B. Remote Testimony and the Right of Confrontation
The governing constitutional framework
The Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution protect a criminal defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses. Physical, face-to-face confrontation is important, but the Court treated it as subject to a carefully limited exception.
The controlling framework came from MARYLAND v. CRAIG, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Under its two-part test:
- Dispensing with physical confrontation must be necessary to further an important public policy.
- The reliability of the testimony must otherwise be assured.
Both elements must be satisfied. A reliable video connection alone does not justify dispensing with physical confrontation, and a substantial public concern does not excuse unreliable procedures.
How the Montana precedents shaped the inquiry
- State v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12
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This decision articulated Montana’s application of the two-part Craig framework. The party seeking remote testimony must establish the public-policy necessity, and the trial court must determine that reliability is otherwise assured. Although decided after the prosecution’s original request in Whitaker’s case, it supplied the governing analysis on appeal.
- City of Missoula v. Duane, 2015 MT 232
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The prosecution initially relied on this decision, which permitted an out-of-state witness to testify remotely in circumstances involving substantial expense and the burden of appearing for three related misdemeanor trials. In Whitaker’s case, that precedent explained the State’s original emphasis on logistical impracticality. It did not establish that inconvenience alone necessarily defeats confrontation rights.
- State v. Martell, 2021 MT 318
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This case supplied the limiting principle: judicial economy, added expense, and inconvenience alone are insufficient public policies to override physical confrontation. Such considerations may form part of the surrounding circumstances, but cannot independently carry the constitutional burden.
- State v. Walsh, 2023 MT 33
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Beyond supplying the review standard, this precedent required case-specific evidence rather than generalized findings. Its treatment of pandemic-related concerns involving a foreign witness also provided a comparison for the risks associated with Grubb’s interstate travel from prison.
- State v. Bailey, 2021 MT 157, and State v. Corena Marie Mountain Chief, 2023 MT 147
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The Court cited these decisions as part of its recent body of confrontation jurisprudence. The opinion did not separately analyze their facts or make their individual holdings decisive. Their role was contextual: they situated the dispute within Montana’s sustained application of constitutional limits on alternatives to in-person testimony.
Why the pandemic justification was sufficient here
The State’s February 2020 request originally emphasized the difficulty of transporting Grubb from Illinois. The constitutional justification, however, developed as the pandemic emerged. During proceedings in May 2020, October 2020, and January 2021, the trial court repeatedly discussed COVID-19 and the risks associated with bringing an incarcerated, out-of-state witness to Montana.
The Supreme Court considered those discussions sufficient to establish an actual health-and-safety rationale rather than a litigation justification invented after trial. Grubb’s confinement mattered because correctional settings presented heightened transmission concerns. His proposed interstate transportation connected those concerns to the particular witness and proceeding.
The Court acknowledged that some precautions had relaxed by June 2021, but rejected the suggestion that the pandemic had ceased to be a serious concern. It referred to continuing public-health risks, including the emerging Delta variant. The opinion also cited a Chief Justice’s letter concerning transmission in correctional facilities and later-published research supporting the heightened risks in prisons.
Importantly, the trial court had not entered detailed written findings explaining necessity. The Supreme Court nevertheless found its orally stated reasoning, preserved in the record, adequate. The holding therefore concerns the substance of the recorded determination, not a mandatory written format.
State v. Strommen, 2024 MT 87, was the closest contrasting precedent. There, remote expert testimony had initially been authorized because of scheduling and weather concerns. When trial eventually occurred, the expert testified from a vacation home, and the originally identified scheduling conflict no longer existed.
Although COVID-19 was later invoked, the State had not developed an adequate case-specific pandemic justification when the issue arose below. The Supreme Court characterized that justification as an “opportunistic rhetorical afterthought” and reversed.
Whitaker’s case differed because pandemic concerns had repeatedly informed the trial court’s pretrial decisions. The distinction was not simply that one trial occurred during COVID-19 and another did not. It was whether the record demonstrated a genuine, timely, case-specific necessity.
Reliability despite technical interruptions
Grubb testified under oath, could see Whitaker and be seen by him, and underwent cross-examination. These safeguards supported the second Craig requirement.
