Date: Feb 15, 2026

Body-/Dash-Cam Evidence May Defeat Implausible Pleadings at the Motion-to-Dismiss Stage; Selective-Prosecution Requires a Comparator and Swierkiewicz Does Not Excuse It

1. Introduction

In Dakarai Larriett v. Mich. Dep't of State Police (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a civil-rights suit arising from a late-night traffic stop that escalated into field sobriety testing, arrest for suspected impaired driving, a hospital blood draw, and subsequent detention at the county jail. The plaintiff, Dakarai Larriett—a gay Black man—alleged that Michigan State Troopers George Michael Kanyuh and Matthew Okaiye, and the Michigan Department of State Police, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and committed related state-law torts. He further alleged discriminatory treatment based on race and sexual orientation.

The appeal presented recurring pleading-stage questions in police-misconduct litigation: (i) when courts may credit body-/dash-cam video over allegations; (ii) whether qualified immunity can be resolved on a motion to dismiss; (iii) what must be pleaded to state a selective-prosecution claim; and (iv) sovereign-immunity limits on claims against a state agency and officers in their official capacities.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed across the board. It held that:

At the pleading stage, the court may consider body-/dash-cam video that is central to the complaint, and may reject allegations that are blatantly contradicted by clear video evidence.
The Michigan Department of State Police is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from §§ 1981 and 1983 damages claims, and official-capacity claims were properly dismissed with prejudice where the plaintiff neither sought injunctive relief nor moved to amend.
The officers had probable cause for the traffic stop (a red-light violation), reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for sobriety testing, and probable cause to arrest for operating while intoxicated under Michigan law.
The selective-prosecution (Equal Protection) claim failed because the complaint did not allege that similarly situated persons outside the protected category were not prosecuted (a comparator requirement).
The § 1981 claim failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination that abridged a right protected by § 1981(a), particularly given the court’s conclusions about probable cause and the absence of plausible discriminatory intent.
With federal claims dismissed, the district court acted within its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Pleading-stage record and use of video

Guertin v. Michigan: The court began with the standard rule that well-pled allegations are credited on a motion to dismiss, setting the baseline that video can displace allegations only in limited circumstances.
Saalim v. Walmart, Inc. and Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n: These cases defined what materials may be considered on a motion to dismiss (pleadings, attachments, central documents, public records), and rejected efforts to add new factual allegations via an opposition brief or exhibits. The panel used them to disregard new allegations contained only in Larriett’s later-filed affidavit.
Bell v. City of Southfield (relying on Scott v. Harris): The governing rule for video at the pleading stage: courts may rely on video evidence only to the extent it is clear and blatantly contradicts or utterly discredits the plaintiff’s version. This was central to rejecting allegations that the stop lacked a traffic violation and that officers said “drugs” (planning to plant them) rather than “straws.”
Lee v. Russ and Eastep v. City of Nashville: These cases limited the use of video where it is susceptible to multiple interpretations or contains gaps/uncertainties; the panel invoked them to explain why it credited Larriett’s account only as to the portion with audio omissions (Okaiye’s conversation with the passenger).
Chappell v. Woods: Used to reject conclusory “tampering” claims where time stamps show continuity and there is no visible evidence of manipulation beyond privacy redactions.

B. Eleventh Amendment / official-capacity doctrine and preservation

S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper and Lavrack v. City of Oak Park: These authorities supplied the rule that state agencies (including the Michigan Department of State Police) are immune absent waiver, abrogation, or a properly pleaded Ex parte Young-type claim for prospective relief.
Freeman v. Michigan Dep't of State and Harrison v. Michigan: Cited for the propositions that the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1981 suits against a state and that § 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that Michigan has not consented to suit in federal court for these claims.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Strand: The court relied on this preservation rule to refuse new appellate theories (here, a belated attempt to recast the case as supporting injunctive relief).
Spadafore v. Gardner: Supported dismissal with prejudice where the plaintiff did not move for leave to amend or submit a proposed amendment.

C. § 1983 elements, qualified immunity, and appellate standards

West v. Atkins: Provided the baseline elements for a § 1983 claim: violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.
Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., Wesley v. Campbell, and Jackson v. Schultz: These framed when qualified immunity can be resolved at the pleading stage—only if no violation of a clearly established right could be found under any facts consistent with the pleadings.
Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor: Cited for de novo review of dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds.

