government must show possession during the offense/relevant conduct (Catalan); then (b) a presumption arises that the weapon was connected (Darwich), which the defendant must rebut by showing “clearly improbable” connection (Catalan). The district court’s question (“How do I know it’s not?”) was treated as a proper invitation to meet the defendant’s rebuttal burden, not impermissible burden-shifting.
Foreseeability for co-conspirator firearms: Under Woods, the government had to show it was reasonably foreseeable that Terrance would possess firearms. The court distinguished Cochran because the firearms here were openly displayed in common areas of a stash house and one was in a rental car tied to the conspiracy’s hub.

D. Hull’s schizophrenia: departure, variance, and adequacy of explanation

The panel treated the departure and variance requests differently:

Departure (Guidelines-based): Denial was not reviewable under Coleman because the district court understood its authority and simply found the condition not “unusual” enough under U.S.S.G. §5H1.3 or that “significantly reduced mental capacity” was not shown under U.S.S.G. §5K2.13.
Variance (§3553(a)-based): The district court expressly considered the mental-health argument, rejected the claim that Hull was manipulated without evidence, found him “fully engaged,” and recommended Bureau of Prisons treatment. Under Judge and Vonner, the record showed adequate consideration even though the court declined to vary.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished and therefore not binding in the same way as a published Sixth Circuit opinion, the decision has practical significance in at least four recurrent sentencing arenas:

Cash-to-drug conversions: It endorses a “seizure-anchored” approach—converting proceeds in proportion to drugs found at the stash location—and validates reliance on tested purity (actual methamphetamine) absent evidence of mixture trafficking. This may encourage probation offices and district courts to defend ratio-based conversions even when earlier investigative leads involved other drugs.
Conservatism in approximation: The court treated selecting the higher price point as “erring on the side of caution,” offering a concrete way to operationalize that principle in cash conversions.
Rule 32 objections must be evidentiary: The reiteration of Lang underscores that counsel’s denial may be insufficient; defendants should be prepared to present testimony, affidavits, or documentary proof if they intend to force a factual ruling that rejects PSR assertions.
Firearms in stash-house conspiracies: The decision strengthens the inferential link among stash houses, open firearm presence, and foreseeability to co-conspirators, narrowing the persuasive reach of cases like Cochran to circumstances involving concealed weapons and weaker indicators of joint awareness.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Converted drug weight: A Guidelines tool that converts different drugs (and sometimes money) into a common metric (kilograms of “converted drug weight”) so a single base offense level can be calculated.
“Actual” (pure) methamphetamine vs. methamphetamine “mixture”: “Actual” methamphetamine refers to the pure drug content. The Guidelines treat “actual” more severely than a mixture of the same gross weight, so purity testing can materially increase offense levels.
Clear error vs. plain error: “Clear error” is deferential: the appellate court must be firmly convinced a mistake occurred. “Plain error” is even harder for defendants: the error must be obvious and affect substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings.
Rule 32(i)(3)(B): Requires the sentencing judge to rule on disputed PSR matters that affect sentencing. Under Lang, a defendant must create a real dispute with evidence, not just a lawyer’s denial.
Firearm enhancement burden structure: The government must first show possession during the offense; then the weapon is presumed connected. The defendant must rebut by showing it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected to the drug offense.
Departure vs. variance: A “departure” is a Guidelines-authorized adjustment (e.g., unusual mental condition). A “variance” is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on the broader statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).
Relevant conduct (jointly undertaken activity): Under U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B), a defendant can be held accountable for others’ acts if they are within the scope of the joint undertaking, in furtherance of it, and reasonably foreseeable.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Moore, et al. affirms three core sentencing principles in the Sixth Circuit’s day-to-day practice: (1) district courts may approximate drug quantity by converting seized cash using seizure-based drug ratios and lab-tested purity, especially when the methodology is conservative and grounded in the record; (2) leadership enhancements can be supported by control of the conspiracy’s operational “hub” and communications reflecting authority over pricing and transactions even in otherwise “shared” operations; and (3) Rule 32 and firearm-enhancement disputes require evidentiary engagement—once possession is shown, defendants must rebut the presumed offense connection with proof, not argument. The decision also reinforces appellate deference to district courts’ evaluation of mental-health mitigation where the record shows the judge considered the argument and explained why it did not warrant a variance.