CAFA Jurisdiction Is Fixed at Filing Absent a Frivolous CAFA Hook: Eleventh Circuit Requires a “Frivolousness” Inquiry Before Dismissing After Nondiverse Parties Remain

1. Introduction

In Keith Pearce v. State Farm Florida Insurance Company (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (not for publication), Keith and Janet Pearce (Florida residents) brought a putative class action alleging that, after a total-loss claim on a “Personal Articles Policy” covering a diamond pendant, State Farm failed to refund “unearned premiums” purportedly required by the policy. The pleadings evolved over three iterations, naming different State Farm entities: State Farm General Insurance Company, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“SF Fire”), State Farm Florida Insurance Company (“SF Florida”), and later State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“SF Mutual”).

The case presented two clusters of issues:

  1. Merits / pleading issues under Florida law: whether SF Mutual or SF Fire could be liable on the policy (via contract interpretation or apparent agency) and whether unjust enrichment was adequately pleaded.
  2. Subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”): whether jurisdiction may be lost after the district court dismisses the diverse out-of-state defendants, leaving only Florida plaintiffs and a Florida defendant.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit:

  • Affirmed dismissal of claims against SF Mutual and SF Fire for failure to state a claim: (i) apparent agency was not plausibly alleged as to SF Mutual; (ii) the insurance agreement unambiguously identified SF Florida as the insurer, defeating breach-of-contract claims against SF Mutual and SF Fire; and (iii) unjust enrichment against SF Mutual was not plausibly pleaded because the alleged “inequity” depended entirely on the contract’s refund obligation.
  • Vacated and remanded the dismissal for lack of CAFA jurisdiction as to SF Florida, holding the district court’s jurisdictional analysis was erroneous because CAFA jurisdiction is assessed at the time of filing (of the operative complaint), and the court must address whether the earlier inclusion of SF Mutual/SF Fire was a frivolous attempt to invoke CAFA before concluding jurisdiction never existed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

A. Pleading standards and the “policy-as-document” rule

  • Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup Inc. (standard of review: accept allegations as true at Rule 12(b)(6)); the panel reiterated the de novo lens and plaintiff-favorable inferences.
  • Moore v. Cecil (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly): reaffirmed “plausible on its face” pleading. This mattered because the Pearces’ theories (apparent agency, unjust enrichment) required specific factual content (representation, reliance, inequity) rather than conclusory branding-based assertions.
  • Johnson v. City of Atlanta: authorized consideration of the insurance documents attached to the motion to dismiss because the policy was “central” and “undisputed.” This was outcome-determinative on insurer identity: once the panel read the Renewal Certificate + PAP booklet as an integrated agreement, the “Company shown in the Declarations” definition controlled.
  • Fox v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co.: (i) Florida substantive law governs; (ii) de novo review for subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Apparent agency under Florida law: branding is not control

  • Marchisio v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC: supplied the three-part Florida apparent agency framework and emphasized the plaintiff’s burden. It also supported deciding legal sufficiency on a motion to dismiss even if agency is often fact-bound.
  • Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford: the centerpiece. The court relied on Mobil Oil’s insistence that “mere use of franchise logos and related advertisements” does not show the “substantial control” representation needed for apparent agency. The panel treated the Pearces’ evidence (State Farm branding and a lone copyright notice) as the type of “logo-only” showing Mobil Oil rejects.
  • Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. D.N. Morrison Const. Co. and Centennial Ins. Co. v. Parnell: the opinion used these Florida Supreme Court endpoints to illustrate how fact-intensive “representation” can be—ranging from extensive company-supplied indicia (forms, seals, stationery, long-standing course of dealing) to none at all. The Pearces’ allegations were closer to Centennial than Fidelity.
  • Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., plus Essex Ins. Co. v. Zota and Guarente-Desantolo v. John Alden Life Ins. Co.: the panel limited Almerico to its insurance-broker/statutory setting (including Fla. Stat. § 626.342(1)), rejecting the Pearces’ attempt to use it to expand common-law apparent agency based on supplies/forms alone in this corporate-family branding context.
  • Ilgen v. Henderson Properties, Inc. and Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cornerstone Bus., Inc.: Ilgen was distinguished because the franchisor’s name appeared in a “key section of the contract”; Cornerstone was invoked to show that a parent’s logo may merely denote “affiliated relationship,” not agency.

