Carmack Amendment Is No Defense to Fabricated Carrier-Loss Claims; § 1344(2) Bank Fraud Requires No Intent to Defraud the Bank

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arose from the convictions of three brothers—Zumar, Abdush, and Kariem Dubose—for a wide-ranging fraud scheme targeting the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), the United Parcel Service (“UPS”), and Citizens Bank. The Government’s proof centered on the filing of more than 1,200 fraudulent claims for “lost” or “damaged” packages using fake names, and the deposit of resulting claim checks into Citizens Bank accounts held by shell businesses.

The appeals presented recurring issues in federal fraud prosecutions: (i) sufficiency of evidence under Rule 29, (ii) the scope of bank fraud liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), (iii) whether defendants may invoke a civil shipping-liability framework (the Carmack Amendment) as a “defense” to criminal fraud charges, (iv) prosecutorial comments and burden-shifting, and (v) self-representation limits under Faretta.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

• There was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict each defendant on the counts of conviction, including money laundering as charged against Abdush.
• Kariem’s argument that “Citizens Bank was not the intended victim” failed because Loughrin v. United States forecloses any requirement that a defendant intend to defraud the bank under § 1344(2).
• The district court did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments by excluding a proposed “defense” based on the Carmack Amendment; it was irrelevant and, in any event, would not authorize fabricated claims.
• The Government’s closing argument did not shift the burden of proof; under plain-error review there was no reversible error.
• The district court permissibly revoked Zumar’s pro se status due to obstructionist conduct, consistent with Faretta and related precedent.
• Zumar’s remaining indictment and trial-structure challenges (including constructive amendment/variance) failed, and other undeveloped arguments were forfeited.

Although designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the decision synthesizes and applies established Supreme Court and Third Circuit doctrine in ways likely to be persuasive in factually similar prosecutions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in well-settled standards governing evidentiary sufficiency, statutory elements, constitutional trial rights, and appellate review rules. The following cited authorities did the principal work:

• Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) — Used to justify liberal construction of Zumar’s pro se filings, while later emphasizing that even pro se litigants must comply with basic procedural requirements.
• United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2014) and United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005) — Provide the Third Circuit’s framework for Rule 29 sufficiency review: view evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and ask whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002) — Supplies the mail/wire fraud elements: scheme to defraud, use of mails/wires, and specific intent to defraud.
• Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) — Dispositive on the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2): the Government need not prove intent to defraud a bank, only intent to obtain bank-held property “by means of” a false statement that naturally induces the bank to part with money in its control.
• Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) — Provide the constitutional baseline that a defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, which is cabined by ordinary rules of relevance and admissibility.
• United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996) — Governs the prosecutor’s leeway in closing argument: the Government may highlight gaps in a defense theory, but cannot suggest the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence.
• United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449 (3d Cir. 2025) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) — Define the four-part plain-error framework for unpreserved claims (including alleged burden-shifting).
• United States v. Noble, 42 F.4th 346 (3d Cir. 2022), Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), and United States v. Taylor, 21 F.4th 94 (3d Cir. 2021) — Frame the right to self-representation as conditional: valid waiver is required, and a trial judge may terminate self-representation for serious obstructionist misconduct, while exercising patience before doing so.
• United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982), United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969), and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) — Explain limits on substitution/counsel-of-choice claims, including the absence of an absolute right to a particular lawyer and the “good cause” requirement where substitution would disrupt proceedings.
• United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2002), United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2012) (rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Hill, 98 F.4th 473 (3d Cir. 2024)), and United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2013) — Supply indictment sufficiency standards under Rules 7 and 12(b), focusing on notice, elements, and essential allegations.
• United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2006) and United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118 (3d Cir. 1985) — Distinguish constructive amendment (altering essential terms such that the jury may convict for an uncharged offense) from variance (proof differing from charged facts), and emphasize the presumption that juries follow instructions.
• Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182 (3d Cir. 2021) — Reinforces that pro se litigants must still comply with procedural rules.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Sufficiency of the evidence: circumstantial proof can carry each substantive count

Applying John-Baptiste and Brodie, the court treated the jury’s verdict as entitled to substantial deference. The defendants’ sufficiency arguments largely demanded claim-by-claim direct proof that each payee name was fictitious and each underlying shipment was not genuinely lost/damaged. The panel rejected that framing: the Government’s case—use of repeated receipts, facially fabricated names, coordinated text communications, repeated insured label purchases, and the deposit of claim proceeds into shell accounts—was enough for a rational jury to find a scheme to defraud and intent to defraud under Syme.

Notably, the court’s approach reflects a common fraud-prosecution principle: a “pattern of conduct” and coordinated financial handling of proceeds may permit an inference of falsity and intent, even if the Government lacks direct testimony disproving each individual fraudulent representation.

(b) Bank fraud under § 1344(2): intended victim is not an element

The panel treated Kariem’s “Citizens Bank wasn’t the intended victim” argument as legally foreclosed by Loughrin v. United States. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), the Government need not prove intent to defraud the bank itself; it must prove intent to obtain bank-custodied property “by means of” a false statement that naturally induces the bank to release funds.

