“By Means of Deceit” Includes Third-Party Deception Under Colorado’s Attempt-to-Influence Statute

Introduction

In Hupke v. People, 2026 CO 31, the Colorado Supreme Court resolved a question about the scope of Colorado’s crime of attempting to influence a public servant “by means of deceit,” section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2025). The petitioner, Michael Thomas Hupke, was convicted after recorded jail calls showed he instructed his mother to tell his parole officer a false story about his residence change to persuade the officer to lift a parole hold. Hupke argued the statute criminalizes only a defendant’s own direct deceit to a public servant—not the use of an intermediary.

The case thus presented a focused interpretive issue: does a defendant act “by means of deceit” when the deceit is communicated to the public servant through a third party at the defendant’s direction?

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the court of appeals and upheld Hupke’s conviction. It held that the phrase “by means of deceit” in section 18-8-306 is broad enough to include a defendant’s use of a third party to deceive a public servant. Applying that interpretation, the Court concluded the trial evidence—especially the recorded calls directing the false message and proof that the mother conveyed it—was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994)
    Role in Hupke: Janousek supplied both (a) the statute’s purpose—“to protect public servants from undue influence or intimidation by means of deceit”—and (b) a historically broad definition of “deceit” drawn from dictionary sources. The Court used Janousek to anchor its interpretive approach: “deceit” is not limited to a narrow subset of misrepresentations and can include “any trick” or “contrivance” designed to mislead.
  • McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, 442 P.3d 379
    Role in Hupke: McCoy provided the governing framework for statutory interpretation—de novo review, focus on legislative intent, and reliance on the statute’s plain language as the starting point.
  • People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 32, 549 P.3d 957
    Role in Hupke: Johnson reinforced that undefined statutory terms should be given their ordinary meaning based on common usage. This enabled the Court to consult modern dictionary definitions and compare them to the Janousek-era definitions.
  • In re People v. Beverly, 2025 CO 18, 568 P.3d 398
    Role in Hupke: Beverly supported the presumption that the legislature’s word choice is deliberate and made with knowledge of its effects—used here to reject Hupke’s policy-based narrowing argument about offense severity and felony classification.
  • Manjarrez v. People, 2020 CO 53, 465 P.3d 547; Butler v. People, 2019 CO 87, 450 P.3d 714
    Role in Hupke: These cases set the de novo standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence and the requirement to view evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
  • People v. Hupke, 2024 COA 73, 557 P.3d 816
    Role in Hupke: The Court affirmed the division’s conclusion that “by means of deceit” captures attempts to influence through deceptive misrepresentations designed to trick a public servant, including via an intermediary.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Text-first interpretation of “deceit.”
    Because section 18-8-306 does not define “deceit,” the Court treated the term as an ordinary-language concept. It emphasized the breadth of “deceit” as conduct “designed to deceive or trick,” citing both older definitions (as quoted in People v. Janousek) and modern dictionary definitions. The Court’s key move was to treat “deceit” as a functional category—anything intentionally calculated to induce a false belief—rather than a formal category limited to who physically utters the lie.
  2. Deceit can be accomplished through an intermediary.
    The Court rejected the premise that deceit must be “personal” to the defendant in the sense of direct communication. It reasoned that using a third party to convey false information is itself an “act designed to lead” the recipient to accept something untrue. The Court underscored that an intermediary can be an even more effective instrument of deception when the messenger appears more credible.
  3. “By means of deceit” describes the method of influence, not a standalone offense.
    A notable clarification is the Court’s emphasis that section 18-8-306 does not criminalize deceit in the abstract; it criminalizes attempts to influence a public servant where deceit is the “means.” On that logic, the deceit must be part of an effort capable of affecting the public servant’s decision-making. The Court illustrated the limit: if a defendant asks a third party to lie but the lie is never conveyed to the public servant, then section 18-8-306 is not satisfied (though other offenses like solicitation or conspiracy may be implicated “depending on the circumstances”).
  4. Policy/classification arguments cannot override plain statutory language.
    Hupke argued the legislature could not have intended such conduct to be punished as a class 4 felony given other class 4 felonies. The Court dismissed this as inconsistent with the statute’s language and purpose. It relied on the presumption (citing In re People v. Beverly) that the legislature deliberately chose broad language and, quoting People v. Janousek, emphasized the importance of protecting the integrity of public-servant decision-making where accurate information is paramount.
  5. Sufficiency application tightly tracks the elements.
    Applying Manjarrez v. People and Butler v. People, the Court held a reasonable juror could find: (a) the parole officer is a public servant; (b) Hupke intended to alter the parole officer’s action (lifting the hold); (c) he directed a deceptive message; and (d) the deceptive message was actually delivered. This last fact mattered because it connected the “means” (deceit) to the “end” (attempt to influence).

Impact

  • Expanded prosecutorial reach to indirect deception in influence cases.
    After Hupke, defendants cannot avoid section 18-8-306 liability simply by outsourcing the lie to a friend, family member, associate, or other messenger. The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant used deceit as the method of influence—directly or through an intermediary.
  • Clearer boundary between section 18-8-306 and inchoate offenses.
    The Court’s “message must reach the public servant” point provides a practical limiting principle. Cases where the deceptive plan remains uncommunicated may be charged differently (solicitation/conspiracy), reducing the risk that section 18-8-306 becomes a catchall for mere planning.
  • Increased relevance of recorded communications and instruction evidence.
    The opinion signals that proof of direction/control (e.g., recorded jail calls) plus proof of conveyance will commonly satisfy the statute’s “by means of deceit” requirement, even without defendant-to-official contact.
  • Institutional integrity rationale strengthened.
    By emphasizing the statute’s protective purpose, Hupke may encourage future courts to construe section 18-8-306 in a manner that safeguards the reliability of information public servants rely upon, particularly in high-stakes administrative decisions (parole, licensing, benefits, enforcement actions).

Complex Concepts Simplified

“By means of deceit”
This phrase identifies the method used to try to influence a public servant. After Hupke, the method includes using another person as the vehicle to deliver a deceptive message.
Deceit vs. a lie
A “lie” is a direct false statement. “Deceit” is broader: it covers acts designed to create a false belief, including indirect tricks and schemes—such as sending a credible messenger to deliver a false story.
Attempt to influence
The statute targets efforts intended to alter a public servant’s decision or action. The Court stressed that the deceit must actually be used as the means of influence—meaning, in practical terms, the deceptive information must reach the public servant.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Appellate courts do not re-try the case. They ask whether, viewing all evidence in the prosecution’s favor, a reasonable juror could find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

Hupke v. People establishes a clear rule for Colorado: “by means of deceit” in section 18-8-306 includes deception carried out through a third party at the defendant’s direction. The Court reached this result through plain-meaning interpretation, reliance on People v. Janousek’s broad conception of deceit, and a practical understanding of how influence is exerted in the real world. The decision strengthens the statute’s protective function—guarding public servants from manipulated information—while also clarifying a limiting principle: the deceit must actually be deployed to influence the public servant, not merely contemplated.