Burden-Shifting and Objective Harmless-Error Review for Extraneous Juror Information in Tennessee Civil Jury Trials

I. Introduction

In Kendall Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Periclis Roussis, M.D. (Tenn. July 31, 2026), the Supreme Court of Tennessee confronted a recurring modern problem: jurors’ access to information outside the courtroom—here, a product warning label—during deliberations in a civil jury trial.

The case arises from a healthcare liability action brought by Kendall Collier on behalf of her son, Chayce C. (the “Plaintiff”) against Periclis Roussis, M.D., Fort Sanders Perinatal Center, and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (collectively, the “Defendants”). A central trial issue was whether medical personnel negligently failed to administer epinephrine to treat Ms. Collier’s anaphylactic reaction during labor and whether that omission caused Chayce’s severe brain injuries.

After a defense verdict in the 2019 retrial, the Plaintiff learned that Juror 8 examined an EpiPen warning label at home during deliberations and shared its contents with other jurors. The Plaintiff sought a new trial, arguing the jury’s exposure to this outside information “tainted the verdict.” The trial court ultimately denied relief, applying a “clear and convincing evidence” approach focused on whether the Plaintiff proved the extraneous information actually affected the jury. The Court of Appeals reversed, applying a criminal-law-style presumption of prejudice and burden shifting. The Supreme Court granted review to articulate the proper civil standard where the constitutional right to jury trial is implicated.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tennessee Supreme Court held that when a civil verdict is challenged based on the jury’s exposure to material extraneous information, courts must apply a burden-shifting framework analogous to modern Tennessee criminal cases:

  1. Initial burden (challenger): The party challenging the verdict must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury was exposed to material extraneous information. If shown, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises.
  2. Rebuttal burden (defender): The party defending the verdict must rebut the presumption by demonstrating harmless error—i.e., there is no reasonable possibility that the information would have altered the verdict of a reasonable jury. This harmlessness inquiry is objective, not dependent on the subjective effect on the actual jurors.

Because the trial court did not have the benefit of this framework, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded to the trial court to apply the new analysis in the first instance.

Key doctrinal clarifications

  • Standard of proof to show exposure/error: preponderance, not “clear and convincing.” The Court expressly overruled contrary suggestions in Mayo v. Shine, Whiteside v. Hedge, and State v. Booker.
  • Harmlessness test: “no reasonable possibility” the extraneous information would change the verdict of a reasonable jury.
  • Objective inquiry required by Rule 606(b): The Court rejected any approach that depends on jurors testifying about subjective impact. To the extent State v. Adams (specifically its footnote suggesting consideration “in light of the specific jurors”) implied a subjective inquiry, it was overruled.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The constitutional foundation: impartial jury in civil and criminal cases

The Court rooted its new civil framework in the Tennessee Constitution’s jury-trial guarantees and the principle that jurors must decide cases based only on evidence admitted in open court.

  • State v. Smith (418 S.W.3d 38 (Tenn. 2013)) supplied the Court’s core articulation of an “unbiased and impartial jury”: one “influenced only by the competent evidence admitted during the trial.”
  • McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC (596 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2020)) and Ricketts v. Carter (918 S.W.2d 419 (Tenn. 1996)) confirmed that civil litigants who have the constitutional right to a jury trial likewise have the right to an unbiased and impartial jury.
  • Patterson v. Colorado (205 U.S. 454 (1907)) provided a canonical statement of the adversarial-system theory: conclusions must be induced by “evidence and argument in open court,” not outside influence.

2. Tennessee’s historical presumption of prejudice: early criminal and civil cases

The Court carefully traced Tennessee’s earlier, stricter approach—where material extraneous information led to a presumption of prejudice that effectively required a new trial. These cases supplied the historical pedigree for presuming prejudice, even though modern doctrine now allows rebuttal.