Whitaker argued that intermittent audio and video problems disrupted questioning and gave Grubb additional time to formulate answers. The Court examined the actual interruptions: Grubb requested repetition when he could not hear, then answered promptly. Nothing showed that he answered unheard questions or improperly delayed after hearing them.
The holding is correspondingly narrow. Minor, promptly corrected interruptions did not undermine reliability on this record. The Court did not approve materially defective connections or treat all two-way video testimony as constitutionally adequate.
C. A Child Witness’s Memory Lapses as Prior Inconsistency
The evidentiary rule
Montana Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) classifies qualifying prior inconsistent statements as non-hearsay. Here, L.M. testified at trial, but her ability to recall details had diminished substantially since her earlier interviews.
Whitaker emphasized that her central accusation remained consistent: she continued to identify him as the person who touched her sexually. He argued that failing to remember meetings with professionals did not make the substance of her earlier statements inconsistent.
The precedents supporting admission
- State v. Howard, 2011 MT 246
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The Court relied on its rule that a claimed lapse of memory constitutes inconsistency for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Thus, inconsistency does not require a witness to affirmatively deny a prior account. An inability to remember material facts can suffice.
- STATE v. LAWRENCE, 285 Mont. 140, 948 P.2d 186 (1997)
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The opinion cited this case through State v. Howard as the earlier authority underlying the memory-lapse principle. It was not separately factually analyzed, but supplied the doctrinal foundation for treating failed recollection as inconsistency.
- State v. Mederos, 2013 MT 318
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This case addressed young sexual-abuse complainants whose testimony mixed consistent statements with inconsistent ones. It permits admission of consistent portions alongside inconsistent portions when the nature of the testimony makes separation difficult. Its factual similarity made it particularly important to the Court’s resolution.
Why the missing details were material
The Court rejected the premise that L.M. had forgotten only the interviewers. Her memory gaps concerned the alleged abuse itself, including:
- Where the conduct occurred;
- How often it occurred;
- The terminology Whitaker used for his own genital area;
- Details bearing on penetration and the nature of the physical acts; and
- Instructions not to disclose the conduct.
These omissions were significant even though L.M. still recalled the central allegation. A witness can remain consistent at a general level while becoming unable to supply material particulars previously described.
Applying State v. Howard, the Court held that these memory lapses established inconsistency. Applying State v. Mederos, it upheld admission of accounts containing both remembered and forgotten details. The statements were admitted as non-hearsay evidence, not merely as material to attack the child’s credibility.
Limits of the ruling
The opinion does not establish that every earlier interview becomes admissible whenever a child forgets something. Its reasoning depended on significant missing details and the mixed nature of the prior and present accounts.
Nor did admission establish that the interview techniques were reliable or that the earlier statements were necessarily true. The defense remained able to challenge coaching, suggestiveness, and memory contamination through expert testimony.
The State alternatively argued that the defense had “opened the door” by attacking the interview process and alleging concealment of relevant influences. The Court expressly declined to reach that alternative because prior inconsistency already justified admission. Accordingly, the opinion establishes no separate holding that a coaching allegation automatically permits introduction of the entire interview.
D. Same-Act Sexual-Offense Convictions
Whitaker challenged the sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault convictions under both constitutional double-jeopardy protections and Montana’s multiple-conviction statute, § 46-11-410(2)(a), MCA. The State conceded that the challenged convictions rested on the same act.
The controlling precedent was STATE v. WILLIAMS, 2010 MT 58. It held that the statute precludes convictions for both sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault where the charges arise from the same attack as alleged in the information.
That principle directly applied because the prosecution had presented the charges as supported by the same act. The State’s closing argument had expressly urged that the identified bedroom incident was sufficient to establish all three offenses.
The Court therefore reversed the sexual assault conviction and ordered an amended judgment. Although the issue was framed in constitutional as well as statutory terms, the operative reasoning relied on the statute and STATE v. WILLIAMS. The opinion should not be read as announcing a broader, independently developed constitutional test.
Two boundaries are important. First, concurrent sentences did not cure an impermissible additional conviction. Second, the incest conviction remained intact: the Court did not hold that every offense arising from the episode merged into sexual intercourse without consent.