Broad “Common Nexus” Related-Claims Rule: Multi-Claimant Harassment Suits Deemed First Made When the Earliest Related Claim Was Noticed

1. Introduction

In Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v Giorgio Armani Corp. (2025 NY Slip Op 01335), the Appellate Division, First Department confronted a frequent “claims-made” coverage dispute: when multiple lawsuits allege misconduct by the same employee and a common failure by the employer to respond, are later suits “related” (or “interrelated”) such that they are treated as a single claim first made at the time of the earliest suit?

The insured, Giorgio Armani Corporation (GAC), faced three Washington actions alleging sexual harassment and assault by employee Javier Herrera and alleging that GAC failed to deter, investigate, or discipline him. Two insurers issued consecutive policies: Hiscox Insurance Company (earlier period) and Zurich American Insurance Company (ZAI) (later period). The coverage fight centered on whether the third-filed case, Christin v Herrera, was “related” to the earlier cases and therefore deemed made during the earlier Hiscox policy period (and outside ZAI’s period).

The key issue: how broadly courts should read “Related Wrongful Act(s)” and “Interrelated Wrongful Acts” language and whether “relatedness” requires the same claimant(s) or a single discrete “occurrence.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Department reversed Supreme Court. It held that, under the specific wording of both policies, the Christin action shared a sufficiently broad “common nexus or nucleus of facts” with the earlier actions—particularly Oberloh v Giorgio Armani, Corp.—so that Christin was deemed first made no later than the filing of Oberloh. As a result, coverage attached under the Hiscox policy (the earlier policy), and Zurich was entitled to summary judgment.

The court rejected Supreme Court’s reliance on Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., emphasizing that Diocese of Brooklyn analyzed “occurrence” aggregation, not the contractually defined “related”/“interrelated” claims standards.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. (21 NY3d 139 [2013])

Supreme Court treated Diocese of Brooklyn as controlling, but the First Department distinguished it. Diocese of Brooklyn asked whether separate acts constituted a single “occurrence” for coverage purposes—an inquiry typically associated with occurrence-based policies and aggregation of events.

Here, the governing question was different: whether later claims were “Related Wrongful Act(s)” or “Interrelated Wrongful Acts” under the policies’ claims-made frameworks. The First Department thus treated Diocese of Brooklyn as an inapt analytical lens where the policy uses expressly broader “relatedness” language.

2) Nomura Holding Am., Inc. v Federal Ins. Co. (629 Fed Appx 38, 40 [2d Cir 2015])

The court relied on Nomura Holding for the principle that “relatedness” disputes are highly text-dependent: courts must focus on the precise wording of the particular policy definitions and deeming provisions rather than importing tests from other contexts (like “occurrence” jurisprudence).

This citation supports the opinion’s core method: the result flows from the breadth of the contracts’ “common nexus” definitions.

3) Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 (715 F3d 1231,1239 [10th Cir 2013])

The First Department adopted Brecek & Young as persuasive authority for reading broad related-claims language according to its plain meaning and not “narrowly at the expense of applying its plain language.”

The cited reasoning reinforces that “common nexus” clauses are intentionally expansive—designed to treat factually connected disputes as one claim for timing and limits purposes.

4) Natural Organics, Inc. v OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. (102 AD3d 756, 759 [2d Dept 2013], lv dismissed 22 NY3d 989 [2013])

Natural Organics supplied a New York articulation of the phrase “arising out of”: it means “originating from, incident to, or having connection with,” and requires only “some causal relationship.”

The First Department used this standard to connect the later plaintiffs’ injuries to the employer’s alleged earlier failure to act. In other words, it was enough that Christin plausibly “originated from” and was “connected with” the earlier alleged misconduct and GAC’s alleged responses (including transfer decisions).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The contract language set a deliberately broad relatedness test

The court began by anchoring analysis in the policies’ definitions:

  • Hiscox deemed later claims made when the first claim was noticed if they allege any “Related Wrongful Act”, defined to include acts that are “the same, repeated or continuous,” or that “arise from a common causal connection or cause the same or related damages,” or share “a common nexus or nucleus of facts.” The policy expressly contemplated related claims “regardless of whether such Claims involve the same or different claimants.”
  • ZAI treated as one claim all claims arising out of the same wrongful act and all “Interrelated Wrongful Acts”, defined as wrongful acts with “a common nexus” of “any fact, circumstance, situation, event, transaction, cause or series of causally connected” items, and deemed such a claim first made on the date of the earliest such claim.

