Broad Anti-Stacking Language Bars Multi-Vehicle Stacking and Carries Through Follow-Form Umbrella UM/UIM Coverage

Introduction

In Ronald Saslow and Ellen Saslow v. Bankers Standard Insurance (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decided May 28, 2026), the Seventh Circuit addressed whether insureds may “stack” (aggregate) policy limits across multiple covered vehicles and across a follow-form umbrella policy after a single auto accident. The plaintiffs, Ronald and Ellen Saslow, sought additional payments for (i) medical payments coverage and (ii) uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits, arguing that separate premiums for five vehicles, repeated limit entries on the declarations pages, and multiple insured persons permitted stacking. They also sought statutory fees and penalties for delayed payment under 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/155.

The key issues were (1) whether the auto policy’s and umbrella policy’s language unambiguously prohibited stacking, (2) whether the “other insurance” provision or alleged multiple tortfeasors created additional UM/UIM exposure, and (3) whether payment delay was “vexatious and unreasonable” under § 5/155.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Bankers Standard. The court held:

  • The auto policy’s medical payments and UM/UIM limits were subject to unambiguous “most we’ll pay” language “no matter how many people or vehicles were involved,” reinforced by an “other insurance” clause—therefore, no stacking.
  • The follow-form umbrella UM/UIM coverage was also capped at $1 million “per occurrence,” payable “regardless of the number of insured persons, claims made, persons injured, locations insured, or vehicles… involved,” likewise barring stacking.
  • Arguments based on a rental car and the “other insurance” clause failed because the other vehicle was not underinsured relative to the auto policy’s UM/UIM limit.
  • The “multiple tortfeasors” theory was waived as underdeveloped and unsupported by record citation.
  • A two-month delay caused by repeated failed payment attempts was not “vexatious and unreasonable” under § 5/155, so no fees or penalties.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Contract interpretation and ambiguity under Illinois law

  • Thounsavath v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.: Cited for the core Illinois principle that insurance policies are construed under general contract rules and enforced as written if unambiguous. This supplied the framework for rejecting stacking once the court found the operative limit language clear.
  • Kuhn v. Owners Ins. Co.: Used both for the ambiguity standard (“susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”) and, critically, for how Illinois courts treat anti-stacking provisions and repeated limits on declarations pages. Kuhn supported two key moves: (i) broad anti-stacking clauses can be effective without enumerating every stacking theory, and (ii) repeated listing of limits is not a per se ambiguity.
  • Hess v. Est. of Klamm: Cited to rebut the inference that repeated listing of limits implies stacking. The Seventh Circuit adopted Hess’s practical explanation: restating limits across pages may simply reflect formatting constraints rather than an intent to multiply coverage.

2) Anti-stacking clauses and “most we’ll pay” language

  • Polk v. Progressive N. Ins. Co.: Provided (a) the de novo review posture for summary judgment and (b) a substantive comparator for “similar anti-stacking language.” Polk reinforced the conclusion that “most we’ll pay” per occurrence language is ordinarily decisive against stacking.
  • Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co.: The court relied on Hobbs to reject the insureds’ argument that anti-stacking clauses must specifically list each possible basis for stacking (premiums, vehicles, persons, declarations entries). Hobbs was treated as endorsing the sufficiency of broad limitations even when they do not itemize “the facts of the case.”
  • Willison v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co.: Cited as additional Illinois authority approving broad anti-stacking clauses without factor-by-factor prohibitions, supporting the court’s conclusion that the Saslows’ pro-stacking reading was not “reasonable” under Illinois ambiguity doctrine.

3) Umbrella coverage characterization

  • Premcor USA, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co.: Cited to explain the general function of umbrella policies as excess coverage. This contextualized why the umbrella policy’s limit language (“per occurrence,” regardless of number of vehicles/persons) matters: the umbrella is not a separate opportunity to multiply limits but an additional layer subject to its own cap as written—especially where it is follow-form.

4) Waiver and appellate presentation

  • United States v. McGhee: Cited for the Seventh Circuit’s rule that perfunctory, underdeveloped arguments unsupported by record evidence and authority are waived, which disposed of the “driver and employer both uninsured tortfeasors” theory.

5) Illinois § 5/155 (vexatious and unreasonable conduct)

  • Cramer v. Ins. Exch. Agency: Cited for the proposition that § 5/155 supplies an extracontractual remedy for “vexatious and unreasonable” insurer misconduct. It framed the Saslows’ request for fees/penalties as distinct from the contract claim.
  • Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.: Cited for the requirement that fees are appropriate only when the insurer’s behavior is willful and without reasonable cause. This supported affirmance where the record showed attempted payment rather than obstruction.
  • Goldstein v. Fid. and Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc.: Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard of review on the § 5/155 determination, making reversal difficult absent a clear error in the district court’s assessment of the insurer’s conduct.

