Borrowed-Servant Immunity Under Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act Requires a Jury When Evidence of Control Is Conflicting in Federal Task-Force Operations

I. Introduction

Case: Michael Trently v. United States of America (Third Circuit, June 23, 2026) (Not Precedential).
Parties: Michael Trently (and derivative claim by his wife, Amy Trently) vs. the United States (after substitution under the FTCA) and the City of Scranton (dismissed as not the proper FTCA party).
Context: Trently, a Pennsylvania parole agent, was also deputized as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal and served on a USMS-directed fugitive task force pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). He was injured during an attempted arrest when the driver—Scranton police officer Hegedus—drove close to the suspect’s car and Trently’s opened door struck the vehicle and injured him.

Key issue on appeal: Whether the United States was entitled to immunity from suit under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision, 77 Pa. Stat. § 481(a), by establishing—via the “borrowed servant” doctrine—that the USMS was Trently’s employer (for workers’ compensation exclusivity purposes) at the time of injury.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment for the Government and remanded. The District Court had concluded that, under Pennsylvania’s borrowed-servant doctrine, Trently was effectively a USMS employee during the task-force operation, making the Government immune under § 481(a). The Third Circuit held that the record contained conflicting evidence about which entity had the right to control the manner of Trently’s work during task-force operations. Because “different inferences” could be drawn, the question of control was for a jury, not resolution on summary judgment.

The panel emphasized that although USMS documents (MOU, oath, SOPs, supervision) showed significant federal direction, evidence also supported an inference that the Pennsylvania Board retained substantial control (training, equipment, discipline/removal authority, parent-agency policy supremacy in conflicts, and SOP provisions requiring adherence to Board rules). This evidentiary conflict precluded summary judgment.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The controlling Pennsylvania test: “right of control”

The court applied the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s formulation in JFC Temps, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 680 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa. 1996): the “ultimate test” is whether the putative borrowing employer had “the right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.” This case framed the analysis as one of control over the manner of performance, not merely general coordination or the existence of a joint enterprise.

2. Jury question when inferences differ

Relying on McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243, 245-46 (Pa. 1949), the panel reiterated: “When different inferences can fairly be drawn from the evidence as to who is the controlling master ... it is for the jury, not the court, to determine the question of agency.” This principle did the heavy lifting: the Third Circuit did not decide who controlled Trently; it decided only that the evidence permitted competing inferences.

3. “Labels don’t control”—but facts may corroborate them

The District Court had discounted text stating that deputization “does not constitute employment” and MOU language that each agency “retains responsibility for the conduct of its personnel,” treating them as non-dispositive labels. The Third Circuit accepted that general point (citing Burrell v. Streamlight, Inc., 222 A.3d 1137, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)), but held that these provisions could not be dismissed when coupled with concrete evidence of retained state control (training, equipment, supervision, and operational policy constraints).

4. Conflicting evidence precludes summary judgment

The panel’s approach aligns with Pennsylvania intermediate appellate decisions holding that disputed control evidence defeats summary judgment, including:

  • Gardner v. MIA Prods. Co., 189 A.3d 441, 445-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (conflicting evidence regarding control precluded summary judgment).
  • Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 972-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (same).

5. Third Circuit and Commonwealth Court guidance on indicia of control

The court also drew support from:

  • Williams v. Delta Truck Body Co., 892 F.2d 327, 330-31 (3d Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment where factual dispute existed regarding which employer provided specialized training—an important control indicator).
  • City of Monessen v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 387 A.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (off-duty officer directing traffic remained city’s employee where city retained control, officer used city equipment and uniform, and the work furthered city interests).
  • Canot v. City of Easton, 37 A.3d 53, 63-64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (affirming summary judgment for borrowed-employee status where the second employer supplied tools and the agreement gave “full responsibility and control” over the worksite—used here as a contrast).

The opinion’s comparative use of these cases underscores that equipment, training, and workplace authority can be decisive, and that contractual “full control” language can support summary judgment only when the operative facts are not materially contested.

6. Multijurisdictional task-force analogy (out-of-state)

The court cited Garden City v. Herrera, 766 S.E.2d 150, 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) to illustrate a scenario where a task-force agreement explicitly required the city to relinquish all command authority, creating clearer borrowed-servant control by the task force. The Third Circuit treated that fact pattern as notably stronger than the MOU here, which preserved parent-agency responsibility.

7. Unresolved possibility of dual employment

In an important reservation, the panel noted that neither the District Court nor the parties addressed whether both the Board and the USMS could be deemed Trently’s employers for § 481(a) purposes, citing Nagle v. TrueBlue, Inc., 148 A.3d 946, 952-53, 956-61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). The panel expressly did not decide this, but its citation signals that on remand the Government may argue (or the court may consider) a dual-employer framework rather than an either/or determination.

8. Standards of review (procedural framework)

The court cited Nunez v. Wolf, 117 F.4th 137, 145 (3d Cir. 2024) for the plenary review standard on summary judgment—viewing facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Although not a substantive tort precedent, it informed the panel’s insistence that competing inferences about control must be resolved by a factfinder.

