Introduction
In United States v. Donald Parr, the Eleventh Circuit held that its existing precedent foreclosed an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute generally prohibiting people convicted of felonies from possessing firearms. The unpublished, per curiam opinion did not independently decide whether historical tradition permits the permanent disarmament of every nonviolent felon. Instead, it concluded that the circuit’s prior decisions already resolved the issue and remained binding.
Local officers arrested Donald Patrick Parr on an outstanding warrant and found a pistol while searching his truck. Because Parr had prior felony convictions, the government charged him under § 922(g)(1). It also alleged that he qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Parr moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him because his criminal history—consisting mostly of drug offenses—did not demonstrate that he posed a clear threat of physical violence. The district court denied the motion. A jury convicted Parr and found that he had committed three prior felony offenses on different occasions. The district court sentenced the 69-year-old Parr to 235 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to a Florida sentence he was already serving.
On appeal, the central issue was whether developments in Supreme Court Second Amendment law—particularly N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, United States v. Rahimi, and United States v. Hemani—allowed Parr to pursue an individualized challenge to § 922(g)(1).
Analysis
The Controlling Rule
The opinion’s practical rule is that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a person convicted of a felony cannot avoid § 922(g)(1) through an as-applied argument that his prior offenses were mostly nonviolent or that he does not presently pose a clear threat of violence. Unless the Supreme Court or the en banc Eleventh Circuit changes the governing law, panels remain bound by Rozier and Dubois III.
The decision is therefore principally an application of vertical and horizontal precedent rather than a fresh historical examination under Bruen. The panel did not decide whether Parr’s proposed “dangerousness” limitation was persuasive as an original matter; it held that an ordinary three-judge panel lacked authority to adopt it.
Precedents Cited
Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis
Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis supplies the standard for summary disposition. Summary affirmance is appropriate when one party’s position is “clearly right as a matter of law” and there can be no substantial question about the result. Because binding precedent rejected Parr’s legal theory, the court concluded that full merits proceedings were unnecessary.
Bonner v. City of Prichard
The court cited Bonner v. City of Prichard to explain why Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, a former Fifth Circuit decision issued before October 1, 1981, remains binding in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner adopted those former Fifth Circuit decisions as Eleventh Circuit precedent.
United States v. Gruezo
United States v. Gruezo establishes de novo review for a statute’s constitutionality. De novo review ordinarily permits the appellate court to consider the legal question without deference to the district court. It does not, however, permit a panel to disregard binding circuit precedent.
District of Columbia v. Heller
District of Columbia v. Heller recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms and invalidated the District of Columbia’s handgun ban. At the same time, Heller cautioned that the right is “not unlimited” and identified longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons and people with mental illness as “presumptively lawful.”
That language forms the doctrinal foundation for the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of § 922(g)(1). Although the statement was not the direct holding concerning the handgun ban, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently treated it as authoritative guidance supporting felon-disarmament laws.
United States v. Rozier
United States v. Rozier is the central controlling precedent. The defendant there argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied because he possessed a firearm for self-defense in his home. Relying on Heller, the Eleventh Circuit held that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing firearms “under any and all circumstances” do not violate the Second Amendment. It regarded the defendant’s self-defense purpose as irrelevant.
Parr’s argument differed factually—he focused on the predominantly nonviolent nature of his criminal history—but the panel viewed Rozier as establishing a categorical rule broad enough to foreclose that distinction.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen rejected interest-balancing approaches to Second Amendment claims and adopted a text-and-history framework. Once the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct at issue, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Parr relied on this framework to argue that permanent disarmament should be limited to people who pose a clear threat of violence. But Bruen repeatedly described the protected right by reference to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” The Eleventh Circuit had already concluded that this language did not clearly overrule Rozier.
United States v. Dubois (Dubois I)
In United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), the Eleventh Circuit held that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier. The court emphasized Bruen’s references to “law-abiding, responsible citizens” and stated that clearer Supreme Court instruction would be required before the circuit could reconsider § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality.
Dubois v. United States (Dubois II)
In Dubois v. United States (Dubois II), the Supreme Court vacated Dubois I and remanded it for reconsideration after United States v. Rahimi. A vacatur removes the precedential force of the vacated judgment, requiring the lower court to reconsider the matter in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision.
United States v. Rahimi
United States v. Rahimi upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which disarms certain people subject to domestic-violence restraining orders. The Supreme Court found sufficient historical support for temporarily disarming a person judicially found to present a credible threat to another’s safety.
Parr invoked Rahimi to support a dangerousness-based approach. The Eleventh Circuit, however, stressed that Rahimi reiterated Heller’s statement that prohibitions on firearm possession by felons are presumptively lawful. Thus, rather than undermining Rozier, Rahimi was understood to reinforce it.
United States v. Dubois (Dubois III)
On remand, United States v. Dubois (Dubois III) reinstated the circuit’s earlier decision. It held that Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier, particularly because the Supreme Court’s only discussion of felons repeated the presumption that felon-disarmament laws are lawful.
Dubois III directly controlled Parr’s appeal. It established that both Bruen and Rahimi leave Rozier intact within the Eleventh Circuit.
United States v. Hemani
United States v. Hemani held that prosecuting the defendant under § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm in his home while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance violated the Second Amendment. Its relevance to Parr was limited by the Supreme Court’s express statement that it was not addressing § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession provision.
The Eleventh Circuit therefore declined to treat Hemani as an intervening decision that clearly displaced Rozier or Dubois III. A ruling concerning one subsection of § 922(g) does not necessarily resolve the constitutionality of another subsection directed at a different class of people.
United States v. White
United States v. White states the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule. A panel must follow an earlier panel’s holding unless it is overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court. It is insufficient for the later panel to believe that the earlier decision was wrongly reasoned or inconsistent with broader doctrinal developments.
Potential Impact
The opinion reinforces the substantial difficulty of bringing individualized Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Eleventh Circuit. Claims based on the nonviolent character of a felony, the passage of time, advanced age, rehabilitation, self-defense, or an asserted lack of present dangerousness remain foreclosed at the panel level under Rozier and Dubois III.
The decision also illustrates the importance of the prior-panel-precedent rule after major Supreme Court doctrinal changes. A Supreme Court decision does not abrogate circuit precedent merely because its reasoning creates tension with the earlier case. The intervening decision must be clearly inconsistent with, or directly undermine, the circuit precedent.
At the same time, the opinion leaves several broader questions unresolved. It does not independently examine historical laws governing the disarmament of nonviolent felons, determine whether all felons fall outside “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, or decide whether dangerousness is constitutionally required. Those questions could be revisited only through an en banc Eleventh Circuit decision or a controlling Supreme Court ruling directly addressing § 922(g)(1).
Because the opinion is marked “Not for Publication,” its independent precedential force may be limited under circuit rules. Its significance lies primarily in confirming how existing published precedent applies after Hemani.