Brown v. People (2026 CO 51): Strict-Liability Leaving-the-Scene Felonies and Habitual-Criminal Adjudications Sustained Under Harmless-Error Review

1. Introduction

In Brown v. People, 2026 CO 51, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed two recurring criminal-law questions: (1) whether Colorado’s leaving-the-scene offenses for accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury require proof of a culpable mental state; and (2) whether Colorado’s then-existing habitual criminal procedure was unconstitutional because it allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to make certain predicate factual findings that increase sentencing exposure.

The petitioner, Jason P. Brown, was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (“LTS (death)”) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury (“LTS (SBI)”) under section 42-4-1601, C.R.S., and was sentenced as a habitual criminal under section 18-1.3-801, C.R.S. (2017). Brown argued that People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006) (holding LTS offenses are strict liability) should be abandoned in light of Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) and later penalty enhancements. He also asserted that the habitual criminal adjudication violated jury-trial guarantees because the trial judge, not the jury, decided necessary facts.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Leaving the scene: The Court held Manzo remains good law. LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) under section 42-4-1601 do not require the prosecution to prove any culpable mental state; the crimes are treated as strict liability.
  • Habitual criminal scheme: Relying on People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57 and harmless-error principles in People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, the Court held the prior habitual offender scheme was not facially unconstitutional and that any jury-trial error in Brown’s habitual adjudication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming proof of distinct prior felony episodes and identity.
  • The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Instructional-error review and harmless error

The Court framed review of instructions and preserved constitutional error through a familiar chain of authority:

  • Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76: Jury instructions are reviewed de novo to ensure they correctly state governing law.
  • Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63: Preserved constitutional trial errors are reviewed for constitutional harmless error; reversal is required if there is a reasonable possibility the error contributed to the conviction, and the People bear the burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Stare decisis framework

  • Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20: The Court repeated its two-part test for overruling precedent: the prior rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound due to changing conditions, and more good than harm would result from departing.

C. Leaving-the-scene mens rea

  • People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006): The controlling Colorado precedent reaffirmed here; LTS offenses are strict liability notwithstanding the absence of an express mens rea in section 42-4-1601.
  • Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019): Brown’s key federal authority. The Court distinguished it as involving an express “knowingly” requirement and characterized its commentary on public-welfare offenses and “minor penalties” as nonbinding for Colorado’s interpretive question.
  • Colorado mens rea-all-elements authorities invoked in the Court’s discussion of why it would be awkward to imply knowledge only as to the “accident” element: § 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. (2025); People v. Coleby, 34 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2001); People v. Trevino, 826 P.2d 399 (Colo.App. 1991).
  • Legislative ratification / awareness presumptions supporting continued adherence to Manzo: Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001); People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1998).
  • The Court acknowledged other states have implied a knowledge requirement in similar statutes, citing State v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2007) and Clancy v. State, 313 P.3d 226 (Nev. 2013), but treated those authorities as policy considerations for the legislature rather than a basis to depart from Colorado’s statute as interpreted in Manzo.

D. Habitual criminal adjudication and jury factfinding

  • People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57: Central to the Court’s resolution. Gregg held the prior habitual scheme was not facially unconstitutional because it did not “explicitly prohibit” a jury from deciding whether prior convictions arose from “separate and distinct criminal episodes,” and it prescribed a procedure harmonizing jury findings with judicial entry of judgment.
  • People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M: Used to classify omission-of-element errors (including failure to submit sentencing factors/elements to a jury) as nonstructural and subject to harmless-error review.
  • Federal harmless-error authorities reinforcing Crabtree: Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
  • “Overwhelming evidence” harmlessness benchmark: Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1991).
  • Authentication and proof of prior convictions: Brown v. People, 238 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1951); § 18-1.3-802, C.R.S. (2025); CRE 901(b)(8).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the Court reaffirmed strict liability for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI)

The Court’s reasoning is fundamentally institutional and textual:

  1. Stare decisis controls absent strong cause. Applying Love v. Klosky, the Court found no “sound reasons” to undo Manzo.
  2. Rehaif does not compel a different result. The Court treated Rehaif as a statutory-application case about how a stated “knowingly” mens rea attaches to elements, not whether courts must infer mens rea into silent statutes. It further downplayed Rehaif’s discussion of public welfare offenses and penalty severity as not dispositive of Colorado legislative intent for section 42-4-1601.
  3. Legislative acceptance of Manzo. The Court emphasized that after Manzo the General Assembly repeatedly amended section 42-4-1601—including increasing penalties—without adding a mens rea requirement or disapproving Manzo, invoking Griego and Swain to presume legislative awareness and ratification.
  4. Policy alignment with the statutory objective. The Court read the post-Manzo penalty increases as reflecting a policy choice: eliminating incentives for intoxicated drivers to flee and “sober up,” thus preserving the ability to determine culpability and bring appropriate DUI-based vehicular offenses. On this view, importing a mental-state element risks reintroducing incentives to flee.
  5. All-elements mens rea principle. The Court rejected the alternative of implying “knowledge” only for the “accident” element, reasoning that under § 18-1-503(4) and cases like People v. Coleby, a prescribed mens rea generally applies to all material elements absent a clear contrary indication—supporting the Court’s choice to imply no mens rea rather than a partial one.

