Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi: A Single Comparator and Generalized Allegations Do Not Plead a Monell “Custom,” and Unpleaded “Single-Incident Policymaker” Theories Are Forfeited

1. Introduction

In Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026), Priscilla Tryon Cambric (Plaintiff–Appellant) brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the City of Corpus Christi selectively enforced its building code against her historically significant property, violating the Equal Protection Clause under a “class of one” theory. She sought to prevent demolition of her building—an older venue with cultural significance to the Black community—after the City’s code-enforcement process culminated in a Board recommendation for demolition and later reinstated demolition pressure following alleged noncompliance with fencing and security conditions.

After removal to federal court, the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding the complaint failed to state a constitutional violation (and therefore did not reach municipal-liability sufficiency). On appeal, Plaintiff abandoned her claims against two City employees (Cantu and Raymond), leaving only the claim against the City. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on a municipal-liability ground: the pleadings did not plausibly allege a City “policy or custom” under Monell v. Department of Social Services.

Key Issues

  • Whether Plaintiff plausibly alleged an “official policy” or “custom” attributable to the City as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services.
  • Whether a single comparator example (the “Ritz Theatre project”) can plausibly establish a “persistent widespread practice” sufficient for municipal liability.
  • Whether Plaintiff could rely on a “single unconstitutional act by a final policymaker” theory when it was not pleaded or presented below (forfeiture).
  • How (and how far) the Fifth Circuit’s recent Hershey v. City of Bossier City line affects “single-incident” Monell pleading—addressed in concurrence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed dismissal because Plaintiff failed to plead a municipal “policy or custom.” The court emphasized that municipal liability under § 1983 is not available on a respondeat superior theory and requires well-pleaded facts showing an official policy or custom that was the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Plaintiff alleged a pattern of selective enforcement, but provided only one substantive comparator example (the Ritz Theatre) and did not plausibly allege sufficiently numerous prior incidents. The panel treated the allegations as, at most, an isolated incident, which cannot establish a municipal custom.

The court also rejected (as forfeited) an argument raised on appeal that the City could be liable based on a single unconstitutional act by a final policymaker, because Plaintiff did not plead that theory or raise it before the district court.

Because Plaintiff did not satisfy the policy/custom requirement, the panel did not reach the merits of the underlying Equal Protection claim. Judge Oldham concurred to clarify the interaction between Fifth Circuit Monell doctrine and the more recent Hershey decisions, stressing that Hershey should not be extended beyond its specific failure-to-train context.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

Pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) Framework

  • True v. Robles — Used for the Rule 12(b)(6) posture: courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and construe them in plaintiff’s favor.
  • Jackson v. City of Hearne — Supplies the de novo standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and later provides the key municipal-liability proposition that “a single incident doesn’t establish a custom or policy.”
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly — Sets the plausibility baseline (“raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).
  • Favre v. Sharpe — Reinforces that pleaded facts must allow a reasonable inference of plaintiff’s entitlement to relief and authorizes affirmance “on any basis supported by the record.”
  • Ferrer v. Chevron Corp. — Cited via Favre for the appellate court’s ability to affirm on any record-supported basis, enabling the panel to affirm on Monell-policy pleading grounds even though the district court focused on the lack of a constitutional violation.

Municipal Liability Under § 1983 (Monell Doctrine)

  • Monell v. Department of Social Services — The foundational rule: municipalities are liable only for constitutional torts caused by an official policy or custom, not vicariously for employees.
  • Peterson v. City of Fort Worth — Provides the three-part municipal-liability test (official policy; promulgated by policymaker; moving force behind the violation) and emphasizes that patterns require “sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”
  • Piotrowski v. City of Hous. — Reinforces the stringent causation/pattern requirement: the pattern must “transcend[] the error made in a single case.”
  • Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls — Identifies routes to establishing policy/custom (formal policy; widespread custom; single act by final policymaker). It also supports rejecting theories not properly presented.
  • Webster v. City of Hous. — Defines “persistent widespread practice” constituting municipal custom.
  • McConney v. City of Hous. — Cited through Peterson to distinguish patterns from isolated instances.
  • LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. — Supports the court’s forfeiture analysis: issues not raised below are forfeited on appeal.