On the facts described, the panel found the “by means of” requirement satisfied because the defendants allegedly made false representations to Citizens Bank about the payees’ relationship to the shell entity in an effort to lift the hold and access funds in the account. The opinion also notes the filing of allegedly fraudulent lawsuits against the bank after those representations failed, reinforcing the existence of an “attempt[] to execute” a scheme within the statutory language.

(c) “Complete defense” doctrine: constitutional rights do not make irrelevant evidence admissible

Invoking Crane and Trombetta, Abdush and Kariem argued that excluding the Carmack Amendment deprived them of the right to present a complete defense. The panel resolved the issue at the relevance threshold (Fed. R. Evid. 401): even if the Carmack framework applied to legitimate loss/damage claims, it could not authorize fabricated submissions, so it did not tend to make innocence more probable.

The court’s reasoning implicitly distinguishes (i) a claim-of-right or lawful-entitlement theory (potentially relevant where defendants honestly believed they were entitled to money), from (ii) a theory that a civil remedial statute provides “cover” for knowingly false statements (irrelevant because fraud criminalizes the lies and the scheme, not the mere act of filing a claim).

(d) Closing argument and burden-shifting: permissible comment on evidentiary gaps

Under plain-error review (Guyton / Olano), the panel found no misconduct. Citing United States v. Balter, it held that the Government’s argument—there was “not a drop of evidence” of a legitimate reason for the volume of insured labels—was a permissible comment on the evidentiary record and defense theory, not an assertion that defendants had a burden to prove legitimacy or to testify.

(e) Termination of self-representation: obstructionist conduct can forfeit Faretta rights

Relying on Faretta (including footnote 46) and McKaskle, and reviewed under United States v. Noble, the court upheld revocation of Zumar’s pro se status due to repeated disruptions and last-minute refusals to engage with the court’s questions. The panel emphasized that the district court exercised the patience encouraged by United States v. Taylor and terminated self-representation only when proceedings could not continue.

(f) Indictment sufficiency, constructive amendment, and variance: clear instructions and consistent proof defeat structural challenges

Under Whited, Huet, and Stock, the panel held the indictment adequately stated the statutes, elements, and time period, and detailed the alleged fraud scheme. Constructive amendment and variance claims failed under Daraio and Castro because the jury was instructed on the indicted offenses and the proof matched the charged scheme; the mere fact that the evidence might also have supported a different offense (the opinion references 18 U.S.C. § 288) did not mean the jury convicted on an uncharged crime.

3.3. Impact

• Fraud cases involving “claim systems”: The decision reinforces that prosecutors can prove a large-scale fraudulent-claims enterprise with pattern evidence, communications, and financial tracing, even without direct proof refuting every individual claim submission.
• Bank fraud charging strategy under § 1344(2): The opinion underscores the continuing force of Loughrin in the Third Circuit: defendants cannot avoid liability by arguing the bank was merely incidental, so long as false statements are used as the mechanism to obtain bank-controlled property.
• Limits on “civil-statute” defenses: By treating the Carmack Amendment theory as irrelevant, the court signals skepticism toward attempts to transform civil liability regimes into defenses against criminal fraud predicated on fabrication.
• Trial-management and pro se litigants: The holding illustrates how trial courts can develop a record supporting termination of self-representation when defendants become obstructionist, while still showing “patience” to withstand appellate scrutiny.

Because the opinion is designated nonprecedential under I.O.P. 5.7, its formal binding effect is limited; however, its application of Supreme Court holdings (Loughrin, Faretta, Olano) and entrenched Third Circuit standards makes it a practical roadmap for litigants confronting similar arguments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 29 sufficiency review: After a guilty verdict, the appellate court does not re-weigh credibility. It asks whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the Government, any rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Mail/Wire fraud “intent to defraud”: The Government must show the defendant acted with the purpose to deceive and cheat—often proven by circumstantial evidence (patterns, communications, financial behavior).
• Bank fraud under § 1344(2): Unlike the other subsection, § 1344(2) does not require intent to defraud the bank. It is enough that a false statement is used to obtain money/property the bank controls.
• Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706): A civil statute allocating liability for certain shipment losses. Even if it governs legitimate claims, it does not authorize making things up; fabricated claims remain fraud.
• Plain error review: If an issue was not raised in the trial court, the appellant must show an obvious legal error that affected substantial rights and seriously harms the integrity of the proceedings.
• Constructive amendment vs. variance: A constructive amendment changes what crime the jury might convict on (serious). A variance is a mismatch in details between indictment and proof (reversible only if prejudicial).
• Faretta right (self-representation): A defendant may represent himself, but the court may revoke that right if the defendant becomes seriously disruptive or obstructs the process.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms convictions stemming from a large-scale package-claim fraud and, in doing so, delivers several clear doctrinal messages: (1) sufficiency challenges in complex fraud cases can be defeated by coherent pattern-and-proceeds evidence; (2) under Loughrin v. United States, bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) does not hinge on whether the bank was the “intended victim,” only on whether false statements were the mechanism to access bank-controlled funds; (3) the constitutional right to present a defense does not render irrelevant evidence admissible, and a civil shipping-liability statute cannot justify fabricated claims; and (4) courts may terminate self-representation when defendants obstruct proceedings.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion functions as a compact application of core fraud, trial-rights, and appellate-review principles—particularly valuable in cases where defendants attempt to recharacterize fraudulent claim submissions as legitimate disputes under civil statutory frameworks.