B. Why the Court upheld the habitual criminal adjudication

The Court separated the challenge into two questions: facial validity and case-specific remedy.

  1. Not facially unconstitutional under Gregg. Following People v. Gregg, the Court held the statutory text’s assignment of certain determinations to the judge did not necessarily foreclose a constitutionally compliant role for the jury on the “separate and distinct criminal episodes” fact.
  2. No structural error; harmlessness applies. Under People v. Crabtree, and consistent with Washington v. Recuenco and Neder v. United States, failing to submit an element/sentencing factor to the jury is not structural when the defendant had counsel and an impartial tribunal. Therefore, harmless-error analysis governs.
  3. Overwhelming evidence of identity and separateness. The People introduced certified case files (triple-certified in most instances) containing consistent identifying information (including fingerprints, ID numbers, photos, and biographical data). The conviction and sentencing dates across jurisdictions and years (1995–2008) were treated as indisputable proof the felonies arose from separate criminal episodes. Under Bartley v. People, any jury-trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

3.3. Impact

A. Leaving-the-scene prosecutions

  • Strict liability remains the rule in Colorado for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) as charged under section 42-4-1601, absent legislative amendment.
  • The decision makes it difficult for defendants to obtain relief based solely on the absence of an accident-awareness or “knowingly” element in jury instructions for these offenses, because the governing law does not require such an element.
  • The concurrence (Justice Samour) signals continued internal pressure on the doctrine, emphasizing due process concerns and out-of-state authority; future challenges may pivot to constitutional arguments or legislative advocacy rather than statutory interpretation alone.

B. Habitual criminal litigation and appellate remedies

  • The opinion entrenches a harmless-error pathway for cases where a judge, not a jury, made required habitual-criminal predicate findings (especially “separate episodes”), so long as the record evidence is overwhelming.
  • Prosecutors are incentivized to build a meticulous record of properly authenticated conviction packets and identity proof, because overwhelming documentation can defeat jury-trial claims on harmlessness grounds.
  • Defendants challenging habitual adjudications will likely focus on record weaknesses (identity disputes, episode separateness ambiguity, authentication defects) rather than facial invalidity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Strict liability: A crime that does not require proof of intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence regarding the prohibited elements. If the elements occurred, guilt follows even if the defendant lacked awareness.
  • Mens rea / culpable mental state: The mental state the prosecution must prove (e.g., “knowingly”). Many crimes require proof of both the act (actus reus) and a culpable mental state.
  • Stare decisis: The judicial practice of following prior decisions. Courts may overrule precedent only for strong reasons, balancing correctness, stability, and reliance.
  • Facial unconstitutionality: A claim that a statute is unconstitutional in all (or nearly all) applications, not just as applied to one defendant’s facts.
  • Structural error vs. harmless error: Structural errors are so fundamental they require automatic reversal. Most constitutional errors are not structural; appellate courts ask whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Habitual criminal adjudication (“separate and distinct criminal episodes”): Enhanced sentencing may depend not only on prior convictions, but also on whether those convictions came from different criminal incidents, not one continuous episode.
  • Triple-certified records: A method of authenticating out-of-court conviction documents through layered certifications and seals to establish they are true court records.

5. Conclusion

Brown v. People does not announce a novel doctrinal shift so much as it solidifies two lines of Colorado law: (1) People v. Manzo remains controlling, keeping LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) as strict-liability felonies without a culpable mental state requirement; and (2) Colorado’s prior habitual criminal procedure is not facially unconstitutional, and jury-trial defects in habitual adjudications will often be resolved through harmless-error analysis when documentary proof is overwhelming.

The majority opinion prioritizes legislative intent, statutory continuity, and stare decisis; the concurrence underscores perceived due process risk and national divergence. Practically, unless the General Assembly amends section 42-4-1601, Colorado courts will continue to permit leaving-the-scene convictions without proof that a defendant acted “knowingly,” while habitual-criminal challenges will hinge increasingly on the strength (or weakness) of the record rather than on facial constitutional theories.