Case-Specific Pandemic Risks May Justify Remote Testimony, and Material Memory Lapses May Permit Prior Statements

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. WES LEE WHITAKER, Defendant and Appellant.
Supreme Court of Montana · 2024 MT 255 · November 6, 2024
Opinion by Justice Jim Rice

1. Introduction

In State v. Whitaker, the Montana Supreme Court considered three recurring criminal-trial problems: when a prosecution witness may testify remotely without violating confrontation rights; when a child witness’s inability to remember details permits admission of earlier statements; and when overlapping sexual-offense convictions unlawfully punish the same conduct.

The Court upheld the use of two-way video testimony from an incarcerated witness because the trial court’s repeated, case-specific consideration of COVID-19 risks supplied a sufficient justification. It also upheld admission of the child victim’s earlier statements because her trial testimony omitted significant details she could no longer remember. However, it reversed Whitaker’s sexual assault conviction because that conviction and his conviction for sexual intercourse without consent rested on the same act.

The decision principally applies and clarifies existing precedent rather than announcing entirely new doctrine. Its significance lies in identifying what an adequate record supporting remote testimony can look like, distinguishing genuine memory-based inconsistency from mere repetition, and enforcing Montana’s statutory restriction on multiple convictions.

2. Background and Issues

The allegations and investigation

Whitaker married the mother of L.M., a young child who was approximately three years old when the alleged abuse occurred in 2018. After observing troubling interactions between Whitaker and L.M., the child’s mother became increasingly suspicious. L.M. subsequently disclosed sexual touching to her mother, a police officer, a sexual assault nurse examiner, and a forensic interviewer.

The child used the term “diamond” to describe genital areas and gave descriptions of the alleged conduct. The medical examination revealed redness, but the examiner could not determine that sexual contact caused it. Thus, the medical finding was not conclusive physical proof of abuse.

Another important witness was Jamie Grubb, who had shared a jail cell with Whitaker. Grubb reported incriminating statements by Whitaker, including an explanation that he had taught L.M. to use the term “diamond.” A detective considered that information significant because it had not been public.

The trial

Trial began in June 2021, almost three years after the investigation. L.M., then six, remembered sexual touching but could not recall numerous details she had previously reported. Over a hearsay objection, the trial court admitted statements from her medical examination and a portion of her recorded forensic interview.

Grubb, by then incarcerated in a federal facility in Illinois, testified through two-way video. Whitaker objected that the arrangement denied him constitutionally protected face-to-face confrontation.

The defense challenged the reliability of L.M.’s account, alleging coaching and contamination. A clinical psychologist criticized aspects of the forensic interview and explained how young children can combine memories and experience the resulting account as real.

The jury convicted Whitaker of sexual intercourse without consent, incest, and sexual assault. The trial court imposed three concurrent 100-year sentences and designated him a third-tier sex offender.

The appellate questions

  1. Did Grubb’s remote testimony violate Whitaker’s confrontation rights?
  2. Did admitting L.M.’s earlier statements constitute an abuse of discretion?
  3. Could convictions for both sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault stand when the prosecution treated them as arising from the same act?

3. Summary of the Opinion

  • Remote testimony upheld: The record showed repeated consideration of pandemic-related health concerns specific to securing testimony from an out-of-state prisoner. Oath, mutual visibility, cross-examination, and the limited nature of technical interruptions sufficiently assured reliability.
  • Earlier statements admitted: L.M.’s inability to remember important details constituted inconsistency under Montana Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). Her broadly consistent accusation did not eliminate the significance of her missing recollections.
  • Sexual assault conviction reversed: Montana’s multiple-conviction statute prohibited convictions for both sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault on the same-act theory presented at trial.

The Court affirmed the sexual intercourse without consent and incest convictions and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. It did not order a new trial or a general resentencing proceeding.

4. Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Their Supporting Precedents

The Court separated constitutional questions from discretionary evidentiary decisions:

  • State v. Walsh, 2023 MT 33: Supplied the standard of plenary review for constitutional questions and de novo review of interpretations of the federal and Montana confrontation guarantees. The appellate court therefore independently assessed the constitutional adequacy of remote testimony.
  • State v. Duncan, 2012 MT 241: Established de novo review for double-jeopardy claims, which present legal questions.
  • State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148: Supplied abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings.
  • State v. Palmer, 2024 MT 25: Explained that discretion is abused when a court acts arbitrarily, fails to exercise conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.

These distinctions matter. The Court independently evaluated the governing constitutional requirements, but reviewed the admission of L.M.’s earlier statements with the latitude afforded to reasoned trial-management decisions.

B. Remote Testimony and the Right of Confrontation

The governing constitutional framework

The Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution protect a criminal defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses. Physical, face-to-face confrontation is important, but the Court treated it as subject to a carefully limited exception.

The controlling framework came from MARYLAND v. CRAIG, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Under its two-part test:

  1. Dispensing with physical confrontation must be necessary to further an important public policy.
  2. The reliability of the testimony must otherwise be assured.

Both elements must be satisfied. A reliable video connection alone does not justify dispensing with physical confrontation, and a substantial public concern does not excuse unreliable procedures.

How the Montana precedents shaped the inquiry

State v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12

This decision articulated Montana’s application of the two-part Craig framework. The party seeking remote testimony must establish the public-policy necessity, and the trial court must determine that reliability is otherwise assured. Although decided after the prosecution’s original request in Whitaker’s case, it supplied the governing analysis on appeal.

City of Missoula v. Duane, 2015 MT 232

The prosecution initially relied on this decision, which permitted an out-of-state witness to testify remotely in circumstances involving substantial expense and the burden of appearing for three related misdemeanor trials. In Whitaker’s case, that precedent explained the State’s original emphasis on logistical impracticality. It did not establish that inconvenience alone necessarily defeats confrontation rights.

State v. Martell, 2021 MT 318

This case supplied the limiting principle: judicial economy, added expense, and inconvenience alone are insufficient public policies to override physical confrontation. Such considerations may form part of the surrounding circumstances, but cannot independently carry the constitutional burden.

State v. Walsh, 2023 MT 33

Beyond supplying the review standard, this precedent required case-specific evidence rather than generalized findings. Its treatment of pandemic-related concerns involving a foreign witness also provided a comparison for the risks associated with Grubb’s interstate travel from prison.

State v. Bailey, 2021 MT 157, and State v. Corena Marie Mountain Chief, 2023 MT 147

The Court cited these decisions as part of its recent body of confrontation jurisprudence. The opinion did not separately analyze their facts or make their individual holdings decisive. Their role was contextual: they situated the dispute within Montana’s sustained application of constitutional limits on alternatives to in-person testimony.

Why the pandemic justification was sufficient here

The State’s February 2020 request originally emphasized the difficulty of transporting Grubb from Illinois. The constitutional justification, however, developed as the pandemic emerged. During proceedings in May 2020, October 2020, and January 2021, the trial court repeatedly discussed COVID-19 and the risks associated with bringing an incarcerated, out-of-state witness to Montana.

The Supreme Court considered those discussions sufficient to establish an actual health-and-safety rationale rather than a litigation justification invented after trial. Grubb’s confinement mattered because correctional settings presented heightened transmission concerns. His proposed interstate transportation connected those concerns to the particular witness and proceeding.

The Court acknowledged that some precautions had relaxed by June 2021, but rejected the suggestion that the pandemic had ceased to be a serious concern. It referred to continuing public-health risks, including the emerging Delta variant. The opinion also cited a Chief Justice’s letter concerning transmission in correctional facilities and later-published research supporting the heightened risks in prisons.