Materials Considered at the Pleading Stage

  • Funk v. Stryker Corp. — Supports considering Board meeting minutes at Rule 12(b)(6) because they were referenced in the complaint and attached to the motion to dismiss.

When Courts May Avoid the Underlying Constitutional Question

  • Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys and G.M. ex rel. Lopez v. Shelton — Support the panel’s methodological choice: if Monell’s policy/custom element fails, courts need not address the underlying constitutional merits.

The Concurrence: “Single-Incident” Claims and the Hershey Decisions

  • Littell v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist. — Characterizes “single incident” Monell theories as viable only in “very narrow” circumstances.
  • Burge v. St. Tammany Par. — Sets the traditional “single incident” constraint: the incident must demonstrate an obvious potential for recurring constitutional violations and that the violation was a highly predictable consequence.
  • Hershey v. City of Bossier City (“Hershey I”) — Oldham reads it as permitting a Monell claim to survive dismissal in a failure-to-train context where officers received “literally zero training” regarding the relevant constitutional duty (there, First Amendment application).
  • Hershey v. City of Bossier City (“Hershey II”) — Cited for Oldham’s warning about treating Hershey I as allowing single-incident municipal liability even when ex ante risk is “infinitesimal.”
  • Hershey v. City of Bossier City (“Hershey III”) and Hershey v. City of Bossier City (“Hershey IV”) — Cited to highlight procedural and doctrinal instability in the Hershey sequence and to caution against expanding its reach.
  • FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med. — Used to support the concurrence’s principle: do not extend precedent “beyond its context.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) The Panel’s Decisive Move: Municipal “Policy or Custom” Was Not Plausibly Pleaded

Although Plaintiff framed the dispute as selective enforcement (and the district court dismissed for failure to plead a substantive constitutional violation), the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the antecedent municipal-liability pleading requirement. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, the City can be liable only if an official policy/custom caused a constitutional violation.

The panel walked through the three recognized pathways to “official policy” in the Fifth Circuit (formal policy; widespread custom; single act by final policymaker). Plaintiff did not plead a formal written directive. Nor did she properly plead—at least in the district court—a “single unconstitutional act” by a final policymaker as the operative Monell theory. That left only a widespread custom/pattern theory.

(B) Why the Ritz Theatre Allegation Was Not Enough

Plaintiff’s “pattern, practice, and custom” allegations were largely conclusory, and the complaint offered only one concrete comparator example: the City’s allegedly different, more supportive treatment of the “Ritz Theatre project.” The panel treated this as “a single instance of arguably uneven enforcement,” which—under Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Piotrowski v. City of Hous., and Jackson v. City of Hearne—cannot plausibly establish a widespread, persistent practice “so common and well settled as to constitute a custom” (Webster v. City of Hous.).

The panel also noted the Board meeting minutes reflected multiple properties considered for demolition at the same hearing, with demolition recommended for most of them—undercutting the inference that Plaintiff was uniquely targeted via a broader City custom. At the pleading stage, this did not require the court to find that enforcement was evenhanded; it only reinforced that Plaintiff’s complaint did not plausibly allege the kind of numerous, repeated incidents that Monell custom claims demand.

(C) Forfeiture of the “Single Unconstitutional Act by a Final Policymaker” Theory

Plaintiff attempted on appeal to invoke the third Monell route (a single unconstitutional act by a final policymaker). The panel held the issue forfeited because it was not pleaded and not raised before the district court, citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls and LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev.. The practical lesson is procedural as much as substantive: municipal-liability theories are not interchangeable labels; they are distinct doctrinal routes with distinct factual predicates, and plaintiffs must commit to and plead them with specificity early.