D. Fourth Amendment: stop, extension, arrest/detention, and testing

United States v. Copeland and Whren v. United States: Whren supplied the core rule that probable cause of a traffic violation justifies a stop; Copeland framed the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis for traffic stops.
United States v. Ellis, Green v. Throckmorton, and United States v. Perez: These cases set the reasonable-suspicion standard for prolonging a stop for sobriety testing and the “totality of the circumstances” approach, including how individually innocent factors can collectively support suspicion.
Miller v. Sanilac Cnty.: Used twice: (i) to explain that negative later test results can call an officer’s credibility into question in some circumstances, but (ii) also to reaffirm that later exculpatory results do not automatically vitiate probable cause formed from contemporaneous observations.
Akima v. Peca and Hartman v. Thompson: Provided the probable-cause standard for warrantless arrests and emphasized objective evaluation of facts known to the officer.
Kinlin v. Kline: Supported the conclusion that the observed indicia of impairment, viewed in totality, sufficed for probable cause in an OWI-type arrest.
Jones v. Clark Cnty. (noting abrogation on other grounds by Thompson v. Clark): Recognized that continued detention without probable cause can violate the Fourth Amendment.
Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't: Cited for the proposition that drug/alcohol tests constitute Fourth Amendment searches.

E. Equal Protection selective prosecution and pleading

Stemler v. City of Florence: Supplied the selective-prosecution elements and, critically, the “absolute requirement” of a prima facie showing that similarly situated persons outside the protected category were not prosecuted.
Daubenmire v. City of Columbus: Reinforced dismissal where a complaint fails to allege the comparator component of selective prosecution.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, and Keys v. Humana, Inc.: The court distinguished these employment-discrimination pleading principles and rejected their transposition to selective-prosecution claims.

F. § 1981 framework and plausibility

Amini v. Oberlin Coll.: Provided the elements of a § 1981 claim (membership in a protected class, intent, and abridgment of a right enumerated in § 1981(a)).
Willie McCormick & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Detroit: Used to emphasize that § 1981’s requirements mirror equal-protection concepts (particularly intent).
Cunningham v. Sisk: Noted (without adopting as a broad holding) that some circuits treat racially motivated arrests/searches without probable cause as implicating § 1981(a)’s “equal benefits” and “like punishments” clauses; the panel then distinguished the case because probable cause existed here.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Supplied the plausibility framework—courts need not accept conclusory inferences (e.g., discrimination) where factual allegations do not support a reasonable inference.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s threshold move: cabining the pleadings and crediting clear video

The panel first decided what facts it could consider. Under Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, Larriett could not expand his complaint by adding new factual allegations in an opposition affidavit—so allegations of additional discriminatory remarks not pleaded in the complaint were excluded. The court then treated the body-/dash-cam footage as properly considered because the complaint “implicitly relie[d]” on it, and because both parties asked the district court to consider it.

The key doctrinal move was the Bell v. City of Southfield/Scott v. Harris principle: where video clearly contradicts the complaint, the complaint’s contrary allegations become implausible. The panel rejected generalized “tampering” concerns as conclusory and, aside from acknowledged audio gaps in one conversation, treated the video depiction as controlling for the dispositive facts.

B. Official-capacity and state-agency claims: immunity plus waiver/abrogation limits

Turning to the Michigan Department of State Police and the officers in their official capacities, the court applied the Eleventh Amendment framework: absent waiver, congressional abrogation, or a properly pleaded claim for prospective relief, a state agency cannot be sued for damages in federal court. Relying on Freeman v. Michigan Dep't of State and Harrison v. Michigan, the panel held that neither § 1981 nor § 1983 abrogates immunity, and Michigan has not consented to suit.

Larriett’s appellate pivot toward injunctive relief failed procedurally: he did not plead it, did not request it below, and did not move to amend. Under Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Strand and Spadafore v. Gardner, the court refused to entertain new appellate theories or a retroactive request for amendment.

C. Fourth Amendment: three steps, three standards

Stop: Under Whren v. United States, a traffic violation supplies probable cause for a stop regardless of subjective motive. The dash-cam showed a red-light violation, so the stop was lawful.
Extension for sobriety testing: Under United States v. Ellis and Green v. Throckmorton, the question is whether specific, articulable facts created reasonable suspicion of impairment. The panel emphasized the “totality” approach from United States v. Perez. It found reasonable suspicion based on: late-night violation; the trooper’s claimed detection of a “fruity” odor; and, importantly, Larriett’s apparent inconsistent answer about recent alcohol use (initially “at least two hours,” later “no alcohol”). Unlike Green, where suspicion depended heavily on an officer’s credibility later undercut by negative testing, the panel treated Larriett’s seeming admission-and-recant as an objective fact supporting suspicion.
Arrest and detention/testing: Under Akima v. Peca/Hartman v. Thompson, probable cause turns on whether a reasonable officer would believe an offense occurred. The panel credited multiple contemporaneous indicators (countdown failure, divided attention, tracking issues, blinking, recanting statements, and the traffic violation). It further invoked Miller v. Sanilac Cnty. for the point that later negative test results do not retroactively eliminate probable cause formed at the scene. As to the blood draw, the court noted Michigan’s implied-consent consequences and emphasized that the videos showed Larriett was repeatedly informed he would still face a “detox window” regardless of results.