Importantly, the trial court had not entered detailed written findings explaining necessity. The Supreme Court nevertheless found its orally stated reasoning, preserved in the record, adequate. The holding therefore concerns the substance of the recorded determination, not a mandatory written format.

The decisive distinction from State v. Strommen

State v. Strommen, 2024 MT 87, was the closest contrasting precedent. There, remote expert testimony had initially been authorized because of scheduling and weather concerns. When trial eventually occurred, the expert testified from a vacation home, and the originally identified scheduling conflict no longer existed.

Although COVID-19 was later invoked, the State had not developed an adequate case-specific pandemic justification when the issue arose below. The Supreme Court characterized that justification as an “opportunistic rhetorical afterthought” and reversed.

Whitaker’s case differed because pandemic concerns had repeatedly informed the trial court’s pretrial decisions. The distinction was not simply that one trial occurred during COVID-19 and another did not. It was whether the record demonstrated a genuine, timely, case-specific necessity.

Reliability despite technical interruptions

Grubb testified under oath, could see Whitaker and be seen by him, and underwent cross-examination. These safeguards supported the second Craig requirement.

Whitaker argued that intermittent audio and video problems disrupted questioning and gave Grubb additional time to formulate answers. The Court examined the actual interruptions: Grubb requested repetition when he could not hear, then answered promptly. Nothing showed that he answered unheard questions or improperly delayed after hearing them.

The holding is correspondingly narrow. Minor, promptly corrected interruptions did not undermine reliability on this record. The Court did not approve materially defective connections or treat all two-way video testimony as constitutionally adequate.

C. A Child Witness’s Memory Lapses as Prior Inconsistency

The evidentiary rule

Montana Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) classifies qualifying prior inconsistent statements as non-hearsay. Here, L.M. testified at trial, but her ability to recall details had diminished substantially since her earlier interviews.

Whitaker emphasized that her central accusation remained consistent: she continued to identify him as the person who touched her sexually. He argued that failing to remember meetings with professionals did not make the substance of her earlier statements inconsistent.

The precedents supporting admission

State v. Howard, 2011 MT 246

The Court relied on its rule that a claimed lapse of memory constitutes inconsistency for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Thus, inconsistency does not require a witness to affirmatively deny a prior account. An inability to remember material facts can suffice.

STATE v. LAWRENCE, 285 Mont. 140, 948 P.2d 186 (1997)

The opinion cited this case through State v. Howard as the earlier authority underlying the memory-lapse principle. It was not separately factually analyzed, but supplied the doctrinal foundation for treating failed recollection as inconsistency.

State v. Mederos, 2013 MT 318

This case addressed young sexual-abuse complainants whose testimony mixed consistent statements with inconsistent ones. It permits admission of consistent portions alongside inconsistent portions when the nature of the testimony makes separation difficult. Its factual similarity made it particularly important to the Court’s resolution.

Why the missing details were material

The Court rejected the premise that L.M. had forgotten only the interviewers. Her memory gaps concerned the alleged abuse itself, including:

  • Where the conduct occurred;
  • How often it occurred;
  • The terminology Whitaker used for his own genital area;
  • Details bearing on penetration and the nature of the physical acts; and
  • Instructions not to disclose the conduct.

These omissions were significant even though L.M. still recalled the central allegation. A witness can remain consistent at a general level while becoming unable to supply material particulars previously described.

Applying State v. Howard, the Court held that these memory lapses established inconsistency. Applying State v. Mederos, it upheld admission of accounts containing both remembered and forgotten details. The statements were admitted as non-hearsay evidence, not merely as material to attack the child’s credibility.

Limits of the ruling

The opinion does not establish that every earlier interview becomes admissible whenever a child forgets something. Its reasoning depended on significant missing details and the mixed nature of the prior and present accounts.

Nor did admission establish that the interview techniques were reliable or that the earlier statements were necessarily true. The defense remained able to challenge coaching, suggestiveness, and memory contamination through expert testimony.