(D) The Concurrence’s Clarification: Hershey Is Not a Free-Floating “Single-Incident” Monell Shortcut

Judge Oldham’s concurrence addresses an obvious tension: if Hershey v. City of Bossier City (“Hershey I”) allows a Monell claim to survive based on a single incident, why not here? His answer is that Hershey I should be read narrowly—limited to a failure-to-train theory where the municipality provided “literally zero training” on the relevant constitutional duty and that omission caused the violation.

Oldham warns against generalizing Hershey into a broad rule that a single allegedly unconstitutional enforcement decision automatically implies municipal deliberate indifference. He further cautions that the subsequent Hershey procedural history (Hershey II, Hershey III, Hershey IV) invites confusion and should not be used to expand municipal liability into new contexts, invoking FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med. for the “don’t extend beyond context” principle.

3.3 Impact

(A) Higher Practical Pleading Burden for “Selective Enforcement” Monell Claims

The decision reinforces that a plaintiff alleging selective enforcement against a municipality must do more than identify a single “better treated” property and assert a generalized “custom.” Plaintiffs will need:

  • Multiple, factually comparable incidents suggesting consistent selective treatment; and
  • Facts supporting municipal knowledge/acceptance (duration, frequency, recurrence) rather than an isolated enforcement controversy.

(B) Strategic Consequences: Choose and Plead the Monell Pathway Deliberately

Cambric highlights that plaintiffs must clearly plead which Monell route they are taking. If a plaintiff believes the relevant conduct was a single act by a final policymaker, that theory must be pleaded (including identifying the final policymaker, the act, and why it is unconstitutional). Waiting until appeal risks forfeiture.

(C) Confining Hershey to Failure-to-Train (At Least as Read by Oldham)

While the majority does not decide Hershey’s reach, the concurrence signals how at least some judges will resist expanding “single-incident” municipal liability beyond the failure-to-train scenario described in Hershey I. Litigants should expect vigorous disputes about whether Hershey is limited to “literally zero training” and to which constitutional domains it applies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Monell “Policy or Custom”

A city is not automatically liable for everything its employees do. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a plaintiff must connect the alleged constitutional harm to the city itself, typically by showing:

  • Formal policy: a written rule/ordinance/official directive;
  • Custom: an unwritten but widespread, repeated practice that is so common it effectively becomes city policy; or
  • Single act by final policymaker: one decision by an official who has final authority to set city policy in that area.

“Custom” Requires More Than One Example

A “custom” is proven by frequency and persistence. One comparator property (even a strong one) usually shows only a potential inconsistency, not an entrenched municipal practice. That is why the court treated Plaintiff’s allegations as an “isolated instance.”

Forfeiture on Appeal

If a party does not present a legal theory in the district court (through pleadings and argument), appellate courts often will not consider it. In Cambric, the “single unconstitutional act by a final policymaker” Monell theory was deemed forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Affirmance “On Any Basis Supported by the Record”

Even if the district court dismisses for one reason, the court of appeals can affirm for another reason supported by the record (here, insufficient Monell policy/custom pleading), as recognized in Favre v. Sharpe (quoting Ferrer v. Chevron Corp.).

5. Conclusion

Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi strengthens a familiar but decisive Monell pleading principle in the selective-enforcement context: broad assertions of “policy, custom, or practice” coupled with a single comparator incident do not plausibly allege a municipal custom. The opinion also underscores procedural discipline—Monell theories not pleaded and litigated below (such as a “single-act final policymaker” theory) may be forfeited on appeal.

Finally, Judge Oldham’s concurrence adds an important cautionary gloss on the Fifth Circuit’s recent Hershey v. City of Bossier City decisions: whatever their reach, they should not be reflexively extended beyond a narrow failure-to-train scenario, especially into discretionary enforcement disputes. In combination, the majority and concurrence signal a continued insistence on specificity—both in pleading municipal “custom” and in articulating the exact doctrinal route to municipal liability.