C. Florida insurance-contract interpretation: declarations control; extrinsic evidence cannot manufacture ambiguity

  • Washington Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson: the panel applied the “read the policy as a whole” rule and enforced plain meaning when unambiguous. This supported giving operative force to the PAP booklet’s definition that “Company” is the one “shown in the Declarations,” and treating the Renewal Certificate as the Declarations.
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez: complexity does not equal ambiguity; ambiguity requires more than one reasonable interpretation. That principle foreclosed treating a copyright line or generic “State Farm®” references as creating a reasonable alternative insurer identity.
  • Frulla v. CRA Holdings, Inc.: if a party’s interpretation is unreasonable in light of plain language, there is no ambiguity and no resort to extrinsic evidence.
  • Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store: contra proferentem is a last resort; it cannot be used to rewrite contracts or add meaning not present. The court used this to reject the Pearces’ ambiguity-based push to add SF Mutual/SF Fire as contracting parties.
  • Murry v. Zynyx Mktg. Commc'ns, Inc. and EcoVirux, LLC v. BioPledge, LLC: “clear and unambiguous words” best evidence of intent; extrinsic evidence may not be used to create ambiguity. This directly answered the Pearces’ SF Fire theory based on an “Article VI(c)” reference and SF Fire’s articles of incorporation.
  • Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and Royal Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Tr. Co.: reinforced whole-contract reading and (if ambiguity existed) extrinsic evidence only to clarify intent, not to vary terms.
  • People's Tr. Ins. Co. v. Amaro: invoked in the discussion rejecting the idea that a disputed sentence must be rendered “surplusage” to reject the Pearces’ interpretation.
  • Signature-block cases—Ross Oil Corp. v. Foshee, Tampa Bay Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Edman, and Lepisto v. Senior Lifestyle Newport Ltd.—were distinguished as not supporting the Pearces’ attempt to use a common officer’s signature to alter the clearly identified insurer.

D. Unjust enrichment: inequity must be independent of the contract obligation

  • Glob. Network Mgmt., LTD v. Centurylink Latin Am. Sols., LLC: framed unjust enrichment/quasi-contract as equitable gap-filling.
  • Diamond "S" Dev. Corp. v. Mercantile Bank and Agritrade, LP v. Quercia: confirmed the general rule barring unjust enrichment where an express contract between the parties covers the same subject matter, and highlighted the unsettled edge case—when the unjust enrichment defendant is a nonparty to the contract.
  • Doral Collision Ctr., Inc. v. Daimler Tr. and Variety Child.'s Hosp., Inc. v. Vigliotti: presented competing Florida signals on whether a contract bars unjust enrichment against nonparties; the panel avoided choosing sides.
  • Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols.: supplied the elements; the court held the Pearces failed the third element because the “inequity” was purely that the policy allegedly required a refund. Without a non-contractual inequity theory, the claim was insufficient.

E. CAFA jurisdiction: time-of-filing controls, unless the CAFA predicate was frivolous

  • Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.: recited CAFA’s core requirements (amount-in-controversy, numerosity, minimal diversity).
  • Wright Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Corp.: the controlling Eleventh Circuit authority. CAFA jurisdiction is assessed when the operative pleading is filed and is not destroyed by post-filing events (even events eliminating class claims). But Wright recognized an exception where CAFA allegations are frivolous or lack an expectation of certification, allowing a conclusion that jurisdiction never existed.
  • Out-of-circuit support: Metz v. Unizan Bank and Louisiana v. Am. Nat'l Prop. Cas. Co.: reinforced the time-of-filing approach and the broader consensus.