With those definitions, the “relatedness” inquiry was not limited to whether each plaintiff suffered the same harm or whether the acts formed a single “occurrence.” The policies instead asked whether there was a sufficiently connected factual and causal thread.

2) Same employee misconduct + same employer non-response created a “common nexus” across suits

The court identified overlapping allegations tying Christin to the earlier actions, especially Oberloh:

  • Oberloh alleged she learned Herrera was sexually harassing women, reported it, GAC knew women felt unsafe, and GAC did nothing; the women allegedly quit.
  • Christin repeated and expanded those allegations, including that two of the women connected to Oberloh were plaintiffs in Christin, and that GAC’s response included transferring Herrera, enabling further abuse at another store.
  • All three complaints included the allegation that Herrera sexually assaulted Loreto-Hays and that GAC did nothing and knew or should have known he posed a risk to others.

On these pleadings and record references (including deposition confirmation), the First Department found a shared “nucleus of facts” sufficient to meet both policies’ broad nexus definitions.

3) The court treated “common facts” and “common causation” as disjunctive pathways

A notable interpretive move was the court’s emphasis that the policy phrasing presented “common facts and common causation” in the disjunctive. That is, the policies did not require a strict single-cause model; it was enough that the later injuries were alleged to be connected to and to “aris[e] from” the earlier factual nucleus (including earlier complaints and alleged inaction/transfer).

4) Resulting timing consequence: deemed first made by the earlier-filed case

Because Christin was related/interrelated, it was deemed first made no later than the filing of Oberloh. That timing determination pushed the claim into the earlier Hiscox policy period (and, correspondingly, outside ZAI’s later policy period). Thus, the court held it “is thus covered by the Hiscox policy,” reversed Supreme Court, denied Hiscox’s cross-motion, and granted Zurich’s motion.

C. Impact

1) Strengthening a text-driven, broad related-claims approach in claims-made coverage

The decision underscores that New York courts—at least where policy language is as expansive as “common nexus or nucleus of facts”— may aggregate multi-claimant employment misconduct suits across time and venues, even where plaintiffs differ, so long as pleadings share meaningful factual overlap (employee actor, reported misconduct, employer knowledge, and alleged systemic failure to respond).

2) Limiting “occurrence” analogies in related-claims disputes

By explicitly rejecting the trial court’s reliance on Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., the First Department signaled that “occurrence” aggregation doctrines should not be used as a shortcut when the policy’s operative test is “related”/“interrelated” as contractually defined.

3) Practical consequences for insureds and insurers

  • Notice strategy matters: early notice of an initial claim may effectively lock later suits into the earliest policy period if they share a broad factual nexus.
  • Risk of “relation back” cutting off later coverage: insureds may discover that later suits filed in a later policy period do not trigger that later policy if the later policy deems interrelated claims first made earlier.
  • Drafting leverage: insurers seeking narrower aggregation can tighten “common nexus” language; insureds may negotiate to limit relation-back to “same claimant” or to require a tighter causal connection. This case shows that broad nexus wording will be enforced as written.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Claims-made policy: generally covers claims first made (and often reported) during the policy period. If a later claim is deemed “first made” earlier because it is related, it may fall outside the later policy.
  • Related/Interrelated Wrongful Acts: contractual devices that treat multiple lawsuits as one claim when they share enough connecting facts or causes. Here, “common nexus” and “nucleus of facts” are intentionally broad connectors.
  • “Arising out of”: in New York insurance law, typically means “connected with” and requires only some causal relationship, not proximate cause in a tort sense.
  • Occurrence (as contrasted here): a concept often used in occurrence-based policies to determine whether multiple incidents count as one event. The court stressed that this case turns on “relatedness” language, not “occurrence” analysis.
  • Declaratory relief: a court ruling that determines parties’ rights and obligations (here, which insurer must provide coverage).

5. Conclusion

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v Giorgio Armani Corp. establishes a clear, text-centered rule for New York related-claims disputes: when a policy defines relatedness broadly through “common nexus” or “nucleus of facts” language—and does not require the same claimant— courts will aggregate later lawsuits with earlier ones if the pleadings share substantial factual overlap and an alleged causal connection (including employer knowledge and failure to act).

The decision’s broader significance lies in its insistence on separating “occurrence” doctrine from “related claims” doctrine and in its practical message to coverage litigants: in claims-made policies, the definitions control, and broad relation-back clauses can decisively shift coverage responsibility to the earliest triggered policy.