6) Federal diversity choice-of-law and interpretive posture

  • Rahimzadeh v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.: Cited for the proposition that, in this diversity case, the Seventh Circuit applies state law (Illinois) to interpret the policy. This ensured the analysis tracked Illinois insurance-contract doctrine rather than a free-floating federal common law approach.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Start with the policy’s limit structure and definitions. The auto policy defined “coverage limit” as “the most we’ll pay,” and “occurrence” as the accident causing bodily injury/property damage/loss. That definition anchored the “unit of payment” to the accident, not to the number of covered autos, premiums, pages, or insureds.
  2. Apply the medical payments and UM/UIM “most we’ll pay” clauses. The policy stated Bankers Standard would pay up to the limit and that it was the most it would pay “no matter how many people or vehicles were involved.” The court treated this as an unambiguous anti-stacking directive because it directly foreclosed multiplying the limit based on the presence of multiple vehicles or persons.
  3. Use the “other insurance” clause as reinforcement. The auto policy further provided that recovery “may equal but not exceed the higher of the applicable limit for any one vehicle under this insurance or any other insurance.” The court read this as an explicit ceiling: even if multiple coverages might be implicated, the insured cannot exceed the highest single applicable limit.
  4. Reject ambiguity arguments based on premiums and repeated declarations entries. The Saslows emphasized that they paid separate premiums per vehicle and that limits appeared on multiple pages. The court held those facts do not create ambiguity where the operative limit language is clear; repeated limits can be formatting, and Illinois law does not impose a “bright-line rule” that multiple listings equal ambiguity.
  5. Carry the anti-stacking conclusion into the umbrella policy—on its own terms. The umbrella policy set a $1 million UM/UIM limit “per occurrence” and specified that it was the most payable regardless of number of insured persons, claims, injuries, locations, or vehicles involved. This broad phrasing independently barred stacking, and the umbrella being follow-form eliminated any argument that differing underlying definitions created a stacking opening.
  6. Dispose of ancillary recovery theories. The rental car/“other insurance” argument failed because the other vehicle was not underinsured relative to the relevant UM/UIM limit. The multiple tortfeasor theory was waived for lack of developed argument and record support.
  7. Deny § 5/155 relief for delay absent willful, unreasonable conduct. Even though the policy required payment within 60 days of proof of loss and payment was about two months late, the record showed repeated attempts to issue payment (with reissued checks), not deliberate “slow walking.” Under deferential review, the district court’s finding of mistake rather than vexatiousness stood.

Impact

  • Strengthens enforceability of broad anti-stacking drafting in Illinois-governed policies. The opinion signals that insurers need not enumerate every possible stacking rationale (premiums paid, number of cars, number of insureds, declarations repetition) if the policy clearly ties “the most we’ll pay” to an “occurrence” and includes inclusive “regardless/no matter how many” phrasing.
  • Limits “declarations-page ambiguity” arguments. By crediting the formatting explanation and relying on Illinois precedent rejecting a bright-line ambiguity rule, the decision reduces the utility of arguing that repeated limits, without more, create multiple available limits.
  • Confirms umbrella UM/UIM caps where “per occurrence” is paired with expansive anti-stacking language. For follow-form umbrellas, insureds will face a high bar to stack umbrella UM/UIM limits across vehicles or insureds when the umbrella contains its own “regardless of number of vehicles/persons” limitation.
  • Sets a pragmatic bar for § 5/155 claims based on payment-processing delays. The opinion suggests that delay alone—where the insurer is attempting to pay and the record lacks evidence of obstruction—will often be insufficient for “vexatious and unreasonable” findings, particularly under abuse-of-discretion review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Stacking: combining multiple coverage limits (often across multiple vehicles on one policy) to increase the maximum payout for a single accident.
  • UM/UIM coverage: insurance that pays the insured when the at-fault driver has no insurance (uninsured) or not enough insurance (underinsured) to cover the insured’s damages, up to the policy’s limit.
  • Medical payments coverage: first-party coverage that pays medical expenses for the insured (and sometimes passengers) regardless of fault, up to a stated limit.
  • Per occurrence: a cap measured per accident/event, not per vehicle, per person, or per premium line item.
  • Follow form umbrella: an umbrella policy that adopts the definitions/terms/conditions of the underlying policy, so coverage interpretation often tracks the underlying form unless the umbrella expressly differs.
  • Other insurance clause: a provision coordinating how coverage applies when multiple policies could respond; here, it also functioned as a ceiling preventing recovery above the highest single applicable limit.
  • 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/155 (“vexatious and unreasonable”): a statute allowing attorney’s fees/costs (and other relief) when an insurer’s claim-handling is not merely wrong or slow, but unreasonably and willfully misconducted.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision cements a clear Illinois-law takeaway: when an auto policy and follow-form umbrella policy define limits as “the most we’ll pay” per “occurrence,” and state that the cap applies “no matter how many” vehicles or insureds are involved (or “regardless of the number” of such factors), courts will enforce those provisions to bar stacking—even if multiple vehicles are listed, separate premiums are paid, and limits appear on more than one declarations page. The opinion also underscores two practical litigation points: underdeveloped tortfeasor theories risk waiver on appeal, and § 5/155 relief generally demands evidence of willful, unreasonable claim handling beyond mere administrative payment delay.