BLBA “Year” Defined by 125 Working Days, Not a 365-Day Employment Relationship (20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32))

1. Introduction

Anita Baldwin v. DOWCP (Fourth Circuit, Mar. 19, 2026) addresses a recurring, outcome-determinative question in Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”) litigation: how to calculate a “year” of coal mine employment for purposes of the Act’s evidentiary presumptions—most importantly, the fifteen-year presumption in 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).

The petitioner, Anita Baldwin, pursued benefits on behalf of her late husband, miner Eddie D. Baldwin. The respondents included the Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (DOWCP) and the miner’s employer, Island Creek Kentucky Mining (and affiliated entities). The dispute did not center on whether Baldwin had worked for Island Creek for many years—he had—but on whether certain “partial years” (in which he was laid off for periods) could count as full “years” toward the fifteen-year threshold.

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and the Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) required proof of a 365-day employment relationship for each credited year, then examined whether at least 125 working days occurred within that year-long relationship. Petitioner argued the regulation instead credits a year whenever the miner works 125 working days within a one-year period, without a separate 365-day relationship requirement—an approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc..

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BRB’s order, and remanded. It held that 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32) unambiguously defines a “year” of coal mine employment as satisfied when a miner works at least 125 working days in or around a coal mine during a calendar year (or partial periods totaling one year). The regulation does not impose a threshold requirement that the miner maintain a 365-day employment relationship with an operator.

Because the text was unambiguous, the court declined to defer to DOWCP’s contrary interpretation under Kisor v. Wilkie. On remand, the ALJ must make findings as to Baldwin’s actual “working days” within relevant one-year periods, then determine whether Baldwin reached fifteen years and, if so, whether Island Creek rebutted the § 921(c)(4) presumption.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. BLBA framework and the fifteen-year presumption

  • Island Creek Coal Co. v. Blankenship — cited for the basic BLBA entitlement elements and the adversarial administrative structure; it anchors the court’s explanation of how presumptions fit into the miner’s burden-shifting pathway.
  • Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling (quoting Broyles v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs) — used to justify Congress’s use of evidentiary presumptions because pneumonoconiosis causation is “difficult to determine.” This supports reading implementing regulations in a way that does not add extra hurdles.
  • Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. Owens — cited for the proposition that once fifteen years and total disability are shown, a rebuttable presumption arises that the miner is totally disabled due to pneumonoconiosis.
  • W. Virginia CWP Fund v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs — cited for the burden shift to the employer to rebut the presumption.
  • W. Virginia CWP Fund v. Bender — cited for the statutory history (enacted, repealed, revived) of the fifteen-year presumption; it underscores that Congress knowingly returned to a claimant-favorable presumption model.

B. Fourth Circuit cases invoked to defend the “365-day employment relationship” requirement

  • Armco Inc. v Martin — central to the BRB majority’s rationale. The Fourth Circuit distinguished it as addressing predecessor regulations (20 C.F.R. § 718.301(b)(2000) and 20 C.F.R. § 725.493(b) (2000)) defining “year of employment” and “regular employment,” not the unified definition in § 725.101(a)(32). The court treated Armco’s discussion of the newer regulation as non-binding and emphasized that the current text materially changed.
  • Daniels v. Mitchell — similarly relied upon below. The court again confined Daniels to the predecessor regime and highlighted Daniels’s own acknowledgement that § 725.101(a)(32) was “inapplicable” there, while noting Daniels recognized that § 725.101(a)(32)(iii) can apply when employment “lasted less than one year.”
  • United States v. Horsley — supplied the Fourth Circuit’s definition of dicta (“could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations”), supporting the court’s decision not to treat Armco’s aside about § 725.101(a)(32) as controlling.

C. The Sixth Circuit’s decisive interpretive precedent

  • Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc. — the Fourth Circuit expressly joined the Sixth Circuit as the only appellate court “to have definitively ruled” on the revised regulation. Shepherd’s reading—125 working days in a one-year period establishes a year—became the Fourth Circuit’s rule.

D. Administrative-law deference and interpretive methodology

  • Kisor v. Wilkie — framed the deference dispute. The court followed Kisor’s first step: use “all the standard tools of interpretation” to determine whether the regulation is genuinely ambiguous. Finding it unambiguous, the court stopped—no Auer/Kisor deference.
  • Auer v. Robbins — referenced as the doctrinal source of deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation (as narrowed by Kisor).
  • Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. — referenced (via Kisor) for the instruction that courts must interpret as if “no agency to fall back on.”
  • Mohamed v. Bank of Am. N.A. — cited for starting with plain language.
  • United States v. Boler — cited for reading regulatory text in context and within the overall scheme.
  • Black & Decker Corp. v. Comm'r (quoting Hart v. McLucas) — cited for avoiding constructions that render provisions superfluous.

E. Preambles versus binding regulatory text

  • Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland — supplied the principle that if a preamble conflicts with the regulation, the regulation controls; a preamble cannot “require more.”
  • Peabody Twentymile Mining, LLC v. Sec'y of Lab. — cited similarly: preambles may inform but cannot conflict with operative text.

F. Remedial construction of the BLBA

  • Gulf & W. Indus. v. Ling (citing Doris Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs) — invoked for the court’s consistent reluctance to “unduly circumscribe” entitlement.
  • Charles v. Gale Coal Co. — cited for the understanding that BLBA presumptions are designed so medical proof difficulties do not defeat deserving claims.