The State alternatively argued that the defense had “opened the door” by attacking the interview process and alleging concealment of relevant influences. The Court expressly declined to reach that alternative because prior inconsistency already justified admission. Accordingly, the opinion establishes no separate holding that a coaching allegation automatically permits introduction of the entire interview.

D. Same-Act Sexual-Offense Convictions

Whitaker challenged the sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault convictions under both constitutional double-jeopardy protections and Montana’s multiple-conviction statute, § 46-11-410(2)(a), MCA. The State conceded that the challenged convictions rested on the same act.

The controlling precedent was STATE v. WILLIAMS, 2010 MT 58. It held that the statute precludes convictions for both sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault where the charges arise from the same attack as alleged in the information.

That principle directly applied because the prosecution had presented the charges as supported by the same act. The State’s closing argument had expressly urged that the identified bedroom incident was sufficient to establish all three offenses.

The Court therefore reversed the sexual assault conviction and ordered an amended judgment. Although the issue was framed in constitutional as well as statutory terms, the operative reasoning relied on the statute and STATE v. WILLIAMS. The opinion should not be read as announcing a broader, independently developed constitutional test.

Two boundaries are important. First, concurrent sentences did not cure an impermissible additional conviction. Second, the incest conviction remained intact: the Court did not hold that every offense arising from the episode merged into sexual intercourse without consent.

5. Potential Impact

Remote-testimony applications require a developed record

The decision encourages trial courts to identify the particular witness, relevant risks, and reasons physical attendance is inappropriate. Recorded oral findings can suffice, but generalized references to a public emergency remain inadequate. Parties should also revisit earlier remote-testimony orders when circumstances change rather than assume the original justification persists.

The holding does not authorize routine remote testimony from prisoners. It rests on the combination of pandemic conditions, incarceration-related risks, interstate travel, and repeated judicial consideration.

Memory loss can affect substantive admissibility

For delayed child-abuse prosecutions, the opinion confirms that a surviving general recollection does not bar use of earlier, materially more detailed statements. Prosecutors must identify the actual memory gaps; defense counsel can contest their significance, the scope of the admitted material, and the reliability of the earlier questioning.

Charging theories matter to multiple-conviction analysis

The State’s express same-act theory was decisive. Evidence suggesting abuse on multiple occasions did not preserve both challenged convictions when the prosecution relied on the same act to establish them. Future cases will require attention to the conduct supporting each count, rather than merely the number of statutory charges or whether sentences run concurrently.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Confrontation right
A defendant’s right to face and question prosecution witnesses. Replacing physical presence with video requires a constitutionally sufficient justification and reliable procedures.
Case-specific necessity
A reason tied to this witness and this proceeding—not simply a general statement that travel is inconvenient or a public-health problem exists.
Prior inconsistent statement
An earlier account that conflicts with trial testimony. Under the Montana precedents applied here, forgetting important previously described facts can create that conflict.
Non-hearsay
A statement the evidence rules exclude from the hearsay category. The qualifying earlier statements here could be considered as evidence of the events described, not solely to evaluate credibility.
Abuse of discretion
A standard that permits reasonable trial-court choices but allows reversal for arbitrary or seriously unreasonable decision-making.
De novo review
Independent appellate review of a legal question, without deferring to the trial court’s legal conclusion.
Multiple-conviction restriction
A statutory limit on entering overlapping convictions for the same conduct, even when prosecutors may initially pursue multiple charges.

7. Conclusion

State v. Whitaker illustrates the importance of a concrete trial record. Repeated, witness-specific health findings supported remote testimony; identifiable gaps in a child’s recollection supported admission of earlier statements; and the prosecution’s same-act theory required removal of an overlapping conviction.

The result was affirmance of the sexual intercourse without consent and incest convictions, reversal of the sexual assault conviction, and remand for an amended judgment. The broader lesson is that procedural flexibility remains available, but only within carefully demonstrated constitutional and evidentiary limits.