Brown Does Not Displace Somers: Florida Aggravated Assault Remains an ACCA Elements-Clause Predicate Regardless of Conviction Date

Case: United States v. Whitfield Leland, III (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (Not for Publication)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Posture: Sentencing appeal challenging ACCA enhancement based on Florida aggravated assault.

1. Introduction

In United States v. Whitfield Leland, III, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 264-month sentence imposed after Mr. Leland pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The sentence turned on whether the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), applied—specifically, whether a 2011 Florida conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualified as an ACCA “violent felony” predicate.

The key legal issue was not merely whether Florida aggravated assault is a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), but whether intervening Supreme Court guidance in Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024), altered the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier, binding conclusion in Somers v. United States, 66 F.4th 890 (11th Cir. 2023), that Florida aggravated assault categorically qualifies.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed. Applying de novo review, it held that Mr. Leland’s argument was foreclosed by Somers v. United States, which relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s definitive interpretation of Florida assault’s mens rea. The panel rejected Mr. Leland’s attempt to use Brown v. United States to undermine Somers, concluding that Brown (a drug-schedule matching case involving legislative amendment) did not abrogate Somers (a violent-felony case relying on judicial statutory interpretation), especially where the relevant Florida statutory text had not changed between 2011 and 2025.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Deshazior, 882 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2018)
    Cited for the standard of review: whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate is reviewed de novo. This framing matters because it places the appellate court in full control of the legal classification question, rather than deferring to the district court.
  • Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)
    Supplies the governing elements-clause methodology and mens rea limitation. The panel restated Borden’s categorical approach and the rule that offenses that can be committed with mere recklessness do not qualify under the ACCA elements clause. Mr. Leland’s challenge implicitly depended on the possibility that Florida assault/aggravated assault could be committed recklessly.
  • Somers v. United States, 66 F.4th 890 (11th Cir. 2023)
    The controlling circuit precedent. Somers held that Florida aggravated assault “categorically qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA’s elements clause” because Florida assault requires at least knowing conduct and therefore cannot be committed recklessly. The Leland panel treated Somers as dispositive and emphasized that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation described what Florida’s statute has “always meant,” so the holding applies even to older convictions.
  • Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887 (Fla. 2022)
    The state-law foundation for the federal categorical analysis. The Florida Supreme Court clarified that Florida assault requires an “intentional, unlawful threat” and thus a mens rea of at least knowing conduct, precluding recklessness. The Eleventh Circuit relied on this authoritative construction to satisfy Borden’s mens rea requirement for ACCA elements-clause predicates.
  • Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024)
    Mr. Leland invoked Brown to argue for a “backward-looking” approach that would block applying Somers to his 2011 conviction. The panel rejected this extension: Brown addressed ACCA “serious drug offense” matching and how to handle later legislative amendments to drug schedules—not violent felonies, not § 924(e)(2)(B), and not the effect of a state supreme court’s judicial interpretation of unchanged statutory text.
  • United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: a later panel remains bound by circuit precedent unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court, or undermined to the point of abrogation. This principle provided the formal doctrinal “lock” that kept Somers controlling absent a truly on-point Supreme Court decision.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning proceeds in a structured ACCA elements-clause analysis:

  1. Identify the relevant ACCA clause and method.
    The court focused on the ACCA “elements clause,” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and reiterated the categorical approach from Borden v. United States: the question is whether the state offense’s least culpable conduct necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
  2. Apply the mens rea constraint from Borden.
    The panel emphasized that, under Borden, an offense that can be committed recklessly cannot qualify as an ACCA elements-clause predicate. Thus, the key sub-issue for Florida aggravated assault is whether Florida assault can be committed with recklessness.
  3. Use authoritative state-law interpretation to fix the elements.
    Florida defines assault as an “intentional, unlawful threat” to do violence, with apparent ability, and an act creating well-founded fear of imminent violence. Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1). Aggravated assault is an assault with a deadly weapon (without intent to kill) or with intent to commit a felony. Fla. Stat. § 784.021(1). Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s construction (as used in Somers), the panel treated the mens rea as at least knowing—so Florida assault/aggravated assault cannot be recklessly committed, satisfying Borden.
  4. Reject Brown as non-abrogating and distinguish its logic.
    The court gave two main distinctions:
    • Subject-matter distinction: Brown v. United States dealt with ACCA “serious drug offense” matching and did not address “violent felony” analysis under § 924(e)(2)(B).
    • Change-source distinction: Brown addressed how to treat later legislative amendments to drug schedules; Leland concerns a state supreme court’s judicial interpretation of statutory text that remained unchanged from 2011 through 2025. Because the statute’s language did not change, there was no “later amendment” problem for Brown’s backward-looking rule to solve.
    In short, the panel treated Somers as unaffected: Florida aggravated assault “always” required at least knowing conduct, and therefore always met the federal elements-clause requirement as construed in Borden.
  5. Apply the prior-panel-precedent rule.
    Even if Mr. Leland believed Somers was wrongly decided, United States v. Dubois required adherence absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation. The panel found no such abrogation.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision illustrates—and reinforces—the Eleventh Circuit’s operational approach to ACCA predicate litigation after Borden and after Brown:

  • Stability of Somers for Florida aggravated assault.
    Defendants in the Eleventh Circuit remain foreclosed from arguing that Florida aggravated assault is not an ACCA elements-clause predicate on the theory that it can be committed recklessly, or on the theory that Brown changes the temporal analysis for violent-felony predicates.
  • Confinement of Brown to its context.
    The panel signaled a narrow reading of Brown v. United States: it is treated as a drug-schedule/amendment case, not a general instruction that older convictions cannot be evaluated using later state-court clarifications of unchanged statutes.
  • Emphasis on “unchanged text” and “always meant.”
    The opinion underscores a practical dividing line: where a statute’s text remains the same, a state supreme court’s later interpretation is treated as describing the statute’s meaning at the time of the conviction. That approach strengthens reliance on state-court interpretations for federal categorical analysis, particularly for mens rea questions after Borden.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • ACCA enhancement (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)): A federal law that increases the penalty for certain firearm offenders who have three prior convictions for qualifying crimes (“violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses”) committed on different occasions. It includes a 15-year mandatory minimum for qualifying defendants.
  • Elements clause (§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)): One way a prior conviction can count as a “violent felony”—if the offense’s legal elements require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person.
  • Categorical approach: Courts look to the statutory elements of the prior offense (the minimum conduct criminalized), not to what the defendant actually did in the earlier case.
  • Mens rea (mental state): The level of intent required by a crime. After Borden v. United States, crimes that can be committed with mere recklessness do not qualify under the ACCA elements clause.
  • Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, later panels must follow earlier panel decisions unless the court sits en banc or the Supreme Court effectively overrules/abrogates the earlier decision.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Whitfield Leland, III reaffirms that, in the Eleventh Circuit, Florida aggravated assault with a deadly weapon remains an ACCA “violent felony” under the elements clause because Florida assault requires at least knowing conduct and cannot be committed recklessly, as explained in Somers v. United States. The decision also rejects the argument that Brown v. United States alters that analysis, distinguishing Brown as a drug-schedule matching case focused on legislative amendments rather than judicial interpretation of unchanged statutes. The central takeaway is doctrinal continuity: absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation, Somers controls, and Brown does not provide a pathway to relitigate Florida aggravated assault’s ACCA status.

Note: The opinion is designated “Not for Publication,” which generally limits its precedential force. Nonetheless, it provides a clear window into how the Eleventh Circuit is applying Somers, Borden, and Brown in ACCA sentencing disputes.