  • Sam v. State (31 Tenn. 61 (1851)), Nile v. State (79 Tenn. 694 (1883)), and Ryan v. State (36 S.W. 930 (Tenn. 1896)): each held the movant need not prove actual prejudice; it was enough that the party “may have been prejudiced,” and “the law will so presume.”
  • Wade v. Ordway (60 Tenn. 229 (1872)) applied the same principle in a civil case when a juror conducted a scene examination and reported back to other jurors. Importantly, Wade emphasized there was “no sound reason” to apply a different rule in civil cases than criminal ones, given shared concerns about tainted verdicts and public confidence.
  • Jackson & Suburban Street Railroad v. Simmons (64 S.W. 705 (Tenn. 1901)) continued the civil-line application, ordering a new trial where a juror injected settlement and prior-trial information into deliberations.

3. Modern criminal doctrine: rebuttable presumption and harmless-error rebuttal

To design a modern civil framework, the Court drew most directly from its modern criminal cases—where the presumption of prejudice is rebuttable. The structure and logic of the civil rule essentially mirrors these decisions.

  • State v. Blackwell (664 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. 1984)) was the pivot point: it adopted a burden-shifting approach influenced by Remmer v. United States (347 U.S. 227 (1954)). Once extraneous prejudicial information is shown, the burden shifts to the State to show “no prejudice.”
  • Walsh v. State (166 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2005)), State v. Adams (405 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2013)), and State v. Smith (418 S.W.3d 38 (Tenn. 2013)): each reaffirmed (i) a rebuttable presumption of prejudice and (ii) a harmlessness inquiry framed as whether there is a “reasonable possibility” the improper information/influence altered the verdict.

The Court also acknowledged federal confusion after Remmer v. United States due to Smith v. Phillips (455 U.S. 209 (1982)) and United States v. Olano (507 U.S. 725 (1993)), as described in United States v. Lawson (677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012)), but emphasized Tennessee’s criminal precedent has applied the burden-shifting approach consistently.

4. Rule 606(b) and the objective inquiry requirement

The Court’s move to an explicitly objective harmlessness inquiry was driven substantially by the constraints of Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b). Because jurors generally cannot testify about mental processes or the effect of information on their decisions, any standard requiring proof of subjective influence is often unworkable and doctrinally inconsistent.

  • The Court grounded Rule 606(b)’s structure historically in Tanner v. United States (483 U.S. 107 (1987)) and Mattox v. United States (146 U.S. 140 (1892)): jurors may testify to the existence of an “extraneous influence,” but not “how far that influence operated upon [the] mind.”
  • The Court quoted the “objective facts” framing from State v. Christensen (929 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 2019)) to emphasize the permitted scope: who said what, when, and what was introduced.
  • Consistent with this evidentiary boundary, the Court endorsed objective “reasonable jury” approaches cited from State v. Abdi (45 A.3d 29 (Vt. 2012)), Castaneda ex rel. Correll v. Pederson (518 N.W.2d 246 (Wis. 1994)), and Amphavannasouk v. Simoneau (861 A.2d 451 (R.I. 2004)).
  • The Court also relied on civil-case policy explanations for a presumption of prejudice where proving actual prejudice is practically impossible, citing Stallings v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc. (796 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)) and Barksdale v. Wilkowsky (20 A.3d 765 (Md. 2011)).

5. Civil harmless error: why adopt a heightened “no reasonable possibility” standard?

The Court confronted a known debate over whether civil harmless-error review should be less stringent than criminal harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt review, citing Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp. (720 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1983)) and State v. Atkins (261 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1979)) on one side, and McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co. (779 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1985)) and Special v. West Boca Med. Ctr. (160 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2014)) on the other.

It adopted the stricter approach for this category of civil jury-trial error because the error implicates the same foundational constitutional value: verdicts must be based on trial evidence, not outside materials. The Court also noted its prior general observation in State v. Rodriguez (254 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. 2008)) that harmless error doctrine “should operate the same way” in civil and criminal proceedings, and it cited Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad. (551 U.S. 291 (2007)) as an example of the U.S. Supreme Court applying a heightened harmless-error standard in a civil constitutional context.

