CAFA Preliminary Injunctions Require a Facial Allegation of Minimal Diversity (Citizenship, Not Mere Residency)

Case: David Hice v. EQT Corp. (No. 25-2729) — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date: March 19, 2026 (Not precedential)

1. Introduction

This interlocutory appeal arises from a putative class action brought by three Pennsylvania residents (David Hice, Joseph Moore, and Christina Barlow) against EQT Corp. and related entities, alleging that operations at a hydraulically fractured natural gas well (“Lumber 13H”) caused contamination of nearby private well water supplies. The plaintiffs sought classwide injunctive relief before class certification: a preliminary injunction compelling EQT and an affiliate to provide safe drinking water to all affected residents during the litigation.

The District Court denied the preliminary injunction without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged irreparable harm. On appeal, the Third Circuit focused on a threshold issue: whether the pleadings and motion papers made a facial showing of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), specifically CAFA’s minimal-diversity requirement.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit reiterated that federal courts must independently assure themselves of subject-matter jurisdiction and that a court cannot issue preliminary injunctive relief without, at minimum, a prior facial showing of jurisdiction. Although CAFA minimal diversity is “not onerous,” the panel held the plaintiffs did not satisfy it because they pleaded only that the named plaintiffs were residents of Pennsylvania (not citizens), coupled with a conclusory assertion that “at least one member of the proposed Class is a citizen of a different state from one of the Defendants.” Because residency is not synonymous with citizenship for diversity purposes, the pleadings did not establish CAFA minimal diversity.

The court ultimately vacated the District Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. (Judge Phipps agreed with the opinion’s reasoning but would have affirmed rather than vacate.)

Key takeaway: In a CAFA case, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must first make a facial, non-conclusory showing of minimal diversity based on citizenship (domicile + U.S. citizenship for natural persons), not merely residency.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Hice v. EQT Corp., 2025 WL 2457219 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2025)
    The appealed-from decision. The District Court assumed likelihood of success (without deciding), denied relief for failure to show irreparable harm, and did so without an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit’s opinion does not endorse that irreparable-harm analysis; instead it places jurisdiction as a gatekeeping requirement.
  • Erie Indem. Co. v. Stephenson, 157 F.4th 265 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Pa. Env't Hearing Bd., 108 F.4th 144 (3d Cir. 2024))
    These cases are cited for the standard preliminary-injunction principle that irreparable harm is a prerequisite. Their role here is contextual: the panel acknowledges the District Court’s reliance on irreparable harm, but then pivots to the antecedent question of jurisdiction.
  • Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) and Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456 (1926)
    These anchor the burden and pleading requirements for federal jurisdiction: the party invoking jurisdiction must affirmatively and distinctly allege it in the pleadings; jurisdiction is not presumed.
  • Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025)
    Cited for the court’s duty to examine jurisdiction independently, even if the parties overlook it or agree jurisdiction exists. This supports sua sponte scrutiny of CAFA minimal diversity at the preliminary-injunction stage.
  • Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868)
    The foundational maxim: without jurisdiction, a federal court cannot proceed at all. The panel uses this to frame jurisdiction as a prerequisite to the exercise of injunctive power.
  • Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (quoting City & County of Denver v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913))
    These are invoked to confirm that appellate review of preliminary injunctions extends to “insuperable” jurisdictional objections. In other words, jurisdiction is fair game on an interlocutory appeal from an injunction ruling.
  • Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc., 733 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2013)
    Provides the Third Circuit’s formulation of CAFA jurisdictional prerequisites, including minimal diversity: at least one plaintiff citizen of a different state than at least one defendant.
  • Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006); McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989); Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1972)
    This line of cases supplies the doctrinal content of “citizenship” for diversity: residency is not enough; domicile matters; and for natural persons, citizenship requires both U.S. citizenship and state domicile. The panel uses these principles to identify the pleading defect: plaintiffs alleged residency, not citizenship.
  • Out-of-circuit CAFA minimal-diversity pleading cases (as comparative support): Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 152 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2025); Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2016); Dancel v. Groupon, Inc., 940 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2019); contrasted with Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2006).
    The panel aligns with decisions requiring specific, non-conclusory allegations of citizenship and rejects inferences based on vague class-member assertions, while acknowledging that at least one decision (Blockbuster) took a more permissive approach based on “reasonable probability” from residency and customer allegations.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning proceeds in a strict sequence:

  1. Jurisdiction is a threshold constraint on injunctive power.
    Even when a party seeks urgent equitable relief, federal courts cannot grant a preliminary injunction unless jurisdiction is at least facially established. The panel emphasizes that jurisdiction is not merely a defense or a technicality to be addressed later; it is foundational to any judicial action.
  2. CAFA minimal diversity requires “citizenship,” and citizenship is not “residency.”
    The complaint identified the named plaintiffs only as Pennsylvania residents. That is insufficient because an individual may reside in multiple states yet be a citizen (domiciliary) of only one; domicile is the “true, fixed and permanent home.” Thus, the plaintiffs failed to plead the citizenship of even a single plaintiff in a way that could be matched against any defendant to show minimal diversity.
  3. Conclusory allegations cannot substitute for the missing jurisdictional facts.
    The statement that “at least one member of the proposed Class is a citizen of a different state from one of the Defendants” was treated as conclusory because it did not identify any plaintiff citizen or provide facts supporting that a class member is a citizen of a different state.
  4. Result: the District Court could not properly issue preliminary injunctive relief on this record.
    The panel states that “without a facial showing of jurisdiction” it was “not error” for the District Court to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction.

On remedy (vacatur): Although the panel indicates denial was not erroneous given the jurisdictional deficiency, it nevertheless vacates the District Court’s order. Read practically, vacatur clears the order that addressed the injunction on irreparable-harm grounds, leaving room for jurisdiction to be properly pleaded (potentially via amendment, cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1653) and for the injunction request to be reconsidered under the correct sequence (jurisdiction first, then the injunction factors). Judge Phipps’s partial dissent on disposition underscores that the procedural posture was close: he would have affirmed the denial rather than vacate.

3.3 Impact

Even as a “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” disposition, the opinion is a pointed warning for CAFA litigants seeking early equitable relief:

  • Pleading discipline in CAFA cases is essential at the earliest stages. Plaintiffs who move for a preliminary injunction (especially pre-certification) should expect courts to scrutinize CAFA jurisdiction immediately, not after discovery or class certification briefing.
  • Natural-person citizenship must be pleaded as domicile (and U.S. citizenship), not “residence.” This is likely to prompt more careful complaints and motion papers that expressly allege at least one named plaintiff’s state citizenship, thereby enabling a minimal-diversity comparison.
  • Courts may deny urgent relief without reaching irreparable harm if jurisdiction is not facially shown. The opinion reinforces that equitable urgency does not relax jurisdictional requirements.
  • Strategic implications in environmental/tort class actions: Early “status quo” injunction requests (e.g., provision of alternative water) can rise or fall on technical jurisdictional pleading. Defendants, correspondingly, may challenge CAFA allegations at the injunction stage rather than waiting for a removal/remand fight or later dispositive motions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order issued early in a case to prevent harm before final judgment. Courts typically require (among other things) a likelihood of success and irreparable harm.
  • Irreparable harm: Harm that cannot be adequately fixed later by money damages or other remedies.
  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to hear the type of dispute. Parties cannot waive it, and courts must check it on their own.
  • CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act) jurisdiction: A statute expanding federal jurisdiction over certain large class actions. One requirement is minimal diversity: at least one plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than at least one defendant.
  • Residency vs. citizenship (for diversity): “Resident” describes where someone lives; “citizen” for diversity means where someone is domiciled (their fixed, permanent home) and, for natural persons, also requires U.S. citizenship. A person can have multiple residences but only one domicile at a time.
  • Facial showing: The jurisdictional facts must appear from the face of the pleadings (and here, the motion papers) in a sufficiently specific, non-conclusory way.

5. Conclusion

David Hice v. EQT Corp. underscores a sequencing rule with practical bite: before a federal court can entertain preliminary injunctive relief in a CAFA class action, the plaintiff must make a facial, fact-based showing of CAFA jurisdiction, including minimal diversity grounded in citizenship rather than residency. The decision signals that courts may (and should) police jurisdiction sua sponte at the injunction stage, and it elevates careful jurisdictional pleading from a background formality to a determinative threshold issue for emergency relief.