3.2. Legal Reasoning (What the Court Did, Step by Step)

  1. Apparent agency (SF Mutual): Applying Mobil Oil and Mobil Oil-consistent Florida doctrine, the court held that State Farm branding, generic “State Farm®” references, and a single SF Mutual copyright notice did not plausibly allege a principal’s representation of “substantial control.” The Pearces also failed to plead reliance and change of position tied to SF Mutual’s supposed representation.
  2. Insurer identity (SF Mutual and SF Fire): Reading the agreement “as a whole” per Anderson, the PAP booklet defined “we/us/our” as “the Company shown in the Declarations,” and the Renewal Certificate (treated by both sides as the Declarations) expressly named “State Farm Florida Insurance Company.” No other State Farm entity was named in operative policy text; the SF Mutual copyright line was not a reasonable basis to infer it was the contracting insurer. The SF Fire “Article VI(c)” extrinsic-evidence theory was rejected under Florida rules barring extrinsic evidence from creating ambiguity.
  3. Unjust enrichment (SF Mutual): Even assuming Florida law might permit unjust enrichment against a nonparty to the contract, the claim failed because “inequity” was asserted only derivatively from the contract’s alleged refund obligation, not from an independent equitable basis.
  4. CAFA jurisdiction (SF Florida): The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction after dismissing SF Mutual and SF Fire, reasoning minimal diversity no longer existed. The Eleventh Circuit held that approach conflicts with Wright Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Corp.: jurisdiction is pegged to filing of the operative complaint(s). On remand, the district court must (i) evaluate CAFA jurisdiction at filing for both the FAC and SAC, and (ii) determine whether the inclusion of SF Mutual/SF Fire was “frivolous or deficient under CAFA” such that jurisdiction never existed.

3.3. Impact (Why This Matters Going Forward)

  • CAFA practice in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision reinforces that district courts may not “recompute” CAFA jurisdiction after merits dismissals shrink the defendant set to nondiverse parties. Instead, they must anchor jurisdiction to filing and then confront the narrow “frivolous CAFA hook” exception identified in Wright. Practically, this can keep state-law, class-adjacent disputes in federal court even after early Rule 12 wins eliminate diverse defendants—unless those defendants were named in a manner the court finds frivolous for CAFA purposes.
  • Insurance corporate-family litigation: Plaintiffs seeking to sue parent/affiliate insurers will need more than: (i) shared branding; (ii) generic “State Farm®” references; (iii) copyrighted forms; or (iv) overlapping officers. The opinion signals that a declarations page that clearly names the insurer will usually be dispositive absent stronger indicia of representation/control and reliance.
  • Unjust enrichment pleading discipline: Where the alleged “unjustness” is simply “the contract required payment,” courts are likely to demand a distinct inequity theory (e.g., a benefit conferred outside the contract’s allocation, or misconduct creating an independent equitable duty), especially when the unjust enrichment defendant is not a contracting party.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CAFA “minimal diversity”: Unlike traditional diversity (all plaintiffs diverse from all defendants), CAFA requires only that any class member be diverse from any defendant. The dispute here was whether minimal diversity must still exist after certain defendants are dismissed; the court said “no,” because CAFA jurisdiction is assessed at filing unless the CAFA basis was frivolous.
  • “Time-of-filing” jurisdiction rule: Courts generally decide federal jurisdiction based on the facts as they existed when the operative complaint was filed. Later changes (like dismissing a party) ordinarily do not strip jurisdiction that properly attached at the start.
  • Apparent agency: A company can be bound by another’s acts if it held out that actor as its agent and a third party reasonably relied. Under Mobil Oil, seeing a logo or brand is usually not enough; the plaintiff must allege concrete “holding out” and reliance.
  • Declarations page in insurance policies: The declarations are the personalized page(s) naming the insured, insurer, coverage, premium, and policy period. When the policy text defines “Company” by reference to the declarations, that typically answers “who is the insurer.”
  • Unjust enrichment vs. breach of contract: Unjust enrichment is a fallback equitable theory used when no enforceable contract governs. If the only reason retention of money is “unjust” is that “the contract says refund it,” the claim is essentially contractual, not equitable.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit delivered two central lessons. First, on the merits, Florida contract interpretation principles will usually enforce a clear “Company shown in the Declarations” definition, and neither shared branding nor a copyright line plausibly transforms a parent/affiliate into a contracting insurer; likewise, apparent agency requires concrete representations of control plus pleaded reliance, not just logos. Second—and most consequential procedurally—the court clarified that CAFA jurisdiction is not undone merely because later rulings leave only nondiverse named parties; instead, courts must analyze jurisdiction as of filing and consider whether the initially named diverse defendants were included in a frivolous attempt to invoke CAFA before dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.