9. Dissent’s authorities: “time of the negligent act” and dual masters

Judge Matey would have affirmed, emphasizing that control should be assessed “at the time of the negligent act” (quoting McConnell v. Williams, and citing Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 1991)). The dissent also highlighted the dual-servant principle from McConnell v. Williams and cited Tyson v. Litwin Corp., 826 F.2d 1255, 1258 (3d Cir. 1987), suggesting a person can serve two masters for different acts without abandoning service to the other—implying the MOU’s general state employment context did not negate USMS control over the particular operation.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. Identify the dispositive legal test: Under JFC Temps, borrowed-servant status turns on the right to control the manner of performance.
  2. Apply the jury-question rule: Under McConnell, if the evidence supports competing inferences as to control, the issue is for the jury.
  3. Determine whether the record is one-sided or genuinely disputed: The panel acknowledged strong indicia of USMS control (task force “direction and coordination,” oath to execute USMS lawful orders, SOP governance, and a USMS supervisor/coordinator). But it found substantial evidence supporting Board control as well—particularly where:
    • deputization terms stated the appointment “does not constitute employment” by USMS;
    • the MOU preserved that each member agency “retains responsibility for the conduct of its personnel”;
    • the Board provided training and essential equipment (including the firearm);
    • the Board retained and exercised authority to remove Trently from task-force operations;
    • SOP provisions repeatedly required adherence to parent-agency rules (including firearms and deadly force policies), parent-agency approval for travel, and parent-agency internal investigations;
    • Trently testified that Board policy controlled when it conflicted with USMS SOPs, and he described an incident where he refused a USMS supervisor’s operational order based on Board policy and the supervisor acquiesced.
    Because a reasonable factfinder could conclude the Board retained meaningful operational control (even during the task-force mission), summary judgment on borrowed-servant immunity was improper.

Notably, the panel did not decide whether the Government could prevail on other defenses (e.g., the FTCA “discretionary function” exception or comparative fault), expressly leaving those issues open on remand.

C. Impact

Although designated Not Precedential, the decision has practical significance for FTCA litigation involving multi-agency task forces, especially where state or local officers are federally deputized:

  • Heightened evidentiary focus on operational control: Government defendants seeking § 481(a) immunity under a borrowed-servant theory should expect courts to scrutinize not only task-force command structures, but also parent-agency training, equipment, discipline/removal authority, and “policy supremacy” rules governing conflicts.
  • Task-force documents can cut both ways: SOPs and MOUs that preserve parent-agency policies (firearms rules, internal discipline, travel approval) may undermine a clean borrowed-servant narrative by showing the borrowing entity did not control the “manner” of work in all relevant respects.
  • More cases likely to reach a jury (or settlement pressure increases): Where the record supports competing inferences on control, summary judgment may be difficult, increasing litigation costs and encouraging earlier resolution.
  • Dual-employer theories may rise in importance: The court’s reference to Nagle v. TrueBlue, Inc. signals that parties may pivot to arguing that both entities qualify as employers for exclusivity purposes, potentially broadening immunity arguments but also complicating proof.
  • Drafting implications for interagency agreements: Agreements that explicitly reassign (or disclaim) command authority—like the one described in Garden City v. Herrera—may materially affect the borrowed-servant analysis. Ambiguous “coordination” language coupled with preserved parent-agency control may not suffice for early dispositive relief.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

FTCA substitution
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, when a federal employee is sued for negligence for conduct within the scope of federal employment, the United States may be substituted as the defendant, and the case proceeds (if allowed) against the Government under the FTCA.
Workers’ compensation exclusivity (77 Pa. Stat. § 481(a))
Pennsylvania generally makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy against an “employer” for workplace injuries—meaning the employee typically cannot also sue the employer in tort for negligence.
Borrowed servant / borrowed employee doctrine
An employee of one entity may be treated as the employee of another entity for liability/immunity purposes if that other entity has the right to control the manner in which the employee performs the work.
“Right to control” vs. “actual control”
Courts focus primarily on who had the legal/contractual and practical authority to direct how the work is performed, not merely who benefited from the work or who generally coordinated the project.
Summary judgment
A court may decide a case without trial only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact. If reasonable jurors could interpret the evidence differently on a key issue (here, control), summary judgment is improper.

V. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision underscores a central Pennsylvania principle: borrowed-servant status—and the powerful immunity it can trigger under workers’ compensation exclusivity—often turns on a fact-intensive inquiry into the right to control the manner of work. Even in federally coordinated task-force operations with federal SOPs and supervision, summary judgment is inappropriate where the record supports a reasonable inference that the officer’s parent agency retained substantial operational authority through training, equipment, disciplinary control, and overriding policies.

On remand, the Government may still press alternative FTCA defenses, and the parties may confront the unresolved question—flagged but not decided—whether Trently could have had two employers for § 481(a) purposes. The immediate takeaway is procedural but consequential: where control evidence is genuinely mixed, the borrowed-servant question belongs to the factfinder.