6. Additional cited authorities shaping the Court’s framework

  • Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc. (570 S.W.3d 205 (Tenn. 2019)) was cited for de novo review of questions about legal standards.
  • Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc. (181 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2005)) was cited for the default civil burden of proof: preponderance of the evidence.
  • The Court referenced structural-error doctrine via Momon v. State (18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999)) and Arizona v. Fulminate (499 U.S. 279 (1991)), and contrasted with “discrete defects” using Greer v. United States (593 U.S. 503 (2021)) and Cottingham v. Cottingham (193 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. 2006)). It treated extraneous-juror-information error as non-structural constitutional error, citing United States v. Warner (498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007)) and Sherman v. Smith (89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
  • The Court discussed varying articulations of the harmlessness standard by referencing Chapman v. California (386 U.S. 18 (1967)), Fahy v. Connecticut (375 U.S. 85 (1963)), State v. Cecil (409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013)), State v. Valentine (911 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1995)), and State v. Brown (311 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2010)).
  • The Court noted a broad statement in State v. Bobo (814 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. 1991)), but explained later cases have subjected extraneous-information jury errors to harmless-error review.
  • For the remand posture after announcing a new framework, the Court cited First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A. (489 S.W.3d 369 (Tenn. 2015)).
  • The first trial’s appellate history (Collier v. Roussis) and the intermediate appellate decision under review (Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Roussis) frame the procedural path but did not control the Supreme Court’s doctrinal holding.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why a civil burden-shifting framework?

The Court’s reasoning proceeds from a constitutional and practical syllogism:

  • Constitutional premise: Where Article I, Section 6 guarantees a civil jury trial, it guarantees an unbiased, impartial jury that decides based only on trial evidence.
  • Practical premise: Rule 606(b) prevents litigants from proving subjective effect on jurors’ minds. A regime that requires the moving party to prove “prejudice” as actual influence would often be impossible to satisfy and would under-protect the constitutional right.
  • Doctrinal solution: Use a rebuttable presumption of prejudice after proof of exposure to material extraneous information, then require the verdict’s proponent to show harmlessness.

2. Clarifying “material extraneous information”

The Court separated “extraneous” (outside the trial record) from “material” (logically connected to disputed facts or legal issues). This matters because not every outside fact warrants a new trial; the threshold is exposure to information capable of jeopardizing impartial deliberation.

In this case, the EpiPen warning label information—concerning caution during pregnancy and balancing benefit versus fetal risk—was plainly directed to the trial’s central disputed issue: whether epinephrine should have been used in a pregnant patient’s anaphylaxis. The Court did not decide the ultimate harmlessness question; it created the analytic tool for the trial court to decide it.

3. Rejecting “clear and convincing” as the initial burden

The Court held the initial showing is governed by ordinary civil proof rules: preponderance of the evidence. It found no doctrinal support for imposing “clear and convincing” at the first stage and expressly overruled contrary intermediate appellate indications in Mayo v. Shine and Whiteside v. Hedge, and the criminal intermediate opinion State v. Booker, to the extent they suggested otherwise.

4. The harmlessness inquiry: “no reasonable possibility” and an objective “reasonable jury” lens

Once exposure to material extraneous information is shown, the verdict’s proponent must demonstrate harmlessness by showing no reasonable possibility the information would have altered the verdict of a reasonable jury. This approach accomplishes two things:

  • It respects Rule 606(b) by avoiding inquiry into jurors’ mental processes or subjective impact.
  • It provides a principled measure of prejudice aligned with constitutional protection of the jury-trial right.

5. Non-exclusive factors for trial courts

To guide trial courts on remand and in future cases, the Court listed non-exclusive considerations, including:

  • Nature/content of the information; the importance of the issue; whether cumulative; whether inflammatory.
  • Number of jurors exposed.
  • Manner and timing of exposure.
  • Extent of discussion in deliberations.
  • Strength of evidence supporting the verdict.

This multi-factor approach reflects the Court’s recognition that “harmlessness” is context-sensitive but must remain objective.