D. Fourteenth Amendment selective prosecution: comparator requirement as a pleading gate

The panel applied Stemler v. City of Florence to require a prima facie allegation that similarly situated persons outside the protected group were not prosecuted. Because Larriett alleged no such comparator facts, the claim failed as a matter of pleading, consistent with Daubenmire v. City of Columbus.

The court rejected reliance on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. (and Sixth Circuit employment-discrimination pleading cases like Keys v. Humana, Inc.), distinguishing selective prosecution from Title VII-style pleading frameworks.

E. § 1981: no contract nexus, no plausible intent, and probable cause defeats the “absence of cause” theory

Applying Amini v. Oberlin Coll., the panel found the complaint deficient on (at least) intent and abridgment of a § 1981(a) right. Larriett framed the case partly as interference with “making and enforcement of contracts,” but the factual narrative was a traffic stop and arrest. The court acknowledged Cunningham v. Sisk’s observation that some circuits treat racially motivated arrests/searches without probable cause as implicating § 1981(a)’s “equal benefit” and “like punishments” clauses; but because the panel concluded there was probable cause at each relevant stage, that path did not help.

On intent, the panel relied on Ashcroft v. Iqbal to hold that an inference of race-motivated enforcement was not plausible on the pleaded facts—especially because Larriett did not plausibly allege the officers knew his race at the moment they decided to stop him (they were behind his vehicle and occupants were not visible).

3.3 Impact

Video-first pleading discipline in police-misconduct cases: Although unpublished, the opinion reinforces that Sixth Circuit panels will use clear body-/dash-cam footage to screen out allegations that conflict with what the video plainly shows, even at the motion-to-dismiss stage—so long as the video is central to the claims and there is no concrete basis to infer tampering.
Selective-prosecution claims face an early comparator hurdle: The opinion underscores that, in this circuit, selective prosecution/enforcement claims are not “notice pleading” in the same manner as employment-discrimination complaints under Swierkiewicz; failure to plead comparator facts remains fatal.
Probable cause remains a powerful cross-claim defense: By resolving stop, extension, and arrest on probable cause/reasonable suspicion, the decision illustrates how Fourth Amendment determinations can indirectly collapse § 1981 and equal-protection theories premised on “pretextual” or “baseless” enforcement.
Official-capacity/injunctive relief must be litigated intentionally: Plaintiffs who might seek prospective relief must plead it and preserve it; appellate reframing is unlikely to succeed without a motion to amend and a proposed amendment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard: whether a reasonable officer would believe a crime occurred based on facts known at the time. It does not require certainty.
Reasonable suspicion: A lower standard than probable cause. Officers need specific, articulable facts suggesting wrongdoing to extend a stop (e.g., for field sobriety tests). Courts evaluate the “totality of the circumstances,” not any single fact in isolation.
Qualified immunity: A defense for government officials sued personally under § 1983. If there is no constitutional violation (or the law was not clearly established), the official is immune. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, immunity can be granted only when no set of consistent facts could show a violation of clearly established law.
Eleventh Amendment / sovereign immunity: States and state agencies generally cannot be sued for damages in federal court unless the state consents or Congress unmistakably removes that immunity. Suits against officers in their “official capacity” are usually treated as suits against the state itself.
Selective prosecution (Equal Protection): A claim that the government targeted someone for prosecution because of membership in a protected group. In the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that similarly situated people outside the group were not prosecuted (a “comparator”).
§ 1981: A federal statute guaranteeing racial equality in specified civil rights (including contractual rights and “equal benefit” of laws). It does not cover sexual-orientation discrimination, and it requires intentional racial discrimination.
Implied consent: Under Michigan law, drivers are deemed to have consented to chemical testing after certain arrests, with administrative penalties for refusal (e.g., license suspension and points). This does not eliminate the Fourth Amendment, but it shapes the legal consequences and the analysis of refusal.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a familiar but increasingly important modern framework: when a complaint is intertwined with body-/dash-cam footage, clear video can render contrary allegations implausible even at the pleading stage. Substantively, the court applied established Fourth Amendment doctrines to hold the stop, the prolonged detention for sobriety testing, and the arrest were supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Doctrinally, it tightened the pleading consequences for discrimination-based policing claims: selective-prosecution theories still require comparator allegations, and § 1981 claims require plausible facts supporting intentional race discrimination tied to a protected § 1981(a) interest. Finally, the opinion reiterates the procedural rigor surrounding Eleventh Amendment immunity and the need to plead and preserve prospective relief if a plaintiff intends to avoid dismissal of official-capacity claims.