G. Circuit split background (predecessor regulations)

  • Landes v. OWCP and Yauk v. Director, OWCP — noted to illustrate that even under older rules some circuits equated 125 days with a year, providing historical context for why DOL’s later unified definition mattered.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s textual holding: two elements, not two steps

The court read § 725.101(a)(32) as containing two elements: (1) a one-year period (calendar year or partial periods totaling one year) and (2) at least 125 “working days” within that period. Crucially, it found no textual hook for a separate, threshold “employment relationship” lasting 365 days.

B. Subsections (i)–(iii) confirm the 125-day rule

  • § 725.101(a)(32)(i): expressly states that if the evidence establishes 125 working days during the relevant one-year period, “then the miner has worked one year in coal mine employment for all purposes under the Act.” The court treated this as decisive and inconsistent with a 365-day relationship prerequisite. The subsection’s fractional year clause (ratio to 125) further reinforced that 125—not 365—is the operative measure.
  • § 725.101(a)(32)(ii): creates a presumption that if employment lasted for a calendar year (or partial periods totaling 365 days), the miner is presumed to have at least 125 working days. The court reasoned that under respondents’ “365-day first” approach, (ii) would largely swallow the rule—rendering the 125-day inquiry redundant—contrary to anti-superfluity principles.
  • § 725.101(a)(32)(iii): provides a discretionary earnings-based formula where dates are uncertain or where employment “lasted less than a calendar year.” The court found this incompatible with a categorical “must have a year-long relationship” requirement, because the subsection contemplates crediting work histories that do not align with a continuous calendar-year employment relationship.

C. Rejecting “textual clues” and preamble-driven requirements

Respondents relied on implications drawn from references to leap years, counting approved absences, and “partial periods totaling one year,” plus language in the regulatory preamble. The court rejected these arguments as insufficient to add a substantive eligibility threshold absent from the regulatory text, and reiterated (via Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland) that preambles cannot impose requirements not found in the regulation itself.

D. Kisor deference denied at step one

Because the court found § 725.101(a)(32) unambiguous after examining text, structure, history, and purpose, it did not defer to DOWCP under Kisor v. Wilkie. The court emphasized Kisor’s instruction: if there is “only one reasonable construction,” courts have “no business deferring.”

E. Distinguishing Armco and Daniels

The BRB majority treated Armco Inc. v Martin and Daniels v. Mitchell as establishing a two-step approach in the Fourth Circuit. The court narrowed both decisions to their predecessor-regulation context and treated their statements about the revised regulation as non-binding, emphasizing the revised regulation’s intentional shift away from “year of employment” and “regular employment” terminology.

F. Remedial purpose and practical realism: exposure days matter

The court’s purposive analysis aligned with the BLBA’s remedial thrust: black lung disease turns on dust exposure, not payroll formalities. It also flagged the risk of “perverse incentives” if operators could evade accrual by timing layoffs just shy of 365 days (while noting no evidence Island Creek did so).

3.3. Impact

A. Immediate procedural effect: recalculation and remand duties

The decision requires ALJs in the Fourth Circuit to focus on working-day counts within discrete one-year periods when evaluating § 921(c)(4) eligibility. Here, the ALJ had computed partial years as fractions of a 365-day year without finding the number of “working days” in those periods; that methodology is now legally erroneous.

B. Substantive effect: broader access to the fifteen-year presumption

Many miners’ work histories include layoffs, seasonal work, or intermittent employment. By rejecting a rigid “year-long relationship” prerequisite, the Fourth Circuit’s rule likely increases the number of claimants who can invoke § 921(c)(4), shifting more cases into a posture where the operator must affirmatively rebut entitlement.

C. Doctrinal effect: Fourth Circuit alignment with Shepherd

By expressly joining Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc., the Fourth Circuit reduces inter-circuit inconsistency on the revised regulation’s meaning and undercuts BRB reliance on older Fourth Circuit responsible-operator cases to justify a 365-day threshold under § 725.101(a)(32).

D. Potential spillover: “for all purposes under the Act”

Although litigated here in the § 921(c)(4) context, § 725.101(a)(32)(i) states its definition applies “for all purposes under the Act.” Parties may attempt to extend the decision’s logic to other BLBA contexts where “years” of coal mine employment matter, even if the precise downstream implications will depend on the specific statutory/regulatory question presented.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Fifteen-year presumption (30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)): If a miner has at least fifteen years of qualifying coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory impairment, the law presumes pneumonoconiosis causation/entitlement elements—unless the employer rebuts it.
  • “Working day”: Under § 725.101(a)(32), any day (or part of a day) paid for work as a miner; excludes paid approved absences (vacation/sick leave) as “working days,” though those absences may still count toward the surrounding one-year period.
  • “Calendar year or partial periods totaling one year”: The one-year window can be Jan–Dec, or it can be any consecutive 365/366-day span formed by partial segments of adjacent calendar years; the key is that the 125 working days must fall within that one-year window.
  • Kisor/Auer deference: Courts sometimes defer to an agency’s reading of its own ambiguous regulation, but only after the court determines the text is genuinely ambiguous using ordinary interpretive tools. Here, the court found no ambiguity, so no deference applied.
  • Preamble vs. regulation: Explanatory material accompanying a final rule may help interpret unclear text, but it cannot add binding requirements that the regulation’s operative language does not contain.

5. Conclusion

Anita Baldwin v. DOWCPC establishes a clear Fourth Circuit rule: under 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32), a miner earns one “year” of coal mine employment by showing 125 working days within a one-year period; a separate 365-day employment relationship is not required. The decision (1) aligns the Fourth Circuit with Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc., (2) limits reliance on older Fourth Circuit decisions interpreting superseded “year of employment/regular employment” regulations, (3) rejects preamble-based additions to regulatory text, and (4) reinforces the BLBA’s remedial purpose by centering entitlement accounting on actual exposure-related workdays.