C. Impact

1. A unified modern rule for civil extraneous-information claims (where the constitutional jury right applies)

The most important practical effect is that Tennessee now has an explicit, Supreme-Court-endorsed civil test parallel to its modern criminal test: preponderance to show exposure to material extraneous information, presumed prejudice, and rebuttal by objective harmlessness (“no reasonable possibility”).

2. Lowering the challenger’s initial evidentiary barrier

By rejecting “clear and convincing evidence” as the initial requirement, the Court makes it more feasible for civil litigants to obtain meaningful review where juror misconduct introduces outside evidence. The ruling also curtails trial-court approaches that effectively demand the impossible: proof of subjective influence.

3. Re-centering Rule 606(b) as a constraint on what “prejudice” can mean

The opinion’s explicit embrace of an objective inquiry will reshape how motions for new trial are litigated: parties should expect courts to focus on (i) what the information was, (ii) how it entered deliberations, and (iii) whether a reasonable jury could have been affected, rather than trying to elicit jurors’ statements that “it affected me” or “it didn’t affect me”—testimony Rule 606(b) largely forbids.

4. Increased emphasis on record development and evidentiary hearings

Because the harmlessness determination turns on contextual factors (content, timing, discussion, exposure breadth, strength of evidence), parties will likely litigate these issues through admissible juror affidavits and, where appropriate, evidentiary hearings focused on “objective facts.” Trial courts will need to make clearer findings tied to the listed factors to support either granting or denying a new trial.

5. Doctrinal clean-up: overruling and narrowing prior language

The Court expressly overruled:

  • Mayo v. Shine, Whiteside v. Hedge, and State v. Booker, to the extent they suggested a clear-and-convincing standard applies to the initial showing.
  • Any suggestion (including in State v. Adams) that the harmlessness inquiry should be assessed “in light of the specific jurors” in a way that implies subjective-effect examination.

6. Open question expressly reserved

The Court confined its holding to a civil case “implicating the constitutional right to a jury trial” under Article I, Section 6 and left “for another day” whether the same framework applies where the right to jury trial is statutory or where the matter is inherently equitable (as discussed via Young v. City of LaFollette and Smith Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Extraneous information: Information that comes from outside the courtroom record—i.e., not introduced as evidence and not tested by cross-examination or the rules of evidence. Here: a juror reading an EpiPen warning label at home.
  • Material: Relevant in a meaningful way to an issue the jury must decide—connected to disputed facts or legal issues. A trivial outside fact (e.g., a weather report) is not “material” unless it bears on the case.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: “More likely than not.” The ordinary civil standard.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than preponderance, usually reserved for special categories (e.g., fraud, some termination of parental rights findings). The Court rejected using this higher standard for proving juror exposure to material extraneous information.
  • Rebuttable presumption of prejudice: Once the challenger proves exposure to material extraneous information, the law assumes prejudice unless the verdict’s proponent proves harmlessness.
  • Harmless error (here): The verdict stands only if there is no reasonable possibility that the extraneous information would have changed the verdict of a reasonable jury.
  • Objective vs. subjective inquiry: “Objective” asks what effect the information could have on a reasonable jury; “subjective” asks what it actually did to the jurors’ minds. Rule 606(b) largely blocks subjective inquiry.
  • Rule 606(b): An evidence rule limiting juror testimony to protect deliberations. Jurors can testify about whether outside information came in (objective facts), but not about how it influenced their votes (mental processes).

V. Conclusion

Kendall Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Periclis Roussis, M.D. establishes a definitive Tennessee framework for civil claims that jurors considered outside, case-related information during deliberations (at least where the constitutional right to jury trial applies). A challenger must prove by preponderance that the jury was exposed to material extraneous information, triggering a presumption of prejudice. The verdict’s proponent must then prove harmlessness by showing no reasonable possibility the information would have changed the verdict of a reasonable jury. The Court’s insistence on an objective analysis aligns the substantive standard with Rule 606(b)’s evidentiary limits and meaningfully strengthens protections against verdicts tainted by extra-record research—an increasingly common risk in